Schopenhauer's Early Fourfold Root

Translation and Commentary

F. C. White

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781859726563
• eBook ISBN: 9781351901963
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

Schopenhauer's Early Fourfold Root constitutes a landmark in Schopenhaurian scholarship. It is a translation with concise commentary of Schopenhauer's doctoral thesis as submitted to the University of Jena and published at Rudolstadt in 1813. In spite of the great and increasing interest in the writings of Schopenhauer in the English-speaking world, this work has never been translated before, and its long awaited appearance fills the only remaining gap in the philosophical works of Schopenhauer available to English-speaking readers. Schopenhauer's thesis of 1813 is very different from the 1847 edition well known to English readers, and its appearance in translation will enable students and scholars alike to make sense of the development of Schopenhauer's thought in a way that has been possible so far only to those at ease with Schopenhauer's German. The translation, which keeps a fine balance between readability and philosophical accuracy, is accompanied by a commentary enabling students as well as established scholars to follow Schopenhauer's thought with comparative ease.

1 Introduction

§1 The method

The divine Plato and truly remarkable Kant unite their voices in emphatically recommending a rule of method for the pursuit of all philosophy, indeed for the pursuit of all knowledge.¹ There are two laws, they say, that should be complied with equally, the law of homogeneity ana the law of specification, neither being made use of to the disadvantage of the other.

The law of homogeneity enjoins that we take note of similarities and conformities, that in the light of this we group things under species and species under genera, that we place lower genera under higher, and that we continue in this way until we arrive at a unity of a highest, all-embracing kind.

Since the law of homogeneity is transcendental and therefore essential to our reason, it presupposes nature to be in conformity with it, and this presupposition is expressed in the ancient principle, Entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.² The law of specification on the other hand, as expressed by Kant, is as follows: The number of varieties of things is not to be reduced without serious consideration.³ This second law requires us to distinguish clearly the various genera united under a comprehensive general notion, and again the higher and lower species under these genera, without at any point making a leap. In particular it requires us not to subsume lowest-level species, let alone concrete individuals, immediately under the general notion, since all concepts are capable of further subdivision, none reaching down to the level of bare perception.

According to Kant, both laws are transcendental a priori principles of reason, postulating conformity between things and themselves, and Plato in his own way seems to say the same: he asserts that these rules, to which all the sciences owe their origin, were cast down to us from the abode of the gods together with Promethean fire.

§2 Application of the method in the present case

Notwithstanding such an emphatic recommendation, I find that the second of these laws has not been sufficiently applied to the basic principle of knowledge known as the principle of sufficient reason. For, although philosophers have frequently and for a long time formulated this principle in general terms, they have neglected properly to distinguish its fundamentally different applications. They have not ascribed to each a different meaning, and consequently have not revealed the source of each in a different constitutive power of the mind.

Particularly in considering the powers of the mind, applying the principle of homogeneity while neglecting its opposite has engendered a host of enduring errors. By contrast, the application of the principle of specification has produced great and significant advances, as is clear from a comparison between Kant and earlier philosophers. Let me therefore quote a passage from Kant recommending the application of the principle of specification to the sources of our knowledge, a passage that consequently favours my present endeavours.

It is most important to isolate kinds of knowledge that are distinct in species and origin, taking care not to run them together after the fashion of ordinary usage. What the chemist does in the analysis of substances and what the mathematician does in the pure study of quantity is even more incumbent upon the philosopher. It enables him to determine with certainty the part played by any given form of knowledge in the diverse uses of the understanding, and to determine the special value and influence of each such form of knowledge. (CPR, B870.)

§3 An advantage that this inquiry could bring

If I succeed in showing that the principle constituting the subject matter of this inquiry does not derive immediately from a unique form of the intellect’s cognition but in the first instance from several, it will follow that the necessity that accompanies it in virtue of its being an unalterable a priori principle will not be unique either. It will be as multiple as the sources of the principle. If this is so, however, those who base conclusions upon the principle have the obligation of specifying precisely which of the forms of necessity arising from it they are appealing to. They have the further obligation of giving special names to those forms, following the lead that I shall myself give in making various suggestions.

It is to be hoped that in this way something will be done towards increasing clarity and precision in philosophy, since the highest level of comprehension attained through precise definitions of meanings is essential to philosophy. It preserves us from both error and intentional deceit, and it secures all forms of knowledge gained through philosophy in safe possession, not to be snatched from it as the result of some subsequently discovered misunderstanding or ambiguity. Horace’s fable of the country mouse and city mouse has application here, since in philosophy we should prefer a little held in confidence and with unshakeable certainty to a lot based for the most part on rhetoric. For rhetoric is merely con-cerned with making assertions and being impressive, and may therefore be upset at any moment by honest and courageous criticism.

It seems to me that anything likely to foster better communication should be welcome to philosophers, especially given that complaints are frequently heard from them that they are not understood, and complaints from their readers that they are obscure; yet doubtless both parties wish to make themselves properly understood. Or could there perhaps be periods in history in which intelligibility and the understanding accompanying it are dreaded and shunned? If there are, such times may well be happy in themselves; they may even be religious and virtuous. But they will never be philosophical. For the aim of philosophy is lucidity and clarity. Philosophers endeavour to resemble, not a troubled and turbid stream, but a lake in Switzerland, tranquilly possessing depth together with a clarity that renders that depth visible. Furthermore, I believe that if a person possesses the rare quality of thoroughly understanding himself, he will be able to make himself understood by others, provided that these in turn possess the correspondingly rare quality of wanting to understand. For all men possess both the abilities and the basic truths needed for understanding, even if the degree to which they possess them is not the same in all. Indeed there are few that possess them to an eminent degree, which explains why so few are capable of productions in the arts or discoveries and inventions in the sciences. By contrast, all of us have the ability to some extent to receive, understand and recognise what is correct, so long as it is presented to us clearly — that is, unencumbered by side issues. For this reason, a person who creates something out of his own powers is like a musical instrument, while the rest of us are like receptacles of glass or metal. For while these latter do not themselves produce music, they do echo and propagate the sounds of the instrument.

It must be added, however, that only pure sounds are echoed back, never impure sounds, and that this fact causes frustration in many. It may even explain why the didactic tone in certain writings so often gives way to one of scolding, readers being taken to task in advance and in anticipation of their lack of ability.

§4 Importance of the principle of sufficient reason

The principle of sufficient reason is so important that I have no hesitation in calling it the basis of all science. For science is organised knowledge, a system of interconnected items of knowledge; not a bare aggregate. What then is it that holds the parts of such a system together? It is the principle of sufficient reason. For the thing that distinguishes a science from a bare aggregate is precisely that its component truths follow from others as their grounds. Moreover, most sciences contain truths about causes from which effects may be determined, and likewise other truths about the necessity with which conclusions follow from reasons, as will appear in the course of this investigation.

The supposition constantly made by us a priori that all things have a reason is precisely what justifies our asking why at every turn, and because of this we may call such a why the mother of all sciences.

§5 The principle itself

It will become clear later on that the principle of sufficient reason is a common expression for several truths given to us a priori, but since the principle must be given some sort of provisional formulation in the meantime, I choose that of Wolff as being the widest in scope: Nothing is without a reason why it is rather than not.⁴

Notes

1 Platon, Phileb. pp. 219–223, edit. Bip; Kant, Kritik d. reinen Vern., pp. 673–688, 2te u. folgende Ausg. (The edition of Plato referred to by Schopenhauer is the edition published at Bipontium 1781–87; the passage of the Philebus referred to is roughly 16c-18d in Stephanus pagination (FW).)

2 Entia praeter necessitatem non esse multiplicanda.

3 Entium varietates non temere esse minuenaas.

4 Nihil est sine ratione cur potius sit quam non sit.

2 A survey of the principal doctrines put forward so far concerning the principle of sufficient reason

§6 A first statement of the principle and a distinction between two of its applications

Because the principle of sufficient reason is fundamental to all knowledge, some abstract and more or less adequately defined expression of i t was doubtless formulated very early on, and for this very reason it could be difficult to establish where the first expression of it occurs. It is of no great interest anyway.

Plato and Aristotle give no formal expression to it as a major fundamental principle, but they do often speak of it as being self-evident. Plato, with a naivete which, against the background of the critical analysis of recent times, appears like the original state of innocence compared with the knowledge of good and evil, says the following. ‘Whatever comes into being has to come into being through a cause. How could i t come into being without one?’¹ Aristotle, in his Posterior Analytics, I, 2, expresses the principle after a fashion in the following words. ‘We think that we fully understand something when concerning its cause we believe that in fact it is its cause, and that there is no other possibility.’² Also, already in his Metaphysics, IV, 1, he presents a division of various kinds of reason, or rather various kinds of principle, ἀρχαί, of which he assumes there to be eight; although his division is neither thorough nor sufficiently precise. None the less, what he says is quite correct: All principles have this in common, that they are the first things through which anything exists, comes into being, or is known.’³ And in the following chapter he distinguishes various kinds of cause, although again rather arbitrarily. However, he does better in the Posterior Analytics, II, 11, where he states that there are four kinds of reason. ‘There are four kinds of reason: a thing’s essence, its necessitating conditions, that which first put it in motion, and its purpose.’⁴

The principle that nothing is without a cause was an axiom for the scholastics too; though according to Wolff Leibniz was the first to state i t formally and to give it general expression. Leibniz was also the first clearly to distinguish two applications of it. He distinguished an application to judgments, stating that for any judgment to be true it must have a ground from which it follows, and an application to changes in the external world, stating that such changes cannot occur without a cause.

§7 Descartes

Even in the works of the astute Descartes we find no clear understanding of this distinction. In his Reply to the Second Set of Objections to Meditations on First Philosophy, Axiom 1, he writes as follows. ‘Concerning anything that exists it is possible to ask what is the cause of its existing. This qu...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Dedication
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Preface
• 1 Introduction
• 2 A survey of the principal doctrines put forward so far concerning the principle of sufficient reason
• 3 Insufficiency of the account given so far and an outline of a new one
• 4 On the first class of objects for the subject and the form of the principle of sufficient reason governing it
• 5 On the second class of objects for the subject and the form of the principle of sufficient reason governing it
• 6 On the third class of objects for the subject and the form of the principle of sufficient reason governing it
• 7 On the fourth class of objects for the subject and the form of the principle of sufficient reason governing it
• 8 General remarks and conclusions
• 9 General survey with comments on Schopenhauer’s text, by F.C. White
• Bibliography
• Index