Since the end of the Cold War, Western societies have been confronted with new social tensions, a furthering of social inequalities, processes of economic globalization, a crisis of financial capitalism, and a crisis of the welfare state. More and more citizens and social scientists fear that the social and moral basis for the functioning of democratic society and community is diminishing. What most social scientists are looking for nowadays is a new anchor for democracy in the habits and attitudes of the people, a counterbalance to the capitalist logic of commodity value. What these approaches share is the view that there should be an alternative principle on which society rests, which differs from market transactions (exchange) and state bureaucracy (force). Some want to nurture values and norms by strengthening communities (see Etzioni 1988, 1997). Others propose voluntary action and associations as a necessary underpinning of democracy (see Putnam 2000). A third group promotes strengthening democracy through deliberative procedures or a universalistic politics of justice or recognition (see Elster 1998).
These examples are simply meant to show that there is a search for a principle beyond maximizing utility in markets and hierarchic coordination via state institutions. This alternative realm is depicted differently depending on the theoretical approach (the concept of civil society is often mentioned here). But what all of these approaches have in common is a theoretical dichotomy with regard to the foundation of actions. All assume a clear-cut distinction between actions based on utilitarian calculation and selfishness on the one hand, and actions that rest on adherence to values and norms on the other. Thus in Western philosophy and the social sciences, there is a strong binary opposition between morality and value commitments on one side, and egoism on the other. The same is true for the Western religious traditions of Judaism and Christianity. Thus, we find within economics and rational choice theories, the promotion of a hyper-individualistic paradigm of choice, utility, and market transactions. Yet, the history of the social sciences in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries can also be read as the attempt to analyse the conditions for establishing and sustaining social commitments, norms, and moral obligations against individualizing and socially destructive processes of economic modernization.
Nevertheless, this deeply rooted dichotomy between utilitarian and normative or value-laden actions has to be criticized on the level of action theory. My thesis is that this dichotomy is itself a product of our misled reflection on modernity, which caused us to overlook the realm of actions that do not fit into this dichotomy â such as creativity, freedom, spontaneity, love, and care â and cannot be traced back to utilitarianism or normative reasoning. A long-neglected paradigm of action theory, which acknowledges actions that can be reduced neither to the utilitarian nor to the normative, can be found in Marcel Maussâs 1925 essay âThe Giftâ. In the essay, an approach can be found that hints at actions that are simultaneously self-interested and disinterested, voluntary and obligatory. The mistake of modern sociology and philosophy was to suppose that every action is either utilitarian or normatively orientated. Even in modern society, however, actions cannot be reduced to one of these approaches, but either explicitly follow a logic of gift-giving or are accompanied by such a logic.
The dichotomy between rational utilitarian action and normatively orientated action existed long before the establishment of sociology as a discipline around 1900. In Hobbes (2010 [1651]), we find one of the most influential conceptions of the utilitarian dilemma. In the state of nature, where everyone fights against everyone, no peaceful solution is at hand because everyone relies on his or her own power. According to Hobbesâs famous line of reasoning, peace is only possible when all citizens surrender their individual force and become subject to the state. Another, more optimistic version of the utilitarian strand of thinking is Adam Smithâs (2008 [1776]) famous notion of the âinvisible handâ of the market, which ensures that the pursuit of individual interests results in the common good. Orientation to the public good no longer seems necessary, because the public good will result from an aggregation of individual actions. Thus, the tension between private and common interests was by definition seen as untenable.
Normative approaches, such as Rousseauâs (1987 [1762]) theory of the social contract, contradict both the state and the market-orientated types of utilitarian thinking. Via public virtues, individual interests have to be transformed into the volontĂ© gĂ©nĂ©rale, which is more than the aggregation of individual wills. Only supra-individual norms and values can guarantee the functioning of a republic. Like Rousseau, the founding father of French sociology â Ămile Durkheim â relied heavily on Montesquieu in his thinking, which touches on the question of what kind of morality we could expect to emerge in a modern society. Durkheim (1984 [1893]) witnessed the destruction of traditional social relations and traditional morality, which he termed âmechanical solidarityâ. He thought this would be followed by âorganic solidarityâ, which is closely related to the societal division of labour. Society is no longer integrated through the adherence of individuals to a collective consciousness, but through mutual dependence. In his sociology of religion, this âcoldâ concept of solidarity was later accompanied by a âhotâ concept of the genesis of morality, which Durkheim (2008 [1912]) based on the experience of so-called collective effervescence. This term depicts rituals in physical co-presence, where people feel energized and bound to group values. A similar idea with regard to extraordinary experiences can be found in Max Weberâs concept of charisma (Weber 1972: 654â687; Shils 1972; Joas 2000). Weberâs and Durkheimâs hot ritualistic concepts of creating social bonds and values are still discussed in sociology, but show some severe theoretical problems. 1
Still paradigmatic for sociological thinking on norms and values is Talcott Parsonsâs (1968) reinterpretation of the sociological classics. In his view, social action and social order cannot be explained by individualistic and utilitarian action theory. Human actors orientate themselves towards norms and values, and this is the only way to overcome the Hobbesian problem of how social order is possible. Individuals are always socialized into a social realm of norms and values, whereas in the utilitarian mode of action no stable social order would be possible. Norms and values are ends in themselves and are not subject to individual calculations. The utilitarian model was accepted in principle, because it was seen as suitable for explaining economic actions. But sociologists were looking for the domain where non-rational normative action was sustained, and for them that was obviously outside the economy. 2
As Donald Levine succinctly describes, in these sociological and philosophical writings on the normative â especially the French tradition of Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Durkheim â they:
believed that social forces were needed to turn the human animal into a moral creature, but they trusted properly socialized actors to conduct themselves in a moral manner, enjoy the blessings of social solidarity, and be responsive to leaders who embodied their common ideals.
(1995: 233)
This approach of socializing and educating asocial individuals can also be found in Parsons, Habermas, Etzioni, and many others.
Conventional sociological wisdom says that with the development of modern society, we have witnessed a differentiation between self-interest and normative or altruistic action. The âideology of the pure giftâ with no selfish strings attached is the result of this process. It is said, however, that these aspects were interwoven in âarchaic societiesâ. The current hiatus leads to the predominance of utilitarian thinking on the one hand, and a misunderstanding of the gift as a pure gift on the other. For Bourdieu, for example, the gift would have to rest on the total absence of calculation, so that if there is no perfect gift there is no gift at all. The same is true for Derrida: if he conceives of the gift as something that necessarily stands against returns and reciprocity, there is no gift at all. For Derrida, the gift should not appear to be a gift: it is more like an abstract es gibt than something bound to concrete persons engaged in gift-giving. Thus, both authors follow the conventional wisdom of modernity that there is a dichotomy between actions and motives: the ideology of disinterested gifts emerges parallel to an ideology of a purely interested exchange; both are modern inventions (Parry 1986). At the same time, Bourdieu and Derrida try to show that a pure gift is not possible: this means that in the end, only utilitarian calculation seems to be possible and sustainable. Since there seems to be no such thing as a free lunch, every sort of benevolence, care, or gift has utilitarian â that is, selfish â strings attached. Hence, altruism and pure gifts seem to be impossible in modernity.
What is put aside is the idea of an âin-betweenâ category. In this context, Marshall Sahlins (1972a) has put forward an interesting and fertile interpretation of the concept of the gift. He sees the gift as a horizontal alternative to the solution of the Hobbesian problem_ pacification through the exchange of gifts is for Sahlins the alternative to the War of All against All, and to the subjugation of all under one sovereign, namely Leviathan. According to Sahlins, Mauss describes the contrat social of archaic societies; because gifts reduce mistrust and produce social ties, alliances, and solidarity, they prevent wars between competing clans. In Hobbesâs Leviathan, by contrast, peace is only possible through the subjugation of all private forces to the public power of the state. If this classic thinker of utilitarianism is compared with the normativist thread of social theory â seen in Rousseau, Durkheim, and Parsons â it can be maintained that adherence to norms also represents a kind of subjugation: a subjugation not to the all-powerful state, but to the sphere of supra-individual values and norms. For Mauss however, gift-giving represents a horizontally connecting category and not a vertically hierarchical category. Reciprocity initiated by gifts does not dissolve the rival parties into a higher unit: there is no third party standing above both clans (neither a state nor norms that would dissolve the enmity which in principal exists). Hence, for Sahlins reciprocity is a âbetween relationâ (1972a: 170).
This category of the in-between is hardly recognizable and describable under the presuppositions of modernity. As Alain Caillé puts it:
Modern times begin with the decision to split entirely and without hope of return what the ancient societies had tried to hold together â namely, the sacred and the profane, gods and men, the political and the economic, splendour and calculation, friendship and war, gift and interest. ⊠The result of this symbolic split condemns man to the exhausting task of having to bring action and thought in conformity to two series of profoundly antithetical demands. On the one hand, men must become their most efficient, their most active, and their most rational in order to be inside the order of things profane. They must work, calculate, make money, and accumulate. On the other hand, they must also obey the moral law that in principle wants to know nothing about interest, and demands that they act exclusively out of duty.
(2001: 23)
Once the radical disjuncture between the logic of egoism and the logic of altruism has been established, the gift becomes unthinkable for modern (liberal as well as socialist) thinkers.
1.1 A brief look at âThe Giftâ
Marcel Maussâs essay âThe Giftâ synthesizes the ethnological research of his time and develops the thesis that archaic and premodern societies reproduce themselves symbolically through the cycle of giving, accepting, and reciprocating. The gifts proffered between groups seem at first sight to be voluntary in nature; but they exhibit just as strongly an obligating character and refer to each other reciprocally. All contemporary approaches to gift-giving and reciprocity refer to this text â the spectrum of ideas ranging from rational choice theories, through normativist approaches, to attempts to overcome the dichotomy between interests and norms.
According to Mauss (1990), archaic gift-giving represents a system of total prestations (prestations totales): giving, taking, and reciprocating are the basic collective activities through which archaic societies reproduce themselves. Mauss emphasizes that the reciprocal presenting of gifts with the aim of establishing relationships rests on the voluntary and obligating aspects of giving, taking, and giving back simultaneously. Furthermore, Mauss sees gifts as total social facts. Maussâs concept of the fait social total contains several components (Tarot 2003: 64). First, the exchange of gifts is a total social fact because it encompasses all dimensions of the social: the political, religion, economy, law, morals, art, and so on. Second, the exchange of gifts includes the entire society: all individuals and subgroups are affected and engaged. Third, it is total, because it occurs in every society â in archaic as well as modern ones.
Mauss places two variants of premodern gift-giving in the centre of his analysis: the kula ring on the Melanesian Trobriand Islands and the potlatch among American Indians of the Pacific North-west. In this regard, he differentiates between more and less strongly agonistic gifts. Less strongly agonistic gifts create a sphere of approximate equivalences and mutual indebtedness, in which the accumulation of wealth does not assume primacy. Gifts provoke counter-gifts and in this way permanently âfeedâ mutual indebtedness and obligations, which cannot be conclusively settled. An example of this is the kula ring on the Trobriand Islands, in which two kinds of adornment â necklaces and bracelets â circulate in opposite directions between the islands. After ceremonial gift-giving, the actual exchange of goods (gimwali) â in which bargaining and trading takes place â begins. The offering of gifts establishes and maintains relationships at the outset, before the self-interested exchange of goods can start. Furthermore, in this form of gift-giving the attempt is made to build reputation through the fact that the decorative objects differ in status.
The more strongly agonistic gift, in which the fight for reputation takes place much more openly, can be seen paradigmatically in the potlatch, described by Mauss as a âstruggle of wealthâ (1990: 37). This is embodied in a reciprocal increase in gifts, which continues until a clan or a chief has to drop out of the cycle of giving ever greater amounts; for only one can win in potlatch, and the winning consists in status. Everything here is based on the principles of antagonism and rivalry. 3
Mauss drew attention not only to the interconnection of gifts and arrangements of reciprocity, but also to a further phenomenon of gift-giving in archaic societies. There, the gift or given object is usually not divorced from the identity of the giver. Mauss asks what motivates the receiver of the gift to give something back, and in his interpretation of gift-giving among the Maori, he arrives at the conclusion that the spirit of the giver âresidesâ in the given, compelling the receiver to make a counter-gift. That the gift received contains something obligating is for Mauss grounded in the fact that the thing received is not inanimate. Even after the giver has handed it over, it is still a part of him, and through it he has power over the receiver. This interpretation launched a long debate in anthropology, which mostly revolved around attempts to demystify the thesis of things imbued with souls (cf. LĂ©vi-Strauss 1987; Sahlins 1972a). Maurice Godelier (1999), however, proposed a more legalistically orientated interpretation: the objects involved in gift-giving are simultaneously given and kept, so to speak, because they remain the inalienable property of the giver and the latter transfers only possession or a alienable right of use.
The social contract, which Mauss perceives in the examined archaic societies, serves him as a model for the renewal of the contemporary social contract through the recognition of reciprocal indebtedness. The danger he saw was th...
