Reassessing Security in the South Caucasus

Regional Conflicts and Transformation

Annie Jafalian

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781138277151
• eBook ISBN: 9781317070719
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Geopolitics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Lying on the periphery of Europe, Russia, Turkey and Iran, and also being of interest to the United States, the South Caucasus is receiving growing attention among decision-makers and scholars of international relations. From a European perspective, the region is now forming a neighbouring area at the border of the Black Sea, as well as a corridor of oil and gas imports whose stability has become part of European security itself. As such, this volume reassesses security in the South Caucasus. It makes it possible to update analysis on security interests, perceptions and policies at national, regional and international levels through cross-national studies. Aimed at highlighting long-term defence and security trends in the region, contributors re-examine their relevance and enduring impact. They also identify changing dynamics under recent geopolitical and political developments in and around the region such as: the enlargements of NATO, the August 2008 Russia-Georgia war, the creation of the EU Eastern Partnership or Presidential elections. One of this volume's distinct contributions is that chapters have been written by experts from inside and around the region, i.e. Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Turkey, with other important contributions provided by authors from France and Canada having extensive experience in the area. Students and scholars of post-Soviet states, Eurasian geopolitics and European Security will find this volume enlightening.

PART I
Risks, Threats and Conflict
Settlement

Chapter 1
Georgia-Russia Conflict in August 2008: War as a Continuation of Politics

Thornike Gordadze

At the beginning of the 19th century, Karl von Clausewitz wrote that war was a continuation of politics by other means. The 2008 Russian-Georgian war fully corroborates this hypothesis. Renewed hostilities, which lasted for only a few days, were just one episode in the Russian-Georgian confrontation that began long before August 2008 and may still have a long way to go. The conflict between Russia and Georgia dates back at least to Georgia’s independence and the fall of the Soviet Union. Strikingly, very few analysts of the war in 2008 have recalled that in the early 1990s the wars in Abkhazia and South Ossetia already opposed Georgia and Russia, even if the latter then did not prove to be a conflicting party as clearly as during the last war, preferring large scale support to the secessionists and engaging its regular military forces only in some, albeit decisive occasions.

The Russian-Georgian Conflict: From Independence to the “Rose Revolution”

In January 1992, Georgia’s President Zviad Gamsakhurdia, a nationalist leader with a clear anti-Russian/imperial agenda, was overthrown, amidst almost total indifference by the West.1 Once the shock of disintegration was over, both Georgia and Russia returned to their classical national projects: state-building for the first and restoration of its empire or sphere of influence for the second. Quite logically, their interests clashed again. Eduard Shevardnadze’s regime, allegedly loyal to Moscow, turned out to be as committed as its predecessor to Georgia’s independence and sovereignty. For the sake of Russian hegemony, his regime was to be punished in its own turn. Clearly, there was no serious political force in Georgia submissive enough to surrender its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Admittedly, it would be inaccurate to consider that Russia was unilaterally initiating all of these processes. At the beginning of 1990s, Russia was facing violent internal turmoil and thereby most often reacting to events inside Georgia. Nevertheless, the Kremlin never remained unresponsive, as these events could be instrumental in maintaining its special influence outside of national borders. Ethnic tensions in the region were indeed likely to arise, but without Russian involvement, their intensity and outcome would have probably been radically different.

Georgia’s Forced Integration into Russia’s Sphere of Influence

In the first years following Gamsakhurdia’s removal from the presidency, Shevardnadze was believed to be firmly tied to Russia because of his past experience in Soviet times. The peace agreement on South Ossetia that he signed in June 1992 in Dagomys with Boris Yeltsin reinforced this commonly held view. According to the provisions of the agreement, Georgian forces, which were holding a dominant position in Tskhinvali and blockading the secessionist stronghold, were called to retreat and join Russian-Georgian-Ossetian peacekeeping battalions to patrol the conflict zone. The agreement was clearly profitable for Russia and turned out to be rather negative for Georgia.2

Western interest in the region was very limited compared to the weakened, but still very present Russia. Posterior claims by Russian officials and some Russian and Western analysts that Russia suffered a “severe humiliation” from the West in the early 1990s do not stand any serious analysis. Taking into consideration only the Caucasus, the events demonstrate that the West accepted almost everything Russia undertook in the region in the name of stability. At the time, the West markedly lacked willingness to get involved and the American presence was very limited in the region. George Bush Senior’s administration approved and even welcomed the creation of the CIS – which, from the very beginning, was defined by Russia as a zone of special interest.3 Moscow, which had a total freedom of manoeuvre during the Abkhaz and Karabakh wars, was the only international actor involved and did not face any serious condemnation from Western countries. The West did not really level criticism at Russia’s role in ethnic cleansing and massive killings in Abkhazia, which were committed in 1992-1993 either by Russian citizens involved as “volunteers” or by Abkhaz secessionists directly armed and trained by the Russian military.

In April 1993, speaking to the Georgian parliament, Shevardnadze had to recognise that Georgia was facing Russia in Abkhazia. In fact, the conflict in Abkhazia and Russia’s growing involvement against Georgia had definitely nullified the hopes of partnership-like relations between the two countries. Georgian society’s mistrust towards Russia has even been reinforced compared with the Gamsakhurdia period. The final attack on Sukhumi, Abkhazia’s capital which was held by troops loyal to the government of Georgia was planned and executed by regular Russian army officers in violation of the Sochi ceasefire signed on 27 July 1992.

At the end of the Abkhazian War, Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev declared at the UN General Assembly: “Russia realises that no international organisation or group of states can replace our peacekeeping efforts in this specific post-Soviet space”.4 This was a clear indication that Russia’s priority was again, after some period of hesitation, to restore its hegemony in the post-Soviet space. Lacking resources and facing internal chaos, Russia could implement its new doctrine only by insisting on maintaining its military bases and by supporting separatist movements, especially those which were active in the less loyal neighbouring countries such as Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan and to some extent – Ukraine. Moscow’s support was not aimed at the independence of the rebellious provinces. By trying to become the unique “peacekeeper” in the conflicts it has itself greatly fuelled, Russia’s objective was to establish its supremacy over the independent-minded states and to prevent them from getting closer to the West. Thus, the strategy of “peace-keeping” in the post-Soviet space became a neo-byzantine version of “peace keeping”. Paradoxically, even cynically, the very Russian troops which had been involved in the conflicts became “guarantors of peace”, in other words both judge and jury at once. No single international actor has tried to prevent such a process; on the contrary, the UN (in the case of Abkhazia) and the OSCE (in the case of South Ossetia) de facto endorsed Russia’s new role. A relatively small effort by today’s standards from the international community would have deterred weak Russia, which was highly dependent on international money transfers at this time.5

Georgia became the most striking example of Russia’s new policy of involvement in the post-Soviet space. Already at the beginning of the 1990s and partly because of its rather radical and not always realistic approach to regional politics, Georgia was chosen as a show-case of Russia’s ambition to stay the unique decision maker in the area.

The military defeat in Abkhazia has resulted in a nearly total failure of Georgian statehood. At the end of 1993, Georgia had to bitterly accept Russian conditions for peace. Georgia entered the CIS on 21 October, despite fierce debate in the Georgian parliament, and even joined on 3 February the CSTO – a regional security organisation dominated by Russia that looked like a new version of the Warsaw Pact, but on a rather modest CIS level. Shevardnadze had to sign a military agreement with Russia on “the status of the Russian troops in Georgia”, according to which Russia was to maintain four military bases in Vaziani (close to Tbilisi), Akhalkalaki (in southern Georgia), Batumi and Gudauta (in Abkhazia), in addition to the headquarters of the Transcaucasus Military District in Tbilisi and the Border-Guards along the Turkish frontier. A treaty on Friendship and Cooperation sealing a de facto protectorate was solemnly signed by Yeltsin and Shevardnadze on 4 February 1994. Regarding Abkhazia, Georgians had to endorse a humiliating “joint appeal” together with Russia to the Council of the Heads of States of the CIS to send a peace-keeping force to Abkhazia. Two months later, in April 1994, the Georgian and Abkhaz sides signed the Moscow peace agreement, entrusting the Russian Federation with the mandate of peacekeeping. The agreement also implied the return of more than 250,000 Georgian IDP’s to their homes, a point which has never been implemented.

The consequences of Georgia’s subjugation to Russia had a very negative impact on the timid cooperation between Georgia and the West. Humanitarian and financial aid was the only area of cooperation that Georgia was allowed to develop with the West. Russia jealously supervised every move of Georgian law-enforcement and security forces and their eventual links with their Western counterparts.6 Vardiko Nadibaidze, a Russian army general of Georgian origin, deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Transcaucasus Military District, was appointed as Defence Minister of Georgia in February 1994,7 while Igor Giorgadze – an experienced KGB officer and veteran of the Afghan war, became the Minister of State Security and grew in influence.8 Shota Kviraya was the third Russian protégé to advance his carrier, taking office as Minister of Interior. Not a single move was made for several years to move closer to NATO. But despite such “good conduct”, Georgia did not benefit in terms of restoration of its territorial integrity.

Georgia tried even harder to gain Russia’s benevolence in order to resolve its primary problem: territorial integrity. But Russia had no clear intention to abandon Abkhazia for various, mainly domestic, political reasons; blunt anti-Western nationalism was gaining momentum and the political leadership was not inclined to defy the military, which was emotionally and economically inclined to keep Abkhazia under their firm control. Shevardnadze publicly endorsed the Russian invasion of Chechnya in December 1994 and authorised Russian military jets to fly over Georgian territory, hoping that Russia, confronted by its own ethnic separatism, would become more accommodating with Georgia. Georgian leadership believed that an active involvement of Chechens in favour of the Abkhaz secession was going to influence Russia’s position on Abkhazia.

As early as in 1995, Shevardnadze realised that Russian internal and external politics was not going to leave him any chance for a profitable partnership with Moscow. He was increasingly viewed as one of the main gravediggers of the Soviet Union – an unforgivable sin for the Russian political elite. A quasi vassal relationship did not bring any sizable benefit to Georgia. On the contrary, Russia kept trying to weaken Tbilisi by continuously supporting the secessionists and attempting to de-sovereignise the Georgian state. New centrifugal tendencies, partly fuelled by Russia, appeared in Adjara and in Armenian-populated Javakheti, which even reinforced the Georgian state’s fragility.

Georgia’s Progressive Move to the West

In this context, Georgia could only welcome a slow, but irreversible awakening of Western countries in general and of the US in particular. The 1993-1994 Pax Russica in the Caucasus acted as a cold shower for decision makers in Washington, who were well aware of the strategic importance of the Caucasus region, as well as of the energy resources located in the Caspian Sea and Central Asian republics. These resources, which were underexploited at the end of the Soviet era, have raised much attention after the disintegration of the USSR, and the US was prompt in promoting the idea of a new East-West energy corridor by-passing Russia. It was consequently highly interested in the independence and stability of the countries situated between Turkey and China’s Western frontier.

Shevardnadze clearly understood this opening window of opportunity. Although he had his hands tied by militias and Russian security services, he cautiously started his move towards emancipation vis-à-vis Russian tutorial system. Thus, he started to promote, inside the ruling party, that is, “Citizens Union of Georgia” (CUG), a group of young and promising Western educated politicians who, within a few years, became the most active and visible faction of the party. He also got himself surrounded by some overtly pro-occidental advisors and initiated the formation of parallel (competing) security services. This was the case, for instance, of the Presidential Guard, trained by American specialists.9

The failed terrorist act against Shevardnadze on 29 August 1995 served as a major turning point. Shevardnadze had already had a new constitution adopted, giving to the presidency more substantial powers compared to the parliament, which was traditionally dominated by nationalists. He took considerable moral benefit from the terrorist attack and, for the first time, directly pointed “at some obscure forces in Russia”10 who aimed at destabilising the country and jeopardising ongoing energy projects.11 Igor Giorgadze, who was a prime suspect in the case, quickly left the country on a specially chartered Russian jet, whereas Jaba Ioseliani, the leader of Mkhedrioni, was arrested and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. A few months earlier, another former Shevardnadze ally, Tengiz Kitovani, was arrested on his way to Abkhazia, accompanied by a few hundreds armed followers and a Russian colonel. The objectives of Kitovani’s march were unclear, but the manoeuvre was probably supposed to draw Georgia into a new trap of instability, ruling out the prospect of recovering control over Abkhazia.

American involvement in the Caucasus became more active with the BTC pipeline project, which was harshly criticised by Russia, but also by some Western experts who viewed it as a politically driven project essentially aimed at damaging Russia’s influence and reinforcing the US position in the region. At the end of the 1990s, discussions were focussed on the lack of sufficient volumes of oil in the Caspian Sea, raising doubts about the economic viability of the BTC. The events which followed have shown that critics were not less politically motivated. Turkey also played a role as important as the US in supporting the idea of a pipeline going from the Caspian to Western markets via its own territory. Turkish President Süleyman Demirel brought up the idea as early as in spring 1992 and the first memorandums were signed in Ankara on 9 March 1993, in the midst of the Abkhaz and Karabakh wars. Final agreements were signed in Turkey too, in Ankara and in Istanbul, respectively in October and November 1998. As a result, the independence of Georgia (and Azerbaijan) vis-à-vis Russia became as crucial for Turkey as for the US.12

Nevertheless, Shevardnadze’s pro-Western move was far from a linear process and free from hindrance. Stabilisation of Georgia was seriously challenged when Shevardnadze became the target of another terrorist attack in February 1998. All fingers again pointed at Russia. A few months later, in October 1998, a military mutiny took place, with the rioters from the National Guard clearly awaiting instructions from Moscow. Provocations were regularly taking place in Javakheti13 and Adjara. Additionally, attempts to draw Georgia into a new Abkhaz trap continued, as demonstrated by the conflict in Gali in May 1998.14 Georgian authorities received guarantees over the possible recovery of the Gali region, but were eventually mislead.15

During the second Chechen war, that started short after Vladimir Putin was appointed Prime...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of Figures, Tables and Maps
• List of Abbreviations
• List of Contributors
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• PART I RISKS, THREATS AND CONFLICT SETTLEMENT
• PART II COOPERATION WITH REGIONAL NEIGHBOURS: TOWARD A NEW BALANCE?
• PART III INTEGRATION INTO THE EURASIAN COMMUNITY: TAKING STOCK
• Conclusion
• Index