EU-Russia Relations, 1999-2015

From Courtship to Confrontation

Anna-Sophie Maass

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• eBook ISBN: 9781317372660
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: American Government
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book traces the development of EU-Russia relations in recent years. It argues that a major factor influencing the relationship is the changing internal dynamics of both parties, in Russia's case an increasingly authoritarian state, in the case of the EU an increasing coherence in its foreign policy as applied to former Soviet countries which Russia regarded as interference in its own sphere. The book considers the impact of conflicts in Kosovo, Chechnya, Georgia and Ukraine, discusses the changing internal situation in both Russia and the EU, including the difficulties in overcoming fragmentation in EU policy-making, and concludes by assessing how the situation is likely to develop.

1
EU–Russian diplomacy during the Kosovo War

NATO’s intervention in Kosovo precipitated the most serious crisis in Russia’s relations with the West since the end of the Cold War. The rupture began with a symbolic gesture. No sooner had the first cruise missiles struck targets in Serbia on 24 March 1999 than the Russian Prime Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, aborted a visit to the United States. He ordered his plane to be turned around over the mid-Atlantic. By April, President Yeltsin was warning of the possibility of Russian military intervention and ‘a European war or even a world war’.¹ The seriousness of this threat became clear on 12 June, when a contingent of 200 Russian paratroopers seized Pristina’s airport before the arrival of NATO forces. The result was a protracted military stand-off between Russia and NATO.

This chapter seeks to explain why the breakdown of Russia’s relations with NATO and the US coincided with a remarkable development in cooperative EU–Russian diplomacy. At a time when both the EU and Russia were facing internal political and economic challenges, they realised their potential for cooperation when faced with the breakout of the Kosovo War. It was settled because of the establishment of a peace plan by Russia’s envoy for Kosovo, Viktor Chernomyrdin, and the Finnish president, Martti Ahtisaari, who negotiated on behalf of the EU.

The chapter argues that despite being the most severe crisis in Russia’s relations with the US and NATO since the end of the Cold War, the Kosovo conflict became a catalyst for significant EU–Russian cooperation due to three factors. First, in Russian policy-making circles the EU was perceived as a passive actor that was neither a belligerent power nor a focused diplomatic presence. In early March, this impression was reinforced by the lack of leadership in the EU following the sacking of the European Commission over a corruption scandal. While Russian policy-making circles were vociferous in their denunciation of an ‘aggressive’ NATO, the EU remained the acceptable face of the West at the height of the Kosovo crisis.

The second contributing factor was Germany’s Presidency of the European Council. Like Russia, Germany was opposed to a ground war. Hence, during Germany’s chairmanship of the European Council, Russian policymakers regarded the EU as the acceptable partner in the West before and during the Kosovo War, which facilitated EU–Russian diplomacy. At the same time, Germany had close ties with Russia. Since the severe economic crisis in Russia in 1998, Germany had been Russia’s largest foreign creditor. The close personal relationship between the German chancellor and chairman of the European Council Presidency, Gerhard Schroeder, and Yeltsin fostered EU–Russian cooperation.

Third, the Yeltsin administration was preoccupied with resolving domestic problems and thus faced two major difficulties in dealing with the Kosovo crisis on its own. Yeltsin was under threat from a nationalist-inclined State Duma which used the Kosovo War to whip up national condemnation of his administration. The State Duma instigated an impeachment process against Yeltsin in March. At the same time, Russia was facing the repercussions of its 1998 economic crisis. On both levels cooperation with the EU offered a way of defusing a war.

Laying the groundwork for EU–Russian collaboration

Being faced with the emerging international crisis in Kosovo, domestic political turmoil paired with economic problems in Russia and Yeltsin’s cordial relations with Schroeder enhanced the EU and Russia’s determination to develop a partnership. The EU–Russia summit in Moscow on 18 February 1999, the third to take place since the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) – the legal basis for EU–Russia relations – entered into force in 1997, laid the groundwork for the partners’ diplomacy before the Kosovo War. The summit’s joint statement proclaimed that an EU–Russian ‘partnership’, which initiated ‘common approaches to tackle the 21st century’s challenges, [was a] fundamental factor of peace and stability on the European continent’.² In the press conference, Schroeder characterised the summit as a ‘political sign’ of the willingness to engage in enhanced cooperation.³ As a way of contrasting Russia’s relations with the US with those with the EU, Yeltsin expressed his strong opposition to NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in front of Schroeder. He declared that in giving US President Clinton his opinion on the possibility of the US launching air-strikes against Serbia, he had warned that ‘we [would not] stand for this.… We [would not] let them touch Kosovo’.⁴

Yeltsin’s outspoken warning to NATO not to interfere in Kosovo stood in contrast to his political self-identification with the EU. He lamented that ‘regrettably the Russian Federation [was] not a member of the European Union’.⁵ Yeltsin’s friendly sentiments were reciprocated by Schroeder. He announced that Germany would be ‘Russia’s advocate’ [Anwalt] in the West during negotiations to reschedule Russia’s debt repayments.⁶ Russia’s economy at the beginning of the Kosovo War was characterised by trade deficits, the flight of capital in response to shrinking reserves in Russia’s central bank, as well as price increases, simultaneous decreases in salaries, the devaluation of the rouble, massive foreign debts and inflation.⁷ According to Boris Fyodorov, Russia’s former Finance Minister, ‘the government [was] basically bankrupt’.⁸

This auspicious dialogue between Schroeder and Yeltsin coincided with the first attempt by the Kosovo Contact Group to develop an ‘Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Governance’ in Rambouillet on 6 February. These talks, led by Contact Group members Germany, Italy, France, the US and the UK, aimed to negotiate by 19 February a three-year peace agreement that would guarantee autonomy to Kosovo.⁹ The negotiations, mediated by Boris Mayorski from Russia, Chris Hill representing the US, and the EU Special Representative on Kosovo, Dr Wolfgang Petritsch, broke down.¹⁰ According to Mayorski, the possibility of adopting an agreement was unlikely because the negotiators were ‘working under conditions [with] quite a high level of mistrust’.¹¹ Petritsch explained that the reason the negotiations broke down was that politicians in the former Yugoslavia would ‘rather be defeated than compromise’.¹² The continuation of talks in a further round of negotiations in Paris brought Kosovo to the brink of war due to the stalemate among the negotiators.¹³ On the last day of the negotiations, on 23 March, the US envoy Richard Holbrooke declared that an agreement between the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Yugoslav government regarding the deployment of a mission in Kosovo in compliance with UN security resolutions had been violated by Serb and Albanian military groups. As a result, Holbrooke stated that the interim peace agreement could not be implemented without the ‘presence of foreign military forces’.¹⁴

Meanwhile, the EU’s diplomatic role, which had been limited at the negotiations in Rambouillet and Paris, was further undermined by the resignation of the European Commission in March. A report from the European Court of Auditors provided evidence of missing EU funds, disloyalty, corruption and a lack of transparency.¹⁵ The European Commission resigned collectively on 15 March.¹⁶ The fact that the Commission stepped down at a time when the CFSP had not yet been developed undermined the EU’s capabilities in external relations. The post of EU High Representative of the CFSP, responsible for the coordination of EU foreign policy in cooperation with the current, past and future rotating European Council Presidencies and the European Commission, was not established until October 1999.¹⁷ Before this, European Commissioners responsible for this policy domain played a significant role in shaping EU foreign policy. Among those Commissioners was Hans van den Broek, who was responsible for coordination of the EU’s foreign affairs in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, foreign and security policy, and human rights.¹⁸ Van den Broek played an important role in managing EU external relations, especially with Russia. He represented the EU at some of the EU–Russia summits including that of February 1999.¹⁹ He also witnessed the entry into force of the EU–Russian PCA at the summit on 1 December 1997.²⁰

Although the EU reacted quickly to appoint an interim Commission the day after their resignation, its ability to act was limited. Under European Commission Vice President Michel Marin’s leadership, the interim Commission was merely in caretaker mode.²¹ It served until 13 September 1999, when new members were appointed. Nine days after the Commission’s resignation, the former Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi was appointed by European governments as the European Commission’s new president. His election was only endorsed by the European Parliament on 6 May.²²

The EU – the acceptable face of the West

Russia’s suspicions about NATO were heightened by the acc...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• List of abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1 EU–Russian diplomacy during the Kosovo War
• 2 Overcoming the ‘Chechnya Irritant’ in EU–Russia relations
• 3 Russia and the politics of EU eastern enlargement
• 4 The threat to EU–Russia relations of EU enlargement in the Orange Revolution
• 5 Towards confrontation: 2006–2008
• 6 The repercussions of EU diplomacy in Georgia
• 7 The point of no return? EU–Russia relations after the Euro-Maidan
• Conclusions
• Appendix: list of interviews
• Index