Vietnam and the South China Sea

Politics, Security and Legality

Do Thanh Hai

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN:
  9781138929975
• eBook ISBN:
  9781317398196
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Ethnic Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

Studies of the escalating tensions and competing claims in the South China Sea overwhelmingly focus on China and its increasingly assertive approach, while the position of the other claimants is overlooked. This book focuses on the attitude of Vietnam towards the South China Sea dispute. It examines the position from a historical perspective, shows how Vietnam's position is affected by its wish to maintain good relations with China on a range of issues, and outlines how Vietnam has occasionally made overtures to both the United States and Japan in order to bolster its position, and considered the possibility, so far resisted, of taking China to formal arbitration under the auspices of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The book concludes by assessing the future prospects for Vietnam's position in the dispute.

1
Under the shadow of the Dragon

Introduction

Vietnam’s South China Sea problem is essentially part of a larger problem about its relations with China, a much more powerful neighbour. The 1988 skirmish in the Spratlys signalled a shifting balance of power against Vietnam in the maritime domain, exposing its vulnerabilities to China’s superior naval power as well as the limits of the alliance between Hanoi and Moscow. Without the Soviet Union’s direct interventions, Vietnam was incapable of defending its offshore territories. Also, its military adventurism in Cambodia deprived Hanoi of necessary international support in the struggle against irredentist China. In the changing strategic environment, by the end of the 1980s leaders in Hanoi realised that confrontation with China did not best serve their national interest.

As Vietnam moved to restore its relations with China, the unresolved disputes in the South China Sea represented a different security dilemma to Vietnam. As events unfolded, China did not look like a status quo power. China’s overwhelming naval power and revisionist agenda revealed through incessant assertiveness constitute the main threats to Vietnam’s maritime security. On the other hand, as China was the most important remaining socialist country after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the communist leaders in Vietnam considered socialist solidarity with China as vital to the continuance of their rule. The interlocking and comprehensive character of the Vietnam-China relationship undoubtedly complicates Vietnam’s handling of its existing disputes with China. Therefore, the proper point of departure for reading Vietnam’s behaviour in the South China Sea is the spectrum of strategic choices and preferences in Vietnam about its relations with its powerful neighbour.

A range of strategic choices for a small and medium-sized state to cope with neighbouring big power

Appeasement

Classical realist Thucydides sees the world generally a harsh place where “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” The Melian Dialogue, as documented in Thucydides’s History of the Peloponnesian War, is a popular example of the dilemma that a small state has to face in coping with a big power.¹ E. H. Carr later devises a strategic choice, called appeasement, for small states to avoid the fate of Milos after its refusal to accept the Athenian ultimatum. Calling for aligning foreign policy to reality, he proposes that states should adapt to the changed equilibriums of power by accommodating more powerful discontented adversaries to avoid destruction. The whole idea of Carr’s appeasement policy is that states should adequately give in to the demands of the dictatorial powers to preserve peace rather than engage in unnecessary wars in which they “have nothing to gain and everything to lose.”² Carr asserts that foreign policy making should be based on “the possession of military strength, or rather, on the ratio between the military strength of one’s own country and that of others.”³ Statesmen must be aware that all policy options involve some strategic risk of war. As he argues, Carr is convinced that a farsighted policy maker must “balance the chances, and not pursue a policy which is likely to expose his country to war against equal or superior odds.”⁴ Therefore, “yielding to threats of force is a normal part of the process of peaceful change.”⁵

Carr’s preference for appeasement is based on the assumption that power is the mainstay of international order and morality is merely the product of power. Carr sees the world more in terms of conflict of interests between states that are not satisfied with the status quo and those that benefit from it.⁶ In this vein, Carr considers the utopian view of common interest in peace, justice and international order as the vested interest of the latter, those who wish to maintain the status quo. On the other hand, rising powers, which see the status quo as unjust, tend to resort to force to alter the international order previously imposed on them. Carr states, “So the warmongering of the dissatisfied Powers was the ‘natural, cynical reaction’ to the sentimental and dishonest platitudinizing of the satisfied Powers on the common interest in peace.”⁷ He elaborates on the policy of appeasement as such:

Those who profit most by (international) order can in the longer run only hope to maintain it by making sufficient concessions to make it tolerable to those who profit by it least.⁸

However, Carr’s concept of making concessions to rising powers has two inherent weaknesses. First, it is almost impossible to decide how many concessions would be sufficient to satisfy an adversary. Despite its pragmatic nuance, appeasement is usually associated with fear and weakness. Second, Carr exaggerates the role of relative power and fails take into account the constraints imposed by the international system on states. In practical terms, the failure of British diplomacy vis-à-vis Nazi Germany in the late 1930s has made appeasement a dishonourable foreign policy option.

Bandwagoning versus balancing

Modern structural realists came up with more options, though they still saw the world through a dismal lens. Their central assumption is that a state’s behaviour is primarily structured by the nature of the international system in which they interact with each other and the distribution of capabilities among them. They presuppose that in anarchy, which is the absence of a world government as the ultimate arbiter, all states, whether big or small, see survivability as the ultimate end.⁹ In other words, anarchy is a self-help system in which states, as independent and self-serving actors, tend to compete with each other for superior power or greater security through alliances. In this environment, cooperation among states is possible, but short-lived as they act selfishly to defend their own interests.¹⁰

Though they may be left to their own devices to ensure security in the anarchical system, the outlook for small and medium-sized states is less dismal than Carr might argue. The competition among big powers for supremacy creates a balance of power among great states, which gives small and medium-sized states greater room for manoeuvre. In other words, it is less likely that a small state will be left helpless at the hands of a hostile larger power or a coalition of states. According to leading realist theorists, the offsetting system of rivalry among great powers forces small states to lean to one side.¹¹ As Stephen Walt points out, threats rather than power disparities shape alliance choice. As he argues, the level of threat posed to one state by another can be measured by four factors: aggregate strength, geographical proximity, offensive capabilities and offensive intent.¹² Walt suggests that when facing a major threat to its vital interests, a state has limited options: either balancing, that means “allying with others against prevailing threat,” or bandwagoning, that is “aligning with the principal source of danger.”¹³ Walt’s understanding of balancing and bandwagoning has passive connotations because he assumes that weak states are rather helpless to external pressures. Specifically, Walt believes that the choice between balancing and bandwagoning is dependent on three factors: the degree of power disparity, the availability of allies, and the contextual condition of peace and war. Walt argues that the bigger the power gap, the more likely a state is to bandwagon with rather than balance against ascending power. States are also forced to give in to the greatest threat if balancing options are unavailable. Last but not least, balancing is more tempting in peacetime than in wartime. Based on these premises, Walt holds the conviction that balancing is by far the more usual option than bandwagoning.¹⁴ However, his definition of “bandwagoning” is criticised for the fact that it is no different from “accommodation,” “giving in to the threat” or “appeasement.”¹⁵ As a result, it is difficult to point out cases of bandwagoning as such in reality because the concept is narrowly defined.

In terms of foreign policy making, balancing and bandwagoning are strategies that small and medium-sized states can actively adopt to defend or advance their interest vis-à-vis bigger powers.¹⁶ In this instance, balancing is defined in broader terms as the strategy used by a state to actively join with others through military alliances with the clearly defined purpose of preventing or deterring territorial expansion or military domination by a foreign power or coalition, or to contain a specific threat.¹⁷ Balancing in this regard means augmenting a state’s power through military alliances, if alliance choices are available, to purposefully redress the unfavourable balance of power with the predatory state. Internal arms build-up and mobilisation alone are not necessarily part of balancing, as these measures of a small and medium-sized state may not be sufficient to redress the imbalance of power with threatening great powers.

On the other hand, bandwagoning refers to the strategy where one weaker state decides to defer to or join the coalition led by threatening power with expectation of reciprocation with protection, respect for its autonomy and vital interests, or other political and economic benefits. In this sense, bandwagoning is different from appeasement in the way that the bandwagoning state may have its core interests preserved by agreeing to coordinate its external policies with the threatening power and accepting its leadership in certain areas. No doubt, bandwagoning is only possible if the preeminent power desperately needs friends and allies to preserve or advance its interests against other powers in the system. Randall L. Schweller argues that both balancing and bandwagoning as alliance choices can be motivated not only by fear (security) but also the appetite for opportunistic gains (profit).¹⁸ Both options potentially carry political costs (ceding some measure of foreign policy and military autonomy to allies) and strategic risks (antagonising other powers).

However, balancing and bandwagoning by and large require the clear-cut perception of a significant and imminent threat, or an insatiable predator. Though Walt’s definition of threat appears to be clear-cut and rigid, it fails to reflect the complexity of the post–Cold War world. In normal conditions of international relations, it is not an easy task to assess other states’ aggressive intentions and the calculation of costs and benefits, for either balancing or bandwagoning, are usually complex. In case of uncertainty about the strategic intentions of big powers, small and medium-sized states have less incentive to choose one side at the expense of their relations with others.

Students of mainland Southeast Asian politics indicate that though Southeast Asian countries have concerns over China because of its sheer size, geographical proximity and history of Chinese domination, but they are far from considering China as an imminent threat.¹⁹ As a result, there is still a debate as to which category is best to describe Southeast Asian states’ responses to a rising China. David Kang argues that Asian countries are more likely to bandwagon with China than balance against it.²⁰ Robert Ross argues that Southeast Asian states differ in terms of strategies to deal with China, some deferring to China’s growing power and others, especially those less exposed to China’s military power, are prone to align with the United States to deter China.²¹ Other scholars argue that each Southeast Asian country simultaneously adopts multiple strategies, ranging from engagement, enmeshment, indirect or low-intensity balancing, and hedging, to restrain great powers in East Asia.²²

Hedging

Though expressed in different terms, Southeast Asian postures show a region-wide inclination to adopt a middle-way position between great powers to maximise economic gains and at the same time to reduce strategic risks. This practice of the Southeast Asian states could be termed as “hedging.” Various scholars have used the term before in the context of Southeast Asia and China. According to Evelyn Goh, hedging is a strategy “aimed at avoiding (or planning for contingencies in) a situation in which states cannot decide upon more straightforward alternatives such as balancing, bandwagoning or neutrality.”²³ She adds that small states do not want to lean to one side at the expense of their relationships with other powers. Denny Roy defines hedging as “keeping open more than one strategic option a...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of figures
• Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1 Under the shadow of the Dragon
• 2 Vietnam’s claims in the South China Sea
• 3 Befriending the Dragon, 1986–1995
• 4 ASEANising the South China Sea issue, 1995–2002
• 5 Shaping the regional balance of influence, 2003–2007
• 6 Riding on nationalism, 2007–2009
• 7 Internationalising the South China Sea issue, 2009–2011
• 8 Navigating big power politics, 2011–2015
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index