‘The self-made self’: analysing the potential contribution to the field of gender and education of theories that disembed selfhood
Becky Francis and Christine Skelton
Introduction
In keeping with the intentions of this collection, we seek to consider some novel theoretical applications in our field of work – in this case, to examine the extent to which the ideas of certain influential, contemporary social theorists can contribute to the theorising of gender and education. We have chosen to concentrate on some key theorists advancing new conceptions of selfhood with a particular focus on conceptions of the self as cut loose from social structure and biology. Hence we consider the diverse contributions of ‘reflexivity theorists’ (Bauman 2001, 2005; Beck 1992; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002; Giddens 1991, 1998) and of ‘gender theorist’, Judith Halberstam (1998, 2005).
We begin by considering hegemonic explanations of neo-liberal society and particularly the emphasis on conceptions of ‘individualisation’ and ‘individualism’. Beck’s (1992) explanation of individualisation as being a state and not a choice and the corresponding conceptualisation of the ‘self’ as reflexive, as a project which is always in a state of becoming, has proved useful for feminist/pro-feminist educationalists in understanding the ways young people make sense of their lives. In citing Giddens’ (1991) comment on the self as something we make of ourselves, McLeod (2006, p. 223) notes how this leads to ‘contemporary gender identities and relations becom(ing) emblematic, representing in a kind of idealised form the possibilities of a self cut loose from tradition and required to make itself anew’. These motifs of agency and self-making – what Du Gay (1996) refers to as the positioning of individuals as entrepreneurs of the self – have been emblematic of the individualisation thesis.
At the same time we recognise the limitations and challenges of these theoretical positions: for example, the ‘individualisation’ thesis denotes a collapse in reference groups thus presenting a challenge for feminist agendas. For example, Beck (1992) argues that social class differences and family connections recede in importance, if not disintegrate, in an individualised society. And the privileging of agency over social structures in these theoretical positions is playing out in neo-liberal policy-making (often drawing on the highly influential work of theorists of reflexive modernity) to very directly position the individual as responsible for their trajectories and life outcomes (see e.g. Rose, 1999). Consequently, there has been a great deal of feminist critique of, as well as engagement with, such theoretical positions, both within and beyond the field of education. This has been particularly true of theoretical work analysing neo-liberal policy movements (see Davies, 2003; McLeod, 2006).
Yet the theoretical freeing up of the ‘subject’ that these reflexivity theorists engage has strong implications for gender identities and understandings of gender. Beck (1992, p. 111) for example, claims that women, as a group, have been released from their ‘female status fate’ and are symbolic of all the social changes that have occurred within the period of second (reflexive) modernity. Thefull implications (or challenges) of such theoretical positions have not yet been realised in empirical work in gender and education. It is also in this regard that we draw upon the theoretical promise of the work of Judith Halberstam.
Hence the initial sections of this chapter are devoted to outlining the key ideas of different proponents of the individualisation thesis, and exploring both the potential, and the limitations, of these contributions for the field of gender and education. It is argued that the individual subject evoked in the work of Beck and Giddens retains restrictive and stereotypical understandings of ‘woman/women, girl/girls’ (in spite of arguments to the contrary), and that as such these perspectives have limited application to the lives of women. Bauman’s work is more attuned to structure in the economic sense, and we suggest that his devastating critique of neo-liberal society and its creation and pathologisation of the ‘New Poor’ to be highly applicable to work concerned with social justice. Yet we maintain that his lack of attention to gender will mean his work constitutes further theoretical information for feminist work, rather than a central contribution within the field.
Understandings of the self as ‘disembedded’ from society and its structures, and the implications for gender theory, evoke parallels with those theoretical positions in which ‘gender’ is detached from structural biology (Butler, 1990; Halberstam, 1998), and hence we turn to the work of Judith Halberstam in the latter part of the chapter. Some might debate the legitimacy of considering Halberstam’s work alongside that of the reflexivity theorists (especially Anthony Giddens!). Halberstam positions herself as a feminist, and does acknowledge the impact of social structure (ethnicity, social class), and of the material, in some of her discussions. Likewise, while the reflexivity theorists are concerned with sociological analyses of the self in late modernity, Halberstam’s work is located in cultural studies and focuses directly on constructions of gender and sexuality. However, we maintain that her work on ‘female masculinity’ raises similar challenges around the notions of ‘choice-making’, agency and self-making (in this case, regarding gender performance/identification), and of the self as freed up from the material (in this case, from sexed bodies). Halberstam’s work hence proposes an associated de-essentialising of social phenomena; and as such we argue that there are parallels between her work and that of the ‘reflexivity theorists’, in a shared project of disembedding the self.
Halberstam’s (1998) conception of ‘female masculinity’ is informing, as well as being challenged by, feminist educationalists’ work. The latter sections of the chapter explore some of the benefits and limitations of theories of gender as divorced from physical sex (‘masculinity without men’, as Halberstam puts it), arguing that this comprises an important and timely innovation which usefully challenges some of the more theoretically stagnant aspects of work on gender and education. Yet we caution that in developing such analyses we need to retain an awareness and analysis of power inequalities as central to feminist theory in education.
Notions of individualisation
Third Way theorists (such as Beck and Giddens) are specific in their use of the terms ‘individualisation’ and ‘individualism’. ‘Individualisation’ is neither to be confused with individuation (the process of becoming an autonomous individual), nor emancipation. Furthermore, ‘individualisation’ is not shorthand for egotism, the development of a ‘me-first’ generation of people (Field, 2006; Giddens, 1998). However, ‘individualisation’ does place the ego at the centre of decision making and implies that the individual has to (and can) choose and change their social identity whilst taking risks in doing so (Reay, 2003). In defining individualism, Beck (quoted by Giddens, 1998, p. 36) writes:
[it] is not Thatcherism, not market individualism, not atomisation. On the contrary, it means ‘institutionalized individualism’. Most of the rights and entitlements of the welfare state, for example, are designed for individuals rather than for families. In many cases they presuppose employment. Employment in turn implies education and both of these presuppose mobility. By all these requirements people are invited to constitute themselves as individuals: to plan, understand, design themselves as individuals.
Giddens (1998) identifies the rise of ‘individualisation’ with globalisation processes whereby there has been a retreat in tradition such as the significance of the family, religion and politics. Beck (1992) cites three factors that have facilitated individualisation: first, the demise of social class divisions and distinctions; second, women’s liberation from traditional gender roles (with the qualification that people are more ‘aware’ of women’s equality than actually practise it); and third, changes in the nature of work. Both Beck and Giddens see this breakdown of traditional ties in a positive light as a means of providing social cohesion through ‘more actively accept[ing] responsibilities for the consequences of what we do and the lifestyle habits we adopt’ (Giddens, 1998, p. 37).
Applicability of individualisation to gender theory
Theories of individualism have been relatively slow to permeate feminist work on gender and education (perhaps with good reason, as we discuss below). While the neo-liberal policy environment and changed social expectations around, for example, women and work, have been discussed in relation to developments in education (see, for example, Arnot, David, & Weiner, 1999; Blackmore, 2006), until recently relatively few studies have engaged with theorists of individualisation directly to inform their analysis. (Exceptions to this include Kenway & Kelly, 2000; McLeod, 2006; Reay, 2003; Thomson & Holland, 2002; Walkerdine, Lucey, & Melody, 2001.) Critiquing Beck’s work on the individualised society, Walkerdine et al. (2001) and Walkerdine (2003) have maintained that the model for the neo-liberal subject is female (though, Walkerdine observes, a specifically middle-class female) because attributes necessary to the subject in a neo-liberal socio-economic climate (such as flexibility, conscientiousness and so on) are feminine traits. The project of upward mobility via education and work constitute ‘the feminine site of production of the neoliberal subject’ (Walkerdine, 2003, p. 238). She maintains that as well as a middle-class conservatism, neo-liberal values include those of ‘emotionality, caring and introspection – the values of a psychology and interiority usually ascribed to women’ (2003, p. 242). Hence Walkerdine and her colleagues argue that femininity is currently being refashioned, and they analyse the ways in which these new subjectivities are being moulded through discourses of flexibility and ‘choice’ which deny structural and psychic social class inequalities.
Further examples of engagement with the ‘reflexivity theorists’ can be found within aspects of our own work. Examples are Francis’ (2006) use of Bauman’s theorisation of the production and pathologisation of the New Poor in her analysis of policy shifts in relation to ‘underachieving boys’; and Skelton’s (2004, 2005a, 2005b) study of women in the academy, which sought to ascertain the usefulness to researchers of Beck’s model of the ‘individualised individual’ for understanding the attitudes and actions of social actors. We elaborate these contributions below to evaluate the extent of the applicability of these theoretical approaches to the field of gender and education.
Bauman’s (2005) devastating critique of neo-liberal consumerism, and the discourses of meritocracy and freedom mobilised to legitimate and perpetuate its practices, is demonstrated by Francis (2006) to be applicable to diverse aspects of neo-liberal policy (in this case, education). Bauman’s work is very rich, and includes historical as well as contemporary social analysis, but a key strength is his eloquent and incisive critique of neo-liberalism. Like Rose (1999) and others, Bauman maintains that one of the benefits for the neo-liberal state in the transference of responsibility for ‘failure’ from the state to individuals is that these discursive practices justify a ‘washing clean of hands’ in relation to those not thriving in this socio-economic environment. Analysing how discourses of work ethic and meritocracy enable us to blame the poor for their social position, Bauman (2005) maintains,
The call to abide by the commandments of the work ethic serves now as a test of eligibility for moral empathy. Most of those to whom the appeal is addressed are expected (bound) to fail this test, and once they fail they can be without compunction assumed to have put themselves, by their own choice, outside the realm of moral obligation. Society can now relinquish all further responsibility for their predicament without feeling guilty about its ethical duty. (p. 83)
And Bauman catalogues how, as the poor are discursively positioned as irresponsible rather than unfortunate, so there has been a corresponding shift in thinking about how to deal with them, resulting in the shift from a notion of ‘entitlement’ to that of ‘obligation’, which has seeped across neo-liberal policy-making internationally.1 Hence a new approach to welfare has developed, based on a preoccupation with ‘welfare dependency’ and schemes to delineate the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor (Bauman, 2005; Mendes, 2003). This has involved the inception of a raft of punitive policies that entail the surveillance, regulation, circumscription and punishment of those deemed ‘undeserving’ (Bauman, 2005; Hayes & Lingard, 2003).
These practices of locating ‘failure’ with the individual rather than the state, and the consequences emanating from this location, are discussed by Francis (2006) in relation to the issue of ‘boys’ underachievement’. She argues that while an (often misogynist) ‘poor boys’ discourse continues to be applied to boys generally, neo-liberal policy drives are beginning to position some boys differently, with an increasingly sour note developing in English policy documents on ‘failing boys’. Crucially, she maintains that we are beginning to see a policy delineation between ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ boys – the latter group not unsurprisingly including working-class and Black boys, who are increasingly presented as ‘beyond the pale’ in neo-liberal educational policy.
Limitations of reflexive modernity theories for application to gender
On the other hand, it is notable that Francis extends Bauman’s analysis to an aspect of gender analysis, rather than Bauman providing this angle. His focus is firmly on socioeconomic movements (and within this on wealth and poverty), rather than on gender or ‘race’. As such, Bauman offers ideas that prove fruitful for work on gender and education that is concerned with aspects of social class inequality, and neo-liberal policy movements, but does not have anything new to say himself about gender.
Elsewhere we have questioned Beck and Beck-Gernsheim’s (2002) conception of the individualised subject as female (Francis & Skelton, 2005). Such a conception seems to support popular discourses of contemporary women as ‘having it all’ and their success and new-found self-confidence precipitating a ‘crisis of masculinity’ in men. As we have seen, Walkerdine (2003) does identify that Beck’s vision evokes a specifically middle-class, rather than working-class womanhood, but otherwise acquiesces with Beck’s description of this neo-liberal subject as a female one. Yet we argue that although the attributes which Walkerdine associates with the neo-liberal subject can be read as feminine – for example, diligence, responsibility, self-regulation (and self-blame), introspection, flexibility and selftransformation, reflexivity, care (see Walkerdine, 2003) – others may not. These might include entrepreneurism, assertion, self-confidence, ‘drive’, self-reliance, risk-taking, competition, and indeed individualism itself. These traditionally masculine traits are integral to neo-liberal subjecthood (Francis & Skelton, 2005).
Indeed, we used the case of the high-achieving (middle-class) girl – the subject that launched a thousand newspaper columns on ‘boys’ underachievement’ – to demonstrate that a feminine construction of self is not held up as the ‘ideal’ version of identity, either in terms of producing educational achievement or as being an idealised expression of neoliberal selfhood more broadly (Francis & Skelton, 2005). We argued that girls’ achievement continues to be constructed as problematic, even in their out-performance of boys (as the talk is all of ‘boys’ underachievement’, rather than ‘girls’ achievement’). As Walkerdine’s own work has demonstrated, they tend to be constructed as performing through diligence rather than talent (and hence this diligence continues to be pathologised, even as educationalists urge boys to be more diligent, see Francis & Archer, 2005), and as insufficiently q...