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1 Introduction
Analyzing IPBES functioning within the biodiversity regime complex and beyond
Marie Hrabanski and Denis Pesche
The creation of the Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) in 2012 can be seen as key step in international biodiversity governance. Since the 1980s, the neologism âbiodiversityâ has become a concept that increasingly encompasses various scales of life, from genes to ecosystems. Initially invented by conservation biologists to increase their say in policy decision making (Takacs, 1996), biodiversity is now a key concept for various disciplines, a central issue for some public policies and a specific field in global environmental governance. Biodiversity loss is still, nevertheless, a global trend mainly due to anthropogenic pressures (GBO3, 2010). More recently, the ecosystem service concept has gained influence in framing the issue regarding interactions between ecosystems and human wellbeing. The primary objective of IPBES is, âto strengthen the science-policy interface for biodiversity and ecosystem services for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, long-term human wellbeing and sustainable developmentâ (UNEP, 2012b). More than 20 years after the emergence of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), IPBES now illustrates the slow process of institutionalization of the biodiversity agenda in international governance. The complex institutional landscape of international biodiversity politics within which IPBES is now operating is often seen as deficient, fragmented and unstructured (Le Prestre and Martimort-Asso, 2004; Le Prestre, 2002; Young, 2008). The slow and difficult emergence of IPBES between 2008 and 2012 is both strange and surprising in the highly fragmented biodiversity governance context.
The literature on IPBES has been burgeoning since 2010. Most related publications were authored by scientists eager to promote this option for a new Platform (Larigauderie and Mooney, 2010; Duraiappah and Rogers, 2011; Perrings et al., 2011). Some of this literature on IPBES argues in favor of its role in coherent production and coordination based on scientific findings. Some authors claim to generate policy relevant information based on sound science and targeted observations (Larigauderie and Mooney, 2010). Biodiversity loss is often interpreted as a consequence of the provision of deficient information to decision makers. The science-policy process is often conceptualized as the integration of different elements such as research, monitoring, assessment and policy development with the aim of providing decision makers with suitable information to ensure the best responses (Perrings et al., 2011). While some authors emphasize the co-evolving nature of relations between science and policy (van den Hove, 2007; Jasanoff, 2004; Koetz, Farrell and Bridgewater, 2012), most IPBES-oriented literature shares a vision of more linear interactions between science and policy where scientists and other stakeholders provide knowledge for decision makers.
Another often discussed issue in the literature concerns the diversification of âbiodiversity knowledge-holdersâ. Some scholars highlight this issue as a challenge and an opportunity for improving biodiversity governance within IPBES. The key message is often to foster mechanisms able to combine this knowledge diversity within IPBES. But most of those publications were written before the official launch of the Platform in 2013 and combined both analytical and normative assumptions about how IPBES should be or should act (Van den Hove and Chabason, 2009; Turnhout et al., 2012; Goerg, Nesshöver and Paulsch, 2010; Vohland et al., 2011).
More distanced analysis focuses on the complexity and conflicting context of global governance on biodiversity issues (Morin et al., 2015; Vadrot, 2014). Other research has begun focusing on the actual functioning of IPBES concerning the issue of dealing with a plurality of knowledge on biodiversity issues (SoberĂłn and Peterson, 2015; Borie and Hulme, 2015). This book shares this analytical position and is based on the first years of the existence of IPBES. It is structured around two main research questions: How can the emergence of IPBES be explained in a context of fragmentation and complexity of global biodiversity governance? How does IPBES manage tensions between the openness ambition, the knowledge selection process and the production of global assessments by experts? Each chapter provides empirical and analytical elements to address these two main questions.
The next section provides a short description of IPBES and its roots. It explores the literature on global environmental governance and science-policy interactions so as to identify key issues to address the two questions raised in the book.
IPBES â roots and challenges of a new body in global environmental governance
IPBES â a brief history and functions
The challenge of assessing knowledge for policy-making decisions is a large part of any attempt to reduce the numerous uncertainties in global environmental governance. Global environmental assessments have multiplied at the international level since the 1980s. Climate change has been a pioneering element of this trend since the 1988 implementation of a permanent assessment process, i.e. IPCC,1 several years before the adoption of a an intergovernmental convention, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Rio, 1992). Contrary to the work on climate change, no permanent process for the assessment of knowledge on biodiversity questions was available.
The Global Biodiversity Assessment (GBA) (1993â1995) was conducted soon after the signing of CBD. However, in line with its qualification as an independent scientific exercise without any particular political mandate, GBA was not included in the intergovernmental process that started with CBD. The failure of GBA to gain recognition contributed to the motives underlying the launch of a second global biodiversity assessment initiative â the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) (2001â2005) â but this time care was taken to associate several international organizations in its design and implementation (Pesche et al., 2013), while ensuring that it would remain an âindependentâ exercise. From 2005, MA and its follow-up were accompanied by a series of activities and initiatives building on the MA findings, such as The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity study (TEEB), the Ecosystem Management Programme (EMP), led by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and the Programme on Ecosystem Change and Society coordinated by the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) (UNEP, 2010).
MA and its results have influenced research agendas (Carpenter et al., 2009) and prompted the expectation âthat there would then be an exploration of the possibility of creating an ongoing IPCC-like process, which should take into account policy makers and stakeholdersâ. MA thus represents an essential milestone in the genesis of IPBES. Meanwhile, in 2005, the French government launched a three-year consultation process in the framework of the International Mechanism of Scientific Expertise on Biodiversity (IMoSEB), and the most important IMoSEB deliverable was the recommendation that a new âintergovernmental [body] with scientific credibility, political legitimacy and relevanceâ was needed (Babin et al., 2008).
In this context, the debate within CBD on establishing a framework for ensuring the regular production of global assessments of the state of biodiversity worldwide remained focused on how to do so and under what conditions. COP Decision IX/152 (2008) was the beginning of a five-year negotiation processes under the auspices of UNEP â involving stakeholders from more than 100 countries, scientific communities and NGOs â with the aim of deciding whether and potentially how to strengthen the science-policy interface for biodiversity. Negotiations leading to the decision that a new body should be established included three Intergovernmental and Multi-Stakeholder Meetings, which took place in 2008, 2009 and 2010, and two Plenary sessions in 2011 and 2012. It officially led to the creation of IPBES in 2012: âThe Platformâs objective is to strengthen the science-policy interface for biodiversity and ecosystem services for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, long-term human wellbeing and sustainable developmentâ (UNEP, 2012a), âFocusing on government needs and based on priorities established by the Plenary, the Platform responds to requests from governments, including those conveyed to it by multilateral environmental agreements related to biodiversity and ecosystem services as determined by their respective governing bodiesâ.
Four main functions were therefore identified for IPBES. First, âthe Platform identifies and prioritizes key scientific information needed for policy makers at appropriate scales and catalyzes efforts to generate new knowledge by engaging in dialogue with key scientific organizations, policymakers and funding organizations, but should not directly undertake new researchâ. Second, âthe Platform performs regular and timely assessments of knowledge on biodiversity and ecosystem services and their interlinkages, which should include comprehensive global, regional and, as necessary, subregional assessments and thematic issues at appropriate scales and new topics identified by science and as decided upon by the Plenaryâ. Third, âthe Platform supports policy formulation and implementation by identifying policy relevant tools and methodologies (âŠ) for decision makersâ. Fourth, âthe Platform prioritizes key capacity-building needs to improve the science-policy interface at appropriate levels and then provides and calls for financial and other support for the highest-priority needs related directly to its activitiesâ (UNEP, 2012a).
Discussions during the first years of the slow IPBES emergence process were centered on the question of whether and how the science-policy interface should be strengthened. In a complex and sometimes hostile context, IPBES advocates put forward convincing arguments about the relevance of the new Platform. Then, in the two Plenary meetings (2011â2012), the issue of the modalities and institutionalization of the future intergovernmental platform was addressed, highlighting the plurality of visions and interests on the way of governing IPBES. The openness ambition of the Platform was enacted and concerned both the openness to stakeholders (indigenous people, NGOs, private sector, etc.) and to social sciences (economics, anthropology, etc.). The first question addressed in this book concerns the difficulties and controversial context of the IPBES emergence: How can the emergence of IPBES be explained in a context of fragmentation and complexity of global biodiversity governance? The second question explores the impact of the openness strategy on the functioning of the Platform: How does IPBES manage tensions between the openness ambition, the knowledge selection process and the production of global assessments by experts?
Two main scientific-inspired approaches are used to answer these questions. The first approach is derived from the international relations field and deals with IPBES interactions with other Conventions and multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). The IPBES objective to produce assessments on the biodiversity issue is in a context of growing institutional complexity at the international level. The second approach mobilizes both science and political science studies to explore interactions between science and policy in global environmental governance. Part of this literature focuses on the procedural aspects rather than the substance of the results of so-called science-policy interfaces and suggests that attention should be paid to the social conditions necessary for science to become relevant for policy making. The following section provides further detail on those two approaches.
Beyond IPBES â a new platform in a context of fragmentation and complexity of global biodiversity governance
The idea of IPBES was discussed and the Platform was finally set up in a specific international environmental political setting where there is growing concern about the fragmentation and interplay between environmental regimes (Young, 1996; Young, 2008; Biermann et al., 2009). The rationale for creating IPBES was partly founded on the necessity for coordination and coherence outlined in a complex array of conventions, agreements and institutions dealing with biodiversity issues. The coordination of science has been put forward as a key condition for an âefficientâ IPBES (Larigauderie and Mooney, 2010). More broadly, the idea of an IPBES was strongly motivated by the ambition for coordination of the Platform for various purposes: capacity building, scientific assessment, policy recommendations, etc. (UNEP, 2009; Vadrot, 2014). We formulate the hypothesis that this need for coordination, backed by frequent references to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), is a key argument to explain the emergence of IPBES in a potentially hostile context.
Even with IPBES fulfilling its coordination role, the various participants (state, international organizations, NGOs, business, etc.) still approach the âbiodiversity problemâ differently according to their own norms, technologies, and experience. However, the problems are defined jointly and the criteria for interpreting and accepting knowledge are shared. This gives rise to a challenge regarding IPBES policy coherence with other conventions and MEAs. The objective of IPBES to produce assessments on the biodiversity issue is dealt with in a setting of growing institutional complexity at the international level. Understanding this institutional complexity is a key to gaining further insight into the dynamics of the emergence of IPBES and why this Platform was finally possible.
Since its signing in 1992, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) has sought to frame the different biodiversity issues at the international level. However, this Convention has failed to play this pivotal role between all conventions within the biodiversity regime complex.3 The creation of IPBES was founded on the question of coordination within this set of international agreements and institutions concerned about biodiversity issues.
CBD also has a Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice (SBSTTA), which is also the case with regard to most other conventions, such as the Ramsar Convention, CITES, CMS, etc., as well as regional or local conventions (Bern Convention). Discussions at the time of the emergence of IPBES sought to build complementarities between these bodies devoted to interactions between science and policy and the overall view was that IPBES would be a competing structure. The topics developed in IPBES may also be closely linked to climate change, and therefore to IPCC and UNFCCC. Therefore, the question of coordination of the recent Platform with other institutions, and the fact that MA was focused on global governance of biodiversity and the environment, more generally sheds light on how IPBES emerged despite this background of growing institutional complexity.
Moreover, the coordination issue is not really a problem of public policy arising from the implementation of overlapping commitments (VelĂĄzquez Gomar, Stringer and Paavola, 2014; VelĂĄzquez Gomar, 2013). Instead, from an upstream standpoint, it is a problem of coherence among various commitment definitions. In this way, IPBES, as a science-policy interface, aims to provide a means to organize interactions between actors (governments, stakeholders, scientists, etc.) and institutions (CBD, etc.) involved in biodiversity issues at the international level to produce a common framework based on a range of biodiversity knowledge concerns. International relations first proposed to analyze the âinstitutions possessing norms, decision rules, and procedures which facilitate a convergence of expectationsâ regarding the notion of regime (Krasner, 1983). However, since the number of international regimes is constantly increasing and each evolves by expanding, some end up overlapping. This leads to the creation of some constellations of regimes, more or less connected to each other, or so-called âregime complexesâ (Orsini, Morin and Young, 2013). The different regimes that compose a regime complex can compete, develop synergies or conflict (Young, 1998). Several terms are used in the literature to qualify the links between the different elements of a regime complex. Most of the debate on cooperation between these complexes involves a normative vision geared towards overcoming the âfragmentation problemâ to promote coordination and effectiveness of the regime complex. According to Morin and Orsini (2013), âRegime complexity presents governments with an obvious problem of policy coherenceâ (Morin and Orsini, 2013). Similarly, Alter and Meunier highlight, âthe negative consequences of a fragmented regime complex, namely forum-shopping, regime-shifting, strategic inconsistency or in...
