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1 Searching for environmental quality
Wednesday 23 May 2007 was not a date that will be widely remembered for its groundbreaking news. The news in Europe was dominated by the Champions League final between AC Milan and Liverpool, whilst in the US and the Middle East, a new bombing in Iraq dominated the news. Nevertheless, 23 May 2007 might still go into our history books. After all, it is this day that is considered to be the first day in human history that more people lived in urban areas than in rural areas (Wimberley & Fulkerson 2007) â a fact signifying that the 21st century might well be considered the urban century.
In many countries, the urban era arrived many years earlier. In most Western countries, the majority of the population became urbanized even before or soon after the Second World War. The percentage of the urban population in recent decades has reached levels above 80% in countries such as Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Sweden and the United States (UN 2003). Concentrating people and their activities in small areas, such as urban centres, however, has not been without consequences. These consequences include some serious effects on the local environmental quality. Poor air quality, severe congestion, high levels of ambient noise, serious safety risks, excessive resource consumption and large polluted brown field sites are among the immediate problems most towns and cities face. In 2007, for example, the World Health Organization calculated that up to 20% of deaths in Europe could be attributed to bad environmental quality (WHO 2007). Although surrounded by serious uncertainties, the results of this WHO study do illustrate the urgency of addressing the quality of our local environments, something that has not escaped the notice of many governments.
Since its rapid expansion in the 1970s, environmental policy in most of the Western world has been dominated by central government control and legalistic and regulatory-based policies (e.g. Andersen & Liefferink 1997, JÀnicke & Jörgens 2006 and Nelissen 1997). These centralized and legalistic policies have not been without effect, as many environmental conditions have improved in recent decades, including at the local level. Emissions of environmental stressors have been substantially reduced, causing a considerable reduction in emissions into air, water and soil. Despite these successes, the centralistic and legalistic approach is increasingly considered to be only part of the solution to the puzzle of environmental policy (e.g. CEC 1990, De Roo 2003 and Van Tatenhove et al. 2000). During the past two decades, also in environmental policy, many new instruments and strategies have been implemented (e.g. Busch & Jörgens 2005, JÀnicke & Jörgens 2006, Jordan & Lenschow 2008, Jordan et al. 2005, Lemos & Agrawal 2006, Vig & Kraft 2013).
Among the main innovations in renewing environmental policy is the increase in the role of the local level in governing. In this book, I will specifically focus on this increase of the local level in the realm of environmental policy. Nevertheless, in this book I aim to go beyond a study on the motives and consequences of this increase of the local level. Rather, I consider the changes taking place in environmental policy as exemplary for some prime âshifts in governanceâ that can be witnessed in much of the Western world and specifically western Europe over the past few decades. The âshifts in governanceâ can be traced to an increasingly sceptical attitude towards traditional approaches to governance such as centralized control and legalistic and regulatory-based policies. In response, these traditional approaches are being replaced, sometimes swiftly and rigorously, by new approaches through widespread governance-renewal operations. In this book, I argue that such governance renewal should itself also be approached sceptically. That is, governance renewal should be supported by clear theoretical arguments and by a keen awareness of the possible consequences of such renewal. The aim of this book is not only to develop such arguments and awareness but also to cast doubt upon the merits of a rapid and generic shift away from centralized and regulatory-based governance approaches. In doing so, I draw from my empirical study into such shifts in governance in the realm of environmental policy in western Europe, especially due to the rather rigorous shift away from strong centralized and regulatory-based governance approaches in this policy field.
1.1 Shifts in governance
During most of the 20th century, the exercise of governance, also in the Western world, was left largely to the discretion of formal governments, most notably the central state (see also Pierre & Guy Peters 2000). Reliance on government control was supported by the long-held assumption that (central) governments are able to exercise a high degree of control over social processes and, while doing so, are also best equipped to represent the âpublic goodâ. Although left relatively undisputed for a long time, the past few decades are characterized by much greater scepticism towards this assumption. This scepticism has fuelled some important âshifts in governanceâ (see also Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden 2004).
Changing societies
To a large degree, recent âshifts in governanceâ in Europe and beyond are a response to changing societal conditions (e.g. Hajer et al. 2004, Hooghe & Marks 2001, Kooiman 1993, Pierre & Guy Peters 2000, Rhodes 2000, 2007 and Stoker 1998). Social fragmentation and power dispersal have come to challenge the supremacy of the central state in controlling policy development and delivery. Social fragmentation involves an increasing diversity of interests and opinions held by societal actors, undermining widespread societal support for central governments in exercising control over sections of our societies. Governments, therefore, are encountering many different societal or market parties who are claiming their place in the governance process and, as expressed with power dispersal have the resources to exercise influence. In the meantime, societies have also become more mobile, dynamic and, in general, are considered more complex. Such complexity follows the diversification of our economies, ongoing globalization and innovations in, for example, transportation and information and communication technology. Complexity is furthermore caused by the increased interrelatedness of economies, people and problems. On the one hand, interrelatedness manifests itself in the growing mutual dependence between the aforementioned public and private parties. On the other hand, there is also an awareness of the strong interrelation between problems, their causes and effects. Consequently, there are usually multiple and potentially conflicting objectives to which policies should respond, while multiple parties with their own interests and resources are also involved. To summarize, formal governments are facing more eloquent, fragmented, dynamic and interdependent societies and issues. Whilst having to cope with the vast coordinative efforts that follow, formal governments are also facing a decrease in their power base compared to private parties and a decrease in societal support.
Problems to respond to
While governments seek to respond to changing societal conditions, they find it difficult to envision how they should do so. It is not uncommon for governments to reach back to tried-and-tested strategies, i.e. they establish new and additional policies and regulations to regain control. There are, however, serious doubts concerning this strategy.
In the first place, governments are often criticized for being inflexible, fragmented and inefficient (e.g. De Leeuw 1984, Pierre & Guy Peters 2000). Governments are traditionally organized into separate policy fields and departments, each specializing in a distinct set of policy functions and tasks. Although this specialization might in itself be a logical way to organize governments and policies, specialization is also prone to cause fragmentation. Serious coordinative deficits and policy incoherencies can be the consequences of fragmentation, while fragmentation can also frustrate attempts to cope with the interrelatedness of policy problems (e.g. Breheny & Rockwood 1993, De Leeuw 1984, Miller & De Roo 2004, Pierre & Guy Peters 2000 and Van Tatenhove et al. 2000). In the second place, the great extent to which governments rely on regulatory instruments is built on the assumption that governments can control the future direction of our societies. It is an assumption that is incompatible with a social reality characterized by social fragmentation, diminished public support and the dispersal of power. But by holding on to this assumption, many governments turn to proven methods such as additional regulations to increase their degree of control over societies and their problems. As De Leeuw (1984), for example, shows, this strategy is built on the misconception that additional coordinative efforts will always produce more control. Rather, as De Leeuw highlights, continuously adding more regulations and agencies can produce an overload of government policies that, instead of increasing the capacity to govern, increases governing problems such as fragmentation, bureaucracy and coordinative difficulties. As many governments have continuously faced such problems in recent decades, they are gradually acknowledging that merely âimprovingâ or âexpandingâ existing governmental organizations and policies might not be the way forward. Instead, they are starting to accept a need for more radically different modes of governing (e.g. CEC 2001a, Kickert 1993, Nelissen & Raadschelders 1999, Osborne & Gaebler 1992 and RMO 2002). In other words, what we are witnessing is an increased acceptance of the fact that our traditional governments and their instruments are not well suited to coping with the challenges our society is throwing at us (e.g. Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden 2004, Kickert 1993, Pierre 2009 and Rhodes 2000, 2007).
Innovations occurring
Since the 1980s in particular, many central governments and including those in western Europe expanded the societal capacity to govern by involving lower tiers of government and non-government parties. Through strategies such as decentralization, deregulation and privatization, regional and local governments gain in importance, whilst power and responsibility are also transferred to the private sector and the public (e.g. Derksen 2001, Hooghe & Marks 2001, Jessop 1994, Nelissen et al. 1996, Pierre & Guy Peters 2000 and Stoker 1998). The extended use of financial tools, the increased use of partnerships with non-government parties, and the increased participation and involvement of stakeholders and âcivil societyâ are examples of changes. But while actively pursuing these changes, it is far from clear what kind of allocation of responsibilities and steering arrangements these changes should lead to.
In reflecting on governance-renewal operations, Hajer et al. (2004) witness extensive administrative experimentation, while De Roo (2002) calls it a process of âtrial and errorâ (see also Allmendinger 2002a, Nelissen et al. 1996, Nelissen & Raadschelders 1999 and Van Tatenhove et al. 2000). As these scholars argue, we are witnessing the rise of a wide diversity of approaches to governance that are manifesting themselves in an equally diverse set of organizational formats. The result is an increasingly plural landscape of governance practices. Illustrated by the ongoing experimentation, it seems we lack criteria or guidelines to decide which of these practices, approaches and formats are desirable or potentially undesirable. In other words, we are not at all sure which kinds of changes should be pursued. Ideally, we would then look to theories on governance to help us formulate these guidelines. This is not as simple as it seems, however. As it turns out, the plurality that has manifested itself in the practice of governance is also manifested in current theoretical perspectives on governance.
Theoretical shifts
Recent changes in the theoretical debates on governance have undermined the idea that the form of societal control exercised by central governments that was predominant during most of the 20th century is possible or even desirable. Instead, we face what Allmendinger (2002b) calls a âpost-positivist planning landscapeâ that is subject to a continuous condition of what Healey et al. (1979) refer to as âtheoretical pluralityâ. This theoretical plurality means that we are witnessing a wide variety of different and sometimes incommensurable theoretical proposals regarding the organization of governance.
The rise of the theoretical plurality we face can be linked to some large-scale societal and theoretical changes in the latter part of the 20th century. Often signified by the concept of postmodernism, this involves an increased divergence of philosophical positions and socio-cultural values and beliefs (e.g. Harvey 1989). Apart from their influence on social fragmentation and dynamics, these diverging beliefs have also resulted in a divergence of theoretical perspectives on governance. In other words, different theoretical positions each draw upon different socio-cultural and philosophical values and beliefs. Consequently, it has become difficult to find common guidelines for connecting theoretical positions or choose between them. Instead, we are even facing a widespread theoretical scepticism towards the possibility that scientific inquiry can produce universal and fundamental knowledge to produce such guidelines.
The theoretical scepticism referred to is based on the rather common acceptance, in theoretical debates of the late 20th and early 21st century, that facts and values are intertwined and that multiple and plural visions on what is ârealâ and ârationalâ coexist. In the wake of the acceptance of this idea, knowledge and rationality are now increasingly considered as socially constructed, i.e. considered to be human-made (e.g. Berger & Luckman 1967, Gergen 1999 and Healey 1997). Social construction is based on the idea that people use different frames of reference when perceiving, interpreting and judging what they see. Social construction thus explains why people can fundamentally disagree upon what is considered ârealâ, ârationalâ and âgoodâ. Such disagreements have also manifested themselves in the existence of multiple and plural theories on governance, which are inspired by a wide array of different philosophical and socio-cultural values and beliefs (e.g. Allmendinger 2002a). Given these disagreements, we can also explain why it has become problematic to find guidelines for choosing between these beliefs and preferences. After all, if we disagree upon what is ârealâ and ârationalâ, where is the common ground upon which to build these guidelines? The consequence: theory is no longer providing us with ready-made answers regarding how âbestâ to govern but, instead, is confronting us with a plurality that is difficult to navigate.
Where plurality leaves us
In recent decades, governance renewal â for example, in the form of decentralization, deregulation and privatization â has made an impact on the governance landscape, also in western Europe. This impact can also be witnessed when it comes to transferring power and authority to the local level, which is my main interest here. Such changes should ideally be well informed by theoretical arguments and the possible consequences of the changes should be well understood and anticipated. Evidence suggests that, today, many changes are pursued without being well informed, while knowledge of their likely consequences is not evident either (e.g. Connerly et al. 2010, De Vries 2000, Fleurke & Hulst 2006, Flynn 2000, Jordan et al. 2005, Prudâhomme 1994 and Walberg et al. 2000). Certainly, many Western governments are taking serious risks in renewing governance without clearly knowing the possible consequences.
If we are to be better informed when renewing governance, we can look to theories on governance for inspiration and guidance. The âtheoretical pluralityâ prevents us from finding clear answers as to which kind of renewal operations we should pursue. Rather, we face multiple and sometimes incommensurable answers about which governance approaches and related renewal operations are desirable. In addition, we seem to lack the ability to find common ground to serve as a starting point if we are to choose between these answers. Hence, we seem entangled in what Offe (1977) predicted would be a ârestless searchâ to find appropriate governance approaches for the issues we face amidst a plurality of possible approaches (see also Nelissen 2002). We are thus presented with a clear challenge: can we find some kind of common ground to serve as a starting point in choosing between various governance theories and approaches and, hence, navigate the plural governance landscape we face? It is one of the key challenges I will respond to in this book, in order to establish when and how increasing the role of the local level can be considered more or less appropriate. Before doing so, let me first address the changes in environmental policy relating to these shifts in governance, most notably the rise of more proactive and integrated approaches and the related increased role of the local level.
1.2 A Proactive and integrated approach to the environment
Just as in most of the Western world, environmental policy in Europe has been dominated by central government control and legalistic and regulatory-based policies, at least up until the late 1980s (e.g. Andersen & Liefferink 1997). In fact, environmental policy can even be seen as a key example of a policy field dominated by central government control. Not surprisingly, it ran into the typical problems associated with this mode of governance.
During the 1980s, the specialization of environmental policies was already considered to be causing widespread problems of fragmentation and incoherencies in several European countries (e.g. Andersen & Liefferink 1997, Nelissen 1997). Regulations and policies had been developed for separate areas such as air quality, soil remediation, safety risks, noise nuisance, etc. However useful such specialization might be, it led to fragmented policy agendas that made it difficult to deliver cross-sectoral solutions to the many problems encountered and also caused coordinative problems and even policy incoherencies. In the meantime, the drawbacks of a strong focus on legislative instruments also gradually became evident. Dominated by rigid and fixed standards, such a focus on legislative instruments allowed little flexibility for (environmental) government officials to engage in negotiation and bargaining strategies with key stakeholders. It meant that environmental policies were ill adapted to the dispersal of power and fragmentation in society. In addition, the focus on legislative instruments meant that environmental policies were about fulfilling limit values rather than developing more proactive and strategic policies. Most environmental policies were based on setting restrictions on social developments and economic growth that could potentially harm the environment. But in focusing on controlling the damage caused by environmentally intrusive human activities, environmental policy remained a reactive policy field, relatively marginalized in comparison to other governance activities focussed on, for example, social development, economic growth and spatial p...
