Negotiating the U.S.–Japan Alliance

Japan Confidential

Yukinori Komine

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781138349971
• eBook ISBN: 9781315408163
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Asian Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

In recent years, the U.S.–Japan alliance has marked several anniversaries, including 40 years since the 1969 decision on the reversion of Okinawa. These occasions have provided crucial opportunities to reassess the continuing significance of U.S.–Japan security and diplomatic relations, prompting this investigation into major issues in negotiations between the two countries.

This book is the first comprehensive and comparative analysis of the U.S. and Japanese foreign policy formulation and implementation processes from 1961 to 1978, which also explores the long-term strategic significance of the U.S. deterrence in East Asia. It is based on numerous declassified and previously unused U.S. and Japanese documents, oral histories, and the author's interviews with former officials. The book traces the origins of contemporary security and diplomatic issues back to the 1961–1978 U.S.–Japan negotiations involving secret arrangements in the reversion of Okinawa, Japan's defense build-up, including the question of Japan's nuclear option, and U.S.–Japan defense cooperation. Through a systematic assessment of the behind-the-scenes discussions, Dr Yukinori Komine demonstrates that external security calculations were consistently primary factors in U.S.–Japan relations. The book concludes by making policy-relevant suggestions, important for the "Pacific Century".

This book offers crucial contributions to the ongoing debate regarding the increasing need for greater transparency and burden-sharing in the U.S.–Japan alliance. It will appeal to scholars and students of International Relations of the Asia-Pacific region, East Asia–U.S. relations, U.S. Politics and Japanese Politics, as well as Foreign Policy.

Part I
The foundations of U.S.–Japan security arrangements

1
The Kennedy–Reischauer line, 1961–1963

This chapter examines U.S.–Japanese dialogue regarding the strategic significance of the 1960 U.S.–Japan Security Treaty. First, it examines a series of U.S. interdepartmental studies and initiatives regarding the U.S. military and administrative control of Okinawa. Second, it discusses how Washington and Tokyo reassessed U.S. bases in Japan and Japan’s defense effort in order to ensure free use of U.S. bases in Japan for conventional combat operations in regional contingencies. Third, this chapter explores U.S.–Japan secret agreements and disagreements regarding the entry of nuclear weapons into Japan. Finally, it explores the origins of the question of Japan’s nuclear options in relation to the rise of China’s nuclear weapons program.

The conventional interpretation claims that after the widespread public demonstrations against the revision of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty in June 1960, the Japanese government shifted its principal focus from security issues to trade and economic interdependence.¹ Constructivists in Political Science, such as Berger and Katzenstein, argue that the so-called Anpo Crisis of 1960 was a major turning point in the establishment of the culture of anti-militarism in the post-WWII Japan.² The Japanese government, under the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, resisted U.S. pressure by stressing the Constitutional prohibition on the use of armed forces abroad. Japanese leaders also emphasized the concern on the part of the Japanese public, as well as that of people from other Asian countries, about the revival of militarism, and voiced fear of entrapment into U.S. regional conflict. Essentially, former Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida famously claimed that Japan should rely on U.S. military protection until it had rebuilt its economy as it gradually prepared to stand on its own two feet.³ As this chapter explores, however, during the 1960s, the U.S. continuously urged Japan to increase its defense and regional responsibilities in accordance with the growth of its economic might.

As the tensions caused by the June 1960 crisis declined, Washington and Tokyo sought to restabilize the bilateral political relationship. In March 1961, President John F. Kennedy appointed a distinguished Japan expert from Harvard University, Edwin O. Reischauer, as the U.S. Ambassador to Japan in order to facilitate a multifaceted dialogue with Japan based on “equal partnership.” Reischauer attempted to educate Japanese officials and citizens about the need for the U.S. to maintain military strength in the Western Pacific in order to stabilize the region. He encouraged them to overcome their unwillingness to take their share of responsibilities in world affairs.⁴ Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda advocated an “income doubling plan” to be attained within a decade and maintained a low profile with regard to national security. In Reischauer’s words, it was “a process of educating his public, not pushing them.”⁵ For the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the term “equal partnership” was the reflection of Japan’s growing desire to regain equal status with Western states in the international system.⁶

Behind the scenes, the Kennedy administration and the Ikeda cabinet continued to discuss various fundamental elements of the U.S.–Japan alliance, including the treatment of the Ryukyu Islands, Japan’s defense responsibilities, and secret understandings regarding the consultation provisions in the 1960 Security Treaty.⁷ The February 1961 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) asserted that, although the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty would remain the keystone of Japan’s defense planning, the Japanese still had a “fear of involvement in another war” because of the U.S. use of its bases in Japan.⁸ The NIE report concluded, however, that as Japan’s economy was likely to continue to expand at a rapid rate, Tokyo would gradually grow more assertive in pursuing its own independent interests. As the Japanese economy demonstrated remarkable recovery and development during the 1960s, Japan’s international “prestige” was a significant matter for the Japanese public.⁹ The nationalistic movement became a powerful influence in the Japanese domestic debate regarding the reversion of Okinawa in order to fully restore its sovereignty as a newly emerging economic great power.

The Okinawa question

The U.S. administrative control over the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa) had both emotional and military implications in U.S.–Japan relations.¹⁰ The September 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty negotiated between John Foster Dulles and Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida acknowledged Japan’s “residual sovereignty” over the islands, but postponed their return until the threats to peace in the region had diminished.¹¹ The June 1957 joint communiqué between President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi reaffirmed Japan’s “residual sovereignty” over the Ryukyu Islands, but stated that U.S. military presence in the region would be required as long as threats and tensions remained in the Far East.¹² On March 19, 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) emphasized the vital strategic importance of the Ryukyu Islands for the maintenance of stability in the Western Pacific and insisted on the continuing U.S. administration of the islands.¹³ The primary military contributions of the islands were to serve as part of the deterrent to the war in Korea and as general backup bases for the U.S. in East Asia. The Japanese public felt, however, that the continuing American occupation of Okinawa was “unnatural” for Japan as an independent state.¹⁴

This study examines the emergence of the Okinawa problem as a political-military issue in the U.S.–Japan alliance through which the two governments sought to find common ground between external military requirements and domestic restraints in Japan. During their first summit meetings, Prime Minister Ikeda explained to President Kennedy that the best way to diminish “reversionist desires” was to provide the Ryukyuans with economic means and treatment comparable to that which they would receive if residing in a Japanese prefecture. Recognizing Japanese public sentiments, President Kennedy made it clear that the interest of the U.S. in the Ryukyus was not colonial, but rather, was focused on “security considerations.”¹⁵ Okinawa was a key military base in the Far East, “a powerful center for possible military operations, both in Southeast Asia and Korea.” Hence, Kennedy warned Ikeda that if the U.S. were forced to give up Okinawa as a military base, it might be required to deploy personnel as far back as Hawaii, and if this occurred, it would be very difficult to maintain the U.S. defense commitment in Asia, including the provision of nuclear protection over its Asian allies. Ikeda recognized that there was considerable opposition within Japan to bringing nuclear weapons into his country, and thus he fully understood the need to maintain the U.S. position on Okinawa as a base for nuclear weapons (which were deployed in December 1954, as a result of the September 1954–April 1955 Taiwan Strait Crisis). In conclusion, Kennedy indicated the U.S. intention to remain in the Ryukyus because of the continuation of threats and tensions in the Far East, while recognizing the Japanese desire that the Ryukyus be treated equally as a prefecture of Japan due to the racial, cultural, linguistic, and economic ties between the people of Japan and those living on the Ryukyus Islands.¹⁶

After the June 1961 summit, Undersecretary of State George Ball and Ambassador Reischauer started their own campaign to convince U.S. military leaders to initiate the reversion of Okinawa before it became a major irritant in U.S.–Japan relations. During his first visit to Okinawa in early August, Ambassador Reischauer recognized that Okinawans perceived themselves to be fully Japanese, and that sooner or later the reversion of Okinawa would become the key issue in U.S.–Japan relations.¹⁷ Hence, Reischauer recommended to Secretary of State Dean Rusk that the U.S. should “move quickly” to form a broadly competent task force to address this issue.¹⁸

The Kennedy administration implemented a few policy recommendations from Ambassador Reischauer. On August 11, 1961, National Security Action Memorandum 68 (NSAM68), titled “Task Force on the Ryukyus,” was announced.¹⁹ The Task Force would investigate the extent to which economic and social conditions contributed to the dissatisfaction of the Ryukyuans; what actions the U.S. government could undertake to improve economic and social conditions; and what specific steps would be needed to make such a program effective. Carl Kaysen, the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and a former Harvard acquaintance of Reischauer, was appointed to chair the Ryukyus Task Force, which was composed of representatives of the White House, the State Department, the Defense Department, the Labor Department, and the International Cooperation Administration.²⁰

As Kaysen recalled, however, the Task Force operated “over great resistance from the Army.”²¹ In particular, High Commissioner Lt General Paul W. Caraway strongly insisted that U.S. administrative control of the Ryukyus was necessary for the maintenance of U.S. military capabilities that were vital to the Western Pacific defense structure. The Task Force Report therefore reflected the military insistence that the U.S. must retain exclusive control over the Ryukyus for an indefinite period.²² The U.S. enjoyed freedom in the actions it could undertake in the Ryukyus. This included stationing and deploying U.S. military forces to and from Okinawa, introducing missiles, storing special weapons, and using existing facilities for the logistical support of operations in the area. On the other hand, State Department officials were concerned that strong anti-military public protects, especially those against nuclear weapons, might culminate in anti-American, pro-reversionist sentiments in both Japan and the Ryukyus.²³

It was within these external and internal contexts that on November 3, 1961, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Foreign Minister Zentaro Kosaka discussed the matter of the introduction of MACE missiles (tactical surface-launched missiles) into Okinawa. Kosaka suggested that if the announcements were made subsequent to the introduction of the equipment, it would be easier for the Japanese government to take the position that there was nothing it could do to prevent the proposed actions.²⁴ Kosaka elaborated further that announcements in advance would create the impression that the Japanese government ought to be able to do something. Thus, both Ambassador Reischauer and High Commissioner Caraway recommended that every effort be made to minimize the publicity concerning nuclear weapons in the Ryukyus. Reischauer recommended that advance confidential notification be given to Ikeda and Kosaka, although he concluded that “the less said about [MACE] missiles on Okinawa, the better.”²⁵

Reischauer’s attempts to develop a direct channel to the President resulted in the so-called “Kennedy–Reischauer line” regarding U.S. policy toward the Ryukyus. During his trip to Japan on February 4–10, 1962, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, the President’s younger brother, heard a great deal about the Ryukyus from Reischauer, who privately conveyed his impressions about the danger of ignoring the Okinawa situation. He described to Kennedy the need to hasten Okinawan autonomy and to return the islands to Japan in the future.²⁶ George R. Packard, Reischauer’s Special Assistant in Tokyo, summarizes the ambassador’s private message to Bobby Kennedy:

Look, if we do not start the ball rolling and bringing O...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• List of abbreviations
• List of persons
• Introduction
• PART I The foundations of U.S.–Japan security arrangements
• PART II Secrecy in the U.S.–Japan alliance
• PART III Where is Japan heading?
• Conclusion
• Selected bibliography
• Index