Emotions, Decision-Making and Mass Atrocities

Through the Lens of the Macro-Micro Integrated Theoretical Model

Olaoluwa Olusanya

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN:
  9780367600655
• eBook ISBN:
  9781317144489
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Criminology
• Index: Social Sciences

This book rehumanizes perpetrators of mass atrocities. At present a victim/perpetrator dichotomy appears to be the dominant paradigm: perpetrators have either been 'mechanistically dehumanized', that is, perceived as unemotional, hard-hearted and conforming and thereby lacking the core features of human nature or alternatively, they have been 'animalistically dehumanized'. In other words they are seen as immoral, unintelligent, lacking self-control and likened to animals. Within sociology and criminology the dominant view is that genocide and other mass atrocities are committed by technologically-lobotomized perpetrators. Somehow the process of rationalization is believed to have transformed these people from emotionally healthy people into hollow soulless shells of human beings or zombies, devoid of a full range of normal emotions. These people are considered bereft of any ability to reason, think or feel, yet ambulant and able to respond to surrounding stimuli. However it is difficult to imagine crime (especially those involving a group of people working together for the duration of a particular criminal activity) without emotions. For instance, there is ample evidence suggesting that both crimes of passion and pre-meditated crimes involve emotional arousal. Furthermore, research in fields such as evolutionary biology, psychology and sociology of work and organizations suggest that emotions are essential for human progress and survival. In addition, emotions help us make the right call in risky and uncertain situations, in other words, the majority of real life situations. There is, therefore, a need to revisit existing assumptions around the role of emotions in mass atrocities.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Within sociology and its subfield of criminology the dominant view is that genocide and other mass atrocities are committed by technologically-lobotomized perpetrators. Somehow the process of rationalization is believed to have transformed these people from emotionally healthy people into hollow soulless shells of human beings or zombies, devoid of a full range of normal emotions: ‘[r]ational bureaucratic knowledge thrives in a soulless passive social environment which has been “dehumanized” … “the more it is dehumanized”, the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation’ (Stehr 2001, 60–61). These people are considered bereft of any ability to reason, think or feel, yet ambulant and able to respond to surrounding stimuli: ‘[t]hey just followed the flow … [and] … unthinkingly and unquestionably assumed that the goals, aims and means were legitimate’ (see Smeulers and Grünfeld 2011, 189).

However it is difficult to imagine crime (especially those involving a group of people working together for the duration of a particular criminal activity) without emotions. For instance, there is ample evidence suggesting that both crimes of passion (Haidt 2003) and pre-meditated crimes (see for example Bechara 2004; Bechara and Damasio 2005; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio and Anderson 1994) involve emotional arousal. Furthermore, research in fields such as evolutionary biology (see for example Nicholson 2000; Darwin 1872), psychology (see for example Damasio 1994) and sociology of work and organizations (see Hochschild 1983) suggests that emotions are essential for human progress and survival. For example, emotions such as love, trust and admiration play a strong role in building relationships and binding communities. Fear helps protects us by signalling danger and preparing us to deal with it (see for example Lowe and Ziemke 2011). Anger alerts us to the fact that something is wrong or unfair and energizes us to respond (see for example Ellsworth and Smith 1988; Frijda 1993; Frijda, Kuipers and ter Schure 1989; Mikula, Scherer and Athenstaedt 1998; Wallbott and Scherer 1986). Disgust helps us to avoid harmful contaminants (see for example Rozin, Millman and Nemeroff 1986; Fallon, Rozin and Pliner 1984). And guilt can motivate us to make amends, apologize, or correct our behaviour (Tangney 1991; Tangney and Dearing 2002). In addition, emotions help us make the right call in risky and uncertain situations, in other words, the majority of real life situations (see for example Bechara 2004; Bechara and Damasio 2005; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio and Anderson 1994). There is, therefore, a need to revisit existing assumptions.

Finally, this book aims to rehumanize perpetrators of mass atrocities. At present a victim/perpetrator dichotomy appears to be the dominant paradigm: Perpetrators have either been ‘mechanistically dehumanized’ (see Haslam 2006), that is, perceived as unemotional, hard-hearted and conforming and thereby lacking the core features of human nature (see for example Becker 1968; Heineke 1978; Crouch 1979); or alternatively, they have been ‘animalistically dehumanized’ (Haslam 2006). In other words they are seen as immoral, unintelligent, lacking self-control and likened to animals (see for example Agnew 2001; Katz 1988; Lyng 1990; Ferrell 1997; Presdee 2000; Hayward 2003; Cornish and Clarke 1986; Clarke and Felson 1993; Clarke and Cornish 1985; McCarthy 2002). It is time to change these perceptions!

O Emotions, Emotions! Where art thou?

The relationship between cognition and emotion is thus far poorly understood particularly within sociology and its subfield of criminology due, in large part, to scholars’ desire to protect their own intellectual territory (Bouffard, Exum and Paternoster 2000, 159) and the fact that many scholars are put off by the sheer complexity of integrating concepts from different disciplines, particularly, biology, psychology, and sociology (Muftić 2009, 38). As a result the Platonic and dualist view that emotion is the antithesis of reason or rational thought still pervades the field of sociology and its sub-discipline criminology (see for example Yar 2009; De Haan and Loader 2002, 243). As Clark (2002, 155–6) eloquently puts it: ‘Plato’s view has survived through the ages: reason, the quintessentially human characteristic located in the brain, is superior to emotion, which is a mere animalistic vestige produced by baser organs such as the heart, liver and spleen’. Even those who support the view that emotions play an important role in criminal offending seem to adhere to an outdated view of emotions. For instance, according to Agnew (Agnew 2001, 327) anger is thought to:

[F]oster crime because it disrupts cognitive processes in ways that impede noncriminal coping; for example, it leads individuals to disregard information that may help resolve the situation, and it reduces the ability to clearly express grievances. Anger also reduces the actual and perceived costs of crime; for example, angry individuals are less likely to feel guilt for their criminal behaviour because they believe that the injustice they suffered justifies crime. [emphasis added]

It should be pointed out, however, that the dominant view today is that ‘anger can actually enhance [analytic] processing’ (Moons and Mackie 2007, 710; Wegener and Petty 1994; Schwarz 1990). In this regard, Moons, and Mackie (2007, 718) made the following relevant statement: ‘[a]nger-induced action is often seen as particularly deleterious, because anger has “blown out the light of reason”. Our research suggests that anger-induced action might well be the result of quite clear-minded and deliberative processing’.

Moreover, general strain theory erroneously assumes that anger blocks an individual’s capacity to deal with strain in a constructive manner. This erroneous assumption comes from reliance on outdated scientific ideas as is evident from the citation of Averill’s earlier works in the following statement by Agnew (2001, 327): ‘[f]inally, anger energizes the individual for action, creates a sense of power or control, and creates a desire for revenge or retribution – all of which lead individuals to view crime in a more favourable light (see Agnew 1992; Averill 1982, 1993 … on retributive justice)’ [emphasis added].

However, recent evidence suggest that anger can motivate us to move toward the object of our anger thereby encouraging dialogue, compromise and the peaceful resolution of tensions. In this regard, Halperin and colleagues (2011a, 275–6, 2011b, 94; Michal, Halperin, and Federico 2009) made the following relevant statement:

Yet, contrary to the view that anger uniformly promotes aggression and violence (Averill 1982), anger can sometimes lead to constructive action … and can thereby potentially contribute to a peaceful resolution of intergroup conflicts. Empirical findings demonstrate that under certain circumstances, anger increases support for constructive actions such as long-term reconciliation … and support for risk-taking in negotiations (for example compromises) to achieve peace … One way to explain these mixed results is to see anger as an approach emotion (Harmon-Jones 2003) whose specific manifestations (i.e., constructive vs. destructive) may vary across individuals and circumstances. [emphasis added]

In the same vein as Agnew, Young (2003, 391) made the following inaccurate statement:

I have no doubt that much crime is mundane, instrumental and opportunistic in motivation and that there are people whose response to crime is cool, calculated and rationalistic. But an awful lot of crime, from joyriding to murder, from telephone kiosk vandalism to rape, involves much more than an instrumental motivation. Recent work in cultural criminology … all point to the wide swathe of crime that is expressive rather than narrowly instrumental.

Young’s statement contains an implicit assumption that a dichotomy exists between reason and emotion: the instrumental / expressive distinction (see for example Tuana 1993, 284). He does not realize that ‘[e]motions … are more than feelings. They have instrumental aspects … ’ (Tamir, Mitchell and Gross 2008, 324; Frijda 1986). In addition, Tamir, Mitchell and Gross (2008, 324) made the following relevant statement in this regard:

It is generally assumed that individuals seek to increase pleasant and decrease unpleasant emotions … Self-regulation, however, is not driven exclusively by short-term hedonic considerations. Indeed, individuals often forgo immediate pleasure to maximize long-term utility … Such instrumental motives might play a role in the regulation of emotion … Therefore, we endorse an instrumental approach to emotion regulation, according to which preferences for emotions depend on the balance of their hedonic and instrumental benefits in a given context. (see also Tamir 2005; Tamir, Chiu and Gross 2007)

Moreover, examples of instrumental emotion regulation include the fact that debt collectors may increase their anger levels to ensure they collect unpaid debts from serial offenders (Sutton 1991; see also Gross 1998) and the fact that physicians may limit their positive emotions as they inform family members that a patient has died (Tesser, Rosen and Waranch 1973; see also Gross 1998).

Finally, there is evidence to suggest that without emotions, there would be no groups, no organizations, and social interaction will cease to exist (see generally Scherer 2000). Therefore emotions are the heart and soul of human activity and are necessary for human beings to survive. Also without emotions it would be impossible to formulate the following criminological theories: general strain theory (‘Agnew argues that strains, particularly conflictual social relationships, engender negative affective states … that create internal pressure for corrective action’ see Aseltine, Gore and Gordon 2000, 257); social bond/social control theory (‘Shame is a normal part of the process of social control’ – see Scheff 1997, 74; Gadd and Jefferson 2007, 112); self-control theory (‘Gottfredson and Hirschi’s … self-control theory proposes that when parents do not perform or inconsistently perform their parenting tasks (i.e., emotional attachment, …) their child is likely to develop lower self-control levels’ – see Wolfe and Higgins (2008, 108–9); social learning theory (‘For theorists who focus on adolescents’ commitment to conventional values and emotional attachments with family and peers [are] the focus of social learning theories … ’ see Petraitis and Flay 1995, 71); routine activities theory, rational choice theory, deterrence theory and incapacitation theory (for the important role of emotions in decision-making see Damasio 1994; Clore and Huntsinger 2007; Bechara 2004, 30; Bechara, Damsio and Damasio 2000), rehabilitation (see for example Day 2009) and restorative justice (see for example Rossner 2011).

The Macro-Micro Integrated Theoretical Model (MMITM)

In contrast to most theoretical models that have been developed to explain the dynamics of criminal and deviant behaviour, the macro-micro integrated theoretical model (MMITM, Olusanya 2013), recognizes the fact that emotions are complex dynamic systems (Coan 2010, 278) made up of several separate components with different functions: physiological arousal, affect or subjective feelings, cognitive processes, and action tendencies (Sacharin, Schlegel and Scherer 2012; Frijda 1986, 1987).

Furthermore, one of the main features of the MMITM is that it necessitates the integration of ‘divergent criminological theories and dominant historical criminological themes that contradict one another’ (Tuck 1989, 5). In other words, general strain theory (GST; Agnew 1995), Gottfredson and Hirschi’s general theory of crime (GTC; Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990) and Akers’s social learning theory (SLT; Akers 1998). In addition, this approach draws upon related intellectual wellsprings, that is, the works of those who endorse the integrated theoretical approach (Bernard and Snipes 1996; Longshore et al. 2004, 543) and the works of those who support the view that an interdisciplinary approach is indispensable for understanding the role played by emotions in crime (Bouffard, Exum and Paternoster 2000; see also Yar 2009). Moreover, the central element of the MMITM is the notion of cognitive dissonance (CD; Festinger 1957). At its most basic level, cognitive dissonance theory (CDT) is about a feeling of psychological discomfort that arises from holding two conflicting emotions, beliefs, ideas or values (Festinger 1957; Van Dijk and Kirk-Brown 2004).

It should be emphasized at the outset that dissonance involves negative affect, and a motivated, often effortful search for ways of alleviating the negative affect (Cooper, Joel, Zanna and Taves 1978; Zanna and Cooper 1974). In addition, Festinger’s cognitive dissonance theory emphasizes balance ‘among cognitive, affective, and conative components of the person’ (Greenberg and Brehm 1995, 247). Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that emotions trigger the entire process of attitude change. For instance, in a recent study, van Veen and colleagues (2009) found a positive correlation between anterior insula activity (Kober et al. 2008; Lindquist, Wager et al. 2011; Singer et al. 2004; Wager and Barrett 2004; Wicker et al. 2003) and attitude change in the context of performing counter-attitudinal behaviour. Moreover, the empirical evidence indicates that anterior insula activation correlates with negative arousal or dissonance (Knutson and Greer 2008; Jarcho, Elliot, Berkman and Lieberman 2011). It therefore appears that the different manifestations of negative arousal such as feelings of guilt, shame, embarrassment, anxiety, anger, or other negative affective states motivate attitude change and corresponding action tendencies (Greenglass and Nash 2008, 12).

In addition, it is important to emphasize that dissonance can occur prior to a decision (pre-decisional dissonance) and after an action has already taken place (post decisional dissonance) (Russo et al. 1996, 1998; Hinton 1996). Clearly, both types of dissonance play a role in influencing individuals’ involvement in genocide and other mass atrocities and in the perpetration of such crimes (for example in terms of conformity as a means of reducing CD see Waller 2001, 17; Waller 1996;...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Dedication
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of Figures
• Acknowledgements
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Unpacking the Macro–Micro Integrated Theoretical Model
• 3 Through the Lens of the MMITM: The Role of Emotions in the Decision-Making Processes of Perpetrators of Mass Atrocities
• 4 The Macro-Micro Integrated Theoretical Model in Action and Conclusion
• Index