Failed States and the Origins of Violence

A Comparative Analysis of State Failure as a Root Cause of Terrorism and Political Violence

Tiffiany Howard

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• eBook ISBN: 9781317136866
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Peace & Global Development
• Index: Politics & International Relations

What makes a terrorist? Is an individual inherently predisposed to be attracted to political violence or does exposure to a certain environment desensitize them in such a way that violence represents a viable mode for addressing political grievances? Identifying state failure as the impetus for political violence this book addresses these questions and focuses on why existing extremist groups find failed states so attractive. Utilizing global barometer data, Tiffiany Howard examines the underpinnings of individual support for political violence and argues that an insidious pattern of deprivation within failed states drives ordinary citizens to engage in and support extreme acts of political violence. A rigorous examination of four regions plagued by a combination of failed states and political violence-Sub Saharan Africa, The Middle East and North Africa, Southeast and South Asia, and Latin America-this text draws parallels to arrive at a single conclusion: that failed states are a natural breeding ground for terrorism and political violence.

Chapter 1

Breeding Grounds: Failed States and the Origins of Terrorism and Political Violence

Introduction

What are the factors that give rise to a terrorist? From what conditions is a violent extremist born? Is an individual inherently predisposed to be attracted to political violence, given a combination of specific genetic traits, or does an individual’s exposure to a certain environment, generally one containing traumatic experiences of violence, desensitize that person in such a way that political violence, and specifically terrorism, represents a viable mode for addressing political grievances? From historians to psychologists, socio-biologists and political scientists, nearly every social science discipline has grappled with the dilemma of understanding how a seemingly rational individual makes the decision to support and engage in political violence and terrorism.

In 1968, Gurr set forth a proposition in his now classic work, Why Men Rebel, that individuals resort to political violence because of perceptions of relative deprivation. In essence, Gurr argues that an individual’s frustration regarding perceived deprivation (hence it being relative) fosters aggression within that person which can then manifest itself in the form of acts of political violence, such as rebellions, riots, revolutions, and terrorism. Since the publication of Gurr’s work, many have challenged this argument and have postulated other approaches to understanding the factors that compel an individual to terrorist action. Some scholars have asserted that political violence, but specifically terrorism, is rooted in basic human physiology and in many ways see terrorism as an extension of aggressive behavior that is learned in the same manner as all other behaviors (Hubbard, 1983; Oots and Wiegele, 1985). A counter to the physiological position is one rooted in a more environmental approach, which suggests the actions of individuals are based upon their subjective interpretation of their environment (Morgan, 2001; Crenshaw, 1981; Johnson, 1978; Jenkins 1979). Thus, environments conducive to terrorism will naturally give rise to terrorists.

Many scholars have approached the root causes of terrorism from a diverse set of lens; however, what all these works have in common is that there is no consensus among them regarding how a terrorist originates. At best, there remain two divergent paths: nature vs. nurture. Terrorists are either born and there is nothing one can do about their physiological mapping or they are shaped by their environments. Most political scientists would argue it is the latter; the only problem with that position is that little empirical work has been done to test this assertion and ultimately fully understand what types of environments give birth to terrorists.

A proponent of the environmental trajectory, Jenkins (1979) cites certain conflicts as the environmental preconditions for terrorism. He notes the failure of rural guerrilla movements in Latin America forced rebels into metropolitan areas, which led to the emergence of urban violence. He also cites the defeat of Arab nations in the 1967 Six-Day War, which forced the Palestinians to resort to terrorism after having witnessed the failure of conventional warfare (Jenkins, 1979; Hudson, 1999; Morgan, 2001). While Jenkins is one of the few to identify specific environmental factors, the main problem with his argument is that he does not explain how the socio-political landscape of a country can change, while similar patterns of terrorism remain. Case in point: if rural guerilla movements have failed, then what explanation is there for the continued existence of The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and that instead of fading away, they have reorganized, expanded, and remain a thriving enterprise in the rural areas of South America?

Continuing along this vein of thought—that environmental conditions are salient to the makings of a terrorist—Johnson (1978) and Crenshaw (1981, 1995, 2007, 2011) identify permissive causes of terrorism that have their origins in the environment. These factors include urbanization, the transportation system, communications, media, weapons availability, and the absence of security measures. The first problem with their position is that because these are technology-based conditions, they will evolve over time and terrorists with them. The emergence of narco-terrorism and cyber-terrorism are illustrative of this evolution of modality. Twenty years ago, these modes of terrorism were virtually non-existent, but are becoming increasingly more prevalent today. Cyber-terrorism, especially, has garnered a great deal of interest and attention with the growing importance of computers, the internet, and social networking. To focus specifically on situational conditions that will change in time is limiting, and at no point gives us insight into the societal factors that give rise to terrorists, which is the second problem with the position taken by Johnson and Crenshaw. The factors identified by Johnson and Crenshaw, such as media and transportation systems, are essentially correlate factors. Simply put, the evolution of modern transportation does not explain to us why a person decides to engage in terrorism.

At the same time, and despite my critique, I do acknowledge the influence of the media and that exposure to radical views through social networking and the internet are relevant considerations that have largely given birth to homegrown terrorist threats in Western society (Bjelopera and Randol, 2010; Beutel, 2007; Johnson, 2010). Further, I do not dismiss the importance of the media and the internet and its impact on influencing extremist thought and action. At the same time I argue there are specific situational factors unique to each scenario of homegrown terrorism that cannot be captured by a unified analysis, such as this one. In other words, why are some people in Western society susceptible to extremist messages originating from the media and internet, while others who consume the same information are not? While it is a compelling question and undoubtedly related to this work in that it posits why stable states also give rise to terrorist threats—to address the origins of homegrown terrorists in Western society would move us beyond the scope of this work.

Setting situational conditions aside, one of the most salient environmental propositions is poverty. Even Gurr (1968) and his proponents (Davies, 1973; Margolin, 1977; Lichbach, 1990) take the position that poverty, and other similarly related factors such as inequality and lack of education are at the root of terrorism. A number of recent works have discounted education, inequality, and poverty as sufficient preconditions for terrorism (Sandler and Enders, 2001; Taylor and Horgan, 2000; Krueger and Maleckova, 2002; Kendall, 2005; Walker and Smith, 2001; Silber and Verme, 2010, 2012; Hopkins, 2008; Kuegler, 2009) pointing to terrorists from educated, middle to upper class socio-economic backgrounds; yet at no point do the authors provide sufficient alternative theories to the dilemma and that is—if not poverty, then what are the socio-political and economic factors that give rise to terrorism?

As of yet, this question remains largely unanswered. There is a general consensus among the terrorism and political violence literature that individuals who are exposed to a particular environment exhibit a greater likelihood of engaging in political violence and terrorism, but there is no unified understanding, or even agreement regarding the features of this environment. Yes, we would expect terrorists and violent extremists to be born out of experiences of political instability and violence, but neither psychologists nor political scientists have worked to establish any empirical norms to establish this assertion. One of the greatest weaknesses of the field of terrorism and political violence is the lack of empirical research in general (Hudson et al., 1999; Silke, 2004; Borum, 2004). At the risk of being mired down by large N datasets and statistical analyses, there is a dearth of quantitatively oriented research regarding the origins of strategic political violence and terrorism that provides an explanation as to why there is a lack of consensus among scholars, if only because it is difficult to establish generalizations from specific case studies and phenomenological historical accounts.

Failed States and the Origins of Violence

The lack of quantitative research on terrorism, and the absence of a consensus regarding the environmental conditions that foster terrorism and political violence, was what originally gave rise to this work. To answer the query posed at the onset of this chapter—the conditions under which a terrorist emerges—I first identify the climate of state fragility as the ideal environment to give rise to political violence, and in certain cases, it specifically leads to terrorism. And from that position, I argue that the living conditions within weak and failed states are so psychologically damaging and physically threatening that such an unstable climate ultimately drives one to obtain tangible political and economic resources through the use of violence¹. Thus, the crux of this work is that state failure represents the impetus for political violence, in that it makes weak and failing states the volatile breeding grounds for terrorists and violent extremists. Moreover, I contend that this dynamic is so problematic because the majority of states where this phenomenon is present are situated in the developing world.

As research has shown, ‘bad neighbors often make for bad neighborhoods’ in that fragile states in fragile regions are a recipe for disaster (Zartman, 1995; Weiner, 1996; Howard, 2010b; Rotberg, 2003, 2004; Miliken, 2003; Chestermen et al., 2005; Debiel and Klein, 2002). One failed state can collapse an entire region, as has been the case in the Horn of Africa, and along the Western coastline of sub-Saharan Africa with the failure of Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea, and Côte d’Ivoire. Additionally, there is the widely accepted belief that terrorism flourishes in failed states (Howard, 2010, 2011; Freedman, 2002; Linden, 2002; Rabasa et al., 2007).

For the purposes of this work, the assertion that failed states are attractive to terrorists is one to address, because the connection between the two is a logical one. Given the absence of a governmental and military presence, such a climate of disorder naturally would allow entities that existed beyond the scope of governance to establish a quasi set of norms and rule of law in pockets of territory (Howard, 2010a). I do not argue that point. However, I challenge the simplicity of such an argument.

While such an assertion may explain the movement patterns of transnational terrorists, it does not offer any reasoning for the emergence of domestic terrorist threats from failed states. I would go so far as to argue the proponents of the former position conflate these two very distinct groups, which could explain why many scholars are so convinced that failed states are attractive to terrorists, when really they have missed a critical component of this relationship.

I do not argue that failed states are attractive to transnational terrorist groups, because they are, but the relationship between terrorism and state failure is more nuanced than existing studies have demonstrated. This work focuses specifically on why is it that failed states have given rise to such deadly terrorists groups. I assert that earlier studies of the relationship between state failure and terrorism overlook the probability that existing terrorists groups find failed states so attractive, not only because of the absence of a functioning government and security forces, but also because of the recruitment potential. This argument will be fleshed out in the following chapters. The important point is that previous studies have examined the movement patterns of terrorist groups into failed states, but they have missed the micro-level dynamic of the impact fragile states have on the psyche of an individual living in such a devastated state. The sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) represents a tragic example of this phenomenon. After decades of state failure, subsequent conflict, and mass forced migration, the DRC has given rise to some of the most brutal acts of internal violence the world has witnessed since Rwanda.

In Chapter 2, I delve deeper into the violent conditions observed in the DRC, which are deeply rooted in its legacy of state failure. Beyond the DRC, I evaluate the region of sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. This text begins with sub-Saharan Africa for one main reason: that it is a region of chronically failed states. If ever a region should give rise to terrorists, and it has, it is sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time, however, I discuss why the political violence in sub-Saharan Africa, which is generally not transnational, oftentimes is not classified as terrorism, the reasoning behind this politically motivated decision, and the implications this has for the region. In this chapter, I build the argument that grounds the subsequent chapters: that failing and failed states breed terrorists and violent extremists. Utilizing Afrobarometer data, I evaluate respondent support for the use of political violence and draw inferences from these findings. Several points one should take away from this chapter is that despite widely held beliefs, there are terrorists and there is terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa, this terrorism is rooted in a long legacy of state fragility, and most importantly, in recent years these groups have been exposed to extremely deadly internationally sponsored terrorists, which have made domestic terrorists in the region more extreme in their violence. I conclude this chapter with the warning that given the complexities of state decay in the region, if more attention is not given to the increasing political violence in sub-Saharan Africa, terrorism in this part of the world could evolve into an uncontrollable phenomenon, the magnitude and severity of which the global community has yet to witness.

Within Chapter 2, I test the hypothesis that failing and failed states breed terrorism and political violence by evaluating a region of chronically failed states, whereas, in Chapter 3 I observe this phenomenon, utilizing terrorism as my critical variable of interest. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has given birth to some of the most violent terrorist organizations in the form of Hamas and Hezbollah. Moreover, this part of the world has also born witness to bloody insurgent and rebel movements against repressive regimes, most notably, in Iran, Algeria, and Syria. Beyond the political violence against brutal dictators and imperial forces, the Middle East and North Africa remain the site of some of the most protracted conflicts in the world, and host two of the most tragically failed states—Iraq and Syria. Given the prevalence of political violence, the protracted nature of this violence, and its intensity, the MENA region represents an ideal region of observation for this analysis. The question I pose in this chapter is similar to the one posed in the preceding chapter, but diverges somewhat. Instead of trying to understand what type of violence emerges from a region rife with failed states, in the case of Chapter 3, I am most interested in what are the most salient features of the states in a region that has produced the deadliest forms of terrorism the modern world has ever seen.

Chapter 4 follows the concept set forth in Chapters 2 and 3. Yet, what is unique about Southeast and South Asia is that it does not exist at any extreme. In other words, it is neither the region of the most or worst failed states, as is the case in sub-Saharan Africa, nor is it the region with the most or the worst terrorism. Instead, Southeast and South Asia hover in between these two regions in that they are comprised of chronically weak states that have consistently suffered from acts of political violence.

What is probably most interesting about South Asia and Southeast Asia is the stark dichotomies that exist between states in this region. For example, South Asia can produce a violent ethno-separatist terrorist organization in the form of the LTTE or Tamil Tigers, or give rise to an Afghanistan—inarguably a failed state, one that has been in a state of failure for many decades—yet still coexist in the same region as India, a state with the fifth largest economy in the world that is continuing to grow and thrive. If state failure is contagious, and bad neighbors make for bad neighborhoods, then why has India not suffered from the continued failure and ongoing violence of its not-so-distant neighbors? This is a question I address in Chapter 4.

South Asia aside, Southeast Asia presents a similar conundrum, probably one that is even more perplexing, because of all the regions I evaluate in this work, Southeast Asia is undoubtedly the most resilient with regards to socio-economic indicators, though the incidents and threat of terrorism in Indonesia remain a genuine security concern, as well as the growing dissent in Malaysia and Thailand. Despite the problems facing the region, Singapore remains a shining example of prosperity and stability in a region that, while it is not the worst of the bunch when it comes to either terrorism or state failure, it consistently hovers in unstable space. Thus, the obvious question would be why incorporate Southeast and South Asia in the analysis?

The main argument that grounds this entire study is obviously evident in both regions, although South Asia is a stronger case in that the failed states of Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, and Pakistan have been more fertile breeding grounds for terrorists than perhaps Southeast Asia; and there is undoubtedly much to learn from the states that produced the Tamil Tigers and al-Qaeda. A part of this study is also predictive in that I speculate on which regions will give rise to the next generation of internationally sponsored terrorists. The analysis I present in Chapter 2 touches upon these speculative suppositions, but in Chapter 4 is where I really build my case regarding my predictions concerning the future breeding grounds for terrorism—and Southeast Asia, especially, is central to these assertions.²

In comparison to the other regions, where we clearly can observe a relationship between state failure and terrorism, Latin America presents the most challenging case of them all. That is because within Latin America there is a confluence of a number of factors that complicates the linear relationship between the two variables of interest. Since the 1950s, Latin America has had to contend with the festering dissent of the indigenous population. This group has historically occupied the lowest rung of the ethnic caste system and has traditionally been relegated to rural areas, where inequities in wealth distribution and property ownership have marginalized them, and locked them into the agrarian sector of the economy, where there is very little opportunity for upward mobility. As a consequence, the indigenous population has effectively been consigned to poverty, generation after generation.

This climate of ethnic and economic inequality was the ideal catalyst for the Marxist revolutionaries that mobilized the indigenous and rural masses during the sixties. The Cuban Revolution and the rise of Fidel Castro sparked others, like Che Guevara, to initiate their own movements, with the rural poor as their main base. The National Liberation Army (ELN) and FARC in Colombia emerged within this context, but with the fall of the Soviet Union and the essential death of Marxist ideologies, the ELN and the FARC had seemingly two choices: fade away into obscurity or become a legitimate political party in the new government based upon semi-democratic principles. The choices made by the FARC and ELN diverged sharply from its contemporaries and does much to explain why these two groups still exist today, while other leftist revolutionary organizations in Latin America have all but disappeared.

In Chapter 5, ...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Dedication
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of Figures
• List of Tables
• Acknowledgments
• 1 Breeding Grounds: Failed States and the Origins of Terrorism and Political Violence
• 2 And They All Fall Down: The Pandemic of Political Violence and State Failure in sub-Saharan Africa
• 3 A Legacy of Tyranny, Tragedy and Terror: A Closer Look at Weak States, Authoritarian Rule, and Radical Religious Terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa
• 4 Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon No More: The Emerging Crisis of Collapsed States and Extremist Terrorism in Southeast and South Asia
• 5 The Delayed Reign of the Latin King: Why Drug Lords, Rebels and Terrorism Will Forever Plague Latin America’s Frail States
• 6 Beyond Failed States: Reflecting on State Failure and the Origins of Violence and the Future Threat of Transnational Terrorism
• Bibliography
• Appendices
• Index