Media Discourse and the Yugoslav Conflicts

Representations of Self and Other

Pål Kolstø

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9780754676294
• eBook ISBN: 9781317098911
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Anthropology
• Index: Social Sciences

In spite of the growing literature on discourse analysis, the relationship of discourse to violent/non-violent outcomes of conflict is an under-researched area. This book combines theories on ethnic conflict, identity construction and discourse analysis with a comprehensive and inclusive survey of the countries of the former Yugoslavia. It presents an understanding of the interrelationship between 'words' and 'deeds' grounded through an extensively close analysis of film, television and newspapers samples taken from the period. This combination of ground-breaking applications of theory with detailed empirical case studies will make Media Discourse and the Yugoslav Conflicts of key interest to scholars across a range of social sciences including sociology, discourse analysis, media, conflict and peace studies as well as those concerned with ethnopolitical conflict.

Chapter 1
Media Discourse and the Politics of Ethnic Conflict: The Case of Yugoslavia1

Tarik Jusić

Introduction

The mass media played an important role in the series of conflicts that led to the break-up of the former Socialist Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The media discourse was both an indicator of and a contributor to the crisis, highlighting deep divisions that began to open up, while at the same time helping redraw boundaries between ethnic groups in conflict and establishing legitimacy for the actions of their respective political leadership. In this sense, the media had a pivotal role in establishing the public definition of the crisis, helping to construct the playing field and the rules of the game within which the break-up of Yugoslavia took place.

Numerous studies have been conducted investigating the role of the media in the downfall of the former Yugoslavia and the subsequent peace-building efforts (Snyder and Ballentine 1996; Slapšak 1997; Reljić 1998; Skopljanac-Brunner et al. 2000a; Thompson 2000; Kurspahić 2003b; Price and Thompson 2002). These studies mostly focused on the analysis of historical and structural conditions that led to specific types of media coverage (division of audience, political control over media outlets, censorship); description of specific media outputs (for instance, description of coverage and reporting character and patterns); media policy issues; and the analysis of the general relationships between media and elites that use the media as a tool for mass manipulation and mobilization.

Nevertheless, it is still puzzling if and how the mass media and their specific content contributed to violence or to peaceful resolution of ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. It also remains to be investigated how media discourse varies in relation to differences in the types and intensity of conflict, and how discourses evolve in relation to the evolution of a conflict through time. In addition, existing studies of the media’s role in the conflicts in former Yugoslavia fall short of offering a consistent theoretical framework that can help us systematically to explain the complex dynamics between media discourse and the conflict within a specific environment and along the timeline of the genesis and the resolution of the conflict, and are often confined to mere description of what happened, with little explanatory power of causes and consequences.

Therefore, this entire volume tries to offer a fresh insight into the role of the media discourse in ethnic conflict by focusing on how ethnic groups were presented through the mass media in the period before, during and after the fall of the former Yugoslavia, and through the variety of conflicts that unfolded. This longitudinal approach is a novelty in the study of media discourse in Yugoslav conflicts, and will hopefully help us understand more thoroughly the relationship between conflict and discourse throughout the time, and in different contexts. We are not only interested in how and by whom a particular media discourse is produced, but primarily how it influences and is influenced by a specific conflict.

For this purpose, we need a theory of ethnic conflicts, a theory of discourse, a conceptualization of representation of identities and ethnic groups in media texts, an explanation of the link between discourse and power, an understanding of the relationship between context and media discourse, and an overall understanding of the link between the media and a discourse in conflict, and how media discourse influences and is influenced by the conflict. We also need a longitudinal analysis of media texts and discourses in the specific conflicts we focus upon.

Issues and theories of conflict, discourse, representation and identity are discussed by Kolstø, in the Introduction. Other chapters in this book focus on the nature and dynamics of the development of media discourse in different conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and give due attention to the specific media texts and how these relate to discourses in conflict. In this article I will address the link between the media and the wider context of Yugoslav conflicts, and how the media discourse is influenced by and is influencing those conflicts. I will try to show how the media are linked to power structures, and how they contribute to (re)definition of power-relations and the actions of actors in conflict. Hence, the paper focuses on the link and interactions between the media discourse and the politics of conflict.

Media between War and Peace

The study of media effects has been and remains a contested field in communication studies since its inception after the First World War in the 1920s. The theories range from those that claim all-powerful effects of the media, via limited effects and the role of individual opinion leaders in their communities, all the way to the claims about the power of the audience to interpret and use the media content in its own way (for a review of contesting media effect theories see for example McQuail 2000 and Bratić 2006).

This problem, I believe, stems from a rather narrow definition of media effects as a ‘relationship between the media content and its audiences’ (Newbold 1995, 119; quoted in Bratić 2006, 3), especially in earlier works. Such a definition reduces the effects of the media to the effects of specific messages/content on knowledge, attitudes, beliefs and behaviour of audiences, neglecting the fact that the mass media by their very nature (centralized, one-to-many, all-present, simultaneous, major source of information, legitimacy, etc.) significantly shape societal dynamics far beyond the individual’s opinions and behaviour, influencing the way that politics are conducted, how our free time is organized, how activities within society are coordinated (for example in times of crisis such as natural disasters) and how the overall public realm and debate is structured (whether it is open or monopolized, whether there is a democratic debate culture or authoritarian style dictum, and so forth).2

Bratić (2006, 3) studies the effect of mass media on conflict and peace by looking at the types of media messages (message, that is mass media factors), people (audiences) and conditions in the environment (situation). In his study of media in conflicts, Wolfsfeld (2004) similarly depicts a set of contextual variables (depth of crisis, elite consensus) and media variables (sensationalism, shared media) that contribute to the way the media influence and are influenced by the conflict. He also points out the effects the media can have on the political processes in conflicts by shaping the nature and the atmosphere of the debate, awarding legitimacy to specific political actors and influencing the way actors themselves act towards the media in their never-ending quest for media attention. In his study, which investigates the link between the media and conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Reljić (1998) also talks about how the media influence the conflict by the very nature of the mediated one-to-many communication that is happening simultaneously across time and space, making whole communities become spectators of and participants in such conflicts.

Summing up, and building upon these and other relevant studies, I argue that we need to look at two aspects of the relationship between media discourse and conflict: (1) the variables that shape the way the media act in the conflict; and (2) the effects of the media on conflict.

The variables that shape the media’s discourse in conflict are: (1) environmental variables such as the nature of the crisis, relationships between elites, type of control over the media, and so forth; (2) the nature of the media (presence of sensationalism, existence of shared media, professional journalistic standards, existence of alternative voices, media monopolization of public space, and so forth); and (3) the nature of the audience (educational levels, territorial distribution, linguistic barriers, segregation patterns, and so forth).

The effects the media discourse can have on the conflict are: (1) creation of the overall discursive framework within which the public debate unfolds, limiting possible options for deliberation and interpretation of events and processes; (2) definition of socially relevant and legitimate political actors; and (3) influence of specific media messages within a given context of knowledge, attitudes, opinions, beliefs and behaviour of the audience.

This chapter will investigate all four sets of variables that shape the media’s role in conflict, and will also focus on two sets of effects the media can have on conflict – creation of discursive framework and definition of political actors. The chapter will not be concerned with the issue of the effect of media content on audience in a situation of conflict since that lies beyond the scope of this volume. For an excellent analysis of that type of effect please consult Bratić (2006).

Variables that Shape Media Discourse in Conflict

Political Environment and the Media

Elite consensus The level of elite consensus is a powerful factor that decisively influences the nature of news reporting and media discourse in conflict, be it during the peace process or in the midst of escalating crisis (see Wolfsfeld 2004, 26). The media are prone to follow the lead of key political actors, and if there is a consensus about peace or war, the media are most likely to play to their tune, since those actors are their primary sources of information and interpretations of events. In the case that there is no consensus, the media will focus more and more on conflict between elites, and will also report more about negative aspects of either peace processes or the war. For example, the case of the Vietnam War shows that ‘these changes in the political environment had a direct influence on the news media moving from a supportive role to a more independent and critical role’ (Wolfsfeld 2004, 26). In other words, elite consensus reduces the number of adequate frames for interpretation of events, while lack of consensus fosters creation of many different and often opposing frames about conflict.

The fall of communism in Yugoslavia brought a new opposition power elite onto the political stage, polarizing relations within and between republics and provinces. In addition, the ethnically plural republics and provinces, such as Bosnia, Croatia and Macedonia, had several nationalist power elites, one for each of the ethnic groups living in those societies. As a consequence, the political situation on the supply side of the ‘marketplace of ideas’ (Snyder and Ballentine 1996) was so polarized that it strongly contributed to the proliferation of polarizing nationalist media discourses in the public sphere. The case of Yugoslavia shows ‘how societies in such a situation where old and rising elites have partial monopolies over the production and dissemination of ideas, as frequently occurs in incipient democracies and in cases of state breakdown, are prone to nationalism, mythmaking and overall manipulation and polarization of the public space’ (Jusić 2003).

As a democratizing political system opens up, old elites and rising counter-elites must compete for the support of new entrants into the marketplace through popular appeals, including appeals to the purported common interests of elites and mass groups in pursuing nationalistic aims against out-groups. (Snyder and Ballentine 1996, 16)

All in all, there was basically no consensus among the ruling elite as to what would be the solution for the crisis. The only consensus was that there was no consensus. As a result, media discourse closely reflected this polarized political scene.

The complexity of the crisis The second important variable to shape the media discourse is the complexity and severity of the crisis. There are different types of crises. First, we distinguish between violent (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and nonviolent (such as Montenegro) conflicts. We can also distinguish between limited (Slovenia, Macedonia) and extensive (Bosnia, Kosovo) violence. Finally, we can distinguish between the levels of complexity of crisis in respect of the level to which state institutions are functioning, or not – for example, Bosnia would be a case of the collapse of almost all institutions, while Macedonia is a case where state institutions and a regulatory framework functioned even during the violent episodes of crisis. For the media, this means that the more intensive and complex the crisis is, the more the media will be prone to further polarize the public discourse: ‘In other words, when things get bad, the news media often make them worse. … The news media, then, often play the role of the catalyst in such conflicts’ (Wolfsfeld 2004, 30).

The crisis that led to the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation was deep and extremely complex. First, devastating economic crisis characterized by chronic shortages and unemployment undermined the very basis of the concept of the command economy and pushed the country towards the rough waters of market liberalization (see Goati 1991, 13; quoted in Marković 1997, 47). At the political level, the state was seriously undermined through internal antagonisms. This was particularly visible in the dissatisfaction of Serbs and Albanians in the province of Kosovo, and strong aspirations for secession of certain members of the Yugoslav federation, such as Slovenia and Croatia (ibid.). At the same time, these secessionist aspirations were strongly opposed by Serbia. Moreover, Yugoslavia was a highly decentralized federation, so that by the mid-1980s the country had lost its real political centre of power, and power was primarily concentrated in its federal republics. The national character of most of those republics thus enhanced polarizing processes (see Puhovski 2000, 43). An important element of the crisis was the development of new plural political landscapes and democratization that replaced state socialism (see Simić 1989, 7–19 in Marković 1997, 46). Nevertheless, Yugoslavia started to open up and democratize without having developed the necessary preconditions in terms of political culture, regulations and institutions. The creation of a plural political scene without the parallel existence of influential public opinion, regulatory framework and civil society led to the rapid proliferation of totalitarian ideologies based on nationalism and populism (see Puhovski 2000, 43).

The situation was even more complex at the level of individual republics and provinces with ethnically mixed populations. For example, in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, populated by Bosniaks (Muslims), Croats (Catholics) and Serbs (Orthodox), three ethnonationalist elites emerged, each mobilizing its own ethnic group, while at the same time there was strong influence from Belgrade and Zagreb on Bosnian internal matters. In Croatia, the large Serb population, whose leadership was strongly linked with Belgrade, was opposed to Croatia’s drive for independence. In Kosovo, the minority Serb population, supported by Belgrade, became embroiled in decades-long tension with the majority Albanian ethnic population that had strong ties with neighbouring Albania. In the case of Macedonia, a minority Albanian population, linked with Albania as well as with rebels in Kosovo, started to voice its dissatisfaction with the domination of ethnic Macedonians in practically all spheres of public life.

Such a gradual disintegration of the system, coupled with a deep economic and political crisis, and ever-widening ethnic divisions, decisively influenced the way the media operated, resulting in the rapid spread of polarizing ethnonationalist discourses (see Snyder and Ballentine 1996; Slapšak 1997; Reljić 1998; Skopljanac-Brunner et al. 2000a; Thompson 2000; Kurspahić 2003b).

Political control over media Furthermore, a crucial variable that influences media conduct in times of crisis is the level and the nature of the political control over the media. This means that, in established democracies, the influence of the power elite on the media is significantly limited and the competing elites differently influence the media conduct, while in authoritarian societies and incipient and weak democracies (that is, early stages of transitional societies), the power elite exercises stronger pressure and control over the media, making it more vulnerable to manipulation (Snyder and Ballentine 1996; Reljić 1998).

The Communist Party had a monopoly over the political system of the former Yugoslavia, and exercised decisive control over the media until the democratization processes started in the late 1980s. Since the system was largely decentralized, the control over the media was in the hands of the political elite in each of the six republics and two provinces. Censorship was legalized and self-censorship was widespread (Robinson 1977; Thompson 2000, 11–12; Kurspahić 2003b). After the collapse of the federal state, each of the republics developed formally democratic multiparty systems with a series of elections being held in each of the republics in 1990. These brought to power nationalist forces in Bosnia and Croatia, while confirming Milošević’s hold on power in Serbia, Kosovo and Vojvodina. Although nominally democratic, most of the regimes in the states that emerged from the collapse of Yugoslav...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of Figure and Table
• Notes on Contributors
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction Discourse and Violent Conflict: Representations of ‘Self’–‘Other’ in the Yugoslav Successor States
• 1 Media Discourse and the Politics of Ethnic Conflict: The Case of Yugoslavia
• 2 Reorganizing the Identification Matrix: Televisual Construction of Collective Identities in the Early Phase of Yugoslav Disintegration
• 3 Foreclosing the Other, Building the War: A Comparative Analysis of Croatian and Serbian Press Discourses During the Conflict in Croatia
• 4 Events and Sites of Difference: Mark-ing Self and Other in Kosovo
• 5 The Yugoslav Succession Wars and the War for Symbolic Hegemony
• 6 Relations between Montenegro and Serbia from 1991 to 2006: An Analysis of Media Discourse
• 7 Spinning Out of Control: Media Coverage in the Bosnian Conflict
• 8 ‘Spinning Out of Control’: Mutual Reinforcement Discourse in Macedonia?
• 9 The Semantics of Silence, Violence and Social Memory: ‘The Storm’ in the Croatian and Serbian Press
• 10 Self and Other in Balkan (Post-)War Cinema
• Conclusion Discourse and Violence
• Bibliography
• List of Media Sources
• Index