The aim of this book is to examine the merging of Europeâs military cultures by studying the advent of a new European-wide concept of military education. A new educational concept has emerged across Europe, and can best be described as a National Defence University (NDU). National defence universities are civilian accredited universities of Ministries of Defence. By developing such institutions (some of which are based on previous, traditional military colleges), along the lines of a common model, the ministries transformed NDUs into incubators for the military Europeanisation process. Examining this development is important, as a military cultural convergence is a precondition for robust European security cooperation (King, 2006; Tonra, 2003). This book analyses changes in the key post-commissioning institutions for professional military education in the UK, Germany, Finland, Romania and the Baltic states.
The research is based on several assumptions. First, the national defence university concept of military education is considered as the EU member statesâ armed forcesâ response to the pressures of a changing security paradigm. The European Cold War paradigm of âheroic warfareâ has transformed into one of a âpost-heroic operationâ. Therefore, demonstrating the validity of the NDU concept requires exploration of how national armed forces perceived the implications of the paradigm shift and adapted their military education system in response. Second, the convergence of the European national military education systems is heading towards the NDU concept. Third, the NDUs are linked through a dense network of NATO and EU collaboration frameworks, coordination arenas and professional and scientific associations. These served as a fertile ground for an emergence of an epistemic community based in the NDUs. By promoting a shared concept of military education and taking into account how military education affects military culture, this epistemic community facilitates the adoption and institutionalisation of the NDU concept of military education across Europe, and with it the convergence of national military cultures.
The first part of the chapter surveys the literature concerning European security in order to characterise the changing security paradigm in Europe. Building on the analytical framework of Luttwak (2000), several drivers of change can be identified in the post-Cold War era. Among them are Europeâs changing demography and declining military spending. The second part of this introduction presents the theoretical approach of the book. Following Kingâs (2011) example, the current study looks into a certain component of the military in order to understand wider dynamics of European military transformation. This is done by using an original, interdisciplinary conceptual framework. This framework is based on a modern constructivist approach that aims to bridge the gap between constructivist subject matter and empirical research design. This approach is the context for the emergence of what is defined hereafter as a âfourth generationâ strategic culture.1 This generation diverged from earlier ones in formulating a strategic culture that consists of competing sub-units, i.e. subcultures rather than a unified, cohesive entity. The current study develops this further by suggesting that security-centred epistemic communities constitute the core of subcultures that compete on influencing security and foreign policies. This competition is perceived as a social mechanism through which ideas inform and influence policy. Next, this reformulation of strategic culture is being used to explain changes in military culture, which is defined hereafter as the âmilitary dimensions of strategic cultureâ. This reformulation relies on the âofficership as professionâ school in civilâmilitary relations literature, and suggests that the culture of professional militaries is determined by socialisation processes that take place in the professional military education (PME) system.
Next, the studyâs empirical research design is presented. The developed conceptual framework of military culture change serves as a basis and guide through the analysis. Following Winton (2005), a set of parameters is defined to trace changes in professional military education institutions. The findings are then used to study the emergence of a multinational epistemic community within NDUs. For this aim, the modified parameters of Winton are integrated with the analytical concept of Davis Cross (2013a), which serves to determine whether the structural and cultural conditions for the construction of a new epistemic community are met. After developing the research design, the chapter gives an introduction to the remaining chapters of the book. It then concludes with a discussion of how this work adds to the existing literature in European studies and international relations, both from a theoretical and empirical point of view.
The causes of the EUâs military crisis
The current study assumes that EU member statesâ security policies reflect the characteristics of Edward Luttwakâs concept of âpost-heroic warfareâ in postindustrial societies. However, as Luttwakâs work was written in the early post-Cold War era, his basic assumptions need to be further developed into what can be called âpost-heroic operationâ. This can be summarised as the transition of European societies from conducting warfare from a âpost-heroicâ stance to focusing on civilian-oriented crisis management operations. It is argued that the gradual development of the European Union (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) into a crisis management tool is an effort by the member states to turn their military decline into a positive product: unique expertise in the kind of activities that the great powers (i.e. the United States (US)) usually lack, namely, crisis management and stabilisation operations.
âPost-heroic warfareâ is a characteristic of states whose societies are composed of small families that enjoy high income. These states tend to maintain highly advanced and costly armed forces, which rarely deploy sophisticated capabilities but rather confine themselves for the most part to low-risk missions (Luttwak, 2000: 129). During the Cold War, the danger of nuclear escalation led both blocs to maintain an image of armed forces ready for war. However, not only did they usually save money by neglecting proper logistics and training, but their officers were promoted according to seniority and management skills rather than professional abilities and combat leadership. Similarly, the public and the national leadership in Western societies (except for the US in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) bloc) became disengaged from the experience of war, with its costs and demands, due to a lack of military experience or an understanding of strategic matters.
This development led to a historic watershed. The great powers of the past were distinguished by their willingness and ability to fight not only for vital national interests but also for lesser ones. This provided them with the required deterrence to maintain their status in the international system and often obviated the need to use military force entirely (Luttwak, 2000: 131â134). The major force driving this evolution was the dramatic transformation of the demographic base of modern, post-industrial societies. In previous centuries families with four and more children were common while nowadays one to three children are much more common. The smaller family structure with its higher share of emotional investment in each member created a reluctance to risk these lives in combat and led to a societal aversion to war and military interventions (ibid.: 134â137).
The characteristics of post-heroic societies can therefore be summarised as a changing demographic base associated with declining military readiness, both of which characterised the EU member states and led to the Europeanisation of defence as a solution to national military decline.
Changing demographic base
Beginning in the 1970s, Western armed forces gradually abolished the draft. In its place many of them opted for the all-volunteer or professional force model (Dandeker, 1994; Sorensen, 2000: 313â314; van der Meulen and Manigart, 1998: 315). Historically, conscription in Europe was adopted widely in the early nineteenth century as part of its democratisation and nation-building processes. Similarly, the end of conscription in the late twentieth century was the result of major societal and technological transformations that influenced the core of state sovereignty as well as the Gordian relationship between citizenship and military service (Dandeker, 1994; Moskos, 1977; Sorensen, 2000: 313â314; van der Meulen and Manigart, 1998: 315). The decreasing importance of military service as a symbol of active citizenship paradoxically did not lead to increased detachment of the armed forces from the parent societies. Quite the contrary, armed forces faced decreasing professional autonomy as they were required to incorporate civilian concepts and legalisation in areas of cultural diversity such as ethnicity, gender and sexual preferences. As a result, European armed forces often had to undergo implicit but significant changes in their organisational culture and institutional ethos (Soeters and van der Meulen, 2007).
The abolition of the draft also resulted from dramatic demographical changes. European demographical changes are explained by two trends: decreasing fertility and rising life expectancy (Ranier, 2007: 1). Europe has entered a phase of very slow demographic growth which is gradually shrinking its population in the first half of the twenty-first century. European Union member states face an ever-shrinking labour force and an associated dependence on working-age immigrants. This picture is the result of demographic extremes in EU member states. Many of them have the lowest fertility rates globally while at the same time enjoying the highest life expectancy in the world. Current European Commission assessments predict that by 2050, the median age amongst the EU 27 member countries will be 48,2 and it is expected that the EU will experience a steady decline in population after 2025. There is a growing consensus among experts that immigration will not suffice to fully compensate for the decreasing workforce population. In other words, EU member states are on their way to becoming societies in which older cohorts constitute the majority (ibid.: 3â5). The emerging demographic reality has major ramifications for funding pension schemes and associated public budget programmes (ibid.: 8).
It also has important implications for future governmental and EU security and defence policies. It is assumed that growing welfare demands will limit the funding available for military modernisation projects, especially as the European armed forces have turned to information technology (IT) and other advanced and expensive technologies to compensate for their downsizing (Wenke, 2005: 85â88). In addition to budgetary implications, the shrinking population and increasing competition with the private sector for the decreasing number of young adults is expected to limit the ability of the armed forces to meet recruitment and retention goals (ibid.: 89). Furthermore, as soldiers become a rarecommodity, the armed forces, societies and governments will be reluctant to put them in harmâs way.
Declining military readiness and might
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the sudden disappearance of a direct threat to EU member countries created a drive to end the significant burden of defence expenditures. As a result all of the member countries have significantly reduced their annual defence budgets compared to Cold War levels (Dandeker, 1994: 645; Wenke, 2005: 91). In the 1990s, decreasing defence budgets were augmented by the trend towards outsourcing in public sectors. Many member states began to aggressively transfer support and administration activities to contractors (Dandeker, 1994: 645â646; King, 2006: 362â365). European and North American governments provided most of the employment for private military companies.
Furthermore these companies were increasingly seen as legitimate actors in the transatlantic security industry and decision-making. Therefore the privatisation of security in North America and Europe could be part of the growing new system of âsecurity governanceâ in the post-Cold War era (Krahmann, 2005: 248). The literature discussed three factors influencing the dramatic increase in the use of such companies over the last two decades: first, the increased demand for their services resulting from small conflicts breaking out in developing countries; second, the declining willingness of European and North American governments to become involved in international peacekeeping operations unless their immediate security interests were threatened; third, defence budget cuts and the increased costs of military technology and operations (ibid.: 249â250).
All of these factors, combined with a growing emphasis on cost-effectiveness and efficiency in the post-Cold War era, resulted in the belief that outsourcing security services and relying on private military company expertise would help meet these aims. The increase of new security threats, such as ethnic warfare, international terrorism and transnational crime, was a key factor in promoting the growing role of private security providers and heightening demand for their services. It is important to note that this demand could only be partially fulfilled in Europe and North America by downsizing national armed forces in line with public pressures for peace dividends. Therefore, Western governments turned to private military companies (PMCs) to reinforce the national armed forces in foreign interventions.
Finally, the declining ideology of sovereignty, resulting in diminishing the hegemony of states in security provision, opened the door to growing public pressures for cost-effectiveness and efficiency. Thus governments began to promote âvalue for moneyâ policies and apply them to defence expenditures. In Europe the result was a gradual privatisation of the national defence industry, as well as transnational mergers in the armament and military service sectors. Nowadays conglomerates such as BAE Systems or EADS provide not only the products but, increasingly, related military services as well, such as training and maintenance (ibid.: 251â254). All of these developments made the EU member statesâ armed forces much less warfare-oriented and much more capable of and ready for crisis management or stabilisation operations. These forces are increasingly collaborating through common programmes, i.e. the Europeanisation of military forces.
Analysing Europeanisation using a modernist-constructivist approach: the fourth generation of strategic culture
The EU member states are fully aware of their individual declining military prowess and, since the 1990s, have increasingly tried to overcome it by means of enhanced cooperation and improved interoperability, epitomised within the EU by the CSDP (King, 2006: 48). Cultural and cognitive reception of this cooperation and the concomitant limitation of sovereignty as reflected in an increased reliance on a joint European defence was shaped in great part by more than 50 years of membership in NATO. That intensive interaction led not only to the development of shared standard operating procedures but also to close social commitment. Thus, the leading Western European member states had intellectual, cultural and political experience in defence cooperation, brought to the CSDP context, as well as a doctrinal and institutional infrastructure for the development and employment of force (ibid.: 52â55).
This process of increasing inter-European cooperation is called Europeanisation. Europeanisation refers to the construction and institutionalisation of rules and practices at the EU level and their integration into the national policy-making process. When applied to the CSDP, it has downloading and uploading aspects. Downloading refers to the adaptation of EU member statesâ practices and rules ...