Strategic Thinking, Deterrence and the US Ballistic Missile Defense Project

From Truman to Obama

Reuben Steff

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781138267237
• eBook ISBN: 9781317049449
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

A systematic critical survey of American strategic thinking and the strategic culture in which it is formed. In particular, this book seeks to interrogate the theory and strategy of nuclear deterrence, and its relationship to the concept of missile defence. Drawing widely on the theoretical literature in international relations and strategic studies, it identifies the key groups that have competed over America's nuclear policy post-1945 and examines how the concept of missile defence went through a process of gestation and intellectual contestation, leading to its eventual legitimization in the late 1990s. Steff sheds light on the individuals, groups, institutions and processes that led to the decision by the Bush administration to deploy a national missile defence shield. Additionally, Steff systematically examines the impact deployment had on the calculations of Russia and China. In the process he explains that their reactions under the Bush administration have continued into the Obama era, revealing that a new great power security dilemma has broken out. This, Steff shows, has led to a decline in great power relations as a consequence.

Chapter 1
Deterrence Theory, World Order and Missile Defense

This chapter outlines the four theoretical waves of nuclear deterrence. Firstly, it addresses deterrence in the context of the Cold War structure of bipolarity, and examines the major international relations theories of Realism and Constructivism. Core deterrence concepts are outlined and it is explained why the superpowers outlawed the deployment of large national BMD systems, as deterrence came to rely on retaliation rather than denial. Following this, it reveals that the superpowers during the Cold War constructed a joint framework for bipolar management via the creation of a system of mutually managed deterrence, and a managed system of abstinence in the form of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Subsequently, the fourth wave of deterrence theory that emerged in the unipolar world after the collapse of the Soviet Union is considered. It examines the theoretical debate over the implications of unipolarity, and the changing orientation of US strategic policy, as deterrence was re-tooled to fit the new strategic environment. The chapter explains why a structurally based explanation for US decision making is inadequate as the singular cause for the eventual deployment of BMD, as it overlooks important domestic drivers. Finally, the chapter considers the ongoing debate in contemporary international relations scholarship concerning the issue of whether balancing has occurred in response to US-based unipolarity and in response to BMD in particular. The chapter proceeds in seven stages. Firstly, it reveals the context in which deterrence theory was conceived, and outlines the intellectual paradigms of Realism and Constructivism. Secondly, the three Cold War waves of deterrence theory are examined. Thirdly, it discusses the joint efforts of the superpowers to construct a nuclear order during the Cold War. Fourthly, it addresses the newly emergent fourth wave of deterrence theory and the Bush administration’s new approach to deterrence. This part also describes why the deployment of BMD was judged to be an essential prerequisite for maintaining a unipolar world order, and why the analysis of the central drivers of BMD must be extended beyond the systemic level. Finally, it examines the debate over whether balancing against US-based unipolarity is occurring, positioning this project for an empirical examination of Russia and China’s response to BMD in later chapters.

The Global Arena: Bipolarity

After World War II a breakdown in relations between the two ascendant superpowers, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, led their global rivalry to consume the world. At the root of the confrontation was a political and ideological disagreement over the future of the international system, and whether a US-led order embracing free markets and liberal democracy would dominate it, or a Soviet-dominated order of state-controlled socialism. War did not just look possible but probable, leading to the assessment that the opposing superpower would use any window of opportunity in the military balance to change the international status quo to its benefit. American policymakers assumed the Soviet Union was hell-bent on world domination. For the US, this necessitated the emplacement of ‘forward bases’ around the periphery of the Soviet Union, as the US pursued a strategy known as containment advocated by George F. Kennan.1 Containment was a prescription for perpetual military preparedness and a justification for ceaseless qualitative and quantitative military build-up, and prescribed a “need for open-ended commitments and the capability of anticipating and responding to political and military challenges anywhere in the world.”2 On a geopolitical level this strategy required the US to ensure the Soviets could not dominate the Eurasian landmass and to pursue a global naval strategy to control the high seas, enabling America to define the rules of global trade.3 This analysis was underpinned by core realist assumptions.

Realism and Anarchy

The roots of deterrence theory can be found in the ‘grand theory’ of International Relations known as Realism.4 For realists, states are the most important actors within the international system. States are driven by a natural desire to maximize power (military and economic resources) and further their interests.5 The nation-state system is primarily a ‘war-system.’ Kenneth Waltz explains: “With many sovereign states, with no system of law enforceable among them, with each state judging its grievances and ambitions according to its own reason or desire – conflict, sometimes leading to war, is bound to occur.”6 Thus, anarchy is a structural constant and is the operational environment of the international system. Actions by states exist within a zero-sum setting, whereby anything ‘my’ adversary gains, ‘I’ lose, and military force becomes the ultimate arbiter. In this situation diplomacy is judged to be unreliable and can only be effective if backed up by military threats.7

Realist theory contains a number of variants. Classical realists, such E. H. Carr and Hans J. Morgenthau, believed that the “drive for power and the will to dominate [are] held to be fundamental aspects of human nature,” and its interaction with anarchy produce conflict.8 Kenneth Waltz classic 1979 publication, Theory of International Politics signaled the arrival of Neorealism, by explaining how the structure of power in the system acted as both a constraint on and encouragement of behavior: “polarity structures the horizon of states’ probable actions and reactions, narrowing the range of choice and providing subtle incentives and disincentives for certain types of behavior.”9 In this formulation state behavior is correlated with a state’s position in the system, more so than ideology, regime type, economics, etcetera.

Waltz’s approach spawned a number of subsequent variants. The most important include defensive realism,10 which holds that states seek security and can overcome hostility and mutual distrust through efforts aimed at reducing fear and facilitating co-operation; offensive realism,11 that contends states seek power and the intentions of others are intrinsically uncertain, requiring states to be prepared for war at all times; Hegemonic Stability Theory,12 which suggests there are rational reasons for a state to acquire a position of primacy, as it will reduce anarchy and extend a measure of stability to the entire system. It also holds that co-operation in international politics requires the dominant state to provide strong leadership and provide public goods that other states find attractive, such as an open international trading system. Unsurprisingly, the leaders of the hegemonic state are likely to portray their role to others as benign. Finally, there is Neoclassical Realism. This approach is a logical evolution of structural realism and expands its explanatory power by incorporating factors other than those of structure into its analysis, namely the effect individuals and domestic political groups inside states have on state action.13 Considering these other levels of analysis is necessary because the effects of the system are ultimately indeterminate, as Waltz himself admitted.14 Therefore, neoclassical realism offers a new analytical synthesis. Its major contribution is that domestic politics, interest groups and the ideas held by important actors distort decision making because the ‘national interest’ can be pursued in multiple ways, and states can fail to properly adapt to systemic constraints as a result.15 As later parts of this chapter explain, this is especially the case for a unipolar power because its position reduces the perceived costs and risks of new strategic policies, allowing room for determined actors to propose narrow or parochial goals that are suboptimal. Therefore, this book uses a neoclassical realist approach to examine the drivers of BMD and the effect it had on US security.

Realist theory proposes that states are rational as they calculate the consequences of each policy decision in terms of cost/benefit ratios and leaders act in ways that maximize national interests. This provides a rational ideal, providing a benchmark to measure deviations from it. Consequently, Hans Morgenthau tells us that: “a realist theory of international politics will guard against two popular fallacies: the concern with motives and the concern with ideological preferences.”16 Peace is maintained by a stable balance of power, as each rational state is deterred from initiating hostilities. States respond to concentrations of power by mobilizing their resources (internal balancing and relying upon themselves) and by co-operating with other powers, potentially creating an anti-hegemonic alliance (external balancing).17 The above provides a set of testable propositions by linking the structure of the system, national interests of states and their foreign policies.

Edwark Luttwak explains that under anarchy, state strategists have only one purpose: “to strengthen one’s side in the contention of nations,” with strategic theories becoming “the mode of survival of a society,” and physical arms the vehicle to implement them.18 According to this view, strategists should look to follow Karl von Clausewitz’s famous dictum that “war is only a continuation of state policy by other means,” with both offensive and defensive forces used in synergy to further state goals.19 At the extreme, realism and strategy can lead powerful states to seek a strategic utopia in a zero-sum environment. This would not be a utopia for all but a realpolitik utopia for the singular state that could achieve a strategic ideal by marrying an unstoppable offence to an impenetrable defense.20

Ultimately, Realists sought to aid policymakers when making effective and rational decisions. Deterrence theorists set out to do the same, and both complemented one another. Realism generated the assumptions and explained the forces that drove state action; deterrence provided the means through which to limit competition. But the two are not equivalent: realists presume eternal great power conflict; (nuclear) deterrence seeks the eternal absence of it, realists hold out small hope for significant co-operation amongst states; (many) deterrence theorists believe it lays the foundation for arms control, realists believe a balance of power system is essential; deterrent theo...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1 Deterrence Theory, World Order and Missile Defense
• 2 The Emergence of the Missile Defense Project after 1945
• 3 Holding the Line Against the Nuclear Warfighters? The Clinton Administration and the Containment of Rogue States
• 4 The Paradigm Shift: The George W. Bush Administration’s Embrace of Missile Defense
• 5 Finding the Middle Ground? The Obama Administration’s Consolidation and Expansion of Missile Defense
• 6 Destabilizing Great Power Relations: Russian and Chinese Hard Balancing against US Missile Defense
• 7 The Contours of the Missile Defense Debate in the Twenty-first Century
• 8 The Persistence of the Missile Defense Project: Domestic and Systemic Drivers
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index