The European Union and Japan

A New Chapter in Civilian Power Cooperation?

Paul Bacon, Hartmut Mayer, Hidetoshi Nakamura

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN:
  9781472457462
• eBook ISBN:
  9781317033004
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Economics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The EU and Japan have one of the most important trade relationships in the world. Fittingly, this book presents a detailed analysis of their bilateral regulatory environment and negotiation processes. Moreover, the two polities have also co-operated extensively in bilateral and multilateral contexts on a range of global governance issues. Nevertheless, the relationship is widely acknowledged to have significant untapped potential. Deploying the concept of civilian power, the book takes a fresh, honest and provocative look at this important relationship, in a post-Fukushima, post-sovereign debt crisis world. First the book analyses the place of EU-Japan relations within the worldviews of the Japanese and European bodies politic. Subsequently, three thematic sections evaluate their cooperation on such issues as trade, energy security, environmental politics, development, human rights, post-conflict reconstruction, health and biosecurity. The eminent scholars of the EU-Japan relationship gathered in this book offer informed, empirically rich and policy-relevant insights into the present and future prospects for the relationship.

PART I
Japan, the EU and Civilian Power Relations

Chapter 1
Japan as a ‘Proactive Civilian Power’? Domestic Constraints and Competing Priorities

Hidetoshi Nakamura

Introduction: The Hague Declarations of July 1991 and March 2014

How much has the EU–Japan political relationship evolved since 1991, and what have been some of the main factors impacting on this evolution? The Joint Declaration on Relations between the European Community and its Member States and Japan was adopted in The Hague on 18 July 1991. Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, European Commission President Jacques Delors and European Council President Ruud Lubbers met there for the first summit meeting. The EU and Japan were keen to stress that they share a number of political values, such as a common attachment to freedom, democracy, the rule of law and human rights. This notion of shared values has regularly been referred to in subsequent summit Joint Press Statements and other such pronouncements. Among 10 or so of the EU’s strategic partners, Japan has been identified as a like-minded partner, along with the US and Canada.

The EU–Japan relationship has been further institutionalized since 1991. This chapter offers a brief indicative sketch of these developments, but for a fuller account of this institutional history, please refer to Nakamura (2013), which is drawn on in places within the current chapter. At the ninth EU–Japan summit in 2000, the EU and Japan jointly declared a ‘Decade of Japan-Europe Co-operation’, to commence from 2001. Both parties affirmed their intention to translate the EU–Japan partnership into coordinated policies and concrete actions. An ‘Action Plan for EU-Japan Cooperation: Shaping Our Common Future’ was adopted at the tenth EU–Japan summit in 2001. The Action Plan had four main objectives: promoting peace and security, strengthening the economic and trade partnership, coping with global and societal challenges, and bringing together people and cultures. This Action Plan was intended to operate for 10 years.

To mark the tenth anniversary of the Action Plan, an attempt was made in 2011 to inject fresh momentum into EU–Japan relations. In the Joint Press Statement issued after the May 2011 summit, leaders agreed to start the process for parallel negotiations for:

• a deep and comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (FTA)/Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), addressing all issues of shared interest to both sides including tariffs, non-tariff measures, services, investment, Intellectual Property Rights, competition and public procurement; and

• a binding agreement, covering political, global and other sectoral cooperation in a comprehensive manner, underpinned by their shared commitment to fundamental values and principles.

Summit leaders decided, to this end, that the two sides would start discussions with a view to defining the scope and level of ambition of both negotiations, with such scoping to be carried out as soon as possible. On 31 May 2012 the European Commission announced that it had finally ended its ‘scoping exercise’ for a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement with Japan, but the 27 trade ministers, who met the same day in Brussels, did not immediately give the Commission a mandate to open formal negotiations. The decision to begin negotiations was instead approved at a meeting of trade ministers in November 2012. On 25 March 2013 these negotiations towards an EPA/FTA were formally launched through EU–Japan summit talks via telephone, instead of the scheduled meeting in Tokyo, which European leaders were forced to cancel because of the Cyprus crisis. However, the negotiations commenced on condition that the process could be suspended after a year if Japan refused to eliminate a range of nontariff trade barriers. EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht said at the time that he believed it would take three to four years to conclude the envisioned EPA. In the end, there were five rounds of increasingly productive talks from April 2013 to April 2014, before the EU’s mandated review. Neither the European Parliament nor the Council took the opportunity provided by this unprecedented additional review to politicize or influence the negotiations. They simply endorsed DG Trade’s expert opinion, noting the progress made throughout rounds 1–5, and it was therefore possible to hold the sixth round in July 2014. The ‘one-year test’ was passed, and negotiations now proceed in a routine and constructive manner. Frederik Ponjaert charts these developments in some detail in Chapter 5 of this volume.

Although this bilateral framework has been firmly institutionalized, as the brief discussion above demonstrates, EU–Japan relations have largely been played out within the G7 (Group of Seven) framework. The annual EU–Japan summit itself, the regular meeting between the Japanese Prime Minister and the two EU Presidents, of the European Council and the Commission respectively, was firmly institutionalized as long ago as 1991. Table 1.1 shows the names of Japanese and European leaders who attended these summits. The locations for the summits indicate the following established practices: since 1992, the hosting of the summit has rotated every time between Japan and Europe. However, the timing of the EU–Japan summit shows that Japanese and European leaders often effectively meet on the fringe of the G7/G8 summit: nine out of 22 EU–Japan summits were held within just a few days before or after a G7/G8 summit.

The EU and Japan have been able to cooperate not only reactively, but also proactively, with regard to the US within the G7 framework. And it is not only the economic field, but also the security field where the two international actors cooperate proactively with regard to the US. Although European countries and Japan had little substantial political cooperation during the Gulf conflict and they were both responsive to the US, there have been some cases of proactive cooperation since they adopted The Hague Declaration. In December 1991, for example, the EU and Japan drafted the joint proposal for a universal register of conventional arms transfers under UN auspices.

After Russia joined the G8 Summit, the EU and Japan successfully persuaded Russia to ratify the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, and they were able to help the Kyoto Protocol to come into force without US ratification. This is an important example of earlier civilian power cooperation. However, the G8 has not entirely replaced the G7, and the Ukraine crisis may well be understood as offering unfortunate evidence that Russia has never quite been a fully like-minded partner of the G7. Indeed, the G7 leaders condemned Russia’s ‘clear violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine’ in their statement issued on 3 March 2014 (European Council 2014a). The G7 leaders also met in The Hague and issued a Declaration on 24 March 2014. They stated: ‘International law prohibits the acquisition of part or all of another state’s territory through coercion or force’ (European Council 2014b). The Japanese Prime Minister also said that ‘changing the status quo by force is completely unacceptable’, thereby sending an implicit message to China (MOFA 2014).

Among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, we still frequently observe conflict between the US, the UK and France on the one hand, and Russia and China on the other. Cooperation among the P5 has yet to become business as usual, and it is natural that any attempt to expand the G7 into the G8 (plus China) has not been successful, particularly in the political and security fields. Although the attempt to expand the G8 into the G20 in the economic field has been successful so far, the originally planned G8 summit was not held in Sochi on 4–5 June 2014. Instead, a G7 summit was held in Brussels on the same day. This summit was hosted by the EU instead of Russia. The 41st summit will be held in Germany, but it remains unclear whether this will be a meeting of the G7 or the G8.

Whether in the G7, the G20 or elsewhere, some EU–Japan political cooperation can be observed. But such cooperation remains limited in the politico-military field. Japan was almost indifferent, for example, to Libya. And on North Korea, for example, the EU has little to say. The roles which the EU and Japan have played in these respective multilateral frameworks are still limited: the EU and Japan are still described as two civilian powers. Although the EU and Japan make some military contributions to international peace and security, both actors are not necessarily described as normal military powers, but still viewed as civilian powers with some military capabilities.

Table 1.1 The annual EU–Japan summit (names of leaders) and the G7/G8 summit

Note: This table is updated from Nakamura (2013).

Source: http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/eu/shuno.html; http://www.deljpn.ec.europa.eu/modules/relation/chronology/ (both last accessed 14 October 2014).

This book examines the prospects for greater EU–Japan cooperation, and one of the recurring themes is that the relationship has unfulfilled potential (Barroso 2006). This obviously suggests that Japan’s approach to its relationship with the EU could be improved, and vice versa. However, although the EU has not always been a priority for Japan, it is not only Japan’s relations with the EU that could be criticized. Japan’s relations with the US, China and Korea, to name but three, could be significantly improved. Internally, Japan faces a persistent debate about what ‘normal statehood’ is, and whether Japan is a normal power, or needs to become one. A disproportionate amount of Japanese political energy is also consumed on intra- and inter-party conflict. This chapter therefore attempts to explain why EU–Japan relations are not as well developed as they could be, not by focusing on the institutional history of the relationship itself, but rather on identifying and explaining some of the other factors which have distracted Japanese attention and energy, giving insights into what Japan’s main international priorities are, and what domestic constraints are placed on the development of Japanese foreign policy, and how these factors impact on EU–Japan relations.

While the first part of the chapter attempts to identify and explain shortcomings, the second half of the chapter assumes a more positive tone. It looks at debates about what kind of international actor Japan is, and notes an emerging consensus that Japan is moving in the direction of assuming ‘normal statehood’. The chapter also analyses the Abe administration’s promulgation of the concept of a proactive contribution to peace, and asks how original the concept actually is. It is suggested that although there is room for considerable improvement, Japan has in fact already been a proactive civilian power, in post-war Iraq and the Horn of Africa for quite some time. In short, the chapter argues that it is possible to maintain a credible distinction between the concepts of ‘civilian power’ and ‘military power’, to question the primacy and legitimacy of the latter type of power, to reclaim the notion of proactivity and to be a proactive civilian power.

Japan’s Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics: Continuity and Change

The first issue of the Diplomatic Bluebook, published in September 1957, listed the following three major principles of Japan’s diplomatic action: (1) UN-centred diplomacy, (2) cooperation with other free nations (democracies) and (3) firm positioning as a member of Asia (MOFA 1957). Since Japan was admitted to the UN in 1956, the three pillars of Japan’s foreign policy have been: (1) US–Japan relations, (2) the UN and (3) Asia. Historically, Europe had played a more significant role in Japan’s foreign policy. After the Second World War, although most West European countries were democracies as well as the US, Europe–Japan relations have been less salient than those provided for in these three pillars.

It is frequently mentioned that Japan’s foreign policy, including that towards Europe, has long been made by a ‘tripartite elite’: the central bureaucracy, big business and the LDP or the governing party of the time (Hook et al. 2012: 38–64). EU–Japan relations have also been formulated through this established policy-making mechanism. Japan’s foreign policy towards the EU and European countries is primarily drafted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), but also the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Prime Minister’s Office. Secondly, big business, particularly through the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren), has often played a significant role in EU–Japan economic relations. Third, Diet members have also played some role in EU–Japan political relations, but to quite a limited degree. For example, the Interparliamentary Conference was institutionalized in the late 1970s. However, these exchanges of opinion with their European counterparts have not directly influenced the making of Japan’s foreign policy.

Domestic politics often matter, and it has been the ruling political party which has had a direct influence upon the making of foreign policy as a part of the ‘tripartite elite’. From 1955 to 1993, during most of the second half of the twentieth century, the ruling political party was always and only the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). However, in June 1993 an intra-party LDP political conflict led to the successful passage of a no-confidence motion in the Miyazawa government, and to the dissolution of the lower house (House of Representatives). General elections were held, and the LDP lost their majority in the lower house for the first time since their foundation in 1955 (although it should be noted that the LDP won 223 out of 511 seats, a far larger share than that secured by any other party). In August 1993 an eight-party coalition government, excluding the LDP, was formed and Hosokawa of the Japan New Party became the new Prime Minister. In April 1994 Hosokawa suddenly resigned and Hata of the Japan Renewal Party became the Prime Minister, by forming a new coalition government. Among the eight original coalition partners, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) did not join and the New Party Harbinger (NPH) refused to cooperate with the Hata government. Following this, in June 1994 the three party leaders of the LDP (Kono), the JSP (Murayama) and the NPH (Takemura) struck a deal and formed a new coalition government. The LDP was therefore quickly able to return to power, at the cost of ceding the post of Prime Minister to the JSP, which had been an arch-enemy in the so-called 1955 political system. The JSP ceased to oppose the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty under its own Prime Minister (Stockwin 2008: 80–87).

In January 1996 Murayama stepped down from the premiership and Hashimoto of the LDP replaced him. The same month, the JSP changed its name to the Social Democratic Party (SDP), but was losing parliamentary seats. In September political forces of the moderate left formed the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), absorbing the SDP’s right-of-centre factions, the NPH, the New Frontier Party (NFP) and others. The following governments were formed under LDP Prime Ministers. In October 1999 Prime Minister Obuchi decided to form a coalition government with Komeito (Clean Government Party), and Komeito has since become a major coalition partner for the LDP.

The arrival of Koizumi as Prime Minister in April 2001 marked a significant political change, with his neo-liberal economic policy of deregulation, including privatization of the postal services. In this policy area, Koizumi was confronted by the central bureaucracy and many powerful members of his own party. However, his stance with regard to foreign policy was basically in line with that of the central bureaucracy, as exemplified by the dismissal of Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka in January 2002. Foreign Minister Tanaka was alleged to have asked her German and Italian counterparts about a potentially negative aspect of the US-led missile defence system while she was attending the ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting) of Foreign Ministers on 25 May 2001. The media somehow revealed the contents of their meeting, and this revelation surprised, and to some degree, shamed Tanaka. In the following months Koizumi’s decision to visit the Yasukuni Shrine in April and Pyongyang in September did rather break the traditional mould. However, he placed great emphasis on the US–Japan alliance by morally supporting the US invasion of Iraq and by initiating the subsequent dispatches of Self-Defence Forces (SDF) for reconstruction activities there in 2003.

In 2003 the DPJ, led by Kan, and the Liberal Party, led by Ozawa, reached an agreement for the latter to be merged into the DPJ. The DPJ and the LDP issued party ‘manifestos’, and fought against each other in the November general election. A two-party system was expected to emerge. The LDP kept a similar number of seats, but the DPJ won 50 more seats than it had in the previous election. In September 2005, however, Koizumi surprisingly dissolved the lower house and called a general election, mainly focusing on the single issue of postal service privatization. The election gave a huge majority to the LDP, with 296 out of 480 seats, while the number of DPJ seats was reduced to 113. One year later, Abe succeeded Koizumi as the new Prime Minister. But in September 2007 a combination of the loss of upper house elections two months previously and his own health problems forced him to resign, and Fukuda replaced him. A year later, Fukuda was replaced by Aso. Throughout this period, the LDP lost popular support, and two-party alternation was expected to become the norm in the future.

In the August 2009 general election the DPJ won a huge majority, with 308 out of 480 seats, while the number of LDP seats was reduced to 119, and Komeito seats to 21. In order to secure two-thirds of all seats, the DPJ formed a coalition government with the SDP and the People’s New Party (PNP). This political change was undoubtedly historical in many aspects, and there was also potential for a real change in many policy areas. The DPJ particularly pledged to break the long-established dominance of the central bureaucracy during the election campaign, and Prime Minister Hatoyama and his government attempted to change the traditional domination of the ‘tripartite elite’ in foreign policy as well. European commentators naturally expected the new DPJ-led government to announce a moratorium on the death penalty. Justice Minister Chiba and several other new ministers had previously been vocal abolitionists. Kamei, the PNP leader, was a particularly well-known abolitionist, and headed the Parliamentary League for abolition of the death penalty. Over time, however, it became clear that his real priority was rather to fight back against Koizumi’s reform agenda for postal services privatization and other deregulation policies (Bacon 2010).

Meanwhile, the new Hatoyama government attempted to change many of the foreign policies which previous LDP-led governments had established. One of the major attempts at reform was to change the policy of relocating the US Marine Corps Air Station in Futenma to Henoko. Hatoyama explicitly pledged to move the Futenma base outside Okinawa during the election campaign in August 2009. The possible relocation of the US base in Okinawa naturally caused huge tension with the Obama administration as well as the established Japanese ‘tripartite elite’. As early as May 2010 Prime Minister Hatoyama realized that the Futenma base relocation policy was difficult to change. This led to disagreement with one of his coalition partners, the SDP, which subsequently withdrew from the coalition. In early June, as a result of respective personal scandals being revealed, Hatoyama resigned as Prime Minister and Ozawa resigned as DPJ Secretary-General. The confused relationship between the US and Japan was one of the reasons why Hatoyama was replaced by Kan as the new Prime Minister. The entire episode shows that it can be risky to challenge the primacy of the role of the US in Japanese foreign policy considerations. This episode also demonstrates the limits on the extent to which Japan can reach out to other partners besides the US, or promote alternative multilateral visions of international relations.

In July the DPJ lost the upper house elections, leading to a hung parliament, but Kan stayed in power. In September Kan won a DPJ leadership contest with Ozawa. In F...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of Figures, Illustrations and Tables
• Notes on Contributors
• Foreword by Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council
• Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations
• Introduction: EU–Japan Relations in a Fluid Global Order
• PART I: JAPAN, THE EU AND CIVILIAN POWER RELATIONS
• PART II: ENHANCING TRADE RELATIONS AND REGULATORY STANDARDS
• PART III: PROMOTING ENVIRONMENTAL, ECONOMIC AND ENERGY SECURITY
• PART IV: PROTECTING POLITICAL, FOOD AND HEALTH SECURITY
• Bibliography
• Index