Indian Ocean and Maritime Security

Competition, Cooperation and Threat

Bimal N. Patel, Aruna Kumar Malik, William Nunes

• Publisher: Routledge India
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781138743892
• eBook ISBN: 9781315439747
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Diplomacy & Treaties
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book provides a synoptic view of the Indian Ocean and maritime security in its contested waters. Using a historical approach, it reveals vital links to events in the present day. The volume:

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• Highlights the competition between major Asian powers to control the 'String of Pearls' — a reference to the Chinese attempts at controlling the Indian Ocean periphery.

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• Shows that cooperation amongst the major powers of the region could abate the threat of the potential of conflict becoming global and inviting external intervention.

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• Discusses India's Look-East policy and the deepening relation between India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

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• Argues for the need of Indian Ocean states and particularly the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) members of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) to look afresh at their political and security issues and common interests.

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• Suggests measures for evolving a robust mechanism of maintaining the Indian Ocean as a sustainable zone of commerce, energy, security and peace rather than threat.

A major contribution on a critical area in Asian geopolitics, this volume will be useful to scholars and researchers of international relations, politics, defence studies and maritime security studies, along with strategic affairs experts and think tanks.

Part I
The past, present and future of the Indian Ocean

1
Revisiting maritime security in the Indian Ocean

A note on current scenario

Aruna Kumar Malik and William Nunes

There is no dearth of attention, from policymakers and commentators, paid to the broad theme of emerging security threats and challenges in the maritime sphere in the Indian Ocean. Indian Ocean covers almost 20 per cent of the world’s water. Its total area is about 68.556 million sq. km, and it is almost 5.5 times larger than the United States. The ocean total area includes Andaman Sea, Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, Flores Sea, Great Australian Bight, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Java Sea, Mozambique Channel, Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Savu Sea, Strait of Malacca, Timor Sea and other tributary water bodies (Debee, 2011). It also has several small island nations such as the Madagascar, the Seychelles, Reunion Island, Maldives, Mauritius and Sri Lanka, while a cluster of islands forming Indonesia border the ocean in east. Indian Ocean got its name after the huge Indian subcontinent in its north. It has remained an important area throughout the realms of history due to its unique strategic location and bulk of natural resources. Various criteria could be used to designate states as Indian Ocean Rim states. In this chapter, the term applies to 38 coastal states and 13 landlocked states; the coastal states are 26 Indian Ocean rim states, 5 Red Sea states, 4 Persian Gulf states, and Saudi Arabia, France and Britain. Many of these states are former colonies. The landlocked states included as Indian Ocean states are dependent upon the Indian Ocean for trade and communications but, with the exception of Afghanistan, they exclude the central Asian states. This delimitation covers an area of 101.6 million sq. km, split between an ocean area of 68.56 sq. km and a land area of 33.05 sq. km. With a total population of 2.6 billion, the region represents 39 per cent of the global population and consists of a vast and diverse political, cultural and economic kaleidoscope.¹ The Indian Ocean is an area of conflict. Some conflicts are internal and remain localized, but other conflicts are of global significance and are prone to foreign political and military interference. According to a recent analysis of global conflicts carried out by the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, altogether 42 per cent of world conflicts can be associated with Indian Ocean countries.² The list is extensive, but notable conflict areas are Israel and Palestine, Iraq, Sudan, Afghanistan, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Pakistan. Though the causes of these conflicts vary, many can be associated with weak or failed states, significant levels of poverty, poorly developed institutions, the absence of democracy, corruption, competition for scarce resources, interference by foreign powers, the global war on terror and what can be termed as ‘turbulence’ in the Islamic world. The urgent need for both human and sustainable economic development and improved security cooperation within the Indian Ocean Region is obvious. The region is rich in energy resources and minerals such as gold, tin, uranium, cobalt, nickel, aluminium and cadmium, and also contains abundant fishing resources. Oil and gas traversing the Indian Ocean are of great importance to the global economy. Roughly 55 per cent of known oil reserves and 40 per cent of gas reserves are in the Indian Ocean Region. The Gulf and Arab states produce around 21 per cent of the world’s oil, with daily crude exports of up to 17,262 million barrels, representing about 43 per cent of international exports.³ Indian Ocean ports handle about 30 per cent of global trade and half of the word’s container traffic traverses the Indian Ocean. However, the Indian Ocean has some of the world’s most important choke points, notably the straits of Hormuz, Malacca and the Babel-Mandeb. As these choke points are strategically important for global trade and energy flow, a number of extra-regional states maintain a naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

The Indian Ocean seaboard of sub-Saharan Africa has historically not been given high strategic international priority. However, as competition for scarce resources intensifies and China and India in particular become major role-players in Africa, major Western powers are showing increasing interest in the region. Significantly, international interest in the whole Indian Ocean Region is on the rise. The reasons for this include security concerns about instability that characterizes and destabilizes the region, the region’s vital role in oil production and its importance for energy shipments, the wealth of resources and raw materials in the region, involvement of extra-regional powers in a number of conflicts and the rise of new regional powers and their ability to project their power.

Indian Ocean maritime security: characteristics and threats

During the Cold War, the newly independent Indian Ocean states of Asia and Africa became subject to the competition between the superpowers. The resultant security balance in the region dissipated when the Cold War came to an end. The post–Cold War era saw the region becoming less stable, with much rivalry, competition, suspicion and turmoil. Moreover, the maritime security environment in the Indian Ocean also underwent transformation. Because of weak government structures and a limited capacity to control maritime domains, all types of illicit activities began to flourish in many parts of the Indian Ocean. As a result, the region’s maritime security challenges are now considerable and are affected by key variables such as militarization within the region, the involvement of major and extra-regional powers and non-traditional security threats.

Military aspects

Because of these factors, it is perhaps understandable that considerable recent international attention has focused on the maritime security abilities of state, regional and multinational role-players in the Indian Ocean. An analysis of the complex maritime security system has led Don Berlin to identify a number of principal trends.⁴ The first is the efforts of the United States and to some extent its international partners – India, Australia, Singapore, Japan, France, the United Kingdom and Canada – to maintain and expand its authority in the Indian Ocean and achieve key strategic objectives. These include attempts to hinder or limit the power and influence of countries such as China, Iran and Russia; to protect energy sources and to counter terrorism and other security threats. The second trend is the endeavour by countries such as China, and perhaps even Iran, Pakistan and to some extent Russia, to strengthen their positions in the Indian Ocean and increase their ability to counter the potential threats that may be posed by the US-aligned states.

The third trend is the activities of the littoral Indian Ocean states, which are concerned with national or regional maritime security in relation to specific rivals within their own subregions, as attested to by the many maritime boundary disputes and jurisdictional claims in the region. Another trend is indicated by the efforts of IOR states to manage the large variety of transnational and non-traditional threats they face, including environmental challenges, fishing infringements, smuggling and trafficking, piracy and the security of offshore installations. Since the Indian Ocean is an area of much geostrategic rivalry between the largest IOR states, considerable militarization has taken place. Two of the top military spenders in the world in 2008 were Saudi Arabia and India. The armed forces of six states in the Indian Ocean Region exceed 400,000 men (India − 1,200,000; Pakistan – 610,000; Vietnam – 484,000; Iran – 440,000; Myanmar – 439,000; and Egypt – 423,000) and the military expenditure of ten states is above 3 per cent of the state’s GDP (Oman – 10.7; Saudi Arabia – 9.3; Burundi – 4.9; Sudan – 4.4; Singapore – 4.1; Djibouti – 4.1; Kuwait – 3.9; Brunei – 3.6; Bahrain – 3.4; and Pakistan – 3.1). Although military observers will be quick to point out that the size of an armed force is not necessarily an indication of an efficient, competent and well-equipped force, many Indian Ocean states are certainly placing much emphasis on their military preparedness. Since the Cold War, the US strategic umbrella in the Indian Ocean has widened. Besides its base in Diego Garcia, the US navy also uses bases in littoral states such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Following the US anti-terrorism campaign in the wake of 9/11, the whole Indian Ocean Region came under US military surveillance, while the US navy was able to translate its commanding position at sea into military interventions. With the assistance of both regional and extra-regional coalition powers, the United States has consolidated its naval grip on the region. In fact, the employment of highly advanced naval forces such as carrier battle groups with their surveillance, support and logistical capabilities made the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan possible. This was essentially a maritime operation that was dependent on the long maritime reach of the United States. The Indian navy is undergoing substantial expansion with 40 ships and submarines, including 2 nuclear submarines and 2 aircraft carriers. Its target is to have a 165-ship fleet by 2022, consisting of surface combatants, submarines and three aircraft carrier groups with a total of 400 MiG-29K aircraft and helicopters. As some Indian observers are keen to point out, with two aircraft carriers in operation by 2012, ‘the balance of power in the Indian Ocean will tilt decisively in India’s favour’. However, it has been emphasized that India seeks cooperation with IOR states and will aim to improve stability in the region. Maritime security in the Indian Ocean is characterized by a considerable extra-regional naval presence. Although the focus is obviously trade and energy security, many countries are also providing assistance to the maritime security forces of IOR states. The scourge of piracy and non-traditional maritime threats has furthermore led to multilateral exercises and maritime security interaction. In the light of turbulence in much of the region, ensuring good order at sea poses a daunting challenge to existing maritime security forces. In fact, many coastal navies focus on policing roles and the security of littorals. With the possible exception of the states mentioned in Berlin’s first two categories (discussed earlier), a considerable number of IOR states, specifically those situated in Africa, lack the resources and budgets necessary to properly enforce their maritime sovereignty. In many instances, their navies or coastguards cannot even be considered to be token navies. The dilemma is that sovereignty must be exercised to be recognized. In the absence of this, a double jeopardy situation arises: as it is not possible to police and control the maritime domain effectively and maritime domain awareness is low, illicit activities of all types flourish, preventing these countries from exploiting their own ocean resources properly and drawing full benefit from the potential revenue this might bring. As geopolitical power shifts from the Atlantic to the Pacific, policymakers in the European Union ought to pay closer attention to the vast maritime region that lies in between: the Indian Ocean. All major powers rely on the so-called great connector that stretches from the Cape of Good Hope to the Strait of Malacca. The rising economies of East Asia are acquiring more and more purchasing power and need to secure increasing energy needs. This affects the vital sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean, especially those along the strategic choke points in the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb. These are becoming increasingly packed with cargo ships, oil tankers and patrolling navy vessels.

Actors such as the European Union and its member states, China, India, the United States, Japan and Australia are steadily increasing their naval presence and their military capabilities in the Indian Ocean and in various strategic positions along its rim. Smaller naval powers such as Pakistan, Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea are also expanding their activities in the region. The absence of a comprehensive multilateral agreement on maritime security in the Indian Ocean makes this force projection dynamic highly problematic. It bears the trademarks of a classical security dilemma. Many actors harbour suspicions about others’ ulterior motives and quietly mobilize for rougher times.

Moreover, many countries in this region are politically unstable. This has given rise to non-conventional security challenges in the Indian Ocean such as piracy, human and drug trafficking and maritime terrorism. The precarious security situation along the Horn of Africa is particularly noteworthy in this regard. Violent insurgencies are commonplace and threaten the political stability of the entire region. The World Food Program recently reported ‘over 400,000 internally displaced persons and war-affected individuals in Yemen’s northern region’⁵ alone. As the sources of insecurity for ordinary citizens are so profound, some peop...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Notes on contributors
• Foreword
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• PART I The past, present and future of the Indian Ocean
• PART II The Indian Ocean and India’s partners
• PART III India’s influence and responsibilities in the Indian Ocean Region
• Index