The Capability Approach and Sustainability

Ortrud Lessmann, Felix Rauschmayer

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN:
  9780415712538
• eBook ISBN:
  9781134912339
• Topic: Biological Sciences
• Subtopic: Ecology
• Index: Biological Sciences

This is the first book dedicated exclusively to the question of the relationships between sustainability and the capability approach. It is rather astonishing that the issue of sustainability first posed by the Brundtland commission in 1987 has gained so little attention from capability scholars despite the approach's focus on human well-being. This book starts with a seminal contribution by Sen on the "Ends and Means of Sustainability" delivered as a keynote in 2000. All contributions to the book focus on the difficulties that arise from a freedom-oriented view of sustainability: they argue for taking note of the impact of human life on nature, they question the meaning of intergenerational justice when measured in the currency of "substantive freedoms" (capabilities), they raise the issue of collective responsibility and suggest ways to model and operationalize the capability approach to sustainable development. The book presents the state of the art concerning "The capability approach and sustainability" while admitting that it is only a first contribution to a growing field that deserves our attention: Defining what is to be sustained and asking how it can be sustained.

This book was published as a special issue of the Journal of Human Development and Capabilities.

Introduction: The Capability Approach and Sustainability

FELIX RAUSCHMAYER and ORTRUD LESSMANN

The question of the Brundtland Commission (WCED, 1987), how well-being can be sustained for future generations, has gained little attention from scholars working with the capability approach (CA). This is astonishing at first sight, given the political importance of sustainability and the CA’s chief concern with what well-being is. Only in 2000 did Anand and Sen (2000) publish the—rather obvious—general idea to replace the reference to ‘needs’ in the Brundtland definition by a reference to ‘freedoms’ or ‘capabilities’, without really elaborating, however, on the implications of this replacement. In the last years, however, the subject of sustainability has been taken up by a couple of scholars and research projects, as the 2011 UN Development Report (UNDP, 2011), this book and the literature referred to shows.

This book mainly comprises current work on sustainability and the CA, but it starts with a basic and 12-year-old paper on this subject by Amartya Sen that has not so far been published (his keynote address at the International Conference on Transition to Sustainability in Tokyo, May 2000). Of course, parts of the paper are outdated by now and it does not go into the details of conceiving sustainable development based on the CA. At the same time, Sen has never since voiced his general view on sustainability from a capability perspective in such a comprehensive manner. In his other publications on the subject (Anand and Sen, 1994, 2000; Sen, 2004, 2009a, 2009b) the ideas are divided into bits and pieces and spread over several publications. (Admittedly, these publications partly deepen aspects of his talk included here.) Sen mainly argues for a freedom-oriented view of sustainability and names some grounds to do so.

The difficulties that arise from such a freedom-oriented view are the subject of some of the papers in this book: Crabtree and Watene ask how to justify any ‘currency of justice’—be it needs or freedoms—in the inter-generational context. Watene focuses on Nussbaum’s CA and argues that the solution Nussbaum (2006) offers to the problem of intergenerational justice—namely, to follow Rawls’ idea of extending the original position to an ongoing society—overlooks both the problems involved in Rawls’ idea as well as the differences between his and her approach. By pointing to the problems involved in conceiving justice for current and future generations, Watene also hints at the close link of sustainability to demography. The growing world population is still a challenge to sustaining well-being on the global level—an issue easily forgotten from the viewpoint of shrinking industrial societies. Granting reproductive freedom seems to be at odds with the demand of sustainability, and yet Sen illustrates his argument for a freedom-oriented view with the case for enhancing people’s freedom in fertility issues. Restricting the reproductive freedom of people now may serve to sustain the world, but it is not in line with the general idea of sustaining well-being of future generations without compromising the well-being of the current generation. This dilemma usually is silenced in sustainability discussions due to its political sensitivity.

While Watene mainly shows that Rawls’ veil of ignorance does not work in the intergenerational case, Crabtree suggests using Scanlon’s justification method of reasonable rejection. Crabtree compares this justification strategy with the Rawlsian and applies it to the issue of sustainability. He further argues that by using the device of asking which principles can be reasonably rejected, it is possible to broaden the scope of justice beyond the anthropocentric realm. Pelenc et al. share this concern for broadening the scope of justice to biocentric or ecocentric approaches.

Considering human freedoms, as do Schultz et al., Peeters et al. hold that the simple view of expanding freedoms infinitely is flawed. They highlight the interdependency of people’s freedoms by conceiving freedoms as ‘triadic’ relations between an agent, constraints, and possible functionings. Hence, they argue for introducing ‘functioning constraints’ in order to protect the freedom of others, including that of future people. By so doing they point to the impact of an individual’s decision on others and hence to individual responsibility for sustainable development.

Similarly, Schultz et al. think that any application of the CA in the context of sustainability has to take account of the individuals’ impact on nature and hence on the sustainability of development. In contrast to Sen and to Peeters et al., they point out, however, that freedoms or capabilities as the currency of justice have to be complemented by considerations regarding the legitimacy of using natural capital. They argue for catching the individuals’ impact on nature by ‘feedback loops’ (similar to Lessmann and Rauschmayer) and use the model of feedback loops to discuss four different strategies present in the literature on how to integrate the ‘natural dimension’ into the CA.

One of these strategies to capture the natural dimension in the CA—namely, by identifying ‘critical natural capital’—stems from Pelenc et al. and is explained further in their contribution. Their main theme, however, is responsibility. From the conception of critical natural capital, they derive a special responsibility towards nature. They argue that apart from individual responsibility, people share a collective responsibility for nature as a common good. By emphasizing the threefold responsibility of people—with regard to themselves, nature and the collective—Pelenc et al. shift the emphasis from freedom to responsibility.

Hence, the relation between freedom and responsibility or the obligations people face is tackled by various contributions. They all highlight the tension between the CA’s freedom orientation and the idea of sustainability that involves responsibility towards future generations and/or nature. They differ, however, in emphasis: whereas Peeters et al. integrate the responsibility towards nature as functioning constraints, Schultz et al. argue that the evaluative space has to be extended beyond freedom and Pelenc et al. seem to reverse the relation by claiming that responsibility for nature is a precondition for freedom. Whereas Peeters et al., Schultz et al. as well as Lessmann and Rauschmayer ground the necessity of preserving nature or the environment in intergenerational justice, Pelenc et al. additionally ascribe an intrinsic value to nature.

The focus of Lessmann and Rauschmayer’s contribution is on modeling sustainable development on the basis of the CA. The feedback loop of Schultz et al. is but one element of this model, which is more directed towards elaborating on the meaning of intergenerational justice than on integrating the ‘natural dimension’. The functioning constraints proposed by Peeters et al. may—in Lessmann and Rauschmayer’s terminology—be regarded as a rule or ‘collective institution’ that helps individuals to operationalize their responsibility towards nature and future generations. What the model clearly brings to the fore is the tension between the individualistic focus of the CA—also mentioned by Schultz et al.—and the collective nature of the problem of sustainable development highlighted by Pelenc et al. and ascribed by Sen to ‘humanity as a whole’.

Modeling may help to operationalize the idea of sustainable development based on the CA, and Neumayer gives an excellent example for a contribution on quantitative empirical measurement or more specifically on indicators.¹ Most quantitative work on sustainable development uses macro-data and argues on an aggregate level. The CA’s focus on the individual requires developing strategies for incorporating sustainability in micro-data and/or for combining micro-data and macro-data (for example, Robeyns and van der Veen, 2007; Casini and Bernetti, 1996; see also the results of the wellbebe project²). Neumayer, even though pointing out that there is no real difference between human development and sustainable development, concludes from his empirical crosscountry and time-series analysis, that all countries with very high human development fail to achieve strong sustainability. Additionally, countries economically dependent on the extraction of natural resources often face difficulties with achieving weak sustainability.

Given these problems, it is useful to start with case studies that do not aim at giving a comprehensive view on the sustainability of a country or region, but strive at pointing out some characteristic interrelations. Hirvilammi et al. investigate the relation between functioning achievements of minimum income receivers in Finland and their impacts on sustainability as measured by the footprint. The latter has the advantage of measuring the impact on nature on the micro-level by summarizing the impact of an individual on the environment in one indicator. Obviously, they operationalize the idea that the CA has to take account of people’s impact on the environment that is also brought forward by Peeters et al. in their functionings constraints and by Schultz et al. as well as Lessmann and Rauschmayer in their feedback loops. Hirvilammi et al. show that even minimum income receivers in Finland leave footprints that are considered unsustainable although their footprint can be assumed to be lower than that of most other Finns. This sheds a light on how difficult it is to reconcile intra-generational and intergenerational justice; that is, to maintain a concern for the poor and for the environment and future generations.

What the book also does not cover is the issue of governance. Several papers mention the importance of responsibility and emphasize that achieving sustainable development demands participation of all (Sen, Pelenc et al., Lessmann and Rauschmayer, Watene). How this theoretical requirement can be conceptualized, applied and implemented in governance measures that lead to sustainable development is an important question. The work of Elinor Ostrom gives some hints how this can be done on a small scale. But, as Sen has noted, the solution to the problem of sustainability concerns ‘humanity as a whole’. The papers included in this book provide some insights into the difficulties of conceiving sustainable development on the basis of the CA. This is but a first step. More research is necessary—in particular, more applied research that proposes measures and indicators as well as research on governance for the transition to sustainable development that is urgently needed in order to preserve human life on earth.

Acknowledgements

Many thanks to the library of the International Institute for Sustainable Development for providing a copy of Sen’s manuscript for his keynote address at the international conference on ‘Transition to Sustainability’ in Tokyo, May 2000. Further, the editors are grateful for the support provided by the research project ‘GeNECA: Fair Sustainable Development based on the Capability Approach’ (www.geneca.ufz.de). GeNECA is a three-year project (2010–2013) funded by the German Ministry for Science and Research as part of the funding program ‘Economics for Sustainability’ (FKZ 01UN1015A).

Notes

1  More empirical results should be forthcoming when the data from a recent survey in the German Socio-Economic Panel are analyzed—for upcoming results, check http://www.geneca.ufz.de.

2  See http://www.wellbebe.be/.

References

Anand, S. and Sen, A. K. (1994) ‘Sustainable human development: Concepts and priorities’, Human Development Report Office Occasional Paper 8, United Nations Development Programme, New York.

Anand, S. and Sen, A. K. (2000) ‘Human development and economic sustainability’, World Development, 28(12), pp. 2029–2049.

Casini, L. and Bernetti, I. (1996) ‘Public project evaluation, Environment and Sen’s theory’, Notizie di Politeia, 12(43/44), pp. 55–78.

Nussbaum, M. C. (2006) Frontiers of Justice, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

Robeyns, I. and van der Veen, R. (2007) ‘Sustainable quality of life. Conceptual analysis for a policy-relevant empirical specification’, MNP Report 550031006/2007, Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, Bilthoven, the Netherlands.

Sen, A. K. (2004) ‘Why we should preserve the spotted owl?’, London Review of Books, 26(3), [http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n03/sen_01_.html], accessed 20 September 2009.

Sen, A. K. (2009a) The Idea of Justice, Belknap Press, Cambridge, MA.

Sen, A. K. (2009b) ‘Sustainable development and our responsibilities’, Notizie di Politeia, 26(98), pp. 129–137.

UNDP (2011) Human Development Report 2011: Sustainability and Equity: A Better Future for All, Human Development Report Office, Palgrave, N.Y.

WCED (1987) Our Common Future, United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development, [http://www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm], accessed 3 April 2010.

The Ends and Means of Sustainability

AMARTYA SEN

Abstract The idea of ‘sustainability’ received serious attention in the so-called Brundtland Commission Report that has many attractive features. In particular, it highlighted the importance of intergenerational justice while maintaining a concern for the poor of each generation and shifted the focus away from resources to human beings. I argue that this way of understanding sustainability, while a great improvement, is still incomplete. There are important grounds for favouring a freedom-oriented view, focusing on crucial freedoms that people have reason to value. Human freedoms include the fulfilment of needs, but also the liberty to define and pursue our own goals, objectives and commitments, no matter how they link with our own particular needs. Human beings are reflective creatures and are able to reason about and decide what they would like to happen, rather than being compellingly led by their own needs—biological or social. A fuller concept of sustainability has to aim at sustaining human freedoms, rather than only at our ability to fulfil our felt needs. Some empirical examples are given to illustrate the distinctive nature and the reasoned importance of seeing sustainability in terms of sustaining human freedoms and capabilities.

Introduction

I do not know many endearing stories about General Franco, the Spanish dictator; I am, in fact, rather astonished that I know even one. That particular anecdote concerns the time when General Franco was on his death-bed, and his fascist admirers gathered around the building, singing with tearful eyes: ‘Adios, adios, our leader!’ The General felt confused by this, sat up on his bed, and asked his doctor: ‘Where are they going?’ In asking about the sustainability of the world in which we live, we come close to Franco’s disorientation. It is not so much that humanity is trying to sustain the natural world, but rather that humanity is trying to sustain itself. It is us that will have to ‘go’ unless we can put the world around us in reasonable order. The precariousness of nature is our peril, our fragility.

There is, however, also another side of this relationship. The quandary of unsustainability may be our predicament, but the task of solving it is ours as well. The nature of the problem, its fuller appreciation and the ways and means of solving it all belong to us—humanity as a whole. If there is a subject on which collaboration and non-divisive commitments are needed, this surely is it. But in order to make this possible and effective, we need a vision of mankind not as patients whose interests have to be looked after, but as agents who can do effective things—both individually and jointly.¹

Seen in this perspective, there is an important need to take the discussion on sustainability beyond its traditional and confined limits. It is right that we should explore and investigate the problems that arise from the conflict between the needs of people today and those of the future generations (as the Brundtland Commission Report has so forcefully analysed; WCED, 1987). It is also apt that there must be greater understanding of the environmental precariousness arising from the consumption habits around the world, especially of the affluent (as the report of the Royal Society, Towards Sustainable Consumption: A European Perspective, has illuminatingly brought out; Heap and Kent 2000). These are important issues to be discussed, but we also have to go beyond the role of human beings specifically as ‘consumers’ or as ‘people with needs’, and consider, more broadly, their general role as agents of change who can—given the opportunity—think, assess, evaluate, resolve, inspire, agitate, and, through these means, reshape the world.

Even the scientific dialogues, for which we have gathered here, have to be seen as the constructive basis of broad public discussion and general involvement of the population at large. The challenges that we face in so many different fields—from population growth to the explosion of material consumption and proliferation of wastage—call for something much more than technically cunning recommendations. Scientific analysis, which is crucially important as a first step (I shall not shy away from trying to present some myself), should also lead the way to much broader exchanges, deliberations and informed agitations. The complementar...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Citation Information
• Notes on Contributors
• 1. Introduction: The Capability Approach and Sustainability
• 2. The Ends and Means of Sustainability
• 3. Nussbaum’s Capability Approach and Future Generations
• 4. Sustainable Development: Does the Capability Approach have Anything to Offer? Outlining a Legitimate Freedom Approach
• 5. Putting Sustainability into Sustainable Human Development
• 6. Sustainable Human Development and the Capability Approach: Integrating Environment, Responsibility and Collective Agency
• 7. Re-conceptualizing Sustainable Development on the Basis of the Capability Approach: A Model and Its Difficulties
• 8. A Sustainability-Fitting Interpretation of the Capability Approach: Integrating the Natural Dimension by Employing Feedback Loops
• 9. Studying Well-being and its Environmental Impacts: A Case Study of Minimum Income Receivers in Finland
• 10. Human Development and Sustainability
• Index