Popular Music and the State in the UK

Culture, Trade or Industry?

Martin Cloonan

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781138246546
• eBook ISBN: 9781317078098
• Topic: Media & Performing Arts
• Subtopic: Music

In an era of the rise of the free market and economic globalization, Martin Cloonan examines why politicians and policymakers in the UK have sought to intervene in popular music - a field that has often been held up as the epitome of the free market form. Cloonan traces the development of government attitudes and policies towards popular music from the 1950s to the present, discovering the prominence of two overlapping concerns: public order and the political economy of music. Since the music industry began to lobby politicians, particularly on the issue of copyright in relation to the internet, an inherent tension has become apparent with economic rationale on one side, and Romantic notions of 'the artist' on the other. Cloonan examines the development of policy under New Labour; numerous reports which have charted the economics of the industry; the New Deal for Musicians scheme and the impact of devolution on music policy in Scotland. He makes the case for the inherently political nature of popular music and asserts that the development of popular music policies can only be understood in the context of an increasingly close working relationship between government and the cultural industries. In addition he argues that a rather myopic view of the music industries has meant that policy initiatives have lacked cohesion and have generally served the interests of multinational corporations rather than struggling musicians.

Chapter 1 Popular Music and Politics from the 1950s – A Brief Guide

DOI: 10.4324/9781315601410-2

This chapter provides a brief overview of the development of the relationship between politics and popular music in the UK from the arrival of rock and roll in the mid-1950s to the present. Focussing primarily on the relationship between the music industries and government, it will be argued that this relationship has become increasingly close as mutual mistrust and distrust was gradually replaced by the sort of mutual support which is shown in more detail in Chapter 3. Within this history two overlapping themes emerge – concern about public order and about the political economy of the music industries. The former is of intermittent concern, while in the latter two trends are noticeable – industries-led campaigns to which national government was reactive (or not), and local government-led proactive initiatives in which advocates saw popular music as a form of populist culture which could also help to revise the local economy. As will be seen in Chapter 3, this would eventually lead to national initiatives, but this took some time to emerge.

The Arrival of Rock and Roll

In the mid-1950s Britain was still in the grips of a post-war hangover, which saw national service extended until 1960 and participation in a war in Korea (1950–53). However, it also saw economic upturn as the ‘long boom’ began. This was the era in which the phenomenon of the teenager – a stage between childhood and adulthood with some economic independence – was established in the public and academic consciousness. The key work here is Abrams’ The Teenage Consumer (1959). While Harker (1980: 76) argues that Abrams’s work ultimately comforted those in authority by showing that these new working class consumers could be coped with and a profit made from them, it is also important to note, as Laing (1969: 108) does, that it was rock and roll which turned youth into a self-conscious generation. That generation was also the focal point of some concern after Daily Express exaggerations of disturbances involving Teddy Boys and the film Rock Around The Clock (Whitcomb 1994: 227). While the extent of Teddy Boys’ violence is debated (c/f Harker 1980: 75), the link of rock and roll with juvenile delinquency was quickly established (Bradley 1992: 56) and was to become a recurring theme (Cloonan 1996). As popular music advanced then, one reaction was suspicion and concern about its propensity to promote public disorder.

But those who wish to come to terms with the relationship between popular music and its UK audience in the mid-1950s are hampered by the fact that no social history of popular music in the UK exists. In addition, as Blake (1997: 77) notes, a great deal of existing Anglo-American popular music history is either heavily skewed toward the USA or concentrated on the charts. Thus, for example, Gillett’s classic text The Sound of the City (1983) devotes fewer than 60 of its 500 plus pages to the UK. Moreover, none of the main histories (c/f ibid., Cohn 1970, Laing 1969, Melly 1989, Palmer 1977) really consider the interaction of pop and politics. Where they do, it is generally via disparaging references to events such as the Beatles being awarded MBEs (Melly 1989: 77) or the closure of pirate radio (Cohn 1970: 184). ¹ Thus in this chapter it has been necessary to bring together an account from limited secondary sources.

¹ However, see Denselow (1989) for some examples.

The general picture of the British popular music industries provided in previous works is one of conservatism and complacency. Four major record companies were dominant - EMI, Decca, Pye and Philips (which was Dutch-owned). Citing Davies (1969), Harker (1980: 68) explains that these companies each issued around ten records a month, neatly divided into two each of jazz, dance, classical, male vocal and female vocal. Gillett suggests that the majors were the establishment, with little else existing. Moreover, they were: ‘controlling the market even more effectively than did the big six American companies, they had virtually all the hit records, both through their contracts with American companies for releasing the latter’s product, and through their own English records’ (Gillett (1983: 252). Others are more damning with Cohn (1970: 61) describing the situation as ‘pure face’ and Palmer (1977: 213) saying it was ‘inane’, although Whitcomb (1994: 188) is more sanguine.

Importantly, recording was not the major money-making activity, as most income for the industries came from sheet music and live shows (Cohn 1970: 61). Broadcasting was dominated by the BBC which had a cosy relationship with the recording industry from which it took money for plays (Cohn 1970: 61, Harker 1980: 68). A ‘needletime’ agreement with the Phonographic Performance Limited (PPL) ² collecting agency (acting partly on behalf of the Musicians’ Union (MU)) limited the amount of recorded music that could be played to 22 hours a week (Chambers 1985: 33) in order to protect live radio work for musicians. While an alternative was offered by Radio Luxembourg, which had resumed broadcasting after the war, it was also in the pockets of the majors and accepted money for playing their records (Gillett 1983: 250–51). In addition, visits by American jazz musicians had been effectively banned due to a 1935 Ministry of Labour edict which said that such visits could only take place once the MU had reached a reciprocal arrangement with the American Federation of Musicians – something which did not happen until the mid-1950s (Godbolt 1984: 116-21, Blake 1997: 85).

² The PPL administers record company license fees for use of recordings. See www.ppluk.com.

It was into this market of ‘notable institutional inflexibility’ (Chambers 1985: 33) that Bill Haley’s Rock Around The Clock was released in October 1954. It re-entered the charts in October 1955 for 17 weeks and again in September 1956 for 11 weeks (Harker 1980: 68–9). Such processes lead Harker (1980: 69) to say that: ‘When we talk about the rise of rock ‘n’ roll and the creation of the pop scene in Britain, we have to realise that the process was a very long drawn-out one indeed.’ This was evolution, not revolution. Neither was it embraced by the BBC, which passed all records to its Dance Music Policy Committee (Briggs 1979: 760) and kept rock and roll firmly at arm’s length (Barnard 1989: 38, Chambers 1985: 34).

It is also important to realize that at this point popular music was seen simply as entertainment, as part of show business. Thus, during the 1950s the idea that popular music was culture or that it had any ‘politics’ would have been anathema to most. ³ This did not mean that it was unimportant, but rather that it was something to be enjoyed at the end of a day’s work, as was reflected in BBC policy (Barnard 1989: 8). The intimate connections between pop and show business can be readily demonstrated. First, many of the venues were the same. Thus, popular musicians would find themselves on the same bill as comedians, magicians, etc. When the UK produced its first domestic ‘rock ‘n’ roll’ star, Tommy Steele, he was not only on the same bill as variety acts, but soon pursuing a direct route into becoming a family entertainer (Palmer 1977: 215) – a path soon followed others, notably Cliff Richard.

³ This was the case in the UK. However, in the USA Theodor Adorno’s work had already attempted to discern the politics of the cultural industries, including that of popular music. See Adorno (1990).

Steele’s first hit, Rock With The Caveman, was a novelty record. Partly this was because rock itself was seen as a novelty, but it also related to the music hall tradition. Thus, one response to rock and roll was to Anglicize ⁴ it by mixing it with music hall and family entertainment traditions. So while skiffle has rightly been lauded as a form of amateur music making of some import (Bradley 1992), its major star, Lonnie Donegan, soon moved from Leadbelly and Woody Guthrie covers to novelty hits such as Does Your Chewing Gum Lose Its Flavour (On the Bed Post Overnight)? (1959) and My Old Man’s A Dustman (1960). Melly (1989: 51) notes that in the mid-1950s ‘not many people over the age of sixteen thought of pop as anything more than a profitable gimmick or an unpleasant epidemic.’ There was certainly politics involved here, but not the sort which would attract government interest. ⁵

⁴ My reference here is to the whole of the UK, although ‘Briticize’ seemed too ugly a term! ⁵ A nice contrast to this situation is provided by Carr’s (2004) analysis of American politicians who were using popular music for propaganda purposes.

However, the stirrings of a relationship were there. As I have noted elsewhere (Cloonan 1996: 30), it is often popular music’s attendant features which have caused censorial actions against it. This was the case here. It was reaction to the film Rock Around The Clock – and in particular the alleged ‘riots’ which accompanied it – which caused concern in some circles. Thus, the Conservative MP Robert Boothby called for it to be banned (Salewicz 1977). Here he was building on a longer heritage which had seen Tory MP Sir Waldron Smithers tell the Beveridge Committee on Broadcasting that crooning should be banned as it was part of a communist conspiracy to demoralize people (Street 1987: 71). Palmer (1977: 216) also reports questions being asked about the role of the BBC in promoting teenage decadence following an appearance by Wee Willie Harris on the 6.5 Special television show in 1957. However, at this time the main role of the state was one of benign indifference. Rock and roll did not provoke the same backlash that it did in the US – for at least three reasons. First, it did not evoke the same fear of miscegenation. Secondly, related to this, Britain did not have pressure groups and churches making racist critiques of the music’s African (and allegedly demonic) origins. Thirdly, it was soon shown to be safe as rockers such as Steele and Richard swiftly moved into showbiz careers. So the main criticisms came from places such as Melody Maker which, as the paper of established musicians, stood against this potential threat to its readers’ jobs (Martin and Segrave 1988: 53).

Musically the end of the decade is generally portrayed as witnessing a decline in ‘hard’ rock and roll and a move towards softer musical forms – labelled ‘highschool’ (Chambers 1985: 40). Of the early rock pioneers, Buddy Holly was dead, Little Richard had turned to religion, Jerry Lee Lewis was in disgrace following his marriage to his 14-year-old cousin which provoked outrage in the UK (White 1995: 56–62), Chuck Berry was in jail for having sex with a minor, and Elvis had joined the army on 14 March 1958. Meanwhile, early UK rock artists were either on their way to a career in showbiz (Steele, Richard) or obscurity (Terry Dene). According to Harker (1980: 73): ‘The period 1959–62 was the deadest phase of British and American recorded song since at least 1945 … For adolescents it was a desert… Unless you lived in major city or coast, or had access to amusement arcade or fairground or made your own music, musically it was a “bloody desert”’ (emphasis in original). However, beneath this surface movements such as rhythm and blues and beat were developing and both pop and politics were about to change (Gillett 1983: 257).

The 1960s

Cohn (1970: 75) argues that 1960 was the worst year musically since the arrival of rock and roll and, as noted above, the period from 1960–62 is generally portrayed in previous histories as one in which little occurred. However, it must be remembered that such a view is based on an over-concentration on the charts and that at grassroots level a great deal was happening, as the subsequent arrival of the Beatles, the Rolling Stones and others was to amply illustrate. An important, if under-researched, scene was developing (Blake 1997: 103). The decade was also to see popular music and government move a little closer as the Arts Council opened up to forms such as jazz (see Chapter 2). A thaw was beginning.

The success of the Beatles led to a great many changes. In terms of social concern, the reaction was not generally from politicians but from commentators such as Johnson’s notorious attack on ‘The menace of Beatlism’ (Johnson 1964). Politically, the band’s rise coincided with the election of a Labour government under a young leader from a Liverpool constituency, Harold Wilson. It seems that the temptation to try and link the two new phenomena was irresistible. Thus, in November 1965 Wilson awarded the band MBEs for services to exports during hard economic times (Blake 1997: 93). But the band were also courted by the Conservatives, as in an equally opportunist move, William Deedes, then Tory Minister of Information, told a Young Conservative meeting in spring 1964 that the band ‘herald a cultural movement among the young and may become part of the history of our time … something important and heartening is happening here’ (Laurie 1965: 23).

Wilson’s move was clearly ‘a political gimmick’ (Hewison 1986: 70) designed to court the band’s popularity and to associate the government with youth (Melly 1989: 82). But it should also be borne in mind that there was a certain amount of political risk involved. The award to the band was detected in some quarters as an insult to the honours system and led to at least one retired colonel returning his own award (Martin and Segrave 1988: 119). Thus, associating the government with popular musicians ran the risk of alienating middle England. It also ran the risk of political embarrassment of the sort that occurred in November 1969 when John Lennon returned his MBE because of UK support for the US in Vietnam and involvement in the civil war in Nigeria (Coleman ...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half-Title Page
• Dedication
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations
• General Editor's Preface
• Introduction: Pop, Politics and a Personal Journey
• 1 Popular Music and Politics from the 1950s – A Brief Guide
• 2 Cultural Policy from 1945 to New Labour
• 3 New Labour – New Pop?
• 4 Reporting the Music Industries
• 5 Policy on the Ground: The New Deal for Musicians
• 6 A New Lens? Popular Music Policy under Devolution: The Case of Scotland
• Conclusion: From Benign to Promotional?
• Bibliography
• Index