Land Based Air Power or Aircraft Carriers?

A Case Study of the British Debate about Maritime Air Power in the 1960s

Gjert Lage Dyndal

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781138269439, 9781409433354
• eBook ISBN: 9781317108399
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

During the 1960s - in the midst of its retreat from empire - the British government had to grapple with complex political and military problems in order to find a strategic defence policy that was both credible and affordable. Addressing what was perhaps the most contentious issue within those debates, this book charts the arguments that raged between supporters of a land based air power strategy, and those who favoured aircraft carriers. Drawing upon a wealth of previously classified documents, the book reveals how the Admiralty and Air Ministry became interlocked in a bitter political struggle over which of their military strategies could best meet Britain's future foreign policy challenges. Whilst the broad story of this inter-service rivalry is well known - the Air Force's proposal for a series of island based airfields, and the Navy championing of a small number of expensive but mobile aircraft carriers - the complexity and previous lack of archival sources means that it has, until now, only ever been partially researched and understood. Former studies have largely focused on the cancellation of the CVA-01 carrier programme, and offered little depth as regards the Royal Air Force perspectives. Given that this was a two-Service rivalry, which greatly influenced many aspects of British foreign and defence policy decisions of the period, this book presents an important and balanced overview of the complex issues involved. Through this historical study of the British debate about maritime air power and strategic alternatives in the 1960s, the detailed arguments used for and against both alternatives demonstrate clear relevance to both historical and contemporary conceptual debates on carrier forces and land-based air power. Both from military strategy and inter-service relationship perspectives, contemporary Britain and many other nations with maritime forces may learn much from this historical case.

Chapter 1
Replacement Carriers and the New Idea of an ‘Island Strategy’

… having no land base between the United Kingdom and Australia, there will be a need for aircraft carriers to provide floating airfields from which British air power can operate irrespective of whether this power is provided by the Royal Air Force or the Fleet Air Arm.¹

Lord Mountbatten, 1961

The first part of this chapter deals with the carrier replacement programme, which saw light at the end of the 1950s in the naval community. The need for new carriers gradually reached the political scene in 1960–61. As the review of British defence policy continued the increased focus on the East of Suez challenges had made the carriers ever more important. However, as the dimension of the programme was realised, the RAF and Air Ministry came up with an alternative concept – the Island Strategy. The second part of this chapter therefore discusses the origins of the Island Strategy and how it became a direct and competing alternative to the Royal Navy’s carrier task force concept. As there now were two clear alternatives, the inter-service rivalry escalated greatly during the last months of 1961, and this was a struggle which continued until the summer of 1963. In fact, the intricate inter-service rivalry over strategic concepts available to the British as the garrisons were steadily scaled down, and the new foreign and defence policies, occupied most of the defence debate of 1962–63.

Due to inter-service rivalry, a common and neutral study comparing the alternatives had to be made. A study group was formed with the Chief Scientific Advisor, Solly Zuckerman, in 1962. The third part of this chapter therefor examines the content and focus of this important study.

As a final part of this chapter, a brief examination of the status of the British forces concerning air defence, anti-surface and amphibious capabilities has been made. These three capabilities were those mainly in focus at the time, also for Zuckerman’s study.

Carrier Task Forces

The Need for New Carriers

The first discussions on replacement carriers came about in naval circles in the late 1950s.² However, the question of new carriers did not reach the political scene until late in 1960.³ By then the fleet consisted of seven HMS ships: Centaur, Victorious, Ark Royal, Eagle and Hermes,⁴ as well as Bulwark and Albion which had just been converted to commando carriers. The quest for replacement came as a consequence of the increased interest in the East of Suez missions as well as the ageing of the current fleet, and not least the limitations of the current carriers for operating modern and larger jet aircraft. Previously, the naval forces had had a less important role in the doctrinal concepts for East of Suez missions than the Army with its garrisons and the RAF with the Transport Command. Now, by the early 1960s, there was a concept of naval task forces as well, especially mobile land forces and commando ships. By 1962 HMS Albion, the second commando ship, joined HMS Bulwark in service East of Suez.⁵ These new, or revitalised,⁶ requirements and operations evolved in parallel to the question of replacement of HMS Victorious.⁷ These forces were hardly discussed due to their success. As the Minister of Defence stated: ‘… I cannot think of any better way of having a kind of mobile fire brigade which could be poised in any place where there might be trouble brewing’.⁸

Presentations on the need for new carriers and the new construction programme were made on several occasions during the 1959–60 time frame. By 1960, the question also reached the House of Commons. For instance Mr Orr-Ewing, the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, spoke on the need to replace the existing fleet during a discussion in the House of Commons in November 1960:

Four of our five operational carriers are comparatively new ships and the fifth, the ‘VICTORIOUS’, was completely rebuilt a few years ago. They should all, therefore, be capable of playing a full part with the fleet until the 1970s. Nevertheless, we are considering the requirements of the ships which will succeed them.⁹

The replacement was intended for the 1970s. The Admiralty planned from the beginning to build four new carriers, of about the size of HMS Eagle and HMS Ark Royal. The initial proposal was to lay down the first ship at the end of 1964 and complete the fourth by 1975.¹⁰ Still, outside the Admiralty, studies for replacement carriers and the discussions on the future of carrier policy did not really commence until the second half of 1961. Mountbatten, the Chief of the Defence Staff and the former leader of the Admiralty, was supposed to lead this process. With his history and heritage, he had to balance his official support delicately. Still, in 1961, as the inter-service rivalry had not yet fully peaked, he clearly and officially supported the Admiralty’s aim of four new fleet carriers. He brought the argument for three seaborne task forces, supported by a modern Transport Command and mobile forces, directly to the Prime Minister.¹¹ Solly Zuckerman, the Chief Scientific Advisor and a close friend, wrote to Mountbatten and explained his concerns about the Admiralty led lobby and independent studies.¹² Zuckerman stated he was in favour of the carriers, and even argued they had expanded usefulness in the East of Suez region. However, he proposed that a broad study group be established to discuss this issue, and thereby make it a ‘properly backed Ministry of Defence view’. Mountbatten and his private secretary were reluctant to get into this issue. As the secretary wrote to Mountbatten:

The handling of this matter is tricky. On the one hand if you go ahead as suggested there will be trouble with the Admiralty. On the other hand if you take no action in the matter the news will soon spread round what has happened and that you are backing the Navy.¹³

Clearly, Mountbatten was under pressure in his dual position as the joint Chief of Staff and simultaneously a dedicated naval officer, having been the former First Sea Lord. It ended up, not unsurprisingly, that Mountbatten kept close ties with the Navy, and as the First Sea Lord, Caspar John wrote to Mountbatten: ‘In any study you organise, I hope the Admiralty may be closely associated …’.¹⁴

By the autumn of 1961 the demands for rationalisation were again central. The services were forced to cooperate on the issue of new carriers and look into the possibility of common grounds for training, as well as the operations of organic air power.¹⁵ As for the Air Ministry, it was already clear that they would oppose the building of new fleet carriers. It was the view of the CAS that by the 1970s–80s, for which time the new carriers were intended, future long-range strike aircraft would simply render the aircraft carrier obsolete.¹⁶ Francis Festing, who was Chief of the Imperial General Staff and thereby assessed to be ‘neutral’ to the conflict between the Admiralty and the Air Ministry, was asked by the MoD to look into possible rationalisations, and was invited to propose a solution to the question of replacement carriers. Festing’s paper ‘Future Air Strike Policy in Limited War Outside Europe’¹⁷ was the first study looking into the question of carriers versus land-based air power. Both the Admiralty and Air Ministry put forward their arguments, but Festing did not really put forward clear support to either case. His conclusion was that any British ‘… air strike capability outside Europe should be either one hundred per cent shore based or one hundred per cent carrier-based’.¹⁸

In December 1961, First Sea Lord Caspar John wrote a memorandum on ‘Aircraft Carrier Replacement’ to the Chiefs of Staff Committee. This memorandum briefly discussed the costs, size, and requirements for the 1970s and 1980s. But the Navy’s great challenge was obvious: the memorandum came simultaneously with two other programmes; the construction of nuclear submarines and the escort cruisers.¹⁹ Caspar John, the First Sea Lord, was aware of the overall cost of the naval construction programmes, and the challenges there were to follow. As for priority, he argued that the most important step was for the Navy to build a nuclear submarine fleet. The importance of the new cruisers was less critical, while the case for replacement carriers was more of a demand for the future.²⁰ As for the rationale for the replacement carriers, the focus on the world-role and limited war, as well as support to the Army ashore, were all central arguments from the outset.

Caspar John ended the carrier replacement memorandum by recommending to the Chief of the Defence Staff that he endorsed the continuing requirement for aircraft carriers and start working for a replacement for HMS Victorious. The first should be ordered by 1962/63.²¹ The Chief of Staff, Mountbatten, followed his suggestion and wrote directly to the Prime Minister arguing for the carriers, and simultaneously trying to undermine the new alternative of land-based air power:

… since the extent to which reliance can be placed in the next twenty years or so on fixed bases is at best very uncertain and we may in this period be faced with having no land base between the United Kingdom and Australia, there will be need for aircraft carriers to provide floating airfields from which British air power can be operated irrespectively of whether this power is provided by the Royal Air Force or the Fleet Air Arm.²²

The discussion of replacement of the carriers, and finally over the fate of carrier forces for the British, had then reached political circles.

The issue of new carriers soon became part of the general re-examination of British military strategy. It was particularly the Treasury²³ that was occupied with this crucial link of future strategic developments and the need for carriers. The cost of the ‘obligations East of Suez’ for the 1970s was an important framework by 1962,²⁴ and would be even more so in 1966–67.

During December 1961 and early 1962, the first major studies came about: the Chiefs of Staff, with both the Admiralty and Air Ministry, worked with the question of ‘Future Aircraft Carrier Policy’. A ‘Joint Admiralty/Air Ministry Carrier Study Group’ was also established.²⁵ As stated in a Admiralty note of 1961: ‘It is necessary to start ‘now’ (more or less) if we are to have Fleet Carriers and aircraft in the 1970s …’.²⁶ It was by then a common view within the Chiefs of Staff Committee that British reliance on the current concept of fixed bases would not be sufficient in the future; it was at best ‘uncertain’.²⁷

The Chiefs of Staff and the Minister of Defence believed that HMS Victorious needed to be and would be replaced. However, the Minister of Defence was not satisfied with the strategic rationale presented by the Admiralty. They fell back on political polemic too easily. For instance, in reply to a question about the rationale of carriers the First Sea Lord answered:

The First Sea Lord of the Admiralty expressed surprise that there should still be doubts about the future of the aircraft carrier, following the Admiralty presentation in mid 1961 and the subsequent evolution of a mobile strategy which depended on the carrier.²⁸

The Admiralty had a problem with gett...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of Figures
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 Replacement Carriers and the New Idea of an ‘Island Strategy’
• 2 The Debate on Carriers and the Island Strategy
• 3 A New Framework: A New Debate on Maritime Air Power
• 4 The Fate of the CVA-01
• 5 New Home-Waters Challenges, and the British Forces
• 6 The British Heading Home
• 7 The Grand Story and the Lessons Learned
• Appendix A Abbreviations
• Appendix B Background of the Main Governmental Departments and Leaders Involved
• Bibliography
• Index