Secret Subversion I

Mou Zongsan, Kant, and Early Confucianism

Tang Wenming

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781351242233
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Ancient & Classical Philosophy

Mou Zongsan (1909–1995), one of the representatives of Modern Confucianism, belongs to the most important Chinese philosophers of the twentieth century. From a more traditional Confucian perspective, this book makes a critical analysis on Mou's "moral metaphysics, " mainly his thoughts about Confucian ethos.

The author observes that Mou simplifies Confucian ethos rooted in various and specific environments, making them equal to modern ethics, which is a subversion of the ethical order of life advocated by traditional Confucianism. The author believes, also, that Mou has twisted Confucian ethos systematically by introducing Kant's concept of autonomy into the interpretation of Confucian thoughts.

Scholars and students in Chinese philosophy, especially those in Confucian studies, will be attracted by this book. Also, it will appeal to readers interested in comparative philosophy.

Part I

The reduction of morality

Abstract: Part I criticizes the reduction of Confucianism caused by understanding the core of Confucianism in terms of Kantian modern moral concepts, led by Mou Zongsan.

1Autonomy and altruism

On the moralistic interpretation of Confucian thought

Since modern times, the essential feature of Confucianism seems to be depicted by the term “moralism.” Both thinkers openly bowing to Confucian thought and researchers with a critical approach to Confucianism seem to share an epistemological belief, i.e., identifying morality as a remarkable feature of Confucianism. This viewpoint not only can be confirmed with modern scholars of Neo-Confucianism, such as Xiong Shili, Liang Shuming, Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan and Xu Fuguan, but is also acknowledged by most researchers who hold critical views of Confucianism. For example, a viewpoint that probably originated from Jesuit missionaries maintains that Confucianism is either ethics or moral philosophy, and the core of this viewpoint is that the fundamental aim of Confucianism lies in morality.

Then, how to accurately understand the connotation of moralism? Because of the polysemic nature of the word “morality,” we first need to clarify the cultural and essential content carried and conveyed in the modern sense of “morality.” From a structural point of view, the fundamental feature of morality is nothing but a rational autonomy, especially compared with obedience-oriented religious belief. However, what we need to explain is, such a viewpoint is a purely modern idea started by Kant. In Chinese classical literature, dao (道) and de (德) are fundamental and originary notions, while dao and de connected and used as daode (道德, “morality”) is a relatively late notion. The use of daode by modern Chinese academia can be traced back to two long-standing conceptions in Chinese classical literature: dao and de were used in combination by Japanese scholars to translate “morality” from Western languages. From an etymological point of view, “morality” has an affinity with the Latin word mores (custom). In the Western ancient theoretical discourse, the foundation of morality was often attributed to nature or God, or the combination of both. For example, Aristotle maintained that natural teleology is the basis of ethics, while in the Judeo-Christian tradition moral commandments are given by God. We also know that with the development of Christian theology, theodicy has formed on the premises of natural teleology, which is especially evident concerning ethical issues, for example the relationship between the theological virtues rooted in God (faith, hope and charity) and the natural virtues rooted in nature (wisdom, courage, temperance and justice) discussed by Thomas Aquinas.

In the Age of Enlightenment, Immanuel Kant advocated the authority of reason within the moral issue, and he explained morality as a natural matter of practical reason, by adopting the concept of autonomy proposed by Rousseau in the field of political philosophy, thus relating the foundation of morality from nature or from God to reason. According to Kant’s view, morality has to be considered as an independent and self-sufficient value. Since goodwill is a thing-in-itself, to act out of goodwill epitomizes the highest good, and best exemplifies the moral value. In order to defend the purity of moral value, Kant employed a rigorous formalistic argumentation, but it does not mean that Kant’s moral concept lacks substantial connotation. If autonomy is considered as the formal standard of moral value, then altruism should be the substantial standard of moral value. Whether we resort to moral emotion or goodwill, or whether we adopt deontology or consequentialism, altruism is in fact one of the core meanings of modern morality. In this regard, Nietzsche claimed that, according to the prevailing practice of modern morality, “the essential characteristic of moral conduct is selflessness, self-sacrifice, sympathy or compassion.”¹ The altruistic tendency of morality can sometimes be reflected by the universality appeal of moral views; it could be the universality of righteousness and sense of justice or even the universality of utility: the altruistic tendency is always a substantial element of moral value. In other words, an opinion will not be credited as directly connected to moral value if it does not consciously or unconsciously contain this altruistic tendency. Morality is always related to the altruistic tendency, which claimed to be self-oriented and refuses to be based on anything else, regardless of any theoretical forms. By connecting the formal standard and the substantial standard, we can then summarize the Kantian statement on the modern notion of morality as a pure and voluntary altruistic tendency.

Confucianism’s explanation of moralism has prevailed since modern times. In general, given such a moralistic explanation, the ethical spirit carried by Confucianism is then described as a pure and voluntary altruistic tendency. Separately speaking, moralism is interpreted to understand the Confucian ethical spirit as a formal autonomy and essential altruism. As for the autonomy, when discussing Confucianism, the substitution of religion with morality, Liang Shuming advocated that:

morality is a matter of reason and relies on self-aware autonomy. Religion is a matter of belief and lies in believers’ obedience to precepts. Influenced by this opinion, China has been replacing religion with morality since Confucius. This is exactly the opposite of the nature of religion, that is, placing one’s trust in others instead of oneself, and relying on others rather than claiming self-sufficiency.²

The main reason for Xu Fuguan to regard the concern-consciousness as moral conscience is that “the concern-consciousness is a manifestation of the human mind beginning to bear direct responsibility for what has happened, i.e., humans start to have self-conscious thoughts.”³ Besides, in Mou Zongsan’s system of thought focused on “moral metaphysics,” Kant’s autonomy has great importance, and we are also very familiar with Mou’s view. As for altruism, although Confucius claimed that “people in old times learned to improve themselves, but people at present learn to please others,” both Confucius’ “benevolence” and Mencius’ “sense of compassion,” and his theory of the goodness of human nature, are always reductively interpreted as a pure and voluntary altruistic tendency. Based on this premise, wei ji zhi xue (为己之学, “learning for oneself”) is understood as morally pure and voluntary, i.e., a person actively and voluntarily does things for others. Here we can explain the willingness of a person according to the principle of autonomy. Moreover, since this moral ego is essentially, actively and voluntarily oriented to others, this altruistic feature can be recognized as its true nature. Similarly, in this context, Mencius said that “The principle of what is right and the sense of justice are agreeable to my mind, as the flesh of grass- and grain-fed animals is agreeable to my mouth.” The “principle of what is right” and the “sense of justice” are radically regarded as a pure and voluntary altruistic tendency, and “my own heart-mind” is pleased when putting those principles into practice. I am willing to do things for others, or as Schiller said, I have “love for moral obligation.”

In the recent theoretical tradition of Neo-Confucianism, Mou Zongsan’s “moral metaphysics” is the highest achievement related to the moralistic interpretation of Confucianism. Conscience is seen as an innate moral emotion or goodwill, i.e., a transcendental moral substance. At the same time, it is a transcendental moral subject, namely the pure highest good as noumenal essence. Here “goodness” can only be explained in a moral sense, i.e., “goodness for others” rather than “what is good for oneself” beyond moral sense. Although some scholars used all kinds of reasons to oppose Mou’s “moral metaphysics,” none of them objected to the interpretation of Confucianism according to the category of moralism, especially in terms of its substantial spiritual aim. It seems that a wide consensus has been reached in academia, resulting in a self-explanatory common view that needs no further discussion. After all, who would object to the concept of “goodness”? We can say with certainty that the moralistic interpretation of Confucianism, through its current absolute position, dictates our intellectual and spiritual world. However, we must realize that moralism is sometimes mistakenly understood. For example, Nietzsche questioned this partial view on modern moralism using his genealogical method: is the current morality a sign of “the weariness, the distress, and the decline of life,” or is it “an indication of the energy, the power, and the will of life, revealing the courage, the certainty, and the future of life?”⁴ In his view, the moral understanding of ego undoubtedly lies on the premise of nihilism, and it includes depreciation of man’s noble quality. It claims the absolutely worthless value of the ego and life, and even belittles humans to the level of animals. Therefore, for individuals, moralism is a sign of a decadent life, and insane striving for morality is merely used to conceal the poverty of life. For a nation, moralism causes cultural septicemia that will destroy the national spirit; thus, it does not deserve to be and is unlikely to be a nation’s cultural life. If we consider Nietzsche’s critical rational standpoint towards modern moralism, we should recognize that it poses a challenge to the unquestioned and widely accepted interpretation of the moralistic tendency of Confucianism. For those who support a moralistic understanding of Confucianism, the central problem lies in the fact that, on the one hand, they cannot consider or are not willing to admit the misuse of the moralistic tendency and, on the other hand, they lack a necessary reflection on the reductive trend to conceive of moralism as the fundamental spiritual aim of Confucianism.

Notes

1Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. by Walter Kaufmann (Random House, 1974), p. 284. 2Liang Shuming, The Substance of Chinese Culture (Xuelin Publishing, 1987), p. 106. 3Xu Fuguan, History of Human Nature in China: The Pre-Qin Period (Shanghai Joint Publishing, 2001), p. 19. 4Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, trans. by Walter Kaufmann and Reginald J. Hollingdale (Random House, 1967), Preface, p. 17.

2Do the Zhou people’s concern-consciousness and respect for virtue constitute a moral breakthrough?

One of the most important contributions made by modern New Confucians, including Mou Zongsan, to describing the moralistic character of Confucianism, consists in claiming a close connection between the origin of Confucianism and the concern-consciousness of the Zhou people, thus relating this consciousness to a kind of moral conscience. Xu Fuguan pointed out that, in Chinese culture, concern-consciousness is crucial for the development from the primitive religion of the Yin and Zhou dynasties to morality. Hence, the Zhou people’s concern-consciousness should be interpreted as an “awakening of the humanistic spirit” instead of some kind of “primitive religious motivation.” Thus, what this awakening of the humanistic spirit reveals are the spiritual self-awareness, the consciousness and responsibility of the subject rather than the fear and desperation of the primitive religious motivation:

Concern-consciousness is different from the fear and the desperation peculiar to the primitive religion motivation. In the middle of fear and desperation, people usually feel extremely insignificant, so they give up their duties and make decisions relying on a deity’s will. The action is then carried out following the divine will. As for the man himself, this also means that the action deprives him of his own decision and rationality. It may be said, this kind of action is blindly made, without proper moral evaluation. […] The greatest difference between concern, and fear and desperation, is that the formation of this mental state results from a perspective based on a deep concern of the participants for the auspicious or bad situations, and for success or misfortune. In this perspective, we can see that there is a close relationship between the auspicious or bad situation, the success or misfortune, and who is involved in the activities related to that situation. Moreover, who is involved in that activity is also responsible for the related action. Concern for those people is a mental state related to the unsolved situation of solving the difficulties by their own, and their efforts derive from such a sense of duty. Therefore, concern-consciousness is the direct expression of the sense of responsibility towards things originated by this awakening of humanistic spirit, or in other words, it is the expression of human self-awareness, which shows itself thanks to the awakening of humanistic spirit.¹

From Xu Fuguan’s perspective, the feature of concern-consciousness highlights the moral obligation of the people involved. In the middle of the fear and desperation of the primitive religious motivation, such a sense of moral obligation is still unseen. In other words, while the awareness of fear and desperation belongs to a belief consciousness peculiar to the primitive religion, concern-consciousness just corresponds to moral conscience. This is because self-confidence and a clear sense of responsibility do not exist in the belief consciousness of primitive religion at all. Only moral conscience embodies those examples of self-confidence and sense of responsibility:

Under a religious atmosphere with faith as its core, men are saved by faith. When men delegate responsibility for all problems to divinity, the concern-consciousness will not appear. Men’s confidence in this situation lies in faith in the divine. Only when someone takes the responsibility for problems does he reveal the concern-consciousness. This concern-consciousness, in fact, embodies a strong will and a fighting spirit.²

After establishing concern-consciousness as the main point in his interpretation of moralism, Xu Fuguan further claimed that a fundamental concept in the Zhou people’s spiritual world, that is, the concept of jing (敬, “respect”), derived from the concern-consciousness. Moreover, since concern-consciousness can be strictly interpreted as a moral conscience, so “respect” can only be explained as jingde (敬德, “respect for virtue”) and according to “who proceeds to action full of solicitude” (as quoted in Lunyu VII.11) in dealing with social relations, instead of a kind of religious reverence:

Following the active sign of concern-consciousness, the orientation and foundation of human trust gradually shift from referring to divinity to relying on the ...