Global Media Perspectives on the Crisis in Panama

Nelson Michaud, Howard M. Hensel

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN:
  9781409429494
• eBook ISBN:
  9781317127598
• Topic: Ciencias sociales
• Subtopic: Política

Operation Just Cause, the United States' incursion into Panama, was the culmination of a gradually escalating confrontation between the United States and the Noriega dominated government of Panama that extended from June, 1987 until early January, 1990. Applying diverse methodological approaches, this volume examines the various ways representative examples of the global media covered the developing crisis and the eventual US incursion into Panama. The volume: - sets the stage for this analysis by delineating the chronological development of the escalating confrontation, as well as by examining the confrontation from the perspective of the US government - analyzes the crisis from the perspective of the US, Soviet, Canadian, French, Portuguese, Arab, and the People's Republic of China media - exposes the challenges for public affairs officers operating within the context of the global media response to international crises, and provides an assessment of the implications of the crisis for inter-American and international relations. This analysis and evaluation of a variety of global media perspectives on the escalating US-Panamanian confrontation will serve to better illuminate and further enrich our understanding of a major international event - indeed, one of the final events of the Cold War era.

PART I
The Context

Chapter 1
Ousting Noriega from Power: Setting the Stage for a Crisis

Mathieu Carrier

Our interests and those of our southern neighbours are in reality identical … We would interfere with them only in the last resort, and then only if it became evident that their inability or unwillingness to do justice at home and abroad had violated the rights of the United States or had invited foreign aggression to the detriment of the entire body of American nations.

Theodore Roosevelt, State of the Union Address, December 1904

Introduction

The US invasion of Panama on 20 December 1989, authorized by George H.W. Bush under the code name Operation Just Cause, came at a turning point in the history of international politics. As other authors in this book point out, many events of international importance took place in the year 1989, from the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in February to the fall of the Berlin Wall in November. It was a year of transition that shifted the world from a bipolar system, in which the United States and the Soviet Union were the only two superpowers, each with its own political and economical system, to a ‘unipolar moment’. The United States was the sole superpower, and would be able to spread its vision of a ‘new world order’.

The purpose of this chapter is to paint a larger picture of the US military intervention in Panama by looking at the major events leading up to the abolition of the country’s military dictatorship. I will examine the US government’s reasons for resorting to military invasion to overthrow Manual Antonio Noriega, a narco-military dictator at the head of an army of only 4,000 combat troops. This chapter will focus on events that took place in the final three years of the Noriega regime in order to look at how the two administrations, first under Reagan and then Bush, understood and reacted to it. During that period, three crises had a major impact on the relationship between the US government and the Noriega regime: the Herrera crisis, the Noriega indictments in the US, and the Panamanian presidential election of 1989. A close look at these events clearly shows that the US stance towards Noriega was not consistent, and reduced the likelihood of the US managing the relationship to its advantage.

At the turn of the twentieth century, the US government financed the completion of the Panama Canal, thereby procuring certain rights over the Canal Zone. The provisions of the 1903 treaty between the US and Panama gave the US perpetual

use, occupation and control of a zone of land and land under water for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of said Canal of the width of ten miles extending to the distance of five miles on each side of the centre line of the route of the Canal to be constructed.1

Over the decades to come, the Treaty provisions gave rise to friction between the US and Panamanian governments, and it became obvious that it would need to be re-negotiated some day. It was not until 1974, however, that the necessary conditions for fresh negotiations were in place.2

At the time, Panama was a military dictatorship headed by Omar Torrijos. It took almost four years of negotiations between the Carter administration and the Torrijos regime before new treaties were ratified. Under the provisions of these treaties, Panama would take control of the canal in January 2000, and it would remain a neutral zone allowing ‘permanent access to the Canal by vessels of all nations on the basis of entire equality’.3 Soon after both countries ratified the treaties, the Carter administration pushed Panama to restore full civilian rule.4 Torrijos took several steps towards this end, including promising that presidential elections would be held in 1984. However, he died in a plane crash in 1981, leaving the country without an institutionalized mechanism for replacing him. On his death, four members of his inner circle, including Noriega, signed a secret agreement regarding the management of Torrijos’ succession. This agreement led to the first major crisis Noriega faced after taking power in 1983, known as the Herrera crisis.

The Herrera Crisis

In June 1987, Noriega was scheduled to step down as the head of the Panamanian Defense Forces to make way for Roberto Diaz Herrera, in compliance with an agreement Noriega had signed with Herrera and two other Panamanian Defense Forces colonels in 1981.5 However, on 1 June, Noriega forced Herrera to retire as Chief of Staff. Four days later Noriega announced that he would remain Commander of the Panamanian Defense Forces for another five years, and that Herrera had been appointed to a diplomatic position. The next day, Herrera called a press conference and publicly denounced the crimes committed by the Noriega regime, including the personal implication of Noriega in the Torrijos plane crash of 1981, and in the murder of Hugo Spadafora, an important opposition figure, in 1985. Finally, Herrera also admitted helping Noriega to rig the 1984 presidential election6 and accused him of profiting from drug trafficking.7

Whether these accusations were founded or not was of little importance for the opponents of Noriega’s regime. Many of Herrera’s charges were not even news. However, this was the first time Noriega had been accused by a member of his inner circle. The situation presented the opposition with an opportunity to form a new coalition, the National Civic Crusade, which was officially announced on 7 June. Herrera’s revelations also led to massive protests right across Panama. On 8 June, about 100,000 people took to the streets to demonstrate their indignation against the regime.

The Herrera crisis had turned into a serious threat for Noriega’s government, and he responded to the uprisings with military might. His newly-created special riot police, known as the Dobermans, were sent out to subdue the demonstrators, many of whom were injured, arrested and detained.8 On 11 June the government, in the person of President Arturo Delvalle, imposed a state of emergency. The state of emergency galvanized various key players in Panamanian society into action, including the Catholic Church. On 17 June, the Episcopal Conference of Panama issued a statement asking for:

the restoration as soon as possible of constitutional guarantees and the freeing of all those jailed as a result of their suspension; the establishment of genuine autonomy on the part of the nation’s civilian authorities and the effective and gradual retreat of the Defense Forces to its designated duties; the building of institutions and mechanisms necessary to conduct free and democratic elections.9

These demands served to put domestic pressure on the military regime, but Noriega took the hard line. The state of emergency remained in place until 30 June 1987.10

The crisis of June 1987 had serious repercussions on the relationship between the Noriega regime and the US government. It called US attention to a situation that was unknown to the public at a time when illicit drugs were becoming a significant issue in the United States. The fact that Noriega, or some members of his regime, were involved in drug trafficking had been known to the US administration for several years thanks to the work of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations of the US Senate. In a report released in December 1988, one year before the launch of Operation Just Cause, the Subcommittee stated that ‘the United States government had received substantial information about the criminal involvement of top Panamanian officials for nearly 20 years and done little to respond’.11

Dr Norman Bailey, a former senior staff member of the National Security Council (NSC) between 1981 and 1983, testified in this report that while he was at the NSC there already existed ‘available to any authorized official of the US government … a plethora of human intelligence, electronic intercepts and satellite and overflight photography that taken together constitute[d] not a “smoking gun” but rather a 21 cannon barrage of evidence’ of Noriega’s involvement in criminal activity and drugs.12 These allegations were also confirmed by a US Defense Enforcement Administration agent based in South America who testified that the US first received reports linking Noriega and narcotics before 1978.13 Even the Joint Staff, in an unclassified report entitled Operation Just Cause: Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama, stated that ‘in 1985, the National Security Adviser to the President, Vice Admiral John Poindexter, and the Assistant Secretary of State for Interamerican Affairs, Elliott Abrams, warned Noriega of US concern over his monopoly of power and his involvement in narcotrafficking’.14

Given that the US government knew full well that the General was involved in drug trafficking and money laundering, why had it never acted against Noriega before?

The answer is twofold. First, Washington was using Noriega to pursue a larger agenda than its war against drug trafficking. Indeed, in the early 1980s, the Reagan administration’s foreign policy in Central America was shaped by a will to confront and defeat Communism in the region, as confirmed by the S...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of Figure and Tables
• List of Contributors
• Foreword
• Introduction
• PART I THE CONTEXT
• PART II US PERSPECTIVES
• PART III SOVIET PERSPECTIVES
• PART IV WESTERN PERSPECTIVES
• PART V NON-WESTERN PERSPECTIVES
• CONCLUSIONS : THE CRISIS IN PANAMA AND THE US RESPONSE
• Index