Complex Political Decision-Making

Leadership, Legitimacy and Communication

Peter Bursens, Christ'l De Landtsheer, Luc Braeckmans, Barbara Segaert

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• eBook ISBN: 9781315453514
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Political and societal elites are increasingly confronted with complex environments in which they need to take collective decisions. Decision-makers are faced with policy issues situated at different intertwined levels which need to be negotiated with different actors. The negotiation and decision-making processes raise issues of legitimacy, leadership and communication. Modern societal systems are not only affected by horizontal specialization and diversity but also by a vertical expansion of governance layers. The national level is no longer the sole, or even the most important, level of governance. In these complex environments, cognitive abilities and personalities of political and societal elites have gained importance.

This book addresses the impact of an increasingly complex environment on the legitimacy and transparency of polities, on the role of leadership and political personality and on motivated images, rhetoric and communication. Examining how these issues interact at the macro and theoretical level, the types of problems decision-makers face and how they communicate ideas with their audiences, it brings together leading experts in political psychology, law and political science to bridge the gap in the way these disciplines explore the issue of complex decision-making.

Part I
Complex decision-making and legitimacy

1
Covert integration of core state powers¹

Renegotiating incomplete contracts

Adrienne Héritier

Introduction

This chapter argues that the integration of policymaking in the European Union has frequently occurred not manifestly in the formal central political arena but rather in a process of covert integration without being explicitly mandated by formal political actors. It has arguably led to a ‘competence creep’ from the national to the supranational level and from legislative to executive and judicial actors. Deepening integration through covert integration happens because it is politically more expedient and politically less costly. It reveals different patterns that may be theoretically grasped by rational choice institutionalism and the theory of incomplete contracts developed and applied in a multilevel context. The chapter will theorize and broadly empirically analyze the conditions and processes of covert integration and their ‘stopping points’ on the basis of the empirical policy examples.

In this chapter, covert integration is defined as a process which takes place outside the formal European political decision-making arena. It is a process that implies further steps in the integration process. This deepening integration hence refers to an outcome and is defined along two dimensions: (i) a transfer of policymaking competences to the higher level/supranational level and/or (ii) the demandingness and detailedness of policy prescriptions issued at the supranational level.

Covert integration occurs in several instances. The most important patterns or causal mechanisms of covert integration are the following:

• Member states’ formal political commitment to framework policy goals which are vaguely formulated may inadvertently lead to ambitious integration in individual policy areas when specified by executive or court action in the course of implementation.
• Similarly, international agreements framed in general framework terms – through executive action or court rulings – may lead to a competence shift and more stringent supranational regulation.
• Delegating policymaking to independent regulatory bodies at the European level may result in a strengthening of supranational policymaking.
• The use of soft, voluntary modes of policymaking and capacity building at the European level may subsequently give rise to a deepening formal integration.
• The introduction of parallel options of regulation, regional and national, may lead to a crowding out of national regulation.

Hence this chapter raises the following questions: Why and how do covert forms of integration emerge, and what is their impact as regards policy outcome and possible shifts of power from the national to the supranational level and from legislative to executive and judicial actors?

In a first step, the chapter conceptualizes, theorizes and empirically illustrates different patterns of covert deepening integration of policies and the conditions of their emergence and outcomes. It builds on past and ongoing work on the EU (Héritier, 1999; Scharpf, 1999; Majone, 2005; Falkner, 2012; Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 2014) by analyzing the conditions, patterns and outcomes of covert integration and their institutional implications. In doing so, the chapter draws on two big strands of theory: regional integration theory in general and European integration theory, in particular the literature on ‘escaping the deadlock’ in inter-governmental decision-making on the one hand and theory of institutional change on the other.

Theorizing covert integration from a rational institutionalist perspective

Theories of regional integration and European integration constitute important starting points for the analysis. Neofunctionalist explanations of regional integration focus on the societal demand, which presses for more integrated forms of formal political decision-making (Haas, 1958; Haas and Schmitter, 1964; Nye, 1965; Mattli, 1999). It analyzes political, social, economic and cultural factors and their spillover effects, which, in turn, create a demand for further steps of political integration (Haas, 1966, 1968, 1975; Nye, 1968), eventually leading to a ‘shifting of loyalties’ (Haas, 1968) to the supranational level. The study of the EU as a political system by Lindberg and Scheingold emphasized three integration mechanisms of logrolling and side payments, actor socialization and feedback. Inputs such as political demands, support and leadership are transformed into outputs in the form of policies and decisions (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970). In this decision-making system, the independent Commission plays an important role because it actively tries to build coalitions to overcome national resistance to new policies and decisions and exercise supranational leadership (Laursen, 2003, p.9). Later neofunctionalist studies of European integration also focus on supranational institutions (Pollack, 1996; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1998; Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001) and the promotion of ideas in view of a functional demand (Wiener and Diez, 2003; Hooghe and Marks, 2009; Risse, 2010). In a historical institutionalist approach to European integration, Pierson (1996) builds on neofunctionalist arguments by pointing to the gaps that emerge in member states’ control over supranational actors and unintended consequences thereof. These gaps are difficult to close because supranational actors enjoy some autonomy, political decision-makers have restricted time horizons and shifting preferences and there may be institutional barriers to reform as well as various costs of change (Pierson, 1996).

The argument presented in this chapter builds on the neofunctionalist argument emphasizing a possible gap between original integration decisions and unintended deepening consequences. It points to supranational initiatives in seeking to bring about integration. EU’s non-majoritarian ‘engines of integration’ (the Commission and the European Court of Justice) are widely believed to be very effective at supplying more integration ‘by stealth’ (Pollack, 2003). Establishing supranational actors (the Commission and the ECJ in the case of the EU) with some autonomy in decision-making constitutes an important prerequisite for opening processes of covert integration (Héritier, 1997, 2003, 2007, 2012).

Intergovernmentalism as a theory of regional integration analyzes the bargaining processes between governments’ intent upon joint action which, however, also seek to preserve as much as possible of their national sovereignty and therefore tend to agree on the smallest common denominator. Keohane (1989) emphasizes the important role of institutions in cooperation and conflict in international politics. Steps concerning integration are negotiated and decided in the central formal political arena. Liberal intergovernmentalism includes the preference formation of members in view of their domestic political processes to explain the negotiation outcomes at centre stage (Moravcsik, 1993, 1998). The outcome of these decision processes in the central political arena constitutes the starting point of the argument on covert integration.

Linking perspectives of intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism, the literature on how to avoid stalled intergovernmental decision-making processes emphasizes possible escape routes from gridlock (Héritier, 1997). However, a systematic conceptualization and theorization of different channels of covert deepening integration, its conditions, mechanisms and outcomes for the European Union is still underdeveloped (see Héritier, 1997; Scharpf, 1999; Tallberg, 2000; Majone, 2005; Falkner, 2012; Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 2014). Assuming decision-making deadlock due to divergent preferences, Héritier (1997) maps and explains a number of escape routes or ‘subterfuge’ out of deadlock, such as switching negotiation arenas, multilevel games and the early self-commitment of actors. Scharpf (1999) pointed out the political slowness and costliness of positive integration through intergovernmental decision-making and the resulting asymmetry between Court- and Commission-driven negative integration leading to deepening integration. Falkner (2012) conceptualizes and theorizes different avenues of escaping the ‘joint decision-making trap’ developed by Scharpf (1988). She distinguishes various patterns of deepening integration and differentiates between supranational hierarchical steering (ECJ and Commission decisions), playing the treaty-base game and arena shifting on the one hand and socialization processes on the other, showing how a convergence of actors’ preferences is induced by following the same values of integration (Falkner, 2011). Genschel and Jachtenfuchs use a demand and supply model to emphasize that there are no non-majoritarian actors, such as the Commission and the ECJ, with an institutional self-interest in ‘disintegration’ which would contain inroads into national sovereignty cores. While member states willing to adopt disintegrative decisions need to achieve unanimity in most areas of core state powers, ‘non-majoritarian actors can supply integration indirectly by reading regulatory implications or capacity requirements into EU law that were not anticipated, or at least not explicitly agreed upon, at the time the law was initially legislated’ (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 2014, p.16).

Why and how do different patterns of covert integration emerge? Such patterns may lead to a deepening of integration in areas of core state powers, more demanding and detailed common policy requirements and power shifts, both to the supranational level and from the legislator to the executive and judiciary. Different strands of theory offer different answers. I will mainly use rational choice institutionalism to explain covert processes of institutional and policy change. Additionally, to offer a view through contrasting lenses, I will briefly discuss and illustrate a possible explanation from the perspective of sociological institutionalism.

The rational choice explanation builds on the theory of continuous institutional change (Héritier, 1997, 2007, 2012; Farrell and Héritier, 2003, 2004; Stacey and Rittberger, 2003), which may also be applied to the change of policies. It emphasizes the renegotiation or re-interpretation of incomplete institutional rules and policy decisions. Channels of covert integration may be considered as an institutional change and as a policy change that emerges once a formal political decision of integration has been taken that offers the possibility to be renegotiated and specified in the course of its application. The explanation is based on the assumptions of goal-oriented, bounded rational actors seeking to maximize their institutional power and thereby their power over policy outcomes. Answers to why patterns of deepening integration appear may be derived from the existence of external problem pressure, specific institutional conditions and the relative bargaining power of the involved actors when redefining incomplete institutional or policy rules.

Five patterns of covert integration

Deepening integration through general commitment

Revealing a first discernible pattern of covert integration, ‘Deepening integration through general commitment’, I argue that given problem pressure and a demand for a coordination of national policies, it is crucial whether decisions to coordinate at the higher level represent complete or incomplete contracts. If member states have similar preferences and agree in a detailed decision to upload competences to the higher level which also clearly circumscribes the power given to supranational actors, a limited transfer of national powers has occurred in a complete contract and in an overt way in the main political arena. If, by contrast, member states have diverse preferences regarding the desired policy solutions and appropriate limits of supranational power, then the outcome of the decision process in the main arena is likely to be vaguely formulated (an incomplete contract) and/or at the lowest common denominator. An incomplete contract – for strategic reasons and reasons of substantive uncertainty (Cooley and Spruyt, 2009) – leaves many details yet to be specified and thereby opens the door for subsequent institutional and policy changes (Héritier, 2007). These changes often happen outside the formal political arena. The renegotiation may give rise to informal rules regarding the handling of national powers emerging alongside the formal political arena. The outcome of the re-bargaining of the incomplete contract will be determined by the most powerful actors (as defined by their fallback position in case of a bargaining failure), the existing decision-making rule and exogenous events. When specifying the incomplete contract, supranational executive actors may form an alliance with judicial actors in interpreting the details of the contract and – through court rulings – make an inroad into national competences that have not previously been formally mandated.

In short, a deepening integration may result from the fact that given external problem pressure, the formal political decision-makers commit th...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• Contributors
• Introduction
• PART I Complex decision-making and legitimacy
• PART II Complex decision-making and leadership
• PART III Complex decision-making and communication
• Index