Religion, Education and Governance in the Middle East

Between Tradition and Modernity

Sai Felicia Krishna-Hensel

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• eBook ISBN: 9781317067351
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Political Ideologies
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The Middle East is a key geopolitical strategic region in the international system but its distinctive cultural and political divisions present a mosaic of states that do not lend themselves to simplistic interpretations. A thoughtful analysis of the Middle East requires an understanding of the synergism between tradition and modernity in the region as it adapts to a globalizing world. Religious education and activism continue to remain a significant factor in the modernization process and the development of modern governance in the states of the Middle East. This interdisciplinary book explores the historical and contemporary role of religious tradition and education on political elites and governing agencies in several major states as well as generally in the region. The relationship between democracy and authority is examined to provide a better understanding of the complexity underlying the emergence of new power configurations. As the region continues to respond to the forces of change in the international system it remains an important and intriguing area for analysts.

Chapter 1
Global Governance, Islamism, and Authority in the Middle East

Alise Coen

Introduction

International Relations (IR) is increasingly concerned with how transnational forces, originating and operating outside the traditional domain of the state, wield influence on states’ policy decisions and outcomes. While IR scholars have begun to uncover the myriad challenges to state authority in the Middle East, derived from transnational religious movements, diasporas, and phenomena associated with the “new Arab media,” little work has related such transnational challenges to the study of Global Governance. Bearing in mind Craig Murphy’s observation that Global Governance has been “poorly done and poorly understood,” this chapter examines three manifestations of Islamist transnationalism in the Middle East to consider the empirical and theoretical implications for Global Governance: (1) the Muslim Brotherhood; (2) Hamas; and (3) Hizbullah. Empirically, these case studies present several trends regarding societal expectations of, and organizational competition over, governance in the Middle East. Theoretically, the chapter addresses the debate regarding what constitutes “Global Governance” and explores the tension between national and transnational elements of Islamist authority in the Middle East.

In his assessment of what constitutes Global Governance, Craig Murphy (2000: 796) describes a “global polity” comprised of neoliberal ideology, growing networks of transnational public and private regimes, global intergovernmental organizations, and transnational organizations that “[carry] out some of the traditional service functions of global public agencies.” Relevant to the latter category of global governance activities, IR scholars focusing on the Middle East have observed a spectrum of political actors and phenomena that increasingly challenge the traditional functions of the State. Marc Lynch (2006: 21), for example, analyzes the emergence of a new, transnational Arab public sphere “defined by the rapidly expanding universe of Arabs able and willing to engage in public argument … within an ever-increasing range of possible media outlets.” This new public sphere, facilitated by new technologies, is increasingly able to disrupt the traditional state monopoly over the flow of information, pressuring Arab political elites to provide greater justification for their positions.

On a similar note, Fred Halliday (2005: 232) uses the term “transnational” to identify activities and spaces in Middle Eastern societies “that are not controlled by the state and which derive much of their strength and character from interaction with the external.” Halliday discusses nationalist movements, diasporas, political violence, and media influences in this context, and additionally identifies Islamist movements as manifestations par excellence of transnational ideology and organization. As an important caveat, he notes that the origins and operations of these Islamist movements “lie very much within the specific societies in which they originate” (ibid.: 241). This chapter examines the theoretical and empirical implications of Islamist transnationalism for Global Governance, paying particular attention to the paradoxical nature of Islamism: on one hand, the rhetoric, ideology, and “social movement” aspects of political Islam appear supranational in many ways. On the other hand, important organizational and operational dimensions of Islamism remain very much territorially and nationally bound. In both cases, it is apparent that Islamist movements play an important role in the “disaggregation” of authority observed by Rosenau (2005) to be a worldwide process. Attention is also paid to the ways in which Islamist organizations challenge the traditional functions of the State. Here, the chapter seeks to illuminate the undermining of the State particularly in the realm of the provision of basic social services. By challenging traditional authority in this and other arenas, Islamist movements are poised to compete with the State over claims of good governance.

This chapter will proceed in four stages. First, the conceptualization of Islam as an inherently “transnational space” will be discussed. Secondly, the notion of Islamic governance vis-à-vis Islamism will be explicated to address those aspects which are aptly described as “transnational” or “global,” particularly on the issue of reestablishing a supranational Islamic caliphate, and those aspects which are perhaps better described as nationally and territorially bound. Third, the chapter will examine three case studies of Islamist transnationalism in the contexts of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and Hizbullah. Finally, the chapter will conclude with an assessment of the trends observed across these three cases and their implications for future trajectories of global governance in the Middle East.

Islam as a Transnational Space

In considering the implications of transnational Islamism for Global Governance, it is important to address those elements of Islam itself which might be aptly described as “transnational.” In his study of Islam as a transnational public space, John Bowen (2011: 202) identifies five elements of Islam which he characterizes as “universal”: the concept of a worldwide umma (Muslim community), the use of Arabic as a primary language of scholarship and prayer, the system of Islamic global jurisprudence, the annual Hajj to Mecca, and an encouraged Islamic consciousness which “transcend[s] specific boundaries and borders.” The first point is heavily related to the latter, as both connote attributes of Islam which organically facilitate a transplanetary mindset. Indeed, the pan-Islamist movement has capitalized on the concept of the umma to emphasize spiritual unity over nationally or territorially bound identities. This global consciousness has in many ways been intensified, negotiated, and reconstructed by new media technologies, which have opened up areas of contestation and debate theologically, politically, and with regard to identity construction. Peter Mandaville (2001) refers to this phenomenon as the creation of a “new umma consciousness,” in which the monopoly on religious knowledge is increasingly broken down and Islamic virtual communities increasingly constitute new spaces of interaction.

Historically, the Hajj, as a pillar of Islam, has facilitated regular interaction of Muslims from diverse territorial spaces. Intrinsic to this religious obligation of pilgrimage is the uniting together of followers despite geographical separation or isolation. As such, it can be considered an organically transnational attribute of Islam. With regard to the third element identified by Bowen, the “universality” of Islamic jurisprudence, an important caveat should be noted. The madhab (schools) of Islamic legal thought are undeniably transnational in their geographic scope, with the influence of the Sunni Hanafi school, for example, transcending polities in the Middle East, Southern Europe, the Indian subcontinent, and Central Asia. At the same time, the division among these schools of jurisprudence in many ways limits their universality. While the influence of the Hanafi school spans multiple territorial polities, so too does the influence of the Shafi’i school, Maliki school, and, to a lesser extent, the Hanbali and Shi’a Ja’fari schools. No one madhab garners universal legitimacy, yet most of them are transnational in their reach.

Additionally significant is the historical presence of Islam across multiple geographic regions. In this way, Islam was substantially transnational by as early as 710 AD, with the Umayyad conquest of the Iberian Peninsula in Europe. Measuring transnationalism purely in terms of migration and the demographic movement of Muslims across the globe fails, however, to capture transnational Islam as “the existence and legitimacy of a global public space of normative reference and debate” (Bowen 2011: 199–200). For scholars like Bowen and Mandaville, transnational Islam connotes the creation of a supraterritorial space comprised of systematic debates, discussions, and reflections by Muslims via transnational socioreligious networks, institutions, and new media technologies.1 Contemporary cyber communities like IslamOnline.net and Ummah Forum exemplify this aspect of transnational Islam. These websites provide users with interactive educational tools pertaining to Islam and the Qur’an and host discussion forums on issues ranging from marriage proposals to politics. The UK-based Ummah Forum, for example, hosts an “Ummah Lounge” that enables users to create discussion threads on any topic, such that one may engage in debates over collective identity issues by pondering “Who counts as a kafir [unbeliever],” or negotiate the significance of religious holidays in a discussion entitled “What does Eid mean to you?” IslamOnline.net, founded by prominent Egyptian Islamist Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi and administered from offices in Doha and Cairo, offers educational tools, youth portals, and discussion forums in both English and Arabic, and additionally provides commentary and analysis of news events that affect the daily lives and governance of Muslims living in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East (“IslamOnline.net: Independent, Interactive, Popular” 2008). The English website of IslamOnline.net offers a forum oriented specifically towards “Euro-Muslims,” enabling users to actively construct and deconstruct this hybridized identity.

From Transnational Islam to Transnational Governance

In shifting to a discussion of transnational governance, it is important to distinguish the concept of a worldwide umma (Muslim community) in Islam from that of a supranational Muslim state. The latter, in particular, has generated a great deal of debate among Muslims thinkers. Some Muslim scholars, such as ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq (1998: 32), have argued that Islam does not specify any particular form of government: “The Glorious Qur’an supports the view that the Prophet, peace be upon him, had nothing to do with political kingship. Qur’anic verses are in agreement that his heavenly work did not go beyond delivering the Message, which is free of all meanings of authority.” ‘Abd al-Raziq goes so far as to argue that the Qur’an prohibits Muslims from believing that the Prophet was calling upon his followers to establish a political state, as Muhammad’s message should be “untainted by anything that has to do with government” (36). Similarly, Egyptian jurist Muhammad Sa’id Al-‘Ashmawi (1998: 56) avers that “political conceptions of religion are extremely dangerous for Islam and for its shari’a,” insisting that calls for an Islamic state have no theological basis in Islam.

On the other end of the spectrum are those who insist that Islam, and its foundational texts, requires Muslims to establish a political system, though the nature of this system has been heavily debated. Many scholars agree that calls for the reestablishment of a global Islamic caliphate by some contemporary Islamists and, in particular, transnational jihadists, exaggerate the extent to which such a polity ever existed. As many critics of the Ottoman Caliphate pointed out after its abolition in 1924, the “real Caliphate” was in existence for only three decades after the death of the Prophet, and the imposed political structure which lasted for centuries after was maintained largely by brute force for utilitarian rather than theological purposes (Enayat 2005: 83). This “fictitious Caliphate” was limited not only in its legitimacy but also in its territorial scope. During the ninth and tenth centuries, for example, the ‘Abbasid dynasty struggled not only with the growing influence of Shi’a regimes, such as the Fatimids, but additionally with the fact that Sunni Muslims living in Spain and Morocco continued to recognize the Umayyads of Cordoba as their caliph (Bennison 2009: 43). Moreover, after the fall of ‘Abbasid rule, most members of the umma in Central Asia, Persia, and Africa did not recognize the Ottoman Caliphate or perceive themselves as part of a unified, transnational structure of Islamic political authority.

As an alternative to the establishment of a modern caliphate, contemporary Islamists have put forth calls for establishing “Islamic states.” Islamism (that is, political Islam) provides the primary means by which we may transition from a discussion of transnational Islam into a discussion of transnational Islamic governance. Islamism has been aptly defined by Mohammad Ayoob (2008: 2) as “a form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals and organizations that pursue political objectives.” The emergence of contemporary Islamism traces back to the colonial period of the nineteenth century, when religious reformers such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abdu advocated pan-Islamic unity and a “return” to the Islam of the Prophet and the Rashidun to address contemporary challenges in Muslim societies, particularly with regard to the struggle against foreign occupation and the dilemma of reconciling Islam with Western modernity. Building on the ideas of al-Afghani and Abdu, though ultimately reformulating their orientation, Rashid Rida, Hasan al-Banna, and Abul Ala Mawdudi transformed Islam into a modern political ideology.

While substantial majorities in predominantly Muslim countries believe Shari’a should provide “a” source of legislation (Esposito and Mogahed 2007), Islamism does not unambiguously dominate the political ideology of the majority of the global Muslim population. In majority-Muslim countries in the Middle East, for example, one observes a spectrum of self-identified “Islamists” competing for political power with a spectrum of self-identified “liberals,” “leftists,” “nationalists,” and “secularists” who happen to be Muslim. Hybridized versions of these political ideologies are also active in Muslim-majority polities, as seen in the cases of the “Islamic Left” and “liberal Islam,” the latter of which has most notably gained ground in Egyptian politics under the term wasatiyya (centrism) (Browers 2009: 48). Furthermore, the majority of European and North American Muslims are not Islamists; rather, they have been described as “culturalists,” meaning they interpret their Islamic faith as primarily ethno-historical and cultural, as “a family tradition and a source of identity, but not as the center of their lives” (Vidino 2010: 10).

Pertinent to the trajectory of Global Governance, it is noteworthy that the majority of Islamists do not seek the destruction of the territorially defined nation-state. As Lee (2010: 14) observes, “their victory … would perhaps be the ultimate legitimation of political modernity,” as it would signify “the nationalization of Islam.” The category of Islamists who have taken the most rejectionist stance towards the existence of the modern, territorially defined system of states is that of the “transnational jihadists.” Unlike the vast majority of Islamist groups who can be conceptualized as “mainstream” given their rejection of violence and willingness to participate in electoral systems of governance, “transnational jihadists” are distinguished by their global scale of operations as well as their willingness to use force, particularly against the “far enemy” (Gerges 2009).

Al-Qaeda is the most prominent example of a transnational jihadist network, and has famously called for both the reestablishment of the Islamic Caliphate and the disassembling of the territorial nation-state system in the Muslim world. Bin Laden has described the latter as a Western/American imperialist “scheme” imposed on Muslim societies to weaken and divide them. This rejection of the contemporary state system with regard to the Muslim world has led scholars like Barak Mendelsohn (2005) to conclude that al-Qaeda’s brand of Islamism poses a challenge to the very nature of the international system by calling into question its most fundamental organizing principle: territorially bound state sovereignty.

Another transnational Islamist group, Hizb ut-Tahrir, similarly calls for the revival of the caliphate but must be distinguished from al-Qaeda in that it does not advocate the use of force. Established by Palestinian Shaykh Taqiuddin al-Nabhani in Jordanian-controlled East Jerusalem in the early 1950s, Hizb ut-Tahrir envisions the peaceful restoration of an Islamic Caliphate as a central component in reshaping Muslim society and governance. While its objectives have been presented in universal, pan-Islamic terms, its members have demonstrated an inclination to initiate the caliphate restoration project in the Arab world, and it has a “small but committed” following in Indonesia (Fealy 2004; Ward 2009). The vision of Hizb ut-Tahrir has very limited support, and the organization is described by Ayoob (2008: 140) as operating “on the fringes of Islamist political activity, with very little impact on the day-to-day political and social struggles in the vast majority of Muslim countries.” Thus, while the political objectives of this transnational Islamist group are certainly global in scope, the implications of its “fringe” influence on Islamist Glo...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of Figures and Tables
• List of Contributors
• Introduction: The Middle East—Modernity, Religion, and Governance
• 1 Global Governance, Islamism, and Authority in the Middle East
• 2 Modernity, Islam, and Religious Activism
• 3 The Interrelated Dynamics of Culture, Religion, and Nation in the United Arab Emirates
• 4 Lebanon’s Quest for Independence: Between Fragmentation, Political Instability, and Foreign Intervention
• 5 Challenging the Hashemites: The Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Action Front in Jordan
• 6 The Micro-foundations of Religious Party Moderation: Religious Party Supporters and Ideological Changes
• 7 The Politics of Religious Education in Turkey
• 8 Uncertainty in Governance Processes: The Political Economy of Biosafety Policies in Turkey
• Epilog
• Index