Cultural Processes and Identity
Visualising Culture: The âTransnational Circuit of Cultureâ
Beginning with the writings of Raymond Williams (1958; 1961), interest in the study of culture in the social sciences and humanities has grown dramatically. This is sometimes called the âcultural turnâ and is characterised by an emphasis on âthe importance of meaning to the definition of cultureâ (Hall, 1997, p. 2). Defining âcultureâ, one of the most prominent figures in contemporary Cultural Studies, Stuart Hall, writes that âculture is not so much a set of things⌠as a process, a set of practicesâ (Hall, 1997, p. 2, emphasis as in original). Thus, culture is the production and exchange of meanings through practices such as ârepresentationâ, âidentityâ, âproductionâ, âconsumptionâ and âregulationâ. As Hall argues, these practices constitute key âmomentsâ in the âcircuit of cultureâ, which suggests that âmeanings are produced at several different sites and circulated through several different processes and practicesâ (Hall, 1997, p. 3).
The âcultural turnâ may also be seen as a critical intervention in a subject area which, for a long time, was reserved for anthropology. This corresponds with a growing dissatisfaction among socio-cultural anthropologists with the traditional definition of culture as âa highly patterned and consistent set of representations (or beliefs) that constitute a peopleâs perception of reality and that get reproduced relatively intact across generations through enculturationâ (Fox and King, 2002, p. 1).
The understanding of culture as a process for the production and circulation of meanings brings into focus a cognitive aspect of cultural processes. Social researchers are especially concerned about the discursive formation of cultural processes as âways of referring to and constructing knowledge about a particular topic of practiceâ (Hall, 1997, p. 6). In socio-cultural anthropology, the discursive construction of cultural practices has been acknowledged in the extensive critical writing on the challenges posed by post-colonialism, modernity and globalisation to the traditional understanding of, and approaches to, culture within the discipline (see for example Appadurai, 1996; Clifford, 1988; 1997; Gupta and Ferguson, 1992; 1997; Hannerz, 1996; Marcus, 1995; 1997; Marcus and Fischer, 1986; Staring et al., 1997).
Anthropological research has been primarily concerned with the everyday practices of people in whom cognition is often understood to be inseparable from the actions of individuals in the society. Thus, Katherine Verdery defines culture as âworlds of meaningsâ which, in her opinion, are âbeliefs and ideas materialised in actionâ (1999, p. 34). Verdery provides a highly explicit definition of what she means by a âworld of meaningâ when she writes:
âWorldâ ⌠seeks to capture a combination of âworldviewâ and associated action-in-the-world, peopleâs sense of a meaningful universe in which they also act. Their ideas and their action constantly influence one another in a dynamic way.
(Verdery, 1999, p. 34)
Thus, by using the expression âcultural processesâ in this book, I want to indicate my understanding of âcultureâ as a process of producing and reproducing meanings through and within peopleâs actions. This implies that discourses and practices intersect and affect each other in many different ways: in a world full of meanings, people act in accordance with their understanding of this world. At the same time, the meanings of peopleâs actions are produced, changed, exchanged and reproduced in the course of their interactions, in other words, through the âcircuit of cultureâ.
A theoretical framework of this book thus develops from a synthesis of key approaches to culture in Cultural Studies and socio-cultural anthropology. I am drawing together Cultural Studiesâ concern with the cognitive aspect, or meaning-making properties, of the circuit of culture and the anthropological notion of practice as the ideas and beliefs enacted in everyday life. I also argue that involvement in transnational migration directly and indirectly affects the practices and meanings of âeverydaynessâ among the Russian Greeks in their home communities. The âtransnational circuit of cultureâ is proposed as a concept explaining the social and cultural processes among the group in question. This âtransnational circuit of cultureâ is characterised by agentsâ involvement in the geographically distant and culturally different locales in which they operate through their participation in the global circulation of people, ideas, goods and capital.
The conception of the âtransnational circuit of cultureâ provides a model for an analysis of cultural and social practices in the community in question. It also permits an analysis of the cultural production of identity as part of a broader social process. Identity is already present in the âcircuit of cultureâ as one of its key elements. Being a part of the meaning-making process, identity is both a product of the circulation of meanings and a process of the production and exchange of meanings between members of a society. In the book, I focus on the meanings of Pontic Greek identities in relation to, and in the context of, the diverse practices through and within which these meanings are generated and reproduced. These practices include some which relate to the regulation, production, consumption and representation of meanings. To a certain extent, the notion of the âcircuit of cultureâ constitutes the meta-structure of this book, and the chapters which follow demonstrate how the social and cultural identities of Russian Greeks are produced, regulated, consumed and represented within the transnational circuit. At the same time, the concept of a âtransnational circuit of cultureâ is employed as a very broad model for the theory which explains the social and cultural processes under consideration, while, as has been explained in the bookâs Introduction, a more inductive approach is applied in interpreting the ethnographic data. This allows theoretical generalisations about the cultural production of identity to be grounded in the context of the particular practices of the social actors considered.
The focus on practices as driving moments of cultural production implies the importance of an individualâs actions for cultural processes. As a result, more attention needs to be paid to the role of social agency in the âcircuit of cultureâ.
Theory of Practice: Structure, Agency and the Cultural Production of Identity
The recent interest of social researchers in agency may be partly explained by a general trend in the social science disciplines to overcome their earlier emphasis on structure, system and social determinism (Hannerz, 1996, p. 22). For instance, in the anthropological tradition, where the sociocentric understanding of culture as a domain of social structure was developed on the assumption that territory, culture and people are closely related (see below), little interest was paid in analyses to the role of agency in the production of culture (Hannerz, 1996, p. 22).
Several theoretical attempts have been made to redirect the focus of the social sciences towards an individualâs actions by challenging the opposition of structure and agency. Giddensâ (1984) theory of structuration, for example, suggests that the nature of the social system may be understood by investigating the production, reproduction and transformation of structures across time and space by knowledgeable actors who are drawing on rules and resources contained within the system. Hannerz (1996, p. 22), for his part, proposes the notion of âhabitats of meaningâ as a useful device for cultural analysis, expanding the theoretical understanding of culture as âworlds of meaningâ by adapting Baumanâs idea that agency should combine, not with system, but with a flexible sense of habitat in which âagency operates and which it also producesâ. Many such theoretical attempts âto bring human beings back inâ to social research reflect the thought-provoking concept of habitus which has been developed in Bourdieuâs theory of practice (Fowler, 2001, p. 321).
According to Pierre Bourdieu (1992), habitus is the system of the durable, transposable dispositions of actors. Habitus is also an âobjective relation between practices and situation that produces meaning through categories of perception and appreciation that are themselves social productsâ (cited from Bottomley, 1992, p. 13). Structure itself is the structure of the consequences of human practices. In this respect, the relationship between structure and agency is mutually congruent and dialectic: social structures are reproduced only within and through actorsâ everyday practices, while, at the same time, these practices are strategic actions orientated towards a goal which is determined by the structural dispositions and positions of actors. Hence, social structures are embodied and encoded in the actorâs habitus (Bourdieu, 1992, pp. 52â6).
Describing the structural resources which are used, accumulated and reproduced by actors in their actions âobjectively oriented towards a goalâ (cited from Wodak et al., 1999, p. 32), Bourdieu uses the economic metaphor of âcapitalâ (economic, cultural, social, symbolic âcapitalâ). Social space is structured by the ways in which the various forms of âcapitalâ are distributed, which are capable of conferring strength, power and consequently profit on their holder (cited from Skeggs, 1997, p. 8).
The notion of habitus allows us to introduce everyday practices as the strategic actions of social agents into the focus of our analysis of cultural processes. On the one hand, this explains how structural elements of culture are reproduced and changed by agents and, on the other, it shows that agentsâ behaviour, emotional attitudes and cognition become dynamic moments in social structures.
The theory of practice has been reflected in studies of identity, notably in works which examine the reproduction of ethnic and national identity through collective and individual practices as an interplay between structure and agency (Karakasidou, 2000; Papadakis, 1998; Wodak et al., 1999). Nations (as well as ethnic groups) act both as dominant value systems and as practices. Hence, the appropriation of national identity by individuals indicates their sense of habitus (Karakasidou, 2000, p. 423). The identities of individual actors are manifested in their practices (including their discursive practices of representation), while they act strategically in order to achieve particular practical outcomes (Wodak et al., 1999, pp. 29â32).
I apply the theory of practice as a conceptual framework to explain how the social and cultural identities of Greeks are produced through the practices of individual actors as they deal with such structural elements of the social process as the state, market, regional citizenship regimes, the local community network, family and kinship structures, and so on. Such an approach makes it possible to show the influence which structure has on agency, since social practices are shaped and constrained by agentsâ dispositions; however, it also illustrates the reality of individual strategies through which identities are represented, manifested and reproduced.
Thus, from the vantage point of the theory of practice, the production of identity is seen as a dialectic process of internalising and reproducing social structures through individual actions. This makes identity the site of an interplay between structure and agency, discourse and practices, ideology and subjectivity and also brings a dynamic aspect to the view of identity as a process of identification.
Identification: The Discursive Construction of Identity and the âOtherâ
Being a part of the meaning-making process, identity itself is conceived as a process of identification, because, as a process, social identification implies both structure, which involves the dispositions and positions of social agents, and the agents themselves who âdo the identifyingâ. Since agents act strategically in a given situation and their habitus, identification is also situational and contextual. Thus, some scholars see the concept of âidentificationâ as a way to escape the âreifying connotationsâ suggested by the term âidentityâ (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000, p. 14). The process of identification takes place in broader historical, political and cultural contexts, suggesting that individual identity is affected by practices and discourses which are external to the individual and which change over time. Therefore, identities are also subject to change and negotiation.
Since culture involves the production of meanings which are expressed, represented and exchanged through and within language and other discursive practices (Hall, 1997, p. 4), identification is a process of the discursive construction of meanings of the âselfâ. This also suggests the notion of identification as a psychological process of the construction of âselfâ which involves the conscious and unconscious experiences of the subjectâs position (in relation to sexuality, gender, race and ethnicity) (Elliott, 2001, p. 9). For Hall (2000, pp. 5â6), this interface between the psychological âinsideâ and the discursive âoutsideâ constitutes the central idea of identity. Hall also argues that the process of identification is never absolutely stable but articulated through the relationship with the âotherâ. Identities are primarily not the product of something deep inside individuals, but come about in consequence of the ways in which others have recognised them (Hall, 1996b, p. 345).
Through the process of identification, people are positioned and position themselves in relation to the âotherâ. Since culture is a process of constant change and of the (re-)production of social structures through agentsâ practices, identity is produced and changed in the course of these discursive practices. Hence, identity is a discursive construction which emerges in the dialogic relationship with âothersâ through representation of the differences between the âselfâ and the âotherâ.
The idea that the relationship of the âotherâ is important for the construction of the âselfâ is also central to a psychoanalytic conception of identity and was particularly developed in the work of Jacques Lacan. According to Lacanian psychoanalysis, identity starts developing at âthe mirror phaseâ when the infant recognises him / herself through the image of the mother which acts as the âotherâ (Lacan, 2000, p. 45). Lacan followed classic Freudian theory in his emphasis on the child-mother dyad. At the same time, he introduced the notion of the âsymbolic orderâ or language, which is also âthe domain of human law and cultureâ (Barker and Galasinski, 2001, p. 32), as a site of the âcultural mediationâ of libidinal normalisation. This suggests that it is language that imposes the structure of the subject position which forms the basis for making the articulation of identity possible (Lacan, 2000, p. 48). In Lacanâs account, identity is developed through and within language, or discourse as a symbolic reflection of the relationship with the âotherâ.
This âLacanian discoveryâ of the critical role which the âotherâ plays in the discursive construction of the subject was further elaborated in Louis Althusserâs writings on ideology (Althusser, 1993b, p. 161). Althusser argues that ideology, which is a discourse, recruits its subjects through the practice of âinterpellationâ â that is, their recognition by ideology and within ideology (Althusser, 1993a, pp. 49â53). Therefore, the process of interpellation is critical for the existence of ideology, since it ensures the functioning and reproduction of ideology through the subjects of that ideology. The individual is an abstract concept until he / she is recognised by others who function both in accordance with a certain ideology and as an ideology. So the individual becomes the subject, because he / she is recognised as a subject by the âotherâ. Thus, according to Althusserâs theory of interpellation, ideology, or discourse, acts as the âotherâ in the process of identifying the individual. Or, in other words, identification is a transformative process of âan interchange between self and structureâ (Rutherford, 1990, p. 14).
This idea of the construction of the subject by and within the discourses of power receives further development in Michel Foucaultâs (2000) study of the genealogy of âtechniques of the selfâ. According to Foucault, the individual is formed by regulatory power in the way in which he or she establishes relations to the rule of conduct (or discourses of power) and sees him / herself as obliged to put this rule into practice (Foucault, 2000, p. 366). Hence, discourses are internalised by individuals as a regulatory and normative means of self-formation. Following Foucaultâs argument, Judith Butler (1993) suggests that identities operate through the discursive âproduction of âoutsideââ (cited from Hall, 2000, p. 15). Thus, the âotherâ is outside as well as inside the âselfâ, because the individual can identify him / herself only through his / her own perception of difference from the âotherâ. This knowledge of differences is a product of the regulatory power which shapes the identity of the individual as a historically and culturally determined subject and which is reproduced through agentsâ practices.
The theoretical framework for the study of identity as a cultural phenomenon is complex. As one of the key moments of the circuit of culture, identity is both a product of the circulation of meanings and a process of producing and exchanging meanings. Identity is also seen as a site where the process of the internalisation and reproduction of social structures through individual actions takes place. In the course of the agentsâ discursive practices, social identities are constructed which represent âselfâ through differences from the âotherâ. This dialogic relationship with the âotherâ constitutes the core of the identification process. Thus, paraphrasin...