The French Army's Tank Force and Armoured Warfare in the Great War

The Artillerie Spéciale

Tim Gale

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781409466611
• eBook ISBN: 9781317031321
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

Recent scholarship has challenged the assumption that military commanders during the First World War were inflexible, backward-looking and unwilling to exploit new technologies. Instead a very different picture is now emerging of armies desperately looking to a wide range of often untested and immature scientific and technological innovations to help break the deadlock of the Western Front. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the development of tank warfare, which both the British and the French hoped would give them a decisive edge in their offensives of 1917 and 1918. Whilst the British efforts to develop armoured warfare have been well chronicled, there has been no academic study in English on the French tank force - the Artillerie Spéciale - during the Great War. As such, this book provides a welcome new perspective on an important but much misunderstood area of the war. Such was the scale of the French tanks' failure in their first engagement in 1917, it was rumoured that the Artillerie Spéciale was in danger of being disbanded, yet, by the end of the war it was the world's largest and most technologically advanced tank force. This work examines this important facet of the French army's performance in the First World War, arguing that the AS fought the war in as intelligent and sensible a manner as was possible, given the immature state of the technology available. No amount of sound tank doctrine could compensate for the fragility of the material, for the paucity of battlefield communication equipment and for the lack of tank-infantry training opportunities. Only by 1918 was the French army equipped with enough reliable tanks, as well as aircraft and heavy-artillery, to begin to exercise a mastery of the new form of combined-arms warfare. The successful French armoured effort outlined in this study (including a listing of all the combat engagements of the French tank service in the Great War) highlights a level of military effectiveness within

Chapter 1
‘It takes a lot of stuff to kill a German’:¹ French Material and Technological Responses to the Western Front

The search by the French army for operational and tactical solutions to the problems of trench warfare on the Western Front can conveniently be split into two closely connected approaches. One was what might be called the war of ideas, the other was the war of material. The war of ideas was primarily concerned with developing new tactics to adjust to the onset of a modern war of material. The war of material itself can be divided into two main strands: harnessing the country’s industrial capacity to produce the large quantities of armaments that were required, along with the development of new forms of armament. This process led to what Rolf-Dieter Müller has called ‘the transition from personnel-intensive to material-intensive armaments’.² The development of new weapons is a point where the war of ideas and the war of material coincided. Estienne’s suggestion that a technological solution to the problems of the war be developed, via the cuirassé terrestre (land battleship), was only one of many proposals and needs to be seen in that context. Both elements of this war of material will be examined here, with the many demands made on France’s industrial capacity being considered first. The pressures on the French industrial system are important since the development of tanks required resources that were already subject to numerous competing demands. The opposition that Estienne faced throughout the AS project was depicted in many post-war accounts in the familiar terms of a man of genius struggling against narrow-minded bureaucrats, both military and civilian.³ However, these accounts fail to take into consideration any factors beyond the immediate needs of the AS and are rather undermined by the qualities of those who showed initial opposition to the tank project. It is therefore necessary to consider those other demands on French industry that the AS was competing with and the general context of innovation of military technology in the French army, within which the AS would develop. This survey cannot claim to be comprehensive but it will highlight some particular problems and general developments that are indicative of the French experience of industrial warfare during the first half of the war.

The considerable loss of material in conjunction with the large consumption of supplies, in particular ammunition, in the first year of the war was not wholly unexpected to the participants. However, none had envisaged that this situation would be sustained for years on end and then planned accordingly. Even the state best prepared for war industrially, Germany, was not ready for such a prolonged and intense conflict.⁴ In particular, the belligerents quickly realised the need for a large-scale expansion of their artillery arm, both in terms of the number of guns available and greatly increased amounts of ammunition for them. Germany, for example, began the war with only 1,000 rounds per gun in reserve, with the expectation that this would suffice for six months fighting rather than the month that it actually lasted.⁵ The rigours of war also took their toll on both the gunners and on the guns themselves; in just three weeks during 1914, the French army lost one tenth of its field artillery.⁶ There was thus an urgent need for a rapid increase in the production of guns and ammunition, an industrial process that took some time to organise efficiently.

Initial problems in maximising industrial capacity meant that France was unable to keep shell and gun supply up to the levels required by the Army. In addition, quality control was almost non-existent to begin with and continued to be a problem, meaning that the shell crisis of 1914–15 was not only about the numbers of shells delivered but also about the variable quality of the munitions. Even as late as June 1915, 11 DI was reporting that, on average, four out of five shells were failing to explode.⁷ An early attempt was made to rationalise artillery shell production between the seven manufacturers and the War Ministry in September 1914. This failed to alleviate the later munitions crisis, largely because the problem was not just in the unprecedented consumption of munitions but also because the factories had been stripped of key personnel upon mobilisation.⁸ The shell crisis led to difficult decisions; in March 1915, Joseph Joffre was forced to limit production of 105mm shells in order to concentrate industrial capacity on 75mm shells.⁹ However, as with all the belligerents, this crisis was overcome in due course, although it took a considerable reorganisation of the manufacturing process to achieve this.

The difficulties that all manufacturers had in maintaining quality control led to both faulty artillery shells and problems with the guns themselves, largely in connection with the barrels, which proved even more serious than the faulty shells. For example, on one day in June 1915, 21 CA lost seven 75mm guns to internal explosions. The following day, 33 CA lost nine to bursting.¹⁰ Joffre was still pressing the government in August 1915 for increased 75mm barrel production in tandem with an overall increased production of guns.¹¹ In addition, such was the demand for field guns in the French army that the standard battery size had to be decreased from four guns per battery to three.¹²

There was a clear need for different artillery capabilities too. The Germans had introduced minenwerfer (trench mortars) in September 1914 causing much concern to the French. For example, 2 CA took significant casualties from German minenwerfer between September and November 1914.¹³ Joffre wrote to the War Minister on 28 November 1914 saying that it was ‘of the highest importance’ that trench mortar development was quickly undertaken, as the Germans had gained a considerable advantage from these weapons.¹⁴ The expedient use of obsolescent mortars, many dating to the Franco-Prussian war, gave some plunging fire capability to the French corps and divisions until new mortars could be developed.¹⁵ Indeed, the situation was so bad that black powder mortars from 1839 had to be pressed into service during September 1914. A 58mm trench mortar was first tested in January 1915, proving so successful that Joffre immediately ordered 2,000, with 120 being in action by 1 May 1915. These were to be widely distributed in the French army as trench mortars continued to grow in importance. By the beginning of July 1915, there were 900 58mm mortars in the army, giving ‘excellent results’ in the May and June attacks.¹⁶ The powerful 240T came into service just too late for these offensives, with the even bigger 340T coming into service by the end of 1915. Unfortunately, the German trench artillery continued to be ‘very superior’ to that of the French, as the French official history admits.¹⁷

The imbalance of heavy artillery between the French and Germans, it being in the latter’s favour, caused the French artillery, still mainly consisting of 75mm and 155mm guns, to be frequently outranged.¹⁸ The shortage of heavy artillery was initially addressed by stripping some fortresses of their artillery and redeploying naval guns but these were clearly only temporary measures; Joffre was pressing for more heavy artillery throughout October 1914.¹⁹ However, such was the continuing shortage of heavy-artillery pieces that new units were being formed with old gun designs even as late as 1917. Frequently it was not even possible to supply the same gun across different groupes within an artillery regiment, a situation that continued almost until the end of the war. For example, when the 88 Régiment Artillerie Lourde à Tracteurs (heavy motorised artillery) was formed in early 1917, a third of its groupes were armed with pre-war artillery and it was only by mid 1918 that the regiment was armed with modern long-range guns.²⁰ However, long range artillery continued to be scarce until 1917 and was usually inferior in numbers to the German long-range artillery, although it soon matched it in quality.²¹ Although the French army was in fact quick to appreciate the necessity for heavy guns, it took some considerable time for French industry to catch-up with its demands.

From this brief survey of artillery developments it is evident that French industrial capacity was quite stretched just to accommodate the demands of the artillery. But this was not the only set of demands on French industry; there were also new weapons being developed and older ones being improved. A variety of new technologies were being explored for their military potential, one of which was armoured vehicles.

In essence there are two primary questions facing any army adopting new technology: whether the design available can actually be realised and then manufactured in sufficient quantity (and in time) and whether the result of this process can be effectively used in the context of existing, or possible, doctrine. In other words: can we build it and can we use it? There is also the question as to whether it is worth devoting resources to a new technology that might be better used elsewhere within the existing equipment framework. The technological hurdles that had to be overcome in the successful development of tanks are impressive considering that France had rather an uneven track record in the development of modern weapons prior to the war; the most egregious mistake being the failure to develop an adequate heavy artillery arm.

In some aspects of military technology, the French were ahead of everyone else. For example, in the area of radio communications, the French were better prepared in 1914 than their rivals to read enemy radio traffic, ...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of Figures, Photographs, Maps and Tables
• Series Editor’s Foreword
• Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations
• Introduction: The French Armoured Force: The Artillerie Spéciale
• 1 ‘It takes a lot of stuff to kill a German’: French Material and Technological Responses to the Western Front
• 2 ‘Our sacrifice will not be in vain’: The Artillerie Spéciale in the Nivelle Offensive 1917
• 3 The Battle Behind the Lines: Aftermath of the Nivelle Offensive
• 4 ‘A Masterpiece of Tactics’: The Battle of Malmaison
• 5 ‘A Charming Toy’: The Light and Heavy Tanks and Other Projects
• 6 The Charge at Chaudun: The Tank Regulations and the Introduction of the Renault Light Tank into Service
• 7 All the Perfect Engines of Modern War: The Battles of Cutry and Antheuil and Directive No 5
• 8 ‘The Greatest Day Since the Marne’: The Battle of Soissons – July 1918
• 9 The Battle of Somme-Py: Champagne – Swansong of the Medium Tanks
• Conclusion An Event as Important as the Invention of Gunpowder and Cannon?
• Appendix 1: Artillerie Spéciale – Order of Battle 24 May 19181
• Appendix 2: Table of AS Engagements, 1917–18
• Bibliography
• Index