UN Security Council Reform

Peter Nadin

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781317417583
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This volume comprehensively evaluates the current state and future reform prospects of the UN Security Council, providing the most accessible and rigorous treatment of the subject of reform to date. Apart from a couple of critical eyes in the academic community, few have asked the pertinent questions that this volume seeks to address: Will the enlargement of the Council constitute a reform? Could the inclusion of countries such as India, Germany, Japan, and Brazil markedly improve the Council's agency?

In response, this book focuses on:

• The Role and Agency of the UN Security Council
• The History of the Reform Debate
• An Expanded Council
• Working Method Reforms
• Enhancing Agency

As the future of the UN Security Council continues to be the focus of fierce debate, this book will be essential reading for students of international relations, international organizations and international security studies alike.

1 The UN Security Council

• From the League of Nations to the United Nations: evolution not revolution

• What is the UN Security Council (on paper)?

• What is the UN Security Council (in practice)?

• Conclusion

Rising like a phoenix from the ashes of the Second World War and the wreckage of the League of Nations, the UN was given a broad-reaching set of responsibility—“to maintain international peace and security, facilitate the development of friendly relations among nations, promote social progress, better living standards and human rights.”¹ Of the broad-ranging tasks given to the organization, the UN Security Council was charged with arguably the most important—“primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.”² Over the course of the last seventy years the council has proven a remarkably resilient and adaptable piece of international machinery.

The overarching aim of this chapter is to set the context for the volume, and begin the process of understanding “where it [the council] started, what route it has taken, and how far it has come.”³ To address this aim, the chapter will provide an overview of the history of the council, as a study of philosophical and historical debates that underpinned the League of Nations and the UN is instructive in the context of the contemporary council.

From the League of Nations to the United Nations: evolution not revolution

As far back as the eighteenth century, states had met, on several occasions, to forge, what Kant referred to as “a federation of free states,” “a league of nations,” “a compact among nations,” and “a league of peace (foedus pacificum),”⁴ a diplomatic forum for avoiding global conflicts. The first attempt was the Concert of Europe, founded at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The second attempt was the League of Nations, founded at the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. The third was the UN, founded at San Francisco in 1945. Each was designed to overcome the defects of its predecessor.

The delegates at Dumbarton Oaks were fully aware of the failures of the global order that had preceded the war (WWII). The failure of the League of Nations has been attributed to “its lack of power, lack of universality, lack of solidarity (or cooperation) between members, and the exaggerated equality between the great and small powers, caused by the increase in the number of non-permanent members on the [league’s executive] Council.”⁵ The Council of the League of Nations also met infrequently and was notoriously slow to respond in times of crisis.⁶ It was an organization infused with a spirit of consensualism, where compliance was an option, sanctions not compulsory, and the Covenant ambiguous regarding the authorization of the use of force. The UN was intended to represent a reformed wider and permanent system of general security. Not so much a revolution, but an evolution.

The first step was made on 14 August 1941, when US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR), and Prime Minister of United Kingdom Winston Churchill signed the Atlantic Charter. The charter contained a “vague and tentative commitment to some sort of international organization that would promote peace by the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security.”⁷ A further 24 nations, including the other major allied powers (the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic [USSR] and the Republic of China), pledged to uphold the principles of the Declaration of the United Nations.⁸ Following the signing of the Atlantic Treaty, the concept of the UN began to ferment in the offices of the State Department in Washington and at the Commonwealth and Foreign Office in London. Roosevelt and Churchill also began to talk of a postwar world. The US President recognized the deficiencies of the League system, and in response proposed the four-policemen model.⁹ Under this model, the United States, the UK, the USSR and China would act in concert to provide security through force of power. The four policemen were to be the trustees of the postwar order.¹⁰

These nascent ideas and others were taken to three conferences on the creation of an international peace and security organization—the first at Dumbarton Oaks, the second at Yalta, and the third at San Francisco. Arguably the most important of these conferences was the Washington conversations on the creation of an international peace and security organization held at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944. At Dumbarton Oaks, discussion focused on the creation of a council that would have the power and authority necessary to maintain international peace and security. This council was to become known as the Security Council. Over the course of a couple of weeks, the delegates discussed the composition of the council and its membership, size, meetings, powers, functions, and procedures.¹¹

Each delegation brought differing proposals to the table, and at each juncture, compromise was achieved, except on the matter of the veto, which was deferred to the leaders’ summit at Yalta. At Yalta, the big three approved a voting formula that allowed the permanent members of the council to exercise a veto on substantive decisions, but not on procedural matters. The Dumbarton Oaks drafts (officially entitled Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization) and the so-called Yalta formula were then taken to San Francisco for the United Nations Conference on International Organization. At San Francisco, delegates from 46 nations assembled to draft the Charter of the United Nations.

Notably, the proposals regarding the council passed the convention at San Francisco without significant amendment. This is not to say that the proposals themselves were not controversial. The procedural and deliberative processes of the conference allowed the smaller nations to voice their concerns; and the smaller nations had one concern in particular—the veto.

Australian Foreign Minister Herbert Vere Evatt was the vocal leader of the anti-veto lobby. Evatt and his supporters posed 23 questions relating the use of the veto and issued over a dozen amendments.¹² In the end, no substantive changes were made at San Francisco. The smaller nations accepted the ultimatum—without the veto there would be no UN. The conference, however, had served the purpose of legitimizing the inequalities inherent to the system.¹³

What is the UN Security Council (on paper)?

Chapters V, VI, VII and VIII of the Charter of the UN lay down the fundamental principles of the Security Council in what might be described as a constitution of sorts. Chapter V sets out the council’s composition, voting rules, procedures, functions and powers. Chapter VI entitled the Pacific Settlement of Disputes, calls upon member states to utilize alternative dispute resolution methods in cases where a dispute might likely escalate to open war. Chapter VII, entitled Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression, provides the council with the power to determine the existence of a threat to international peace and security and the power to act upon any threat by way of either non-military (sanctions) or military means (use of force). The final, less cited, chapter of the charter, which pertains to the Security Council, is Chapter VIII—Regional Arrangements. This chapter sets the ground rules for UN interaction with regional organizations, and states clearly that only the Security Council possesses the right to authorize enforcement action.¹⁴

It would now be prudent to examine these sections in a little more detail, starting with Chapter V. This chapter begins by outlining the composition of the council. Article 23 (1) states that the council shall consist of 15 members of the UN. Originally the council consisted of 11 members. In 1966, the council was expanded to 15. The issue of size was a question raised at Dumbarton Oaks. A balance was struck and the big three decided on the number 11. Not all of these fifteen members are considered equal, however. Although Article 1 affirms sovereign equality, for the council this principle does not apply. Article 23 (1) and (2) distinguish between a permanent five (or P-5) and non-permanent 10 (or E-10).¹⁵ The P-5 include the United States, the UK, France, the Republic of China (ROC) and the USSR.¹⁶

The United States, the UK, and the USSR were the undisputed great powers of the era and the victors of the Second World War. The ROC and France were chosen for a variety of reasons. The charter legitimately enshrines P-5 dominance over the council. This dominance takes the form of a veto. Although coded in rather “nifty language,”¹⁷ the veto is found in Article 27 (3):

Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members.¹⁸

The veto is an effective safeguard on the interests of the five; used to protect their own interests or the interests of an ally or proxy.¹⁹ Although, the veto can elicit paralysis, it also serves as a concert function—a term coined by David Bosco.²⁰ One the inherent problems with the League of Nations was that, as an international organization, it failed to maintain continuity of permanent membership. The League council was a veritable revolving door, with permanent members withdrawing from the organization whenever their actions were condemned. Instituting a veto was one way of insuring the participation of all the great powers. When they (the P-5) all agree (or can tolerate a proposal), action can be taken. When they disagree, action can be blocked. The veto is a safety valve, a flag that signals to tread carefully. The veto also forces the P-5 to negotiate daily and “compromise on contentious issues,”²¹ which builds a degree of cohesion and understanding between them. In all, the veto has been used on a total of 271 occasions (as of 1 October 2015) to block council action, and has been threatened on countless other occasions. The veto attracts a great deal of media attention when it is exercised, and rightly so. Yet most council business is conducted without reference to the veto. In fact, in the post–Cold War era, it has been used sparingly by the three major powers—United States (16 times), China (8 times), and Russia (12 times). Since 23 December 1989, the veto has been exercised on 30 occasions, an average just over one a year (Appendix I).

It was FDR’s vision that “might be placed at the disposal of right.”²² For him and the other leaders this equation could only be answered by the institutionalization of the four-policemen concept. The idea being that these policemen would act as the providers of security, while the other members of the organization would be the consumers of security. As bearers of the burden of this responsibility, the P-5 expected to be given the ability to operate the council as their domain. The institutionalized privilege of the veto provides the P-5 with that ability. The founders knew that one of the primary weaknesses of the League was its lack of so-called teeth. The failings of the League were not to be replicated—the council would be given the power of enforcement. An international armed force, placed at the disposal of the UN, would provide the requisite military might. Churchill later (in March 1946) spoke of how a UN armed force might operate:

The United Nations Organisation must immediately begin to be equipped with an international armed force. In such a matter we can only go step by step, but we must begin now. I propose that each of the Powers and States should be invited to delegate a certain number of air squadrons to the service of the world organisation. These squadrons would be trained and prepared in their own countries, but would move around in rotation from one country to another. They would wear the uniform of their own countries but with ...