The Politics of Security Sector Reform

Challenges and Opportunities for the European Union's Global Role

Magnus Ekengren, Greg Simons, Magnus Ekengren

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781409410287
• eBook ISBN: 9781317020103
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: European Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Security Sector Reform (SSR) is increasingly becoming a cornerstone in international security and development cooperation. Indeed, the concept has often been seen as a panacea for many of the biggest threats to the world such as failed states, terrorism and poverty. In particular, this book focuses on the complexities of implementation of SSR across the globe and the actual and potential role for the European Union (EU) to play in SSR. As suggested in the title of the book, this involves not only opportunities, but challenges to be overcome as well. There are three core themes to this book: Policy, Policies and Practice. By presenting the themes in this particular order a greater appreciation of the influences on the process of SSR, from conception to implementation is relayed to the reader. This volume appeals to audiences interested in the EU as a global actor and the interrelationships between foreign, security, defence and development policies.

PART I
Towards a Policy: Concept and Experiences

Chapter 1

Three Traditions and the Concept of Security Sector Reform

Carl-Einar Stålvant

Notes on SSR as an Essentially Contested Concept

SSR is both a comprehensive but vague concept and a policy-making tool. As a vision it embodies a holistic message; a message about good and democratic governance of the basic functions of statehood. Efficient security should be provided both for the state and for human beings. Although the formula remains intact as it is framed within international programs, it is hardly surprising that its content keep shifting with the political environment and underlying assumptions. An examination of the theoretical understandings of SSR reveals how three different discourses about strategic needs and political motives coalesce in the conception. It contains different, perhaps contradictory views on the functions of security and its relationship to other ultimate political goals. The reference to reform intentionality is not uncontested; certain scholars rather prefer to talk about security sector governance. However the former notion brings back a lingering reminder that the security apparatus have been a cause of insecurity and costly overspending in many countries.1 Thus the case is made for not prolonging such a state of affairs by the retention of a non-protective public good outside public scrutiny.

Somewhat simplistically we can say that these three discourses have their origins in a developmental, transitional and post conflict state building context. The underlying assertions and rationales could be spelled like this:

• SSR facilitates development: an insecure environment is an obstacle to progress, propels the misuse of resources and assistance, and creates few incentives for social and economic empowerment;

• SSR is conducive to democratization, reduces political authoritarianism and widens transparency and public accountancy of defence and security matters. Democracy, in turn, is essential for peace.2

• SSR is a key ingredient in healing societal scars when reintegrating previous hostile groups into society and in rebuilding institutions that are legitimate and trusted by the citizens.

As noted, the chapters of this report demonstrate how SSR is working in all the three different strategic environments. Ukraine exemplifies the complexities of transition; certain African states the developmental and Bosnia those of a state in post-conflict circumstances while Afghanistan fulfils all the criteria.

Challenges of a Comprehensive SSR Concept

As an instrument for policy guidance SSR is much en vogue. Hänggi and Tanner claim that a broad agreement prevails on general principles and good practices.3 While the former consensus is met by a list of institutional requirements, the latter criterion suggests that a woolly notion is validated through an intuitive acceptance of its manifestation.

The authors, emphasizing how security sector is subject to democratic governance, mention five components in an ideal type of rule:

• A constitutional and legal framework clarifying both separation of powers and the competencies of individual institutions;

• Civilian control and professional responsibility;

• Parliamentary control and oversight;

• Judicial control and accountability;

• Public control via media and various independent stakeholders.

However, the elasticity of SSR applications is evident when scrutinizing a number of case studies of attempted SSR programs. Abstract principles broken down into pointed projects, specific missions and advisory services subsume quite a number of diverse activities. The concrete and simplistic language interpreting particular actions and quick measures (a two-week training course, a one-week consultancy assessment team) as a SSR measure need not lead to misunderstandings although it is obvious that the underlying vision is easily lost. Even the reverse approach contains a trap. An effort to embrace all the elements of SSR when framing and implementing a policy program for a particular country risks achieving nothing. The particular parts prey on the sum.

These difficulties stem from a well meant but perhaps also overwhelmingly generous development of the concept. A number of attempts to arrive at definitions in and by international organizations have gradually ensured political support. However, any negotiated and approved concept risks enumerating a number of desiderata that ends up as a possible shopping list. Hence one can make the case that both the horizontal and vertical dimensions of SSR seem open-ended: the horizontal by expanding the numbers of actors and public functions addressed, and the vertical by opening up the entire question of state – society relations. A cursory overview of the generally accepted OECD – DAC definition reveals the many possibilities covered by SSR.

SSR is another term used to describe the transformation of the security system-which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance and this contributes to a well-functioning security framework.4

Hence the formula must be brought to life in the diagnosis for each country and situation. The ability to discriminate between various possible measures and to put actions in sequential order has a crucial impact on the likelihood of success. Hence SSR is no easily found and ready made panacea for transforming dire situations into safe environments.

So, in order to get a grip of the significance of SSR and its wide range of uses we have to ponder the particular meanings and applicability of each of the significant corners in a triangular term: security, sector and reform. For each term and corner we can imagine a number of polar possibilities:

• A classical military vs. a broadened understanding of security;

• A narrow concentration on public punitive and coercive powers vs. governance qualities and state capacity and responsive performance across-the – board;

• An incremental and piecemeal but selective strategy vs. drastic alterations and sweeping dismissals of old traditions and guards.

All three notions making up SSR (Security, Sector and Reform) carry more than one dimension and a range of operational alternatives. Functionally the element of security could also be expressed as a summary judgement on the country situation (whether it is domestic or foreign security that is the root of the matter or to what an extent the interplay of external and internal factors yield benign or malign challenges); institutionally as a dispersed or centralized lead agency structure and thirdly, as a choice and time order problem between many competing public concerns. National action plans are often volatile in times of rapid change and dwindling generosity on part of donors and partners.

When trying to comprehend the policy-making part of an alleged SSR attempt one could also make a number of additional distinctions. Crucial alternatives is the nature of the target, the degree and range of conditionality from donors or advisors and the scale of direct foreign involvement in the reforms:

• A narrow vs. wide support to public institution-building; i.e. favouring central ministries at the expense of executing authorities and local public offices. Administrative delineations are often obstacles, yet every country has a number of structures that need to be coordinated within this sector;

• A state centric vs. society centric approach;

• Autonomous driven change that is externally supported vs. change under foreign duress;

• Reform processes in failed states conditioned by various degrees of direct foreign presence.

However, the variability is great between different cases. Using the typology above and referring once again to the studies of the volume, in Afghanistan the scale of involvement encompasses war fighting, PSO and traditional development assistance. Bosnia is still under an international PSO that encompasses civil, police and military assistance. In Ukraine a large number of consultants and commissioned experts are docked into domestic institutions. Moldova illustrates yet another variety where SSR is addressed within various assistance and cooperation programs, but where security is propped up by the presence of a team of unarmed border observers. For the sake of the argument, the criticized Belorussian regime is not totally put into quarantine by EU neighbours and Brussels but substantial efforts are directed to cultivate relations with civil society and induce reform thinking as a prelude to change. As pointed out in the record of Baltic Sea cooperation, domestic circumstances and determination were decisive factors for national development and reforms of the security sectors, foreign advice and assistance only encouraged, complemented and enhanced the process.

Paradoxes of SSR

An activity and one-shot measure might be valuable by enhancing either security, sector efficiency or by inducing a reform package – without necessarily be regarded as means apt to realize SSR. As argued above one should be careful about ‘overloading’ SSR. When many objectives should be realized at the same time it is conceivable that unintended effects outmatch intentions: that democratic governance does not stabilize an unruly environment; that an operationally efficient and leaner security sector is little helpful for democratic control or that reforms of ordering institutions have little bearing on economic development. At least three paradoxes or difficult trade-offs could be mentioned, trade offs that requires both short and long term strategies:

• The ‘local ownership’ imperative is a condition for success but at least this author can see limits for its applicability in the short term: the extraordinary increase in drug trafficking from Afghanistan despite public campaigns and foreign advice to domestic efforts to curb the flows is but one example;

• Stability could be put against immature democratization. As the number of properly conducted elections yielding outcomes that enhances rather than diminishes potential conflicts are on the rise, fingers are crossed behind the doors of many donors and partners in SSR. The experiences of free elections in Algeria and Palestine have made it clear that good governance requires many reforms and additional institutions besides the plebiscite;5

• Massive foreign presence and investment in SSR activities within a dependent economy without self sustained economic growth run a risk of becoming the central ingredient of the local economy apart from crime, thereby perpetuating distress and diminishing the will to solve those cleavages that motivated the intervention in the first place, Kosovo being an example.

Conclusion

Closing this overview of concepts, alternatives and dilemmas one should ponder three things. Political environments, discursive contexts and institutional mind-sets matter when establishing the framework for SSR. A number of ‘hidden assumptions’, ultimate values and international and national objectives colour the three traditions and contexts alluded to above. Each tradition harbour their specific roots and supportive institutional background. A liberal-democratic agenda and cognitions about the desirability and nature of development reform is the driver behind the instrumental view on programming ‘self to self-help’ in partner/target countries. OECD/DAC is a central actor in this tradition. NATO has been the champion of re-educating and transforming military forces and of building defence institutions in countries of transition while paying regard to democratic and civilian control. As for internal safety and border control, EU has taken on a great responsibility. With regard to post-conflict reconstruction members of the UN family has been at the forefront together with more exclusive regional organizations such as NATO, EU and ECOWAS.

However, results in SSR work are susceptible to shifts in both ends of the interconnection. SSR is built on a donor receiver relationship or one of ‘inter-actors’ interacting openly: EU ‘transformatory power’ and the inducements of Europeanization still function in Ukraine and Western Balkans – but since 2005 it is generally known that the lures of membership are closed for foreseeable future. The apprehension is of course that willingness to reform and adapt also slows down. The European Neighbourhood Policy is adamant in pointing out that these partnerships do not equal a pre-accession road. Hence the inducements are less encouraging. In Afghanistan other values are at play, viz. the credibility of services rendered to the government and the long term commitment to the cause, a presence that easily is questioned by domestic opposition and opinion when met by violence.

For every substantial SSR component (police, armed forces, paramilitary troops, border guards, intelligence) there is a supply/demand relationship subject to a political calculus of costs/benefits on both sides. If the costs of change are high, and the inducements low, there is always a point of resistance beyond which change encouraged by an external agent will slow down, become nullified by other actions or simply dismissed and ignored. The window for influence is closed.

What is not SSR? There are realities which correspond to SSR but that are not identified as SSR as the underlying assumption are the wrong ones or the political context intuitively of a different nature.

The resurgence of a powerful defence sector within the so called power structures of the Russian Federation is not generally known as SSR despite a drastic overhaul of structures and a tightening of political control. The Federation has recently increased its defence budget, but in contrast to those new alliance members that also have invested more in traditional defence spending, a major power like Russia is not part of the SSR community. A number of bilateral arms control measures concluded with the US as well as a partnership in the combat against terrorism are not counted as merits.

A shift to a country where the political process unfolds outside of open foreign pressures also reveals the limits to SSR. An outdrawn and almost and stalemated competition between the Swedish MoD and Ministry of Justice concerning constitutional privileges and role in combating terrorism and surveillance of citizens’ electronic transboundary messages are not generally understood as SSR. The label is confined to other areas of applicability and policy designs.

Neither could an imposed political solution and shock treatment SSR be treated as a proper receiver donor relationship: the dismantling of the then power institutions sustaining Saddam Hussein’s regime comes to mind. It is only after a long passage of time, many unsuccessful trials and after successive Security Council resolutions legitimizing new realities that more actors in the international community have accepted the challenges. But the SSR discourse is hesitant, even absent on this particular threshold.

The conclusion is obvious: SSR is a political concept, susceptible both to its own achievements and external forces.

References

Buzan, B., People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd edition. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993.

Galtung, J., Fredsforskning. Stockholm: Prisma-Föreningen Verdandi, 1967.

Hänggi, H. and Tanner, F., Promoting Security Sector Governance in the EU Neighbourhood. Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2005.

Rummel, R., Power Kills: Democracy as a Method of...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Dedication
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Notes on Contributors
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• PART I TOWARDS A POLICY: CONCEPT AND EXPERIENCES
• PART II EU POLICIES
• PART III CASE STUDIES OF SSR POLITICS IN PRACTICE
• Index