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1 Religion, modernities and education
Contexts for Asia’s religious education
Kerry J. Kennedy and John Chi-Kin Lee
Keywords European modernity, secularization, Asian modernity, inter-referencing
Writing of new religious movements in the 20th century, Boyd (1995) made the point that “in a rapidly changing world, in which social institutions are all in flux, to religion alone is ascribed a continuing and theoretically unchanging role, function and form” (p.7). His focus, however, was not on religions in general, but on one religion in particular: Christianity. Throughout the paper he is concerned with variants of what might be called apostolic Christianity and how in some cases new movements challenge mainstream Christian views. Like many Western sociologists of religion, Boyd’s frame of reference is geographically, socially and culturally bounded by an Anglo-European-North American view of religion conceived of as one form or other of Christianity. While this book does not question the historical significance of Christianity its remit is much broader: it seeks to understand how the diverse religions of Asia, which through colonial expansion also happen to include Christianity, construct their educational role, especially in relation to young people. The concern is not so much with the Religious Education (RE) lesson so common in many Western classrooms: rather, the concern is with why, how and under what circumstances Asian religions educate young people. In this book religion is always plural, always contextualized and always subject to social construction both over time and presently.
To explore the book’s framework further the following issues will be discussed:
- “European modernity” and its impact on religion;
- The secularization thesis in Asian contexts;
- The distinctive nature of Asian religions and the implications for education; and
- Inter-referencing and its role in comparative education.
“European modernity” – what it means and its implications for religion
Scholarship related to what is generally referred to as “European modernity” is extensive and complex. Stråth and Wagner (2017) have pointed out that older interpretations stressed the split from religious domination, the reification of rationality over faith and the establishment of the market economy. They argued, however, that these were not necessarily the driving forces of European development in the 19th and 20th centuries, and certainly were not the foundation of democratic development during those times. Rather development, particularly in the form of colonialism, literally took place at the “end of a barrel” reinforced by Europe’s military might and greed. Accommodations were reached with religion that maintained its status, if not its influence, as in previous times. What was more, the so-called market economy was buffeted by large scale protectionism and the exploitation of colonies in Africa and Europe.
This view of European modernity seeks to deconstruct its influence and to identify other forces that were at work influencing European development. Stråth and Wagner (2017) are correct in observing that during this period religion, by which they mean Christianity, remained an important part of social practice in Europe. Yet compared to the Middle Ages and the Renaissance periods, the role of religion in Europe was fundamentally different in these later times. Religion no longer dominated society as it did during the Middle Ages. The accommodation of secular and religious organizations during the Renaissance became more marked with the acceptance of distinct spheres of authority for each. Over time religion’s influence waned in Europe, but it did not totally disappear.
Yet religion’s role changed fundamentally and came to be regarded largely as a private transaction between individuals and whatever transcendent being they chose. This meant the role of church authorities was confined largely to moral and spiritual issues. This transition of religion from centre stage to side stage, from political masters to private minders, is often regarded as the central achievement of what is referred to as the European Enlightenment, a movement that enshrined human autonomy, rationality, and the capacity for human beings to understand themselves from looking inwards rather than to an external being. Despite recent critiques of the Enlightenment and its influence (Peters, 2019), there is little doubt that the abandonment of deity as an explanation for all that human beings are had fundamental implications for religion. The Enlightenment is often seen to be a precursor of European modernity providing the foundation for democratic, industrial and social development. Its principles cannot be easily dismissed, as Stråth and Wagner (2017) seemed to suggest, by asserting that the influence of the church remained, since Enlightenment thinking reflects some fundamental re-thinking not just about the role of religion in society, but about the nature of human beings.
Jensen (2013, p.158) has pointed out that “since religion implies reference to an Other who precedes and defines humankind, it is entirely logical that modern thought has – at least in some of its traditions – avoided the integration of religion into its different manifestations. Tacitly or explicitly to be modern has been understood as entailing the apostasy of religion”. He refers to a range of French, English and German philosophers who initiated, developed and advanced the view that religion, with its transcendent view of reality, had little or no place in the public and even the private life of citizens. It was neatly summed up by René Descartes’ cogito, ergo sum: “I think, therefore I am” making the human subject the arbiter of his/her own destiny. There were many different ways in which this idea was expressed and as Peters (2019) pointed out there was also disagreement with the central role given to rationality and rational thinking. Yet there is little doubt that the split from religion based on the rational capacity of human beings became a major motif from the 17th century onwards. Religion as a social practice did not disappear, but it was no longer central to public and political life and it faced constant opposition from secular and humanist thought. Jensen (2018, p.158) commented that “one of the central crises of Europe is the duality religious-secular.” The concept of the “secular” is important and must be seen as a key characteristic of European modernity.
Deagon (2013) provided what is perhaps the most stringent view of secularism:
Secularism can be defined as the complete separation of church and state in constitutional, legal, political, administrative and even cultural contexts. This entails the complete removal of religion from public affairs, and the preclusion of religious discussion in public discourse. Ultimately, the secularist strategy is to “purify public reason from religious arguments”
(p.3)
Reinforcing this view, Casanova (2018a) has made the point that “Europeans tend to experience secularization as an historical process of religious decline, that is, of temporal and spatial supersession of the religious by the secular” (p.191). Religion and secularism in these formulations are seen to be dichotomous. Yet Berger (2014) has more recently pointed out that this dichotomy, which was so much part of Enlightenment thinking, did not eventuate in reality and that what has been achieved over time is a more realistic vision of pluralism that embraced both religion and secularism existing side by side in many, if not all, European societies. This is an important revision of what for a long time has been considered an enduring legacy of European modernity – secularism may have been unleashed by the Enlightenment, but it has not overridden religion. It has come to exist side by side with religion – most often as an opponent and often embedded in instruments of state to signal that the state itself is not dominated by religion or religious authorities. Thus, secularism can be considered as an influential idea that challenges religion but does not dominate it altogether and certainly has not eliminated it. Yet this is essentially a European phenomenon. What can be said about religion and secularism in Asian contexts?
The secularization thesis in Asian contexts
There is an extensive scholarship that has argued European modernity, and for our purposes this includes the secularization thesis, set the stage for social and economic development not just in Europe but throughout the world. Stråth and Wagner (2017), among others, dispute this view as being Eurocentric and simplistic. Yet the view has been promoted heavily through modernization theory that has suggested development is related to changes in areas such as governance, media and economic development – the kind of changes evident in much of European development. An adjunct to modernization theory is the view that as development takes place religion becomes less important, as it appeared to from the 18th century onwards in Europe. This application of European experience to Asian contexts has been strongly disputed.
In an early critique, Clammer (1984) pointed out that “clearly the Asian situation shows that secularization is not inevitable or irreversible” (p.56). Tu (2000) went further when he asserted that “in the Western and the non-Western worlds, the projected transition from tradition to modernity never occurred. Traditions continue in modernity” (p.198). Casanova (2018a) further commented that “outside of Europe, by contrast, in much of the rest of the world, both the dynamics of confessionalization and de-confessionalization as well as the secularist stadial consciousness are usually absent” (p.191). In other words, European experience is not Asia’s experience, which must be understood in its own contexts and not those of Europe, despite major colonial exploitation that sought to fashion much of Asia in Europe’s image. There are three main aspects of what might be called “Asia’s religious exceptionalism” when it comes to understanding the Asian religious experience.
Casanova (2018a) has argued that what characterizes Asia is religious pluralism rather than a single confessional religion such as Christianity in Europe. Almost the entire discourse about religion in Europe, at least until the current century, has been about one single religion, and from the 16th century onwards about different varieties of that religion. Catholicism and Protestantism represent the two main branches of European Christianity and within those branches there is further differentiation. Protestantism, for example, is reflected in Lutheranism, Calvinism and Anglicanism, just to name a few major strands. Catholicism has been more centralized and controlled both theologically and politically. Together, however, these represent the European conversation about religion, with secularism being a response that attempted to throw off religion’s influence. Europe’s story, however, is not Asia’s.
Casanova (2018b) has gone further than the simplistic idea that Asia’s engagement with religion is just “a different story”. Focussing on East Asia, he has shown the richness of the region’s pluralistic religious history. One example he provided was China, where he shows that from the earliest times Buddhism, Daoism and Confucianism have grown, developed and interacted. The arrival of Christianity in the 16th century did not disturb the status quo but rather was added to Asian religious pluralism. Although hegemonic in both theology and practice, Christianity did not subdue local religions, even in the 19th century when colonialism was at its most potent. Asia’s religious pluralism simply accommodated the new arrival and today this pluralism continues to reflect religious arrangements in the region.
While Casanova (2018b) focused on East Asia, Clammer (1984) developed a similar argument regarding Asia’s religious pluralism, but with reference to South East Asia. Yet his analysis was somewhat more nuanced. He identified countries such as Burma, Thailand and Brunei that were characterized by single dominant religions so that the religious pluralism thesis applies across the broader region, but not necessarily to every individual country. At the same time, he classifies whether countries have a “state religion” by which he means a religion officially endorsed by the state. He lists Buddhism in Burma and Thailand, and Islam in Malaysia and Brunei as being “state religions”. By this is meant religion is intertwined with, and in some senses inseparable from politics: “…the pattern especially in Southeast and West Asia is towards the political appropriation of religion, particularly in those states where a single religion predominates” (p.54). This is another diversity that characterizes religions in Asia, making generalizations very difficult and probably unnecessary.
If religious pluralism characterizes religious engagement in East, South East and West Asia, the same can be said for South Asia as well. Hinduism and Islam exist side by side in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Historically the relationship between adherents of these two religions has not been easy, so that pluralism in itself does not guarantee tolerance or acceptance. It is disappointing to have to note, along with Reid (2015), that violence resulting from a refusal to engage with the peaceful side of religious tolerance has been a feature of the 21st century, not just in South but in South East Asia as well. The co-existence of multiple religions in Asia, therefore, has not always meant an acknowledgement of the ethics of pluralism.
Yet what of secularism or secularization in Asia? Most scholars are agreed that religious pluralism does not exclude secularism and there is evidence in different parts of Asia that secularism has been a part of the pluralist ideology (Clammer, 1984; Casanova, 2018a). This means in different countries there is likely to be a mixture of religion and secularism. Singapore, for example, encourages religious freedom amongst its multi-ethnic population but the working of the state is strictly in the secularist mode. Japan supports Shintoism as a state religion but otherwise the state apparatus works quite separately from the endorsed religion. This kind of discussion, however, is really a “European” discussion based on Enlightenment thinking that discouraged the cleavage between religion, politics and society, a cleavage not reflected in Asia. What is more, the scholars discussed above, and elsewhere, generally construct the secularist debate in European terms, even when they are arguing against the modernization thesis (for example, see Stråth & Wagner, 2017). This raises the issue of what, apart from religious pluralism, might be considered distinctive about religion in Asia.
Ironically, one response might be that in many Asian contexts religion’s closeness to politics not only refutes the secularization thesis but enhances a link long thought to have been severed in Europe. Schottman (2013), for example, talks about Islam in Malaysia as a “civic religion” (p.57), “an all encompassing way of life” (p.57) seeking to influence private, social and political behaviour. Reynolds (2005) has pointed to the existence of a civic religious tradition in Thailand developed over the course of its history and expressed in the early 20th century as the integration of the nation, religion and the king. Even as the monarchy passed from its autocratic to its constitutional stage in the 1930s, this integration was retained with the King having oversight over the nation and Buddhism retained as the state religion (despite Thailand’s religious pluralism) even though the King no longer had political control. In East Asia, Confucianism is usually described as a philosophical, social and moral system of thinking. Yet...
