Religion, Equalities, and Inequalities

Dawn Llewellyn, Sonya Sharma

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781138386105
• eBook ISBN: 9781317067290
• Topic: Theology & Religion
• Subtopic: Religion

Presenting cutting edge research on how religion can confront and obscure social inequalities in everyday life, Religion, Equalities and Inequalities argues that when religion is left out of social scientific analyses, it can result in incomplete analyses that conceal pathways to social inclusion and exclusion. Bringing together an international and interdisciplinary group of contributors who operate at the vanguard of theoretical and empirical work on how social structures of power, institutions and bodies can generate equalities and inequalities in religion, the collection shows how religion can enable and challenge the inequities that affect people's everyday lives. Academics and students of religious studies, sociology, politics and social policy will all find this book offers useful insights into the relationship between religion and contemporary culture.

Part I
Structures

1 Between a rock and a hard place

Negotiating religious voices in public spaces

Elaine Graham

We are currently witnessing a radical reappraisal of the way in which, for over two hundred years, Western philosophy and politics have conceived of the nature of the body politic and the character of civil society. Despite the predictions of secularisation theorists, a distinguishing feature of Western societies in the twenty-first century (exemplified by the UK) is that religion has not disappeared from the public sphere. Yet this is a confusing situation. On the one hand, many faith-based organisations are experiencing a heightened public prominence as partners with government in the delivery of welfare and other public services (Dinham, Furbey and Lowndes, 2009), and interest in personal spirituality beyond creedal and institutional expressions of religion continues to be strong. On the other hand, levels of formal institutional affiliation and membership in mainstream denominations continue to decline by some measures – such as those recorded in the British Social Attitudes Survey – and public scepticism towards religion is actually increasing (Voas and Ling, 2010; Woodhead, 2014). This seemingly paradoxical co-existence of the religious and the secular takes us into uncharted territory, sociologically and theologically, and is giving rise to talk of the emergence of a ‘post-secular’ society (Keenan, 2002; Habermas, 2008; Bretherton, 2010, pp. 10–16).

While a contested concept, what characterises post-secularity is its paradoxical and unprecedented nature (Graham, 2013). While we witness the emergence globally and nationally of revitalised religious activism as a decisive force, there is plenty of evidence of institutional religious decline accompanied by robust intellectual defence of secularism in Western societies. I am not talking about religious revival, and yet I do not believe that the resurgence of religious discourse and practice is simply a blip on the otherwise undisturbed trajectory of modernity. Similarly, the resurgence of religion and things of the spirit may be interpreted as posing a challenge to modernity’s emphasis on rationality; but contemporary discourses founded on the continuing triumph of reason and science continue to put up a vigorous defence of secularism. Religion, then, is both more visible and invisible; more publicly prominent and yet more vicarious; more fragile institutionally and yet more pervasive. As Terry Eagleton eloquently put it recently, ‘The world is … divided between those who believe too much and those who believe too little’ (2014, pp. 197–8).

This unprecedented situation presents a significant challenge to existing assumptions about the mediation of religious voices into public spaces. Faith-based organisations and secular civil governments alike must learn to navigate a path between the ‘rock’ of religious revival and the ‘hard place’ of secularism (Graham, 2013), with little in the way of established maps or rules of engagement to guide them. In this chapter, I want to consider some of the ways in which the paradox of the post-secular might be felt, at the intersection of religion and society, and what that means for our established conventions of negotiation between the two. The ideal of the neutral secular state as a means of framing a public space free of ecclesiastical privilege and ensuring a process of free communication in which all citizens can participate, which is one of the hallmarks of Western liberal democracy, serves in many respects as the benchmark of our considerations, as the re-emergence of religious identity throws out new challenges to our construals of citizenship, freedom and belief. This has particular resonance with issues of equalities and inequalities, as the categories of ‘religion and belief’ are afforded legal protection within the canon of equality and diversity legislation. Beyond the realm of politics and the state, I will also explore whether, as institutional religion and religious affiliation declines, most people are likely to encounter religion vicariously via media representations of religious issues and personnel. Does the post-secular signal, then, the ‘mediatization’ (Hjarvard, 2008) of religion? If this is the case, then where does the authority to speak of, for or about ‘faith’ reside? Finally, I ask whether the association some people make of the post-secular with the deconstruction of some of the binaries of modernity – private/public, faith/reason, sacred/secular – offers opportunities to revisit the ways in which modernity and the secular has been a gendered category, and what that may mean for the religious lives and civic identities of women. Once again, themes of equality and inequality come into play, as I ask whether the post-secular signals a shift of the balance of power in gender relations towards or away from greater equity.

Post-secular society

According to the logic of Western theories of secularism and secularisation, articulated in the classic theories of sociology of writers such as Marx, Weber and Durkheim, through to the orthodoxy of sociological studies of religion till the late twentieth century, religion will inevitably decline as society becomes more complex, technological and differentiated. Such analysis, however, now appears to be breaking down:

The apparent triumph of Enlightenment secularization, manifest in the global spread of political and economic structures that pretended to relegate the sacred to a strictly circumscribed private sphere, seems to have foundered on an unexpected realization of its own parochialism and a belated acknowledgement of the continuing presence and force of ‘public religions’.

(de Vries, 2006a, p. ix)

A defining feature of the post-secular, however, is its defiance of a model of the reversion of secularisation. Despite the new visibility of religion, formal religious observance and participation, at least in the West, continues to be on the decline. Furthermore, via the polemic of celebrated scientists and atheist philosophers such as Richard Dawkins (2008), Christopher Hitchens (2007), Sam Harris (2005) and Polly Toynbee (2005), a classically post-Enlightenment critique of religion and the rhetoric of atheism has gained a new generation of advocates and supporters. In many quarters, the classic trajectory of ‘secularisation’, as denoting the decline of long-established faith traditions and the marginalisation of religious and theological language and values from the public mainstream, still predominates – albeit conditioned by the impact of global diasporas and resurgent political forces.

In his presidential address to the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, James Beckford (2012) put forward a very helpful typology of the many and various understandings of ‘post-secularity’, and issued a call for conceptual clarity and rigour in the use of such a term. In effect, by offering six major interpretations of the concept, Beckford shows both how ubiquitous it has become in the study of religion and in theological studies, but also how vague and sweeping usages risk devaluing its lasting currency. His types embrace definitions that dispute that ‘secularisation’ ever really happened; that while secularism cannot accommodate humanity’s spiritual yearnings, neither can conventional, creedal religion; a revision of the secularisation thesis; the return of the sacred, especially in popular culture; the resurgence of religion as a public and political force; the reassertion of neo-orthodox world views; and an eschewal of the very categories of ‘secular’ and ‘sacred’ (Beckford, 2012, pp. 3–12).

I think James Beckford is setting these out as ideal types as a heuristic exercise, but I am not sure that his survey really brings out what is for me the true essence of the post-secular, which is its ambivalent, almost agonistic quality. Possibly his second model comes closest to that, of the post-secular as ‘building on’ the secular, and where elements of secular modernity endure, and continue to suffuse public life, but in which nevertheless there are instances of resurgent and new expressions of religious belief and practice.

Whereas Beckford discusses ‘building on’ the analysis of secularisation, or ‘assimilating’ the ‘errors of secularization theories’ into the academy, or ‘integrating’ the post-secular into feminist theory, I want to stay with the dissonance between these seemingly co-existent currents of disenchantment and re-enchantment. It is my intention to work within a hypothesis of the post-secular as an awkward and contradictory space, where – particularly in relation to religion and public life – significant aspects of the new context are not easily or comfortably reconcilable.

As Hent de Vries (2006b, p. 1) observes, trends in Western society – especially this corner of Northern Europe – show signs of the simultaneous pluralisation and homogenisation of our social, economic and cultural lives. This transcends the binary of mere religious revival or sociological revisionism, and represents the unique juxtaposition of both significant trends of secularism and continued religious decline (not only in Northern Europe, but certainly undeniably so), and signs of persistent and enduring demonstrations of public, global faith.

Post-secularism is not about straightforward religious revivals, as a paradoxical condition in which currents of disenchantment and re-enchantment co-exist, amid a climate of pluralism which further complicates any search for a universally accessible and intelligible public discourse. The global resurgence of religion and a changing consciousness of its social significance render political discourse and public space all the more differentiated yet, potentially, more polarised, with a small but well-networked religious minority co-existing with a majority of disaffiliated non-believers who often have little or no direct experience of religious belief or practice. This raises the question of how far public authorities, indeed the population at large, should be expected to be familiar with the concepts, knowledge and vocabulary by which to talk about religion or to empathise with those of faith. While some sections of that majority may hold a strongly secularist position, arguing that religion should claim no legitimate place in public discourse, others may argue that pragmatically speaking it is necessary to reach a degree of accommodation with faith-based perspectives.

Religious literacy

I have been suggesting that as British society becomes, sociologically, post-Christian, an increasing gulf opens between a small but increasingly pluralist religious minority and the rest of society who may not be consciously secular or atheist by conviction, but lack lived experience of what it means to be a person of faith. The commentator Jonathan Rauch (2003) has coined the term ‘apatheistic’ to denote those who are religiously indifferent rather than militantly atheistic. That lack of awareness is all very well if faith is marginal or invisible in daily life, but the new mobilisation of religion, its re-entry into social policy and equalities and human rights discourses, arguably creates a need for greater understanding. Hence the emergence of the language of ‘religious literacy’ (Carr, 2007; Prothero, 2007).

‘Religious literacy’ originated in the US with the work of Stephen Prothero and the debate on whether religion can be taught in public or state schools. In Britain, however, it is concerned with fostering greater understanding between an increasingly secular political class and grass-roots faith communities. Talk of ‘religious literacy’ originates in state or public schools where it is considered one of the objectives of religious education (Carr, 2007). In UK schools, a daily act of collective worship and some form of religious instruction have been required by law since 1944; but as British society has become more diverse, such provision is less about the observance of a shared Christian heritage and more about negotiating the pluralism of religious beliefs and practices in a multicultural society.

Furthermore, the new public visibility of religion has extended the use of the term ‘religious’ or ‘faith’ literacy to apply to the training of government and public services personnel. Recent changes to equal opportunities legislation in the UK have proved something of a catalyst. The Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations of 2003 and the Equality Acts of 2006 and 2010 represent the extension of basic protection against discrimination to questions of ‘religion and belief’ (Woodhead, with Catto, 2009). Since employers and service providers are now required to be more aware of religious factors affecting employees and clients, there have been calls for greater sensitivity towards matters of faith in relation to everyday practice and the law.

As a report for the Equality and Human Rights Commission (Woodhead, with Catto, 2009) has suggested, however, if the promotion of religious literacy is entering the consciousness of public institutions and service-providers, it may be that media and popular culture are as influential as more formal sectors such as education. This is reinforced by trends in contemporary scholarship in religion, media and culture which argue that popular culture and the media perform a correspondingly formative role in articulating and constructing people’s perceptions and orientations to the sacred.

The Norwegian sociologist of religion Stig Hjarvard (2008) argues that as formal religious affiliation declines, the media assume greater prominence as conduits of religious ideas for many consumers. This process, which he terms ‘mediatization’ has its post-secular manifestations:

Studying the ways religion interconnects with the media provides evidence of tendencies of secularization and of re-sacralization, and it may be possible that both tendencies are at work at the same time – although in different areas and aspects of the interface between religion and media.

(Hjarvard, 2008, p. 10; my emphasis)

The consumption of various forms of electronic media constitutes an increasingly influential agenda in a number of respects. First, it locates the media as increasingly influential in constructing and defining the categories of ‘religion’ and ‘the religious’. Second, it focuses not only on producers but also on consumers of media as environments we inhabit in everyday life. Third, it alludes to formal, institutional religious beliefs and practices and other ritualised and sacred spaces and environments – physical, imagined or virtual – in which people’s exploration of religious and spiritual dimensions of identity, meaning and action may take place.

Hjarvard suggests that media serve not so much to report or depict religion as a priori but to construct our very understandings of the nature of ‘religion’. This has serious consequences for religious bodies. As secularisation detaches them from first-hand exposure to the general public, they are required to engage with the media as their surrogate or vicarious agents to ensure the maintenance of a public profile. Yet the same trajectories of secularisation that make them dependent on the media require them to conform to the logic of the media:

Presence in the sphere of public discourse is a socio-political currency now controlled by the contemporary guarantors of the public sphere: the media … Public religion finds itself desperately needing presence in the public sphere, yet it must surrender control over its own construction, its own subjectivity, in order to have access here.

(Hoover and Venturelli, 1996, p. 261)

Part of Hjarvard’s thesis is that media are now detached from roots in wider social contexts and construct their own systems of meaning, identity and practice rather than contributing to an autonomous life-world of politics, religion or culture. This challenges the conception that media promotes religious literacy as a mere neutral service-provider. Does this imply that media can no longer be harnessed to the ends of other social institutions, that they now drown out alternative providers of ‘information, tradition and moral orientation’ (Hjarvard, 2008, p. 13) such as religion, family or education?

[T]he media increasingly organize public and private communication in ways th...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of tables
• Acknowledgements
• List of contributors
• Introduction: Religion, Equalities, and Inequalities
• Part I Structures
• Part II Institutions
• Part III Lived experiences
• Concluding remarks and implications for policy: Reflections on religion or belief as an equality issue and a human right
• Index