The Islamic State in the Post-Modern World

The Political Experience of Pakistan

Louis D. Hayes

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781472412621
• eBook ISBN: 9781317026914
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The Islamic State in the Post-Modern World is a study of the political development of Pakistan. This study consists of three parts. The first addresses the concept of the 'state' as it has evolved historically. The approach is comparative and involves a brief review of Islamic political theory. The second part of this section is the modern state, i.e., the Westphalian model. The territorial state is still the standard although it has been evolving in new directions for some time. The second section focuses on the creation of Pakistan as an experiment in bridging the gulf between the demands of the modern state and the philosophical-spiritual attraction of the Islamic model. In addition to constitutional issues, the discussion also includes political forms, i.e., the machinery of daily government and the appropriateness of democratic methods, elections, legislative process, and political parties, to achieve Islamic ends. The third part considers international issues from the beginning of the twenty-first century especially the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite its 'partnership' role with the US in the war on terror, Pakistan has been consistently marginalized. Pakistan's problems are exacerbated by the conflict over Kashmir, a vestigial remnant of Pakistan's continuous, and largely unsuccessful, efforts at self-identification.

Chapter 1 Conceptualizing the State

DOI: 10.4324/9781315556536-2

The purpose of this chapter is to define the key terminology that will be employed in the discussion that follows. It is important to be as precise as possible as confusion over the meaning of words compromises the quality of the end product.

The State

Evidence suggests that the species homo sapiens has always been a social animal, gathering into groups for protection and efficiency. Even the earliest and most primitive of these societies had some kind of political organization. The most elementary of these, the nuclear family, served biological needs and improved the prospects for survival of primitive man. Within the family, roles and responsibilities were assigned according to age and gender. Thus, families were, and indeed continue to be so today, miniature political systems. To enhance the general welfare, families grouped together to form clans and tribes. The functioning of these groups required not only a division of labor but a process for making decisions affecting the entire group, i.e., politics.

Over time, these social organizations grew in size and complexity. To protect the group and promote its collective interests, functionally specific roles developed. These include protection (military roles), survival (economic roles), spirituality (religious roles), and stability (management roles). When these roles were regularized over time, they became institutionalized. With the institutionalization of a variety of social roles, a political system or “polity” exists. Basically, the combination of a society (a functionally integrated group of people), the polity (that group of people organized in a decision-making process), and a set of rules rationalizing its existence (a constitution) together entail the “state.”

The term “state” has been used in many different ways depending upon historical and geographical contexts. The way the term “modern state” is used today is of recent origin and largely Western in derivation. Before the modern state came into existence in recognized form in the middle of the seventeenth century, the state was conceptually vague and structurally imprecise in most places. Basically it was associated with the authority (or coercive power) of the ruler. If this ruler were a conqueror, his rule might extend over vast territory, at least nominally. The extent to which the ruler actually ruled, i.e., governed, was probably minimal. Among these acts of government were maintaining order, raising revenue, fighting wars, and illustrating the grandeur of the ruler through such displays as buildings and pageantry. But for the average person, the idea and reality of the state was something abstract and functionally distant if it existed at all.

Authority and Legitimacy

For the state to work, no matter how rudimentary or imperfect, requires the articulation of two constructs: authority and legitimacy. While the two are closely related, they deal with two distinct issues. Authority is a psychological matter, a value consideration regarding the nature of rule (command) and claims to exercise it. This exercise is considered just or correct. Where authority comes from, while generating frequent arguments, does not really matter so long as those affected by it accept its existence. In the primitive group, members accept, submit to, the authority of the leader to make decisions affecting everyone. Challenging the leader does not, necessarily, question his authority, rather his person. Someone else wants to be leader; asserting a superior claim to authority.

Another fundamental concept, and one closely related to authority is legitimacy. Authority applies to regime; legitimacy applies to government. Legitimacy is a condition, a state of affairs. It is evidenced by the acceptance of the operation of the political process and a demonstrated willingness to live with and abide by the decisions (rules) made within it. While authority is philosophical, legitimacy is behavioral. According to Reinhard Bendix:

Effective authority thus depends upon cumulative, individual acts of compliance or confidence. Those in authority proceed on the assumption that the requisite compliance or confidence will be forthcoming; it is only on this basis that the policeman can hope to order a crowd or the bank can invest its funds for long periods of time. Public good will in these cases consist in the willingness to let the policeman or the bank proceed; and these authorities do so on the assumption that they possess as implicit mandate (or credit) which will become manifest through the public’s willingness to let them proceed.¹

1 Reinhard Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship: Studies of Our Changing Social Order. Garden City; Doubleday and Co., 1969, 24. Also see Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. Garden City: Doubleday, 1963, 64.

Legitimacy does not mean all actions of government are approved or liked by everyone, but it does mean there is a predisposition to abide by the commands of government because they are considered rightful, and obedience is considered morally and legally obligatory. Legitimacy requires a close correspondence between the goals of the rulers and the expectations of the ruled. Should the citizenry become significantly disenchanted with the activities and policies of government, the probability of disobedience is likely to increase. The resulting disorder could bring on a legitimacy crisis if not corrected. A crisis of legitimacy does not necessarily compromise authority, but if it endures it can have a corrosive effect. People begin to lose confidence not only in the government, but, upon the philosophical foundation upon which it rests. Democracies have the advantage of a built-in mechanism to correct legitimacy crises. They are called elections.

Legitimacy involves acts of governance and is determined by the response to such acts by the governed. The appropriate exercise of authority is legitimate, although not necessarily welcome. The police officer has the authority (note the importance of symbols) to stop a vehicle but to take things from the driver is not legitimate. Legitimacy can be compromised by failure to exercise authority, exercising it improperly, or exceeding it.

Both authority and legitimacy may encounter “crises.” An authority crisis exists when the governed no longer accept the basis of the ruler’s claim to make and execute decisions. An authority crisis is fundamental; it is the manifestation of a failed state. For example, the democracy movement in Europe denied the authority of the king based on his claim to divine right. The regime of the monarchy was challenged by a group making the argument that authority resides with those over whom it is exercised, thus the authoritative basis of the political system based on the royal claim to divine right was threatened. When the “democrats” pressed their challenge, the incompatibility of the two points of view escalated with each side resorting to force and violence eventually resulting in civil war. When the governed effectively denied his claim, the king’s authority vanished.

A legitimacy crisis occurs when there is a prolonged or egregiously inappropriate exercise of authority, as perceived by the governed. An example of this would be police brutality. While police misbehavior rarely brings down a regime, it compromises governing effectiveness. Prolonged legitimacy crises can corrode the integrity of authority, eventually undermining it. The ineptitude of the French ruling class, for example, led to the French Revolution.

Authoritative relationships exist in all political systems. The capacity to make rules and issue instructions must exist somewhere or else there would be no organization and no society. Rules and instructions work or are effective because they are based on something other than the threat of sanctions or penalties or the promise of rewards. Force is relevant in rule application and compliance only to the extent that it deters disobedience and punishes those on the margins of the social order who are disinclined to abide by the rules. The act of governance occurs (and works) because of an implicit or explicit acceptance of an argument justifying its existence. According to Carl Friedrich, the issuance of commands by those in authority “possess the potential of reasoned elaboration—they are ‘worthy of acceptance.” Rule does not just happen; it occurs as a result of conscious acts. The justification for these acts may be simple or complex, and several competing ones may exist at the same time. If authority is to be effective, however, it must be accepted by the members of the community, i.e., the ruled. Authority exists in practice when in the minds of the governed it is justified or appropriate. Force may be used to insure compliance by the marginal few. But if general compliance depends on force, then an authoritative relationship between the rulers and the ruled does not exist and the system will not work, at least not very efficiently or for very long.

There are three basic questions regarding authority in any political system_ the first is where is authority located and more fundamentally, what is the rationale justifying it? Or, put in simpler terms, where is the claim to rulership located (in God, the king, or the people?) and why is this acceptable? The second is by whom is authority exercised or, who governs (men, property owners, clergy)? The third is how is authority exercised: on the basis of what, unanimity, majority rule? If governance is to work, there must be answers to these three questions or a state of anarchy exists or in the Western tradition a “state of nature.” The sovereign, i.e., the highest authority, rules only so long as the governed accept it. Once they deny it, the authority ceases to exist. The ruler may impose his will by force, but that does not constitute an authoritative relationship.

While opinion on the location and rationalization of authority is never unanimous, to the extent there is a consensus, the political system will have at least the potential of being orderly and effective. But serious differences over the nature of authority and its location will mean the political process, which must be based on some consensus, will be unable to function or will have difficult doing so.

The first issue concerns the location of authority and the rationale justifying it. Throughout much of history, rulers have claimed their authority derives from God. European rulers claimed authority by “divine right.” The Puritan theocrats in early America claimed to be an “elect of God.” Some secular doctrines are similar to religions in their appeal to an abstract “higher authority.” Marxist-Leninist thought possessed characteristics of scripture. Under the doctrine of party infallibility, Soviet Communists located authority in the Party. In Islam, the concept “Allah is sovereign in all things” is inconsistent with the modern doctrine of state sovereignty.²

2 Calvert, John. Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010, 215.

This raises a second issue. Who is to exercise authority and what is the validity of the claim? How does the king come to have a divine appointment? Where is the evidence that God has made such an appointment? That authority can be inherited is philosophically weak. What are the criteria for being an “elect” of God? And who decides what the criteria are and if they are being met? The same applies to Communists and other advocates of elite doctrines. And what of those who do not subscribe to the doctrine? Should non-Muslims be subject to Islamic law? The fact that there will never be unanimity on a doctrine justifying the location of authority in specific hands leads inevitably to the idea that it is equally shared. Each person counts for one and no more than one. But even here, some people will be left out. For a long time the franchise was limited to property owners and to men and only white men at that. Today, the only “reasonable” limits apply to age (but how old?) and the mentally incompetent (but how determined?).

The third issue is a practical matter. How is authority to be exercised; how are authoritative decisions to be made? If the highest authority, i.e., sovereignty, is located in the king then any of his decisions are authoritative. But if sovereignty is located in more than one person, given differences of opinion, how are decisions to be made? Given the fact that unanimity in all matters is unlikely, the only alternative is proportionality. Should decisions require a two-thirds or three-fourths approval? Majority rule seems the most logical alternative. The problem here is majority tyranny; exploiting or suppressing the minority. There is no perfect answer. The majority should act with fairness, of course. The majority should not act if the minority is willing to fight about it. Today the favored approach is a lengthy list of civil liberties and judicial processes designed to protect against majority excess.

There are several ways by which authority can be established. One is tradition. Traditional authority endures over time and emerges in a symbiotic relationship with the social value system. The mandate of heaven doctrine in China and its association with Confucian social values is a good example. Doctrines of authority, of course, have to adapt to changing social values. France in the late eighteenth century and Russia in the early twentieth century displayed a disconnect between the philosophical foundations of the monarchical regime and evolving social and political values. As a result both were overthrown and new regimes installed.

Authority can also derive from leader-follower relationships. A sense of moral obligation to do the leaders bidding induces obedience.³ This obligation is perceived as long-standing and mutually binding.⁴ While this authority is not always articulated in detail, it is rationalized in that, if asked, leaders and followers would have little difficulty explaining their actions. The relationship between samurai warriors and their leader was based on an elaborate ethical and mythological system, called bushido. Political and ideological issues outside this interpersonal context have little significance for these individuals. Their political system is microcosmic. Leaders and followers have little direct connection to larger institutional authority questions. Leader-follower authority patterns, which are characteristic of tribal systems, inhibit the development of a broader base of popular support for regime legitimacy. Leader-follower authority patterns encompass much smaller constituencies requiring a focused base of support. In fact, these smaller constituencies may be threatened and destabilized by participation in a larger political universe. A larger and more diverse political community dilutes the personal quality of the leader-follower relationship which is not necessarily replaced by a broader authority consensus.

3 Karl D. Jackson, Traditional Authority, Islam, and Rebellion: A Study of Indonesian Political Behavior. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, xix. 4 Jackson, Traditional Authority, Islam, and Rebellion, 186.

Power

Power and authority are frequently confused or used interchangeably. However, they are fundamentally different. Authority is the acceptance of just rule. Power is a phenomenon where one actor A gets another actor B to do X, which is something B would not otherwise do. Power does not actually exist as does authority; it is an event. Terms like military power and economic power are used frequently but they are incorrect and misleading. The appropriate term would be capability, i.e., objective resources. Rulers frequently get into trouble because they think their capabilities will produce desired results, i.e. achieve “X.” The US had an enormous military capability advantage during the Vietnam war but still failed to achieve its objective. In this sense it lacked power.

Regime

Upon the philosophical foundation rationalizing authority, must be built a “regime.” As used here the term “regime” refers to the configuration of political institutions within a state that exists at a given time. These usually have longer life spans than the people who have the roles within them. These institutions include such things as bureaucracy, law enforcement, and the military. The institutionalized roles that make up the regime are abstractions, they are offices or positions usually carrying some sort of title. This is the configuration of institutions by means of which authority is exercised. When there is a close correspondence between the regime and authority, the political system will operate more effectively than if there is an inconsistency between the two. Governing effectiveness and political stability will be adversely affected if the institutions are not based upon an authority consensus, or are acting inconsistent with authority. For example, most Muslims accept the idea that authority derives from Allah via the Qur’an. But basing a regime upon this idea has proven difficult. As a result, political instability has been a common feature of many countries in the Muslim world.

Government

Government means the people who actually exercise the authority of the state at a given time. They are the ones who perform the activities that are required by the institutions of the regime. Regimes endure; governments change frequently. For the most part, these people occupy formal roles, i.e., offices. From time to time the government may include citizens engaged in the act of voting. But the ongoing political business of the state is the function of “officers” duly appointed. By what means this “due appointment” come...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half-Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• Introduction
• 1 Conceptualizing the State
• 2 The State in Historical Perspective
• 3 Islamic Models of the State
• 4 A Homeland for Muslims
• 5 Constitutional Dilemmas
• 6 Toward an Islamic State
• 7 Praetorianism
• 8 The Islamic State and International Relations
• 9 The Islamic State in the Twenty-First Century
• Bibliography
• Index