EU and NATO Relations with Russia

After the Collapse of the Soviet Union

Glenn Diesen

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN:
  9781138063273
• eBook ISBN:
  9781317140528
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: European Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Do the EU and NATO threaten Russian security? The book explores the rise of these exclusive 'inter-democratic' security institutions after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the ensuing effects on relations with Russia. Two competing theories are tested to explore whether these institutions aggravate or mitigate the security dilemma with Russia. These institutions can be theorised to promote security as a positive-sum game through European integration and democracy promotion, or pursue collective hegemony with ideologically uncompromising bloc-politics. Glenn Diesen argues that a European security architecture that demotes the largest state on the continent to an object of security inevitably results in 'European integration' becoming a zero-sum geopolitical project that has set the West on a collision course with Russia.

Chapter 1
Introduction

This book explores a phenomenon evolving since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is the rise of the EU and NATO as inter-democratic security institutions and resulting effects on the security dilemma with Russia as a non-member state. The EU and NATO can be conceptualised as ‘inter-democratic security institutions’ that share several common features. They stipulate that their post-Cold War mission is to advance security by promoting liberal democracy and European integration. Since the European and global political-strategic contexts were recast in 1989–92, their implicit claim to dominance in security affairs has affected power and norms. The organisation of power and the normative agenda have been transformed as these institutions have assumed responsibility for pan-European security.

The EU and NATO can be considered ‘inter-democratic’ and exclusive because membership is conditioned by a state’s possession of acceptable liberal-democratic credentials and adherence to related principles (Dembinski, Hasenclever and Wagner, 2004). The linking by these institutions of democratisation and security, whereby the former is presented as intrinsic to the latter, has created incentives for prospective members to carry out related reforms. The last two decades have, however, demonstrated a mutual disinterest in discussing a possible future membership for Russia and the conditions that this might entail.

The puzzle that this book addresses is whether liberal-democratic essentialism and an associated exclusivity of institutional membership result in benevolent policies which generate positive-sum pan-European security, including for the EU, NATO and Russia, or they incite belligerent policies and a continuation of Cold War structures within which power competition is supported by bloc politics and ideology. In concise form, the central question of this book is: does the behaviour of inter-democratic security institutions after the collapse of the Soviet Union mitigate or aggravate a security dilemma with Russia as a non-member state?

Interpreting the ‘rise’ of Inter-democratic Security Institutions

When the Soviet Union disintegrated, many scholars expected that NATO would either dissolve or diminish in relevance (McCalla, 1996; Mearsheimer, 1990; Waltz, 1993). Some predicted that the inclusive United Nations (UN) would become more effective and relevant. Others expected the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to have a more prominent role (Hyde-Price, 1992). However, over the past two decades NATO has expanded its membership and remit, including by engagement in out-of-area missions. The EU has also grown and developed as a security institution. Notwithstanding their own tensions, the EU and NATO have, often tacitly, asserted a right to regulate and, where necessary, enact responsibility for European and global security, overshadowing potential alternatives such as the UN and the OSCE. One consequence is that post-Soviet Russia is not accommodated as an equal but, rather, is relegated and to some extent ostracised. This inequality of representation in European security can be theorised to produce either cooperation or conflict. The EU and NATO could transcend power politics by providing positive-sum security through European integration and democratisation, or inflame power politics by provoking competition with a marginalised Russia.

This book juxtaposes two opposing perspectives on the rise of inter-democratic security institutions and how that impacts on a security dilemma with Russia. One of these views contends that the EU and NATO constitute a common good, promoting positive-sum gain as a community of democracies that seek regional and transatlantic integration. Proponents of a positive-sum configuration tend to reflect a liberal worldview in which the nature of units or actors affects international anarchy. Some scholars argue that security institutions with greater maturity and liberal-democratic credentials are less likely to become fortresses dependent on external threats for internal cohesion and, instead, become facilitators of broader regional or even global integration (Bellamy, 2004: 178). According to this view, the exclusivity of the EU and NATO is one factor that has enabled them to become a ‘force for good’.

An opposing perspective proposes that security institutions take on state functions, implying that in an enduring competition for power they become militaristic, territory focused and exclusionary. These institutions arrogate the traditional role of states and may elevate conflicts to a higher level. Booth and Wheeler label it the ‘Mitrany paradox’, whereby integration projects that attempt to develop new superpowers depart from functional cooperation among extant actors and instead construct fewer, larger and less compatible entities of power (Booth and Wheeler, 2008: 188–9). The security architecture is expected to disintegrate as inclusive institutions that mitigate conflicts are replaced with exclusive institutions that function as tools for power competition.

These two perspectives do not differ in terms of recognising a genuine belief and desire of decision-makers to transcend power competition. They disagree on the feasibility of actually achieving that. The idea of a European security system led by inter-democratic security institutions can be conceptualised as an international aristocratic system with an intended universal benefit. The UN can also be conceptualised as an international aristocratic system due to the special privileges delegated to the great powers as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). There are differences between these two systems, however. Privileging sovereign inequality and leadership based on liberal-democratic credentials rather than power can be regarded as encouraging a more just and cooperative international system because liberal-democratic norms gain precedence and power competition is transcended. In contrast, if the assumption is that power competition cannot be transcended, inter-democratic security institutions can be theorised as revisionist powers advancing an international oligarchic system that maximises (their) relative power vis-à-vis large powers such as Russia, at the peril of security.

The Security Dilemma between Inter-democratic Security Institutions and Russia

John Herz (1950a) first coined the term ‘security dilemma’ to identify the problem caused by the international anarchy at the heart of security studies. It outlines the key conundrum in an anarchic system, which is that states with defensive motivations inadvertently end up in conflict due to uncertainties about the intentions of the other. A dilemma suggests that there are two possibilities available which are both unfavourable and mutually exclusive. An actor can accumulate power for security, which becomes a source of insecurity for others, resulting in a downward spiral as states accumulate power and security is reduced. Alternatively, states can avoid accumulating power for security, though they then also become less secure as the possible offensive intentions of other states are not deterred.

Jervis (1978: 170) defines the security dilemma as the phenomenon where ‘one state’s gain in security often inadvertently threatens others’, prompting the ‘others’ to accumulate power for defence. States tend to be fearful of the intentions of other states, but do not understand that other states may be fearful of them (Jervis, 1976: 75). Paradoxically, while both parties have defensive intentions and seek only to enhance their security, conflict may nonetheless ensue. Booth and Wheeler (2008) have, however, argued that the security dilemma can be defined as a ‘two-level strategic predicament’: the first level is to interpret the intentions and capabilities of the other as being either offensive or defensive, while the second level is to respond with either reassurance or deterrence (Booth and Wheeler, 2008: 4–5). The result of the security dilemma – that two actors with defensive intentions end up in conflict – is referred to as the ‘security paradox’ (Booth and Wheeler, 2008).

While integration in institutions is usually considered a positive-sum game, it can become a zero-sum game for states excluded from an initiative, which instigates a security dilemma. Russia, as the excluded state, must first interpret whether the integration efforts isolate and threaten Russia’s security. Second, Russia must respond either by reassuring the EU and NATO that it has benign intentions and does not need to be contained, or with deterrence by initiating counter-measures and/or reasserting its influence in Europe. ‘European integration’ can become a zero-sum geopolitical project if ‘Europe’ is united in international institutions that exclude Russia. Exclusive integration initiatives can decouple a state from its neighbours and harm its security and prosperity. If Russia perceives itself to be threatened politically, economically or militarily by exclusive institutions that isolate Russia by imposing a zero-sum ultimatum to its neighbours of integrating either with ‘us’ or with ‘them’, it will compete for influence in these states. The EU/NATO and Russia would then be motivated by the opportunity of having closer integration with the ‘shared neighbourhood’, as well as by the threat of having these states join an exclusive bloc that may develop hostile policies towards them. Thus, the paradox is that while both sides may pursue integration efforts that are believed to be benevolent and a ‘common good’, a spiral of competing initiatives may commence.

The EU and NATO portray themselves as positive-sum actors that benefit non-member states due to their distinct ability to link security with the proliferation of liberal-democratic norms and integration while reaching out to non-member states in multilateral partnerships. This vision of sustainable security may be undermined if Russia were to pursue unwarranted power interests. Russia perceives European security to be enhanced as a positive-sum game through the promotion of multilateralism and inclusive arrangements since security initiatives must be disengaged from power competition. However, the prospect of this idea of European security being operationalised is diluted by the refusal of the West to move beyond bloc politics. This results in zero-sum policies and division because third states must choose between integrating either with ‘us’ or with ‘them’.

Inter-democratic security institutions are unique within this framework because they instigate a security dilemma where one did previously not exist. A security dilemma assumes that both sides are status quo powers responding to fear of the other; however, the enlargement and out-of-area security responsibilities sought by the EU and NATO after the dissolution of the Soviet Union was not motivated by fear. Instead, the rise of inter-democratic security institutions was an opportunity due to systemic pressures as Russia was unable to prevent it and because of the ideological conviction that Russian security would not be undermined. In other words, rather than being status quo powers, inter-democratic security institutions can be defined as revisionist. Schweller (1996: 92, 99) defines status quo powers as seeking ‘self-preservation and the protection of values they already possess’, while revisionist powers seek ‘non-security expansion’. The security dilemma was in the process of being mitigated following Gorbachev’s announcement in 1988 of the unilateral withdrawal of 500,000 troops from Eastern Europe and due to the subsequent declaration by Gorbachev and Bush in 1989 of the Cold War being over. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 had some negative effects on European security since it created an immediate and pressing skewed balance of power. The balance and compromise between two rival status quo powers attempting to manage the security dilemma fell apart due to the systemic incentives for Western powers to seek non-security expansion.

The Effect of Institutions and Norms on the Security Dilemma

International security institutions can have either a favourable or an adverse impact on the security dilemma. If they can facilitate integration as a positive-sum game, insecurity, uncertainty and misunderstanding are reduced. International institutions can organise transparency, encourage compromise and coordination of policies, arrange collective security initiatives and establish common rules of behaviour. In other words, institutions can develop security with other states rather than against them (Booth and Wheeler, 2008: 138). However, international institutions may also aggravate a security dilemma if the exclusivity of integration projects and alliance-building create zero-sum power competition. Incompatibility with the integration projects of excluded states may spiral into zero-sum bloc politics where competition for membership and influence in neighbouring states resembles Cold War struggles over spheres of influence. This can increase security fears and result in the direction of military resources against other states. A distinction should therefore be made between collective security institutions that are inclusive and seek security with other member states, and alliances that are exclusive and seek security against non-members (Wallander and Keohane, 1999). However, there is also conceptual space for exclusive institutions promoting positive-sum security by developing alternative arrangements that benefit non-member states (Wallander and Keohane, 1999).

The elevated role of liberal-democratic norms can also have a favourable or an adverse impact on the security dilemma. Democratic peace theory suggests that liberal-democratic states and societies are very unlikely to go to war with each other. Realist theories attribute much less (if any) significance to norms, though some realist scholars recognise the concept of ‘ideological solidarity’ as a secondary issue in alliance formation. Constructivism postulates socially constructed political identities shaped by common values and norms, which can encourage a benevolent security community. However, these main theoretical frameworks also theorise on liberal-democratic norms aggravating the security dilemma. Liberalism has a tradition of both pacification and imperialism, an observation reflected in academic work on ‘democratic wars’. These are understood as wars initiated by democracies against non-democracies (Geis and Wagner, 2008). Although they do not prioritise ideology, some realists have suggested that it can affect the ability of states to act rationally according to the balance-of-power logic (Mearsheimer, 2009). Some constructivist scholars propose that the identity formation of ‘us’ may involve constructing a negative political identity for the ‘other’ (Diez, 2005; 2006). Wheeler and Booth (1987: 331) introduced the concept of ‘ideological fundamentalism’ to account for the styling of actors as enemies based on an assigned (negative) political identity rather than their actual international behaviour. Ideological fundamentalism reduces the ability to recognise that one’s own policies and actions may constitute a threat to others, because one’s own political identity is held to be indisputably positive and dissociated from any threatening behaviour.

Theoretical Framework for Assessing the Security Dilemma

Two theoretical frameworks on the nature of inter-democratic security institutions and their effect on the security dilemma with Russia are tested. Neoclassical realist theory is used to test the hypothesis that the EU and NATO aggravate the security dilemma due to a zero-sum approach to security with Russia. Liberal institutional theory is used to test the hypothesis that inter-democratic security institutions mitigate/transcend the security dilemma because of a positive-sum approach to security.

The first hypothesis is based on neoclassical realist theory. The EU and NATO are conceptualised as expansionist collective hegemonies with reduced rationality. The neoclassical realist assumptions draw upon compatible work of neorealists and classical realist theory, such as the work of John Herz (1950a) on ‘idealist internationalism and the security dilemma’. Foreign policy is structurally induced by the international distribution of power, while ideological support for collective hegemony impacts on decision-makers as an intervening variable. The rise of the EU and NATO as inter-democratic security institutions is a manifestation of the skewed balance of power, which resulted in expansionism due to the lack of constraints following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The objective is collective hegemony, defined as the shared control over a geographic area by a group of states (Hyde-Price, 2006). Collective hegemonies promote exclusive influence by imposing zero-sum structures that diminish Russia as an alternative locus of influence in Europe. While NATO is dominated to a great extent by the US leadership position, it can nonetheless also be considered a collective hegemony since the alliance members can all extract benefits from the collective influence over foreign territories on its periphery. The extent of rationality in realism is defined as the ability of decision-makers to maximise security by acting according to the balance-of-power logic. This means recognising systemic pressures resulting from the international distribution of power and responding with a foreign policy that maximises security rather than maximising power. This requires decision-makers to recognise that excessive power accumulation results in balancing and possible confrontation at the peril of security. Inter-democratic security institutions encourage adherence to an ideology, which equates power maximisation to security maximisation. Collective hegemony is believed to be a precondition for peace because it is underpinned by liberal-democratic norms. The belief among decision-makers in the relevant institutions that power accumulation does not impact negatively on the security dilemma will result in policies of power maximisation at the expense of security.

The competing hypothesis is grounded in liberal institutional theory. Inter-democratic security institutions are considered to have a positive-sum approach by pursuing security through integration and democratisation. These assumptions have support from prominent scholars like Keohane (2002), who suggests that Russia will ultimately benefit from the EU/NATO format for European security. The promotion of democracy is believed to stabilise states to the benefit of Russia, while European integration is promoted as a positive-sum game and is incrementally also extended to Russia through various strategic partnerships (Wallander and Keohane, 1999). The benign internal characteristics of the democratic community can be externalised in foreign policy. With the proliferation of benign institutions, liberal-democratic norms and interdependence, a more secure international system is expected to emerge, consonant with an expanded democratic ‘zone of peace’. Inter-democratic security institutions are depicted as European or possibly global integrators and socialisers. Benign and cooperative ‘means’ consisting of persuasion and attraction are assisted by the ‘magnetic pull’ of peace and prosperity. The ‘ends’ constitute a more integrated international system and stronger liberal-democratic norms. From this perspective, therefore, the rise of the EU and NATO is expected to mitigate/transcend any potential security dilemma with Russia.

Method: Evaluating Variables that Impact the Security Dilemma

The book limits itself to focusing solely on the impact of the EU and NATO on the security dilemma with Russia. This is an intricate task, as both sides contribute to the character and outcomes of the relationship. A study on inter-democratic security institutions may inadvertently become a study on Russian foreign policy or perceptions, which this book does not intend to be. Rather, the book analyses the specific policies and behaviour of inter-democratic security institutions that, on face value, could affect the security dilemma. Simply measuring alterations in cooperation and conflict would fail to address the explicit role of inter-democratic security institutions. Even the relevance and validity of the security dilemma could be contested if only end results were assessed, since cooperation or conflict can also be attributed to Russian policies. Assessing variables that could contribute to the security dilemma provides a stronger methodological framework to examine the contributions of these inter-democratic security institutions to the security dilemma with Russia. Four key variables that are considered to have a pivotal impact on the security dilemma are assessed:

1. ‘Instruments of power’ is a reference to the tools for power. These can be offensive and provocative or defensive and non-provocative. Developing non-offensive defence implies that the instruments for security maximise defensive functions and minimise offensive potential, thus permitting states to enhance their security without diminishing the security of others. The ability to distinguish between offensive and defensive instruments of power mitigates the security dilemma since the demonstration of defensive intentions and capabilities reduces insecurity in an anarchic system. Both proponents and critics have, however, focused attention on the difficulty of clearly distinguishing between offensive and defensive instruments of power (Van Evera, 1998). Nevertheless, instruments of power can be assessed independently from Russia since a defensive posture would contribute to mitigating the security dilemma irrespective of Russian policies.

2. ‘Security dilemma sensibility’ denotes the extent to which the security dilemma is recognised. It is determined by the capacity and intention to consider the possibility that one’s own actions may cause fears for others and precipitate a response. This ability or lack of it is an essential variable affecting the security dilemma as it logically precedes amending or introducing policies to mitigate it. Security dilemma sensibility can be explored independently from Russian policies since it does not imply accepting Russian arguments and perspectives as being reasonable, or the automatic al...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication Page
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• List of Figures
• Abbreviations
• Foreword
• Preface
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Theoretical Comparison
• 3 Research Design
• 4 Case Study I: CSDP and Russia
• 5 Case Study II: Missile Defence and Russia
• 6 Conclusion: Ideas, Institutions and Hegemony
• References
• Index