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The Second World War and the âquiet colony of Sierra Leoneâ
Andrew Stewart
The experience of the Second World War was a significant one for Sierra Leone, such was the critical nature of its strategic value. Previously a small British colonial territory in West Africa that held little interest for the vast majority of those living within the British Empire, it provided a critical link in wartime supply as men and equipment were moved through its vitally important port. Locally raised manpower was also sent overseas to fight, and these African troops would eventually return home having been exposed to new cultural, social and political ideas. The process of change that began in September 1939 would reach its natural conclusion nearly twenty-two years later with the establishment of an independent country.
Prior to the Second World War, the British media wrote little about this part of West Africa. In a rare article in The Times in 1920, a correspondent explained that
strictly speaking the Colony of Sierra Leone is a mere strip of the coast from one-half to one-quarter of a mile in width with two more spacious areas â one at Freetown and the other at Sherbro. The rest of the so-called Colony is really only a Protectorate. But to the visitor this is a matter of indifference. He regards Colony and Protectorate as one. For him, therefore, the Colony is an area measuring 210 miles from north to south, and 180 miles from east to west.1
Despite the decision to formally establish a Colony in 1896, it was indeed the case that a single Governor, assisted by an Executive Council of official members and with a number of Provincial and District Commissioners acting as representatives of his authority, continued to rule on Londonâs behalf. A new constitution dating from 1924 had pointed to self-government and eventual independence, but between the two world wars the country remained for the most part âa sad and neglected part of the British Empireâ. Capital and intellectual talent were drawn to Nigeria and the Gold Coast, and, with it being too small to build up its own manufacturing industries, there was a reliance on the export of crops and, later, of iron ore and diamonds.2
What Sierra Leone did have, however, was an important strategic position and a particularly fine harbour.3 An article written in a regimental journal in 1897 had correctly anticipated that, as a port of call for all but one of the steamer lines sailing to the west coast of Africa, Freetownâs âimportance in time of war would be greatâ, and this proved to be the case.4 During the First World War, the Colony became a supply depot for expeditionary forces operating across West Africa, whilst the port was termed a âfortified Imperial coaling stationâ and turned into a fortress for convoys awaiting escort from Royal Navy warships to provide protection against enemy submarines.5 For local security, there was the West African Regiment (WAR), administered by the War Office in London, which consisted of 60 British officers, 25 British non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and 1,500 locally recruited troops who stood ready as potential defenders.6 In reality, there was little in the way of a local threat; hence their principal wartime role was to fight against the German garrison in Cameroon. In turn, postwar questions were raised about why âexpensiveâ permanent military forces were needed in West Africa when local police forces would be more than adequate, and eventually, in 1928, economics prevailed.7 With the WARâs disbandment, the newly titled Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF) and, more specifically, its Sierra Leone Battalion assumed responsibility for local defence.8 The battalion at this stage consisted of a headquarters, a signal section and two companies that alternated between Daru and Makene, the two up-country stations that were much preferred to Freetown by the troops for their more temperate climate.9
For much of the interwar period, the RWAFF had little to do. In a piece in the venerable Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, notable for the fact that an army officer wrote almost entirely about the value of the navy, a Colonel Everett seemed to sum up the position as it stood in 1936:
Half-way down the West Coast of Africa sleeps the quiet colony of Sierra Leone. It has no news value; its name seldom appears in the Press; and it has no regular garrison. To the Army officer the mention of its capital, Freetown, calls up an image of a small, hot, unhealthy station, to which he trusts he will never have the misfortune to be sent. A naval officer, if he has been there, is reminded of a large hot harbour, a lot of negroes, and a hospitable club. An Air Officer possibly has to look the place up in his atlas.10
Italyâs attack against Abyssinia in 1935 had, however, brought with it subtle changes as now there was deemed to be a regional threat. A review and reorganisation of British forces in Africa was conducted the following year by Major General George Giffard, the then Inspector-General of both the RWAFF and the Kingâs African Rifles. Over the course of the next two years, he âtransformed the African Colonial Servicesâ producing a common war establishment and equipment tables for the various arms and units and insisting that all West African troops be taught good English, making it much easier for their formations to absorb British officers and NCOs.11 His obituary concluded that his efforts ensured that these forces âceased to be merely a âbush whackingâ force and became able to fulfil a role within a modern armyâ.
Whilst its significance was not understood at the time, all planning was based on two suppositions: that the Royal Navy would retain command of the sea and that France would be an ally. At the same time, it had been decided in London that Freetown would be made a âcategory A defended portâ, and a briefing was released to the press in November 1937 announcing that a regular garrison was once again to be provided to man the coast defences.12 The plan had in fact been agreed in the summer and called for the garrison to expand to a maximum strength of 16 British officers and 139 British other ranks and, by January 1940, for the same number of locally trained African troops. As the annual revenue generated by the Colony was so small, it having decreased over the previous ten years to just ÂŁ785,414, it was accepted that no additional charge could be levied for these forces, and the cost was borne by the British Government.13 By the time of the announcement, the first forty-five African recruits had already been recruited and started their training. An advance party of three officers and thirteen NCOs under the command of a Major Nutt of the Royal Artillery had also already set sail with a mission of assisting in the training of African troops. They were joined by Royal Engineers who were to oversee the construction of improved barracks and gun batteries at Murray Town and Wilberforce.14 By May 1938, the first batch of local recruits had completed their initial training and were transferred to the commanding officer of the Freetown defences to continue their preparations; they were to be followed that same month by a second batch of another forty-five men and then a third.15 Costs were still an issue, but following the Munich crisis the British Government provided a grant of one million pounds for the provision of new equipment for West and East African forces. Although lacking a formal title, the men were referred to locally as the Sierra Leone Artillery, a title that was changed shortly afterwards to the Sierra Leone Heavy Battery Royal Artillery. Their 3.7-inch howitzers, commonly called the âscrew gunsâ, had been designed as kits especially for mountain service on the North West Frontier of India but in West Africa there were no mules or other work animals as they had no resistance to tsetse flies. This meant that local labour was used to carry them either on stretchers or as head loads with a maximum load of sixty pounds.16 Given the quantities of ammunition, supplies and other stores, hundreds of bearers were required to move the battery.
As the situation in Europe worsened during the summer of 1939, the Sierra Leone Battalion remained the principal unit for local defence, but as the war approached, it was at half-strength with a single lieutenant colonel commanding three companies. On 22 August 1939 the Military Headquarters in Freetown received confirmation from the colonial government that the âStand-byâ telegram had been received from London. By the dayâs end, the battery at Murray Town was ready for action, and, using the four civilian lorries and two small cars of the Transport Company, the infantry garrison had deployed to guard vital points around the port.17 Platoons dug themselves into position at the Power Station, Kissi Oil Tanks and King Tom Naval headquarters, while sections did the same at South and North Lumley, Goderich and Babadori Bridge. The troops guarding the oil tanks, perhaps the key strategic position, had rifles, one Lewis and one Bren gun, one anti-tank rifle, a small searchlight and sixty grenades, and they were by far the best equipped within the battalion.18 The âStage IIIâ warning followed two days later, and the defences were fully prepared and manned in time for the declaration of war. All European reservists were called up, and just before the end of September 1939 a draft of British troops arrived to supplement the garrison with four more officers â one each from the Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, Royal Signals and Royal Army Ordnance Corps â along with an additional three warrant officers and fifty-five other ranks.19 A contingent of Southern Rhodesian officers and NCOs also reached Freetown in October 1939 to swell the battalionâs ranks, and on the final day of the year the garrisonâs strength was recorded as being 52 officers, 248 British other ranks and 839 African troops, an uncertain force to meet an uncertain threat.20
The harbour was undoubtedly key, and, as had been the case during the previous war, it immediately began to get busier, several destroyers arriving the day after the declaration of war. So vast was the harbourâs size that, at its peak later in the war, two entire convoys, a total of 300 ships, were assembled.21 During the first few months, the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal was also constantly in and out of the harbour as part of the naval force searching the South Atlantic for the German pocket battleship Graf Spee.22 This was significant in that the first convoy had sailed for England in mid-September; referred to as âSL Convoysâ, a single armed merchant cruiser provided the escort until they were met by the destroyers of Western Approaches Command.23 Only later with the increased appearance of German U-boats were dedicated anti-submarine vessels sent to regional waters to provide additional local escorts.24 With the increase in shipping and troops, the European population of Freetown, which was normally 400, expanded rapidly, and within six weeks of the warâs outbreak it was varying between 5,000 and 18,000; from 35 to 50 merchant ships were now habitually in the harbour, and admirals were âthree a pennyâ.25
Despite all this naval activity, for the land-based forces that had been assembled, there was little to do. By the yearâs end there had been one false alarm about a potential air raid, and the Murray Town battery had opened fire on what was later discovered to be a piece of floating timber.26 Although, as one RWAFF lieutenant recorded, Governor Sir Douglas Jardine had âconvinced himself that Freetown in general and Government House in particular would be prime targets for German aircraft, even though we were 3000 and more miles from the nearest possible German baseâ, the reality was somewhat different.27 With the exception of a solitary sergeant, the reservists that had been called up soon returned to their civilian occupations as there was more than enough manpower to guard key points.28 For the regular officers and NCOs who had all volunteered for this six-year posting and been seconded to the RWAFF from their regiments, many had been back in England on leave...
