Small States in Europe

Challenges and Opportunities

Robert Steinmetz, Anders Wivel

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9780754677826
• eBook ISBN: 9781317054306
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The effects of recent institutional change within the European Union on small states have often been overlooked. This book offers an accessible, coherent and informative analysis of contemporary and future foreign policy challenges facing small states in Europe. Leading experts analyze the experiences of a number of small states including the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Iceland, Austria and Switzerland. Each account, written to a common template, explores the challenges and opportunities faced by each state as a consequence of EU integration, and how their behaviour regarding EU integration has been characterized. In particular, the contributors emphasize the importance of power politics, institutional dynamics and lessons of the past. Innovative and sophisticated, the study draws on the relational understanding of small states to emphasize the implications of institutional change at the European level for the smaller states and to explain how the foreign and European policies of small states in the region are affected by the European Union.

PART I
Small States in Europe: Defining the Issues at Stake

Chapter 1
Introduction

Robert Steinmetz and Anders Wivel1

The aim of this book is to identify the most important challenges and opportunities influencing small state foreign policy-making in Europe today and to explore how small European states have responded to these challenges and opportunities. We seek to identify the most important factors that influence small state foreign policy in Europe and discuss the costs and benefits of each different foreign policy strategy. In essence, the book seeks to answer four general questions about small states in Europe: What are the major opportunities and challenges facing small state foreign policy in Europe today? How have Europe’s small states responded to these opportunities and challenges? Why did small states respond the way they did? What are the costs and benefits of the most important small state foreign policy strategies in Europe today?

Small states in Europe have seen their geopolitical environment and, in many cases, their political and administrative structures, fundamentally changed over the past decades. The end of the Cold War in 1989 and the ensuing collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the intensification of the European integration process in the early 1990s, the consecutive enlargements of the European Union in 1995, 2004 and 2007, as well as the ongoing process of globalisation have all transformed the nature of the foreign policy challenges in Europe. At the same time, these changes in the external environment of Europe’s small states have served as an important cause of domestic political adaptation (cf. Hanf and Soetendorp 1998). The societies in small states in Central and Eastern Europe reinvented themselves as a consequence of the revolutions following the Cold War. The newly constructed small states that succeeded the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, faced a particular set of challenges, while at the same time their establishment helped to transform the geopolitics of Europe. Small states in Western Europe have seen domestic restructuring as well, often adapting more rapidly to global economic and technological trends than the European great powers.

Even though the literature on small states – and particularly the literature on small states in Europe – has been growing rapidly since the end of the Cold War, there have been few attempts to go beyond single country studies and provide an overview of the general pattern of challenges, opportunities and strategies. Now, as in the past, the study of small states is plagued by a lack of cumulative insights and coherent debate. There is no agreement on how we should define a small state, what similarities we would expect to find in their foreign policies, or how small states influence international relations (Antola and Lehtimäki 2001: 13-20; Knudsen 2002: 182-5; Archer and Nugent 2002: 2-5).

This book takes one step in the direction of providing a more coherent picture of small states in Europe by including a number of analyses of small states and the challenges they face in contemporary European politics. In order to focus our analyses and facilitate comparisons, we delimit our study of small state foreign policy in Europe in three important ways. First, we understand foreign policy as ‘the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations’ (Hill 2002: 3). Thus, official policy, as stated by actors representing the government in various public sources (such as official statements and speeches), are our primary focus in this volume. Second, we focus on small state policies towards the European Union (EU). Thus, rather than analysing all aspects of small state foreign policy in Europe, the contributors to this volume zoom in on how small states relate to developments in the EU. Finally, we focus on foreign policy output rather than foreign policy process. The contributors to this volume describe and explain policy positions, but they tell us only little about how policy is made or how policy-making in the EU is changing administrative procedures at the national level.2

The aim of the remaining part of this chapter is fourfold. First, based on a survey of the small state literature, we define what we mean by a ‘small state’. Second, we explain why the study of small states is important, in particular in a European context. Third, we outline the two fundamental approaches for small state foreign policy in Europe. Finally, we offer a brief introduction to the rest of the book.

What is a Small State?

‘Should small states be categorised along geographic, demographic or economic lines, or do institutions, resources, and power hold the key?’, ask Smith, Pace and Lee in a recent discussion of small states (Smith, Pace and Lee 2005). Discussions about small states – both in practical politics and in academic debates – suffer from a number of ambiguities. To be sure, ongoing debate and lack of consensus on how to define ‘small state’ is not a problem per se. Despite the fogginess of the ‘small state’ concept, few people question that small states exist and that they share a number of common challenges (Christmas-Møller 1983; cf. Knudsen 2002). Moreover, consensus on how to define key concepts is more often the exception rather than the rule in the study of international relations. The lack of consensus over how to define key concepts such as the balance of power, security or even great powers has not – and should not – stop us from studying these important aspects of world politics (cf. Amstrup 1976). However, it does necessitate a brief discussion of how we define ‘small state’ for the purposes of this book and why we make this choice.

Typically small states are defined in terms of capabilities, i.e. the possession of – or rather the lack of – power resources in absolute or relative terms. Generally, capabilities are measured by reference to proxies such as population size, GDP, military expenditure etc. Three benefits follow from defining ‘small state’ in terms of capabilities. First, if we are to analyse the economic, administrative or military opportunities and limitations of a specific state, indications of absolute and relative capability are important, because they inform us of the absolute and relative limitations in these states’ capacity to handle different types of challenges. Second, an absolute and universal threshold between big and small states of e.g. a population size of 15 million people or a GDP of 500 billion Euros has the benefit of creating a clear and easily applicable definition of small states. The same can be said of a relative definition defining great powers as the top-10 in the world, or the top-5 in Europe – for example measured by reference to population size, GDP or military expenditure – and the rest as small states.3 Third, there is a vast amount of literature on both specific great powers and on the international system in general, which starts from a power possession definition.4 Using power possession as the point of departure for studies on small states would facilitate the integration of the study of great powers and small states with potential benefits for the study of foreign policy and international relations in general, e.g. through comparative studies of the challenges and opportunities for different types of states.

However, the power possession definition of small states has at least two important limitations. First, power is difficult to measure and its effects are almost impossible to distinguish from the calculations and perceptions of policy makers. Thus, the cut-off point between big and small states is rarely self-evident, and accordingly there is no consensus on what constitutes a small state in term of power possession. In contrast, the notion ‘small state’ is typically used to denote at least three different types of states: micro states, small states in the developed world and small states in the third world (Hey 2003: 2).5 Adding to the confusion, none of these categories are clear-cut, nor is there any agreement on how to define them. Micro states are sometimes defined as states with a population with less than 1 million inhabitants (Anckar 2004: 208), but at other times the threshold is set higher, e.g. 1.5 million inhabitants (Naseer Mohamed 2002: 1) or lower, e.g. 300,000 (Plischke 1977: 21) or 100,000 (Neumann and Gstöhl 2006: 6) or alternatively a micro state is simply viewed as characterised by ‘a size so diminutive as to invite comment’ (Warrington 1998: 102). Likewise, small states in the developed world have been defined using a number of different – often incompatible – criteria leading to confusion over how to know a small state when we see one. Thus, Väyrynen in a survey on the small state concept identifies two axes for defining small states (Väyrynen 1971). One axis focuses on whether the defining criteria for small states are objective, e.g. size of GDP or population, or subjective, e.g. the perceptions of domestic or foreign elites. The other axis focuses on whether the defining criteria are endogenous, i.e. internal characteristics of a country, or exogenous, i.e. the country’s relations with other states. As noted by Archer and Nugent, this typology remains relevant for the study of small states in Europe today (Archer and Nugent 2002: 2-3). Adding to the complexity, small states in the third world usually have much larger populations than what we term small states in the developed world, because ‘population size is taken as a proxy of a range of other economic characteristics – all of which are deemed to bestow particular vulnerabilities on small states’ (Heron 2008: 246). Thus, in his now classical study The Inequality of States, David Vital studies small states with ‘a) a population of 10-15 million in the case of economically advanced countries and b) a population of 20-30 million in the case of underdeveloped countries’ (Vital 1967: 8).

Vital’s attempt at a dual definition of small states in order to grasp the complexity resulting from very different historical, economic and political contexts of different types of small states discloses a second limitation of defining small states in accordance with their possession of material power: concepts like ‘small state’ and ‘great power’ often make most sense within a specific spatio-temporal context. The challenges and opportunities of small states in Europe have been transformed over time and today the challenges and opportunities of small states in Europe are very different from those faced by small states in Africa, Asia or Latin America.

Acknowledging this limitation, as well as the difficulties of measuring power and its consequences, we define a small state as the weak part in an asymmetric relationship (cf. Mouritzen and Wivel 2005). According to this definition a state may be weak in one relation, but simultaneously powerful in another. For instance, Romania is a great power in its relations with Moldova but a small state in its relations with Russia, and Sweden is a small state in the European Union but a great power in relation to the Baltic countries. Thus, we argue that being a small state is tied to a specific spatio-temporal context and that this context, rather than general characteristics of the state, defined by indicators such as its absolute population size or size of GDP relative to other states, is decisive for both the nature of challenges and opportunities and the small states’ answer to these challenges and opportunities.

What does it mean to be the weak part in an asymmetrical relationship? Small states are those states which are ‘stuck with the […] power configuration and its institutional expression, no matter what their specific relation to it is’ (Mouritzen and Wivel 2005: 4). For instance, in the Euro-Atlantic area the United States, Germany, France and Great Britain are considered great powers, because they are all able to change the conditions for policy-making in the area through their actions: Should the United States choose to move all of its troops from the European continent or to leave NATO, or should France choose to leave the EU or fundamentally change its policy within the EU, this would radically change these institutions and therefore conditions for policy-making in the region, but if Denmark left NATO or Austria fundamentally changed its policy within the EU, the consequences would mainly be felt by these small states themselves. Therefore, they cannot credibly threaten to leave, transform or destroy the institutional structures. For this reason they are expected to face a different set of challenges than the great powers.

In essence, our definition of small states is relational: smallness is defined through the relation between the state and its external environment. This definition deviates from the most commonly used definitions which tend to focus on the absolute or relative power of the state. Thus, following Mouritzen and Wivel, we shift the focus from the power that states possess to the power that they exercise (Mouritzen and Wivel 2005).6 From this point of departure, the authors of this book use the concept of small states as a ‘focusing device’ directing us towards interesting research puzzles stemming from ‘the experience of power disparity and the manner of coping with it’ (Knudsen 1996b: 5; cf. Gärtner 1993: 303; Rickli 2008; Thorhallsson and Wivel 2006; Wivel 2005: 395). Thus, ‘[s]mallness is, in this conception, a comparative and not an absolute idea’ (Hanf and Soetendorp 1998: 4). This brings to our attention a particular set of policy problems and foreign policy dilemmas and allows us to distinguish between issue areas, where the notion of small state is relevant, and issue areas, where it is not.

Why are Small States Important?

Small states are largely neglected in the study of international relations (cf. Neumann and Gstöhl 2006). The growth of International Relations (IR) as an academic discipline coincided with the Cold War, which led many researchers to focus on other issues. Superpower rivalry meant that most research efforts, not least in the United States, were focused on understanding and explaining the foreign and security policy of great powers and the problems they faced. The global character of the divides between East and West and North and South meant that theoretical IR debates often focused on the character of the international system and its general implications.7 In addition, early research efforts in the study of small states in the 1960s and 1970s failed to create a common research agenda – let alone a shared theoretical starting point. As noted in early assessments of the literature, there was ‘an astonishing lack of cumulation’ (Amstrup 1976: 178), and accordingly the study of small states in international relations was characterised by ‘coexistence without interdependence’ (Christmas-Møller 1983: 40).

The present world order has resulted in a renewed interest in how small states respond to international challenges, and which role they play in international security and organisations. There are three reasons why studying small states is important in understanding contemporary international relations in general and European politics in particular. First, the unipolar character of the present world order means that all states except the United States are now small states in the sense that ‘they are not in command of power resources sufficient to pursue dominant power politics’ (Kelstrup 1993: 162).8 The challenges and dilemmas traditionally faced by small states are now faced by most states in the international system. Therefore, the study of small states may serve as a source of information for all states on the consequences of being the weak part in an asymmetric relationship.

Second, small states today play a much more active role in international relations than in previous historical epochs (cf. Hey 2003; Knudsen 1996a; Løvold 2004). In economic affairs, small states have taken a leading role in reforming their societies within the context of a globalised world. Not necessarily because they have been more innovative than the larger states, but because the consequences of globalisation have materialised earlier and in a harsher form in small states than in larger ones. In security affairs, rather than just being consumers of security – the traditional role of small states in the past when the military defence of national territory dominated the security agenda and their survival could only be guaranteed by the great powers – small states now actively contribute to the production of security in various issue areas. As small states more actively seek to gain influence over international affairs, we need to know more about how and why they do it if we are to understand international relations. As summed up by Keohane, ‘[i]f Lilliputians can tie up Gulliver, or make him do their fighting for them, they must be studied as carefu...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half-Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of Tables
• List of Contributors
• Preface: About the Resilience of Small States
• Acknowledgements
• Part I Small States in Europe: Defining the Issues at Stake
• Part II The Challenges and Opportunities of Small European States
• Part III The Experience of Small States with the European Union
• Part IV Conclusion
• Index