Securing the State

Reforming the National Security Decisionmaking Process at the Civil-Military Nexus

Christopher P. Gibson

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• eBook ISBN: 9781317058144
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Focusing on top civilian and military advisors within the national security establishment, this significant book looks at four case studies with a focus on civil-military relations within the US Department of Defense. It investigates whether balanced approaches produce more effective policies and outcomes than dominating structures. The culmination of Gibson's treatise is the advancement of the 'Madisonian approach' to civilian control of the military, a normative framework designed to replace Samuel Huntington's 'Objective Control' model and also the 'Subjective Control' model, initially practised by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and most recently by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. The Madisonian approach calls for changes in US law and new norms to guide the interactions of key participants who populate the civil-military nexus. This book is destined to influence US strategic thinking and should be added to the syllabus of courses in civil-military relations, strategic studies and military history. Given the struggling US policy in Iraq, the time is right for a critical review of US civil-military relations and this book provides the departure point for analysis and a potential way forward.

Chapter 1 The Civil–Military Dynamic: A Relationship Adrift¹

DOI: 10.4324/9781315608068-1

1 The views expressed in this work are mine alone and are not those of the Army War College, Department of the Army, Department of Defense or any other governmental agency.

In recent years as the US has struggled to help the Iraqi government stabilize their country and address basic needs, there has been widespread and contentious domestic debate over what went wrong, who should be held accountable, and what course correction was needed to prevail.² Various writers have already offered a series of explanations and narratives.³ Among the reasons why the US has experienced such difficulty in Iraq have been core issues of civil–military relations.⁴

2 The Iraq war was the number 1 issue important to voters in the 2006 US election, according to exit polling data. See, for example CNN exit polling at http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2006/special/issues/. 3 See especially, Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, COBRA II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), and Bob Woodward, State of Denial: Bush at War, part III (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006). 4 The Iraq Study Group, comprised of 10 leading former statesmen of both parties, also came to this finding. Recommendation No. 46 of their report states, “The new Secretary of Defense should make every effort to build healthy civil–military relations, by creating an environment in which the senior military feel free to offer independent advice not only to the civilian leadership in the Pentagon but also to the President and the National Security Council, as envisioned in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation.” Report of the Iraq Study Group (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2006), p. 77.

Functional civil–military relations do not guarantee successful policy outcomes, but dysfunction in this critical area is sure to produce incomplete options and ineffective outcomes. This book will highlight the advantages of employing a more balanced approach to civil–military relations at the Pentagon. Different (although not necessarily new) thinking is necessary if the US is to reform its civil–military relations. The “Madisonian approach” is a call for top-level civilian and military leaders at the Pentagon to form a partnership to assist and advise the nation’s elected leaders as they execute their constitutional responsibilities to direct and control the military in pursuit of national security objectives and the common defense.

Indeed, behind America’s elected leaders stands the civil–military nexus – the top civilian and military advisers to the President and Congress who offer strategic analysis, develop options, and convey recommendations. This decision-support activity is critical to the process, and as will be shown, is not always effectively carried out. A balanced (vice dominating) approach would ensure that elected leaders have access to strategic analysis, options, and advice from both political appointees and the top general officers who represent the profession prior to making weighty decisions in national security-related matters.

In Chapter 3, it will be demonstrated that in the lead up to the Iraq war a dominating rather than balanced approach to US civil–military relations at the Pentagon contributed to the development of an incomplete war plan (specifically the under-development and under-resourcing of the post-hostilities phase). Indeed, that war planning proceeded with politically appointed advisor-dominated options and analysis. In fact, the tenures of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Joint Chiefs Chairman, General Richard Myers can be generally characterized as the domination of the latter by the former.⁵ The nation’s very highest ranking military officers, especially the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combatant Commander responsible for Iraq War planning, General Tommy Franks, were jointly culpable for this flawed process. Accountability on this score proceeds with precision in Chapter 3.

5 Rumsfeld’s dominance extended well beyond his relationship with General Myers and included among others, his interactions with CENTCOM Commander General Tommy Franks. This is clearly the conclusion of a series of books critical of the administration’s handling of the Iraq War, including those sources cited in Footnote 3, but interestingly, Rumsfeld’s actions in putting the military in their place, superimposing his views on the war planning process and transformation efforts at the Pentagon is also the central theme of Rowan Scarborough’s, Rumsfeld’s War (Washington, DC: Regnery Books, 2004), which by the author’s own description in the conclusion, is meant to be read as a very favorable endorsement of the Defense Secretary’s tenure. The same argument is made in this book in Chapter 3.

As it turns out, the US did not learn the lessons of history as this wasn’t the first time dominating methods of civilian control were practiced by political appointees at the Pentagon. Forty years earlier, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara employed similar strategies to achieve his agenda with not surprising negative impacts on policy effectiveness.⁶

6 H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1997), pp. 300–322.

Why didn’t the US learn from history? In part, it was a lack of imagination. The US does not have an effective normative construct or model from which to organize and arrange civil–military relations. Ultimately guidance for arranging the civil–military relationship should come from the nation’s elected leaders.⁷ Although it has been done in the past, the Secretary of Defense is not the right individual to issue formative guidance for the civil–military relationship because that person along with the nation’s top general officers is a servant or “agent” for the nation’s elected leadership, the President and Congress, who by constitutional design share the duty to lead and control the military. Along these lines, and contrary to what other scholars may assert, it is not appropriate for top generals to shape the relationship either.⁸ Subordinates can not arrange and categorize interactions.

7 Military leaders look to their civilian superiors for guidance as the relationship is forged. When explicit guidance on roles and expectations is not forthcoming, cues are sought. However reliance on cues increases the possibility of misunderstanding. The consequences of misinterpretation can be serious or at least a source of friction during early interactions. Much (although certainly not all) of this ambiguity and awkwardness could be lessened by the adoption of a framework or guide for interactions in the civil–military nexus at the outset of a new administration. 8 For another view see Richard H. Kohn, “The Huntington Challenge: Maximizing National Security and Civilian Control of the Military,” West Point Senior Conference Paper, June 2007. Kohn asserts that the military should take responsibility for shaping the civil–military dynamic.

Scholars could play an important role in helping elected leaders with foundational normative theory – a coherent and well developed set of structure and norms to guide key civil–military relationships. Presently elected leaders have a dearth of options to choose from when it comes to organizing their relationships with the national security establishment and they need more help. Therefore, this book is also a call to academia to generate more options, additional normative models.

The topic of civil–military relations has taken on greater saliency in the public discourse over the past year and as national leaders (including 2008 presidential candidates) grapple with developing their philosophy towards “civilian control of the military” and what exactly that would mean in practice a reasonable place to turn for advice would be the community of scholars who have devoted much of their professional life to studying these questions. As a professional soldier, I am not a full-time member of this scholarly community but I’ve admired the work produced by it over the years and believe it can bring to the debate well considered arguments if so focused. Towards that end, this book introduces the “Madisonian approach” for US civil–military relations to help stimulate the discussion. Reactions, corrections, criticisms and alternative proposals are welcomed and encouraged.

In the prevailing literature there are really only two fully developed options as it relates to arranging civil–military relationships: 1) subjective control, the type employed by McNamara and Rumsfeld, and 2) objective control, a method first advanced by Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington in the 1950s with great promise, but ultimately ridden with faulty assumptions about the nature of the civil–military nexus, where options are generated, analyzed, and then conveyed along with advice to elected leaders.⁹

9 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil–Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1957) and Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: The Free Press, initially published in 1960). Post-Cold War reprises were Richard H. Kohn, “The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today,” Naval War College Review (Summer 2002): 9–59, and Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New York: The Free Press, 2002), respectively.

Upon closer examination it will be revealed that objective control is really a false choice because it fails to provide insights on the preponderance of civil–military interaction – the nexus where top-level civil and military leaders share responsibilities of helping elected leaders with understanding the strategic environment and sorting through issues and options prior to making weighty decisions. This leaves subjective control as the only fully developed model. However, because micromanaging a profession with political appointees who generally have lesser practical experience could result in reduced levels of effectiveness, most presidents have eschewed the subjective control approach.

More often than not, Presidents have operated without an established method or normative civil–military relations construct and that has posed a different set of challenges.¹⁰ The confusion and ambiguity associated with this choice (no method) has contributed to criticisms at different times that one or both parties to the relationship has not performed their duties fully and effectively or that one side has overreached into the sphere of the other.¹¹ But without clearly established expectations and standards, without an agreed upon framework, what constitutes dereliction or inappropriate behavior? Such are the circumstances today with subjective control freshly repudiated; elected leaders are without a method to organize civil–military relations. Scholars must answer this calling with models that help shape solutions.

10 Some Presidents in the past have worked effectively with the military despite not having a conscious/established normative framework and the Madisonian Approach incorporates “best practices” from some of these positive examples. The larger point on the need for a conscious method is that while any relationship should be sufficiently flexible and practical to deal with unexpected developments, establishing clear expectations up front in the form of a model, agreement or framework helps guide the relationship, especially in times of crisis, and provides the foundation for accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness. 11 Richard H. Kohn, “Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil–Military Relations,” National Interest, No. 35 (Spring 1994): 3–31.

The Present Struggle

The US is engaged in a difficult struggle against a determined enemy who publicly declares his strategic aim the establishment of a caliphate in the Middle East and the ultimate destruction of the West.¹² Now, in concert with allies and friends the list of whom the US should be endeavoring to expand, America is involved in a wide ranging conflict that spans across the dimensions of power (including diplomatic, economic, informational, and military instruments) to stop al-Qaeda and other declared extremists – the aim is to win.¹³

12 William McCants, editor and project director, Militant Ideology Atlas. Report from the Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, November 2006. Paul Eedle, “Broadband Jihad Television: Filmmaker looks at the role of the internet and television in contemporary journalism,” London Financial Times, 6 November 2006. Michael Scheuer, “al-Qaeda Doctrine for International Political Warfare,” Terrorism Focus (31 October 2006), Vol. III, No. 42. 13 Books on strategy, particularly military strategy, abound. See for example, Thomas Philips, Roots of Strategy: A Collection of Military Classics, Vols. 1 and 2 (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1985). However, rare is it that a book on the practical contributions in the economic sphere of grand strategy is published. For an excellent recent account see, John Taylor, Global Financial Warriors (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007). In this work Taylor describes in detail how the US Government worked with other nations to freeze the financial assets of al-Qaeda in the months after the 9–11 attacks. When the 9–11 Commission Report was published in 2004 it cited these activities as the most successful counter-terrorist efforts to date.

Although this study is not about that topic directly, what is presented is very germane and foundational to that overall effort. It is about how the US prepares for conflict and take decisions that shape national security – at its core are questions of civil–military relations.

Civil–military relations is defined as the delineation of duties among top-level civilian and military leaders as found in existing US legal structure (provisions in the US Constitution and US statutes) and in the norms that guide behavior in view of how these leaders contribute individually and collectively to the national security decisionmaking process, and in all efforts to provide for the common defense. The foundation for US civil–military relations comes from the Constitution, which provides clear provisions for the relationship – simply put: elected leaders control the armed forces.

Article II bestows upon the President the powers of C...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of Figures and Tables
• Acknowledgments
• 1 The Civil–Military Dynamic: A Relationship Adrift
• 2 Excesses and Over-Corrections in US Civil–Military Relations since the Second World War and the Return of Donald Rumsfeld in 2001
• 3 The Search for Role Models
• 4 Normative Theory in Civil–Military Relations during the Cold War: The Objective Control and Subjective Control Models
• 5 The Search for New Normative Theory in the Post-Cold War Era
• 6 A Madisonian Approach for Civil–Military Relations
• Bibliography
• Index