Xinjiang - China's Northwest Frontier

K. Warikoo

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781138184916
• eBook ISBN: 9781317290285
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Xinjiang is the 'pivot of Asia', where the frontiers of China, Tibet, India, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia approach each other. The growing Uyghur demand for a separate homeland and continuing violence in Xinjiang have brought this region into the focus of national and international attention. With Xinjiang becoming the hub of trans-Asian trade and traffic, and also due to its rich energy resources, Uyghur Muslims of Xinjiang are poised to assert their ethno-political position, thereby posing serious challenge to China's authority in the region.

This book offers a new perspective on the region, with a focus on social, economic and political developments in Xinjiang in modern and contemporary times. Drawing on detailed analyses by experts on Xinjiang from India, Central Asia, Russia, Taiwan and China, this book presents a coherent, concise and rich analysis of ethnic relations, Uyghur resistance, China's policy in Xinjiang and its economic relations with its Central Asian neighbours.

It is of interest to those studying in Chinese and Central Asian politics and society, International Relations and Security Studies.

1 Introduction

K. Warikoo

Xinjiang lies at the heart of Asia, bordering Mongolia in the northeast, the Central Asian Republics of Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in the west and north, Afghanistan and Jammu and Kashmir in the south and southwest, Tibet in the southeast and mainland China in the east. It covers a vast expanse of land which constitutes about one-sixth of the total area of the People’s Republic of China and holds the distinction of being her largest province where Muslims are in majority. Owen Lattimore, the noted American scholar, has called it the ‘pivot of Asia’,¹ where the frontiers of China, Tibet, India, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia approach one another.

Different names have been applied to designate the area at different periods of history. Juwaini, the noted Persian scholar, described it as Kichik Bukhara or little Bukhara so as to distinguish it from the proper Bukhara. Mirza Haidar Dughlat, the celebrated author of Tarikh-i-Rashidi, called it as Mashriqi Turkestan (East Turkestan). In the time of Chagatay Khans it was known as Moghalistan and later the name of its famous city and capital – Kashghar – was applied to represent the whole of Tarim basin. Thus several European travellers described it as Kashgharia. It was also known as Alty-Shahr (land of six cities – Kashghar, Yangi Hissar, Yarkand, Khotan, Ush Turfan and Aksu).

The socio-economic life of the people of Xinjiang has been moulded by its peculiar geophysical features. While the lofty mountain ranges of Altyn Tagh, Kunlun, Karakoram, the Pamirs, Tianshan, Alatao and the Altai virtually encircle the region, the great Taklamakan desert to the east cuts it off from the mainland of China. Yet the region’s commercial intercourse with the neighbouring countries – India, Afghanistan and Central Asia – continue unhampered through the numerous passes in the mountain ranges. Though sterile and devoid of any forest life, these mountains are the fountainhead of numerous rivers and streams which bring life to the otherwise desert-dominated country. Within the Kashgharia basin the Aksu Darya (river), Kashghar Darya, Yarkand Darya and Khotan Darya combine to form the great Tarim river, from which the southern part of Xinjiang has derived its name, the Tarim basin. Similarly the northern or Dzungaria basin is fed by the Yili (Ili), Manas and Urungu rivers. It is along the course of these rivers and streams that a number of large and small oasis-settlements have come into existence. Where there is water, there is life. Where the water connection ceases, barren desert reappears.

Apart from this striking contrast between these lush green oases and their barren surroundings, Xinjiang has many more physiographic peculiarities. Whereas southern Xinjiang (Tarim basin) lies at an elevation of about 3,000–4,000 feet above sea-level, the Turfan depression lying to its northeast is 500 feet below sea-level. This depression is neither drained by any river nor blessed by any rainfall. The people there adopted the ancient system of artificial underground irrigation channels (karez) for watering their fields. However, northern Xinjiang (Dzhungaria basin) has the advantage of receiving about ten inches of rainfall a year as compared to the more arid Tarim basin with only about four inches of rainfall. This factor facilitates the development of pastoral nomadism in north Xinjiang as against the predominance of sedentary population in the Tarim basin.

From the historical point of view, mainland China has had a tenuous relationship with its distant periphery in Xinjiang. While its Chinese connection dates back more than 2,000 years, Xinjiang remained under the effective control of imperial China only intermittently for about five centuries.² Long distance, the intervening Taklamakan desert and lack of adequate means of communication, as well as the shifting balance of power in the mainland, were the contributory factors for China’s weak control over Xinjiang for a considerable period in history. Whenever the centre was strong in China, it exerted its control over Xinjiang. And whenever the centre was weak, local chieftains, Mongol Khans, Khojas, Muslim chiefs and warlords assumed control over their territorial strong-holds. However, the chiefs of Hami and Turfan in the eastern part of Xinjiang, being in proximity to mainland China, maintained a sort of tributary relationship with the centre, while retaining their autonomy.

Chinese interest in Xinjiang originated out of the need to safeguard mainland China from foreign incursions. As such, this westernmost border region, then known as Hsi Yu, was regarded as a buffer zone against these attacks from beyond the Great Wall.³ However, the imperial government never lost sight of the importance of fostering trade relations with the outlying Central Asian states, as it enabled China to ‘civilize’ the turbulent nomadic tribes and to extend the political influence over them. Central Asian chiefs and trading delegations were encouraged to visit China and were given costly presents and even subsidies in return for their ‘gifts’ for the Chinese emperor. This was a deliberate move aimed at bringing the outlying border states in the ambit of ‘tributary relationship’ with imperial China.⁴ The Mings consistently followed this policy and they set up a separate Board of Rites to supervise the conduct of relations with Central Asia. The Qings perfected this system by establishing a full-fledged Court of Colonial Affairs (Li-fan Yuan) to look after the affairs of the Central Asian dependencies of Xinjiang, Mongolia and Tibet. The Qings considered the possession of Xinjiang as a prerequisite for safeguarding their position in Central Asia. They successfully used both the military and diplomatic means to ensure the occupation of Xinjiang. Social segregation of numerous oasis-settlements and their respective populations hindered the formation of a united resistance movement against the Qing authorities.⁵ Besides, the Qing policy of permanent settlement of Manchus, Han Chinese civil and military personnel, traders, artisans and Chinese Muslims (Hui) along with their families in Xinjiang altered the ethnographic and demographic composition of Xinjiang and diluted the local Muslim resistance to Chinese rule.

The earliest recorded history of China’s relationship with the outlying border states of Central Asia dates back to 138 BC when the Han emperor, Wu Ti (140–86 BC), sent a mission headed by Chang Chan to Central Asia with the object of forging an alliance with the Yuchi people against the Huns,⁶ who were threatening the security of China’s western frontiers. Having failed in their attempts to secure such support, the Hans pursued the forward policy of extending effective military control over the ‘western regions’. China succeeded in subduing certain oasis-states of the Tarim basin during the later Han period (26–220 AD.).

Soon after Chinese control lapsed until it was reimposed by the Tangs (618–907 AD). The Tangs established the An-Hsi Protectorate (Four Garrisons) to maintain their authority over these outlying principalities. Tang annals are stated to have recorded that this Protectorate was meant to govern Khotan, Tokmak, Sule and Kucha. Yet Kashghar and other small settlements in this area continued to be under the control of native princes though subject to the overlordship of China. Thus due to internal dissensions among the ruling class in China and also due to lack of communication between their subjects in this far distant region, the Chinese could hold it in their possession only intermittently. However, the petty independent chiefs used to send embassies to China periodically, which were also used for smuggling merchandise.⁷ To quote Chavannes, ‘nothing more is heard of Anhsi or “Four Garrisons” from 790–91 AD’.⁸ Tang rulers are, however, believed to have exercised their firm control over Xinjiang during their period of supremacy.⁹

With the decline of Tang power and the rise of Islam between the eighth and tenth centuries, this region again slipped out of Chinese control. Before Islam was introduced into the country in the tenth century by its ruling prince Satuk Boghra Khan (944–1037 AD), Buddhism was the popular religion of the people. The allegiance of the Central Asian chiefs to the Chinese emperor depended upon the latter’s power to enforce it. When the Mongol armies of Chengiz Khan overran Turkestan in the thirteenth century, Xinjiang became part of kingdom assigned to one of his sons, Changhtay. By the fourteenth century the Mongol power waned, with most of its leaders having embraced Islam. Now several local centres of power emerged under the leadership of Mughal Khans and the priestly class of Khojas. The infighting and dissensions among the successive Mughal Khans of Mongol descent paved the way for the rise to power of a priestly class of Khojas under Hidayatullah Afak in Kashgharia in the seventeenth century. It may be recalled that Khoja Makhdum-ul-Azim, a learned theologian of Bukhara, who claimed descent from the Prophet, had settled in Kashghar in the early fifteenth century. He was granted land and other privileges by the ruling Mughal Khans. Thus came into being a line of Khoja feudals who controlled both their landed estates and their revenues. Being the hereditary religious officials and feudal nobles both at the same time, they exercised a good deal of control over the affairs of the country. The internal feuds among the ruling Mughal princes proved useful to these Khojas, who were by now eager to take over the reins of government. It was under these circumstances that Khoja Hidayat Allah, also named Khoja Afaq, wrested power in the seventeenth century. After the death of Afak, the Khojas too became divided into two warring factions, Ak-Taghliqs (white-capped Muslims) and Kara-Taghliqs (black-capped Muslims). Kashgharia witnessed perpetual strife between the rival factions of the Khojas, until after Zhungaria was wrested by the Chinese from the Kalmuks in 1755. By 1759, Kashgharia was under the control of the Qings. The dispossessed Khojas found asylum in the Kokand Khanate from where they seized every opportunity to foment trouble and rebellions against the Chinese rulers in Kashgharia. Even during such periods when China could not sustain its hold over the numerous oasis-states of Central Asia, it sought to bring them in the orbit of the ‘nominal vassalage’ system by fostering trade. The Silk Route, which passed through the oasis-states of the Tarim basin, provided a stable link to facilitate such communication between the mainland of China and the peripheral areas. The Mings sent several Chinese missions to distant cities of Central Asia such as Samarkand, Bukhara, Andkui, Herat, Shiraz and Isfahan,¹⁰ to encourage the Central Asian states to send trade missions to China and also to gather political intelligence about the outlying territories. The Mings encouraged ‘tributary relationships’ with the principalities of Central Asia by offering trade concessions as a bait. Whereas private Chinese traders were generally prevented from going to Central Asia, the Mings admitted only such Central Asian merchants who would come as part of a diplomatic mission from a vassal state bringing ‘tribute’ to the emperor.¹¹ On their part, the Central Asian chiefs found it profitable to send such embassies bearing gifts, as this facilitated their commercial adventures in the ‘Middle Kingdom’ and also gave them Chinese presents in return, which were several times greater in value.

The farce of this ‘tributary relationship’ between Ming China and Central Asia becomes obvious from all available historical evidences. These ‘tribute’ missions would not only specify the gifts desired in exchange,¹² but the merchants often forged the official documents of their kings in which they offered ‘cliental submission to the king of China’.¹³ Even the Ming annals have recorded instances of the false claims made by such Central Asian trading missions. Similarly, we do not find any mention about the relations between the Moghul Khans of Central Asia with China in the Tarikh-i-Rashidi of Mirza Haidar Dughlat, though Ming official history Ming Shih is full of references to ‘tribute’ from the Moghuls. Therefore, it is not surprising to find Tamerlane and his son and successor, Sultan Shahrukh, having been enrolled as ‘tributaries’ in the Ming annals,¹⁴ though both of them maintained diplomatic relations with China on equal footing and even challenged the Mings on several occasions. With the weakening of Ming vitality and increase of border threats from Mongolia, the Chinese position in Central Asia became tenuous. Now trade came to be used as political concession to buy peace.

The period of Chinese rule in Xinjiang from 1760 to 1825 is stated to be un-interrupted by any such upheavals, resulting in relative peace and stability in the region. But it was soon plunged into disorder as a result of a series of Khoja rebellions, which subverted the Chinese authority, but for only limited periods. During their short-lived successes, Khoja leaders like Jahangir, Yusuf, Katta Tora and Walli Khan Tora set in motion a process of mass killings of Chinese soldiers, civilians and even innocent natives. Serious reprisals were organized to root out all traces of opposition with the arrival of Chinese reinforcements. Consequently, the local economy, particularly cottage industry and trade, suffered a severe setback. The Chinese policy of appeasement towards the neighbouring ruler of Kokand, who was provided with an annual subsidy¹⁵ and other trading privileges in Kashgharia in exchange for his promise of restraining the Khoja exiles living in that Khanate, did not prevent Khoja Buzarg and his adjutant Yakub Beg from launching a successful offensive against the Chinese in the 1860s. It was in 1865 when Khoja Buzarg Khan with the aid of adventurous Yakub Beg rebelled against Chinese in Kashgharia and succeeded in overthrowing them. Yakub Beg’s task was facilitated by the great Tungani insurrection that had rocked the Gansu province of China and also Chinese Turkestan, which resulted in wholesale killing of non-Muslim Chinese residents and soldiers. Buzarg Khan was soon displaced by the ambitions Yakub Beg, who assumed full control of Kashgharia by 1870. Throughout his rule, Yakub Beg remained busy suppressing small revolts by chiefs of different oases and an atmosphere of suspicion prevailed in the country owing mainly to the ruler’s lack of trust in his nobles and subjects. People were forced to adhere strictly to the Islamic principles in all their daily habits, which they seemed reluctant to do.

It was in 1871 that Russia occupied Kuldja lying north of the Tian shan mountains, simultaneously making a promise to the Chinese government in Peking to hand it back to China as and when she re-occupied Kashgharia. In the meantime Chinese were making full-scale war preparations against Yakub Beg. Tso-Tsung Tang, Chinese Governor of Shansi and Gansu, occupied most of Zungaria by 1876. Kashgharia was taken without any difficulty in 1877, in which year Yakub Beg died.¹⁶ The Chinese government soon entered into negotiations with the Russian government for the retrocession of Kuldja.¹⁷ Now Chinese Turkestan was formed as a separate province after an imperial edict was issued on 18 November 1884, and it was renamed as Xinjiang.¹⁸ Hitherto it had formed part of the Gansu province. Since then, China has maintained a firm hold on the province.

The nineteenth century formed a significant period in the history of Xinjiang in more than one respect. The country witnessed a series of uprisings and several changes of government. The Kashgharians lived with savage atrocities under the brief reign of Walli Khan Tora. They also saw the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism during the tough rule of Yakub Beg, the impact of which was finally washed away during the lax administration of his Chinese successors. This period presents an example of the colonial practices and exploitative methods employed by the Manchus and the local feudals, at the same time exposing the inherent weaknesses of the Chinese administrative structure. This weakness becomes more apparent from the type of relations which existed with the Khanate of Kokand. Apart from dominating the externa...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of tables
• List of contributors
• Acknowledgements
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Cultural heritage of Xinjiang
• 3 Energy and natural resources in Xinjiang
• 4 Xinjiang under the Qings
• 5 Rethinking ethnicity in China
• 6 China’s ethnic tangle with special reference to Xinjiang
• 7 China’s policy in Xinjiang, 1948–78
• 8 Kazakh diaspora in Xinjiang: history and perspectives of ethnic migration in Kazakhstan
• 9 Economic cooperation between Xinjiang and Central Asian Republics
• 10 Xinjiang factor in Kazakhstan–China relations
• 11 Cross-border interaction between Xinjiang and South Siberia in Central Asia: the ‘Big Altai’ approach
• 12 Economic and social development in Xinjiang
• 13 China’s Western Development Programme in Xinjiang
• 14 China’s nationalities and religious policies in Xinjiang
• 15 Ethno-religious separatism in Xinjiang and China’s response
• 16 Uyghur nationalism and the 5 July 2009 incident in Urumqi
• Bibliography
• Index