Lebanon after the Syrian Withdrawal

External Intervention, Power-Sharing and Political Instability

Ohannes Geukjian

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781138361294
• eBook ISBN: 9781317106500
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Lebanon experienced serious instability and ethno-national conflict following the Syrian withdrawal in 2005, compounded by the Arab Spring, which led to regional instability and civil war in Iraq and Syria. Why did consociational democracy fail? Was failure inevitable? What impact could external powers play in creating an environment where consociationalism might be successfully implemented?

This book addresses these key questions and provides a comprehensive analysis of how internal and external elite relations influence the chances of a successful regulation of ethno-national conflict through power-sharing. Exploring the roles played by Syria, Qatar, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United States and France, it argues that external actors in the Lebanese conflict largely determined whether power-sharing was successfully established and shows that the consociational democratic model cannot provide long-term conflict regulation in their absence. The author argues that relationships between internal and external actors determine the prospects for successful conflict regulation and pinpoints the crucial role of the external forces in the creation of power-sharing agreements in Lebanon concluding that future success is dependent on the maintenance of positive, exogenous pressures.

This book will be of key interest to students and scholars studying politics, international relations, and Middle East studies.

1
Introduction

This book has its earliest origins in a research paper on the external intervention of regional and international actors in Lebanon and its impact on the Lebanese consociational system that I presented at the Middle East Studies Association (MESA) conference in Washington a few years ago. The panel was on Lebanon and external intervention in destabilizing the system after the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri on 14 February 2005, the ‘Cedar Revolution’ and the withdrawal of the Syrian forces from Lebanon in May 2005. Hariri’s assassination broke the post-civil war (1989–2005) stability that was initiated by the Tai’f Agreement in 1989 (discussed in Chapter 2) and consolidated by Syria’s dominant role with international support. The topic attracted a number of colleagues whom I met at the conference because the dramatic political and violent events that followed Hariri’s assassination are the least studied period in the scholarly books written on Lebanon. I learned a tremendous amount throughout this research not only from the topic of my study but also from the colleagues who graciously shared their ideas and expertise with me.

The title of this book – Lebanon after the Syrian Withdrawal: External Intervention, Power-Sharing and Political Instability – is descriptive and compatible with the beginning of a new period in Lebanon’s history. After May 2005, whilst Lebanon began to reclaim its independence and sovereignty after three decades of Syrian domination and manipulation of the power-sharing arrangements, immense endogenous (internal) and exogenous (external) challenges threatened the Lebanese power-sharing system that destabilized the country and increased sectarian tensions. Internally, the intransigence of the political elites and lack of consensus among them on a number of divisive national policy issues (Hizbullah’s arms, national defense strategy, rule of law, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, presidential elections, the cabinet and decision-making, foreign policy, the electoral system) created conflict and instability. All these issues are disputed between the Lebanese parties. Since independence in 1943, Lebanon has been governed by consent between the political elites, although the power-sharing arrangements that regulated conflict between the Christian and Muslim communities have broken several times, for example in 1958, 1975, 2005, 2006 and 2008. Externally, the unstable regional environment in the Middle East, the Arab–Israeli conflict, the Israeli security threat, and the divergent interests of Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and the United States in Lebanon have all contributed to the paralysis of the power-sharing system. Apparently, regional dynamics cannot be separated from power-sharing in Lebanon. As Brendan O’Leary contends, ‘external stability is critical if it is to act as a framework for an internal settlement’.¹ Indeed, Lebanon’s ability to survive the turbulent time in the Middle East, particularly after the Arab Spring from late 2010, has much to do with the regional balance between Syria and Iran, on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia and the United States, on the other. The Syrian civil war has the greatest impact on Lebanon and has raised fears that it will trigger violence between the Shi’a and Sunni communities. After the Syrian withdrawal, the Shi’a–Sunni polarization in Lebanon could be interpreted within the context of Iranian–Saudi rivalry and regional power struggle. Further, Michael Kerr convincingly states that ‘what lies ahead for Lebanon remains inextricably linked to the US–Iranian conflict and the Arab Spring’.²

Still, the Arab Spring that started in 2011 in Tunisia (the Jasmine Revolution) and later spilled over to neighboring countries, mainly Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and most recently Syria further destabilized Lebanon because each of the Lebanese parties has been committed more to the cause of an external actor. I argue that consociational failure and internal instability in Lebanon are linked to external intervention. In addition, Lebanese political elites on various occasions provoked and invited external intervention into their domestic affairs and relied on the help of external patrons to solve their internal problems. The post-2005 period under consideration demonstrates a significant difficulty in maintaining the consociational system in an unstable regional environment. The commitment of Hizbullah (which represents the majority of the Shi’a) to the Syrian and Iranian agenda and the Sunni community’s commitment to the Syrian opposition and Saudi Arabia made power-sharing and elite accommodation problematic. Both Hizbullah and some radical groups from the Sunni community have been involved in the Syrian conflict. Hence, the destabilization of the internal and external balance denied the Lebanese their traditional mechanisms for reconstituting the consociational arrangements. Writing this book in a transitional period in the Middle East illustrates the limitations and costs of imposing consociation in deeply divided societies such as Lebanon.

In the post-2005 period, the religious and sectarian differences in Lebanon’s deeply divided society have become enduring and threatening. Whilst the culture of power-sharing has proven resilient in the country, consociational practices are no guarantee of long-term stability. They can only offer temporary solutions. Thus, Eric Nordlinger rightly contends that ‘in studying conflict regulation in deeply divided societies featuring democratic or, more broadly, open regimes, we are searching for the factors which account for the stability of such regimes under conditions of severe stress’.³ Post-2005 Lebanon is a prime example. After Hariri’s assassination, the vertical sectarian division between the Shi’a and the Sunni communities ‘may be prone to the creation of cycles of violence’, as Adrian Guelke argues.⁴ Indeed, in 2008, when Hizbullah felt threatened by the government’s decision to dismantle its telecommunications network, it used its weapons against the Sunni community. Hizbullah’s action reflects the weakness of the Lebanese state and its lack of monopoly over the use of legitimate violence. Apparently, the armed confrontation would not have happened if the Lebanese state had enjoyed ‘deterrence capability’,⁵ as Marie-Joelle Zahar argues.

During the period of Syrian hegemony the role of Syria as an external guarantor of peace and stability in Lebanon was institutionalized. However, Syria did not become a means to strengthen state institutions and make democracy work. The Tai’f Agreement was implemented selectively under Syrian supervision because Syria’s aim was not to resolve the Lebanese conflict. Instead, Syria manipulated the Lebanese elites and institutions in order to maintain its hegemony and keep Lebanon a front line in the Arab–Israeli conflict. The Syrian authorities reinterpreted the provisions of the agreement as it suited their interests, notably concerning the electoral laws and the gradual withdrawal (deployment) of Syrian troops from Lebanon. Syria pursued its strategic economic and political interests in Lebanon rather than enabling state agencies to penetrate society. Farid El Khazen rightly notes that Lebanon’s consociational system and power-sharing practices were ‘syrianised’.⁶ Genuine representation of the Lebanese groups in parliament, democratic accountability and effective governance were sacrificed at the expense of political stability. After the withdrawal of the Syrian troops from Lebanon the Lebanese state was further weakened. Thus, the state ‘could neither be said to have the ability to deter nor assure’.⁷ I will document how and why Lebanese politicians sought external actors and allies outside Lebanon in order to protect their communities during Syrian tutelage and after the Syrian withdrawal.

The central questions that this book addresses in the case study of Lebanon are:

• Why did consociation fail in Lebanon after the Syrian withdrawal?
• Was the failure of consociation inevitable in Lebanon’s deeply divided society?
• If consociation failed after the Syrian withdrawal, why did conflict regulation mark a return to power-sharing models that had previously collapsed?
• What impact did external actors have on creating a supportive environment so that consociation could be successfully implemented to regulate conflict?
• Is constructive external intervention needed in a consociational system to regulate internal conflict?
• Does Lebanon need a new power-sharing agreement to regulate internal conflict?

Through addressing these questions, this book aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of how internal and external dynamics influence the chances of successful regulation of conflict through power-sharing. It also provides an analysis for scholars and policy-makers of the limitations of imposing consociation in societies that are deeply divided along religious and sectarian lines. The success of power-sharing, as Donald Rothchild and Philip G. Roeder explain, ‘depends on the continuing commitment of the leaders of ethnic groups to moderate their own demands and their ability to contain hard-line elements within their own communities’.⁸ By focusing on power-sharing arrangements in Lebanon, this book examines the changing internal and external circumstances and the role of external actors that engineered the Tai’f (in 1989) and the Doha (in 2008) agreements, and questions whether consociation is a viable tool with which to ensure the peaceful regulation of internal conflict.

The central argument in this book coincides with Michael Kerr’s argument that the relationships between the internal and external actors ‘determined the prospects for successful conflict regulation’. It pinpoints the crucial role of the ‘external actors in the creation of power-sharing agreements in Lebanon, and concludes that their success and/or failure was dependent on the maintenance of positive exogenous pressures’.⁹ I analyze some of the same factors and add further interpretation with the events up to 2016. Kerr’s earlier findings instruct my investigation with two working hypotheses that I seek to corroborate or modify based on more comprehensive analyses up to more recent times. Whilst Kerr’s study focuses on the role of external actors on creating the National Pact (in 1943) and the Tai’f Agreement, I present evidence to the effect that without external intervention the power-sharing arrangements failed in post-2005 Lebanon. Hence, external intervention was crucial in making and/or breaking power-sharing arrangements. What made the situation worse was that after the Syrian withdrawal the Lebanese elites sought the help of external actors to gain advantage over each other. The subsequent chapters discuss how the two main political coalitions of the time – 14 March (Future Movement-led, pro-Western) and 8 March (Hizbullah-led, supported by Syria and Iran) – both sought external support. But it is worth noting that during Syrian tutelage the Lebanese elites also sought Syria’s help to solve their problems and maintain political office.

Within this context, this book examines the causes of political instability and the inability of the Lebanese to conduct periodic parliamentary and presidential elections, and advances two hypotheses related to conflict regulation and external intervention:

• Hypothesis 1 (H1): The consociational model that is designed for divided societies cannot provide long-term conflict regulation of internal conflict in Lebanon in the absence of coercive exogenous positive pressures.
• Hypothesis 2 (H2): Consociational failure and system instability in Lebanon are linked to external (that is, regional) conflicts. Although consociational failure stems from lack of cooperation between the political elites, external (regional) conflicts create crucial antecedent variables that contribute to elite dissention and system instability.

Concerning the first hypothesis, this book analyzes the roles played by Syria, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United States and France as well as the influence they brought to bear on their internal counterparts. It argues that these external actors in the Lebanese conflict largely determined whether power-sharing could be successfully established and implemented. Without exogenous pressure, the power-sharing agreements of Tai’f and Doha would not have occurred. Further, these agreements remained reliant upon external actors for both the successful implementation of their consociational provisions and the stability of the system in general. Consequently, I document that power-sharing governments in Lebanon were not ‘a model for long-term conflict resolution but, rather, should be viewed as a tool for conflict regulation, provided that a stable external political environment exists to guarantee the political structure’.¹⁰ Thus, the vacuum in the post of presidency since 2014 is very likely to continue as long as the external actors do not push their internal counterparts to elect a president and as long as political instability and war continue to prevail in the region. At the time of writing (early 2016), Lebanon was oscillating between instability and collapse because a stable external environment did not exist to guarantee political structures like the presidency.

Concerning the second hypothesis, this book emphasizes not only that elite fragmentation contributes to the failure of consociational government but also that turmoil and conflict in the region destabilize elite consensus and eventually paralyze the system. In the case of Lebanon, this hypothesis better explains the origins of elite fragmentation and the failure of power-sharing arrangements.

Both of the power-sharing agreements in 1989 and 2008 were brokered by external actors based on the internal balance between the Lebanese communities and the interests of the regional and international actors that agreed them. For the sustenance and working of the power-sharing agreements, the Lebanese elites were reliant on the balance that existed between the internal and external forces at the time of each agreement. It is this link that this book aims to explain and analyze.

Consociational government was used in Lebanon to regulate internal conflict. However, consociation was unsuccessful in the Lebanese case as power-sharing collapsed in 1975 and after 2005. Yet, what makes this research interesting is that a return to consociation was the means used to re-regulate the conflict. Whilst the new power-sharing arrangements were different in their provisions and implementations, they were both initiated and imposed by external actors. Apparently, consociation had the potential for conflict regulation but failed to establish sustainable peace in an unstable regional environment.

The consociational model

Consociational democracies, according to Arend Lijphart, share four general characteristics. The first element is government by a grand coalition of the political elites representing all significant seg...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of abbreviations
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Lebanon’s power-sharing arrangements
• 3 The post-Tai’f period: power-sharing and external intervention
• 4 External intervention and the Syrian withdrawal in 2005
• 5 Escalating tensions, war and external intervention, 2006
• 6 Political and military escalation and the Doha Agreement, 2007–8
• 7 Regional and international dynamics to stabilize Lebanon, 2009–10
• 8 The limits of Lebanon’s consociationalism to manage internal conflict, 2011–12
• 9 Political instability and contradictory resilience of Lebanese consociationalism, 2013–16
• 10 Conclusion
• Appendices
• Bibliography
• Index