Somaesthetics: A Pragmatist Aesthetic Approach
In the late 1990s, American pragmatist philosopher Richard Shusterman founded a new philosophical discipline that aimed at the cultivation of the body: âsomaesthetics,â which offers an understanding of the relationship between mind and body. Shusterman defines the body as âthe soma that is both an object in the world and a subject that perceives the world including its own bodily formâ (âBody and the Artsâ 2). He explains:
The term âsomaâ indicates a living, feeling, sentient body rather than a mere physical body that could be devoid of life and sensation, while the âaestheticâ in somaesthetics has the dual role of emphasizing the somaâs perceptual role (whose embodied intentionality contradicts the body/mind dichotomy) and its aesthetic uses both in stylizing oneâs self and in appreciating the aesthetic qualities of other selves and things.
(Body Consciousness 1)
Shusterman builds upon the notion that âperception, language, understanding, and behavior all necessarily rely on a contextual background ⊠in order to achieve their effective meaning and directionâ (Thinking 17). There are three basic branches of somaesthetics: First, analytic somaesthetics examines the impact of epistemological, ontological, and sociopolitical issues relating to our âbodily perceptions and practices and their function in our knowledge and construction of realityâ (Performing Live 141); second, pragmatic somaesthetics not only presupposes the theoretical branch but prescribes various methods to enhance somatic awareness as a means of changing or remaking the body (142)1; and third, practical somaesthetics applies somatic awareness and experiential embodiment for âheightened somatic sensibility and masteryâ (153), used in practices such as Zen meditation, yoga, Alexander Technique, and Feldenkrais Method.2
Shusterman further classifies the branch of pragmatic somaesthetics into three dimensions: representational, experiential, and performative somaesthetics. Representational somaesthetics orientates itself toward external appearance, dealing with the bodyâs surface forms. On the other hand, experiential somaestheticsâ orientation is toward inner experience. It aims âat making us feel better in both senses of that ambiguous phrase: to make the quality of our somatic experience more satisfying and also to make it more acutely perceptiveâ (âDesigning for Interactive Experienceâ 21.3.2). These two disciplines are not mutually exclusive; instead, they work interdependently. The third dimension, performative somaesthetics, concentrates primarily on improving inner and/or outer strength, well-being, or skill. Depending on the goal, whether, for external appearances or inner senses of power and skill, the performative discipline may be linked to or assimilated into the representational or experiential dimensions. Furthermore, all three categories of pragmatic somaesthetics interconnect with both theory and practice, enhancing ânot only our discursive knowledge of the body but also our lived somatic experience and performanceâ (Performing Live 21), see Figure 1.1.
Analytic Somaesthetics
On a sociopolitical level, somaesthetics brings the understanding of the encoded somatic habits imposed by hierarchies of power enforced by laws and social norms; for example, how a woman should walk, speak, etc. (Performing Live 140). Shusterman contends with Foucault that the ârepressive identities that are encoded and sustained in our bodies ⊠can be challenged by alternative somatic practicesâ (Shusterman âFoucaultâ 535).3 Shusterman explains:
As personal feelings of strength and self-awareness feed into more collective feelings of power and solidarity, so individual efforts of consciousness-raising and empowerment through somaesthetics (especially when undertaken with an awareness of the wider social contexts that structure oneâs bodily life) can fruitfully contribute to the larger political struggles whose results will shape the somatic experience of women in the future.
(Body Consciousness 99)
In addressing how somaesthetics can help women to âcultivate a sense of power and consciousness,â Shusterman examines Simone de Beauvoirâs somatic philosophy, focusing on her two major works, The Second Sex (1949) and The Coming of Age (1970). In considering âher problematic relationship to somatic cultivationâ in relation to the different categories of pragmatic somaesthetics, he finds that âperformative-representational somaesthetics activities oriented toward displaying power, skill, and an attractively dynamic self-presentation should promote Beauvoirâs goal of promoting womenâs confidence for engaging in greater action in the worldâ (Body 80, 90). Hence, this book contends that control of the body experienced by the comedia actors helped them not only develop characters on stage, but also in their daily lives.
Shusterman studies Beauvoirâs contribution to analytical somaesthetics and focuses on her âambiguity,â which he regards as a key concept in her philosophy. He believes that Beauvoirâs âcase for womanâs personhood is portrayed as even more problematically divided, because woman, under patriarchy, is not merely torn between body and consciousness but divided within her body itselfâ (Body 82). Consequently, Shusterman suggests, âsuch somatic and social subordination is, moreover, incorporated in the bodily habits of these dominated subjects who thus unconsciously reinscribe their own sense of weakness and dominationâ (Body 78). Feminist theorists have long argued that bodily practices had an effect on womenâs domination, and scholars, such as Anne J. Cruz, present a case for the politics of the female body in early modern Spanish literature.4
In somaesthetics, rethinking the Cartesian notion that separates the mind from the body is essential to the understanding of actor and audience bodily reaction. Hippocrates (460â370 BC), who first attributed an individualâs psychological and physical behavior to the four humors, begins a philosophy of body/mind connectivity that is continued by early modern European theorists who believed that passions belonged both to the body and soul. With the increased interest in cognitive studies, we now find multiple approaches to theater and performance studies that focus on âembodiment spectatorship,â such as Bruce McConachieâs work on cognitive approaches to spectatorship (Engaging Audiences 2008) and McConachie and F. Elizabeth Hart (Performance and Cognition 2006), and essays on audience embodiment found in Affective Performance (2013), edited by Nicola Shaughnessy. In comedia studies, Catherine Connor-Swietlicki shows how the âmirror neuronsâ are interconnected with the bodyâs response to performance.5 Whether reading or actively watching a performance, âour minds are always dependent on our bodies, their brains and on our individual capacities to experience and interact with everything outside usâ (âEmbodyingâ 10).6 Rhonda Blairâs study The Actor, Image, and Action: Acting and Cognitive Neuroscience applies cognitive science and practical techniques to the acting process, highlighting the âpervasive effect that Stanislavsky and his heirs have had on the US view of what acting is and how it should be taughtâ (10). In view of these recent studies, it is important to implement a cognitive approach to comedia studies in order to shift away from textual accounts of the comedia (which result in an incomplete perspective of early modern Spanish drama that leaves aside essential performative aspects), and embrace an embodied view that considers the fundamental aspects of audience embodiment.
For Shusterman, somaesthetics offers pragmatic practices as a means to enrich embodied experiences and somatic awareness, useful in examining art and performance. He suggests that âon the basic sensorimotor level of perception, if we release from the stress of chronic voluntary muscular contractions, the increased muscle relaxation will allow for heightened sensitivity to stimuli and therefore provide for sharper perception and deeper learningâ (âArt as Dramatizationâ 372), somaesthetic practices that extend beyond the neurosciences of mirror neurons.
Taking into consideration recent studies on mirror neurons, Shusterman examines performance techniques used by the great master of Noh Theater Zeami Motokiyo in KakyĆ (âA Mirror Held to the Flowerâ 1424):
While not concentrating especially on where he is placing his hands and feet, âthe actor looks in front of him with his physical eyesâ so that he can see the other actors and the audience and thereby harmonize his performance with the full theatrical environment; âbut his inner concentration must be directed to the appearance of his movements from behind.â In other words, the actor is performing with an explicit, reflective image of himself, not only his internal image of his somatic bearing (his proprioceptive sense of balance, position, muscle tension, expressiveness, grace, and so forth) but also the image of how he senses he appears to the audience.
(âBodyâ 140)7
Thus, Zeami emphasizes âself-reflectionâ as part of the actorâs preparation of performance skills in Noh. In other words, the reflection in the mirror of our memory is what gives us our âIâ, explained more in detail in the following section.
Shusterman offers three possible strategies for achieving âself-reflection.â The first technique involves the actor practicing movements in front of a mirror or a set of mirrors, in order to observe the back of his body. By active observation, the actor becomes aware of his posture, movement, and changes in equilibrium, and hence âshould be able to infer from his proprioceptive feelings what his posture from the back would look like in actual performance (without using any mirrors), even though he does not strictly see himself from the backâ (âBodyâ 141). The practice of using mirrors to improve oneâs physical behavior was seen in seventeenth-century Western theater as well. Speaking through his character Betterton in The Life of Mr. Thomas Betterton (1710), Charles Gildon (1665â1724) suggests a similar exercise, recommending âextensive practice before a mirror to perfect âthe whole Body likewise in all its Postures and Motionsââ (Roach 55).8 The Italian singer and actor Cavaliere Nicolini Grimaldi (1673â1732), also known as Nicolino, prepared himself for a performance by exercising daily in front of a mirror âto practice deportment and gestureâ (Roach 68).9 Shusterman considers this exercise âtransmodal training through vision and proprioception,â which is connected âthrough the visuo-motor mirror-neuron system.â He explains:
The visuo-motor mirror neurons discharge both when an individual performs a particular action of motor movement and when the individual simply sees such actions done by others. Such neurons can help explain our natural abilities to imitate and understand others and to communicate with them. But they also provide a way to explain our basic powers of integrating visual and motor-proprioceptive perceptions. (141â42)
In the context of early modern Spanish studies, Catherine Connor-Swietlicki, reminds us that whether reading or actively watching a performance, âour minds are always dependent on our bodies, their brains and on our individual capacities to experience and interact with everything outside usâ (âEmbodyingâ 10). She proposes that we examine the bodyâs response to performance in relation to mirror neurons, a type of brain cell that responds both when a person acts and when the person observes the same action performed by another, which leads us to the second technique, âother orientedâ or âtranspersonal.â
This second exercise entails the actor taking the role of the audience, âempatheticallyâ observing another individualâs movements, which would then stimulate ânot only areas of the brain similar to those involved in the movement itself but also to activate muscular and other physiological responses related to such a movement or actionâ (Shusterman Body 142). In early modern Spain, exercises in observation were practiced by preachers in preparation for their âroleâ on the pulpit. For example, for exercises on power of persuasion, Fray Luis de Granadaâs Ecclesiasticae Rhetoricae (1575; Ecclesiastical Rhetoric) employs a âtranspersonalâ technique, advising preachers to pay attention to the animated gestures of the old ladies arguing in the market in order to imitate their movements on the pulpit (Flor 146). Others, such as Fray Diego Niseno, maintain that âthe preacher, like the actor, must excel in portraying different characters âon stageâ to produce calculated responses in his listeners and take special care not to destroy the illusions he creates at the end of the performanceâ (Barnes-Karol 60). In addition, this exercise expected priests to produce a visual image of how they would look like before depicting âtheir charactersâ onstage, which corresponds to the third category.
The third technique requires the actor to rely on his own âproprioceptive self-observation of his posture or movement,â as opposed to mirrors or input from others, to produce a âvisual image in his mind of how his pos...