Introduction
The Personal and the Professional: Aid workersâ relationships and values in the development process
ANNE-MEIKE FECHTER
ABSTRACT This introduction, and the special issue as a whole, consider how the personal and the professional are interrelated, and how they matter for aid work. Taking up Chambersâ call for the âprimacy of the personalâ, this paper explores why the personal often remains un-acknowledged in development studies, even though its salience for aid workers is well-documented, for example, in the growing popularity of their blogs and memoirs. One possible reason for this is an implicit narrative of aid work as altruistic and sometimes self-sacrificing, which renders it inappropriate to devote much attention to the experiences and challenges of aid workers themselves. As the contributions in this volume demonstrate, however, their personal relationships and values significantly shape perspectives and practices of aid work. They therefore need to be taken into account in order to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of development processes.
The question of the relation between the personal and the professional dimension in aid work is not new. Academics and practitioners have commented on the relative lack of attention directed at the personal in development studies. Chambers finds that âthe neglect of the personal dimension in development at first sight seems bizarreâ,1 whereas he proposes, in the context of participatory rural appraisal, the âprimacy of the personalâ.2 Much of development research has tended to focus on institutions rather than individuals, although an incipient emphasis on personal change and agency may be emerging.3 The situation is remarkable insofar as those involved in aid work are acutely aware of the relevance of the personal, while âformal development discourses and institutions tend to be anxious, silent, or even hostile on the subjectâ.4 The contributions in this special issue aim to investigate the personal dimension and its relations with the professional, and to explore their potential relevance for aid work. This introduction will outline how the personal has been conceptualised in existing literature, and identify possible reasons why these approaches have remained underused. I suggest that this situation contrasts with the salience of the personal for aid workers, which becomes evident, for example, in the burgeoning popularity of their blogs and memoirs. I argue that it is important to recognise the ways in which the personal and the professional are intertwined in aid work. Drawing on a diverse range of case examples, the contributions in this special issue aim to shed light on this, with particular regard to individualsâ relationships, their belief systems and values, and how they matter for practice.
The few instances in the literature which explicitly conceptualise the personal dimension share a set of basic premises. These hold, in the first place, that individuals are relevant as actors, and thus constitute significant objects of analysis in the development process. They also assume that aid workersâ personal beliefs and attitudes are implicated in, and impact on the outcomes of aid work. They are further underpinned by the view that recognising the relevance of the personal provides a more comprehensive understanding of how aid works, and can therefore help to improve practice. If individualsâaid workers as well as recipientsâare seen as having agency in the development process, they can become points of intervention.
The first premiseâthat the agency of individuals mattersâmay seem commonsensical rather than contentious. It follows development actor theory, which proposes an actor-oriented analysis of development processes, recognising their perspectives and agency.5 This is nevertheless not reflected in much of the development studies literature, which has been mainly concerned with aid institutions and programmes, policy making and knowledge construction. One might interpret this as a structural bias, in both research and practice. Even though this situation may be changing, it does not mean that acknowledging agency is about to supplant the focus on structure. As Blackmore cautiously reckons, âthe emphasis on agency therefore complements (rather than replaces) more structural approaches and recognises that both types of interventions are necessary for successful developmentâ.6
One such approach has been formulated by Chambers within the paradigm of responsible well-being.7 The imperative to foreground the personal is based on the assumption of individualsâ agency, and embedded in the notion of responsible well-being. His call for the primacy of the personal cited above is premised on the view of individual actors as subjects of change. More specifically, he proposes devising a âpedagogy for the non-oppressedâ,8 in order to change the attitudes and practices of those involved in the aid process. This applies to aid workers in particular, as he reasons that âthe wealthier and more powerful people are, the greater the actual or potential impact of their actions or inactions, and so the greater the scope and need for their wellbeing to be responsibleâ.9 Because of the extent of their agency, and its potential impact on the lives of the poor, powerful actors have a particular responsibility to fulfil their obligations towards others. This is why an ethical code for development actors matters and why âone might have supposed then that trying to understand and change their perceptions, motivations and behaviours would have been at the center of development and development studiesâ.10 In order to achieve responsible well-being, the obligation to change rests in particular with powerful individuals. Effecting such changes, and implementing an ethics for the ânon-oppressedâ, would make a difference: if âall development professionals were tomorrow to become aware, committed, honest and courageous in serving and empowering the poorer ⌠most field programmes would be transformedâ.11 The particular changes required include, âsensitivity to the power of language and to who controls it ⌠an openness to listening ⌠and an openness to self-criticism, including about oneâs own lifestyle, and to learning how to be more while having lessâ.12 While change on the level of the individual does not substitute the need for change in institutions, it remains important. As Gasper emphasises in an introduction to development ethics, âdevelopment as good change relies, [Chambers] argues, on individual persons and personal actions, in addition to and underlying the action of organisations and policies. The most fundamental ââmeansââ that should be imbued by a development ethic ⌠are professionalsâ.13
The emphasis on professionalsâ self is also the lynchpin of a related approach, namely Giri and Uffordâs notion of âcare of the selfâ. They argue that, in order to make development a joint endeavour, care of the other needs to be complemented by care of the self. Considering development as a responsibility shared by aid-givers and recipients, they aim to ârethink development as an initiative in self-development on the part of both the subjects and objects of development, and ethics not only as an engagement in the care of the other but also as an engagement in care of the selfâ.14 However, while care of the other is understood as a matter of ethics, care of the self is defined, following Foucault, as a matter of an âaesthetic ethicsâ.15 Such an ethics is primarily concerned with the restraint of the self with regard to exerting power over others. In the development context this means avoiding unnecessary intervention in othersâ lives. Such emphasis on selfrestraint appears to fall short, however, of Giri and Uffordâs proposal that aid practice should provide an opportunity for self-transformation of both aid recipients and workers.16 Arguably, both Chambersâ concept of responsible well-being, with its emphasis on the moral responsibility and personal change of individuals, and Giri and Uffordâs view that aid practice ought to include transformation of the aid worker self, do not seem to have triggered the kind of broad response from researchers, aid agencies or aid workers as they might have.17 There may be a number of reasons for this; one could be that the demand for aid workersâ personal transformation sits uneasily within key development paradigms, which are aimed at changing not oneself, but an Other. As international aid is fuelled by the imperative to change the lives of the poor, its narratives do not usually feature changes in aid workers themselves. It may be part of a deeper reluctance to consider aid workersâ selves, which I return to below.
The approaches mentioned above tend to be normative, that is, aimed at changing individual actorsâ attitudes, partly on the basis of ethical codes. Others have adopted a more analytical stance, which frames the personal such that aid actorsâ subjectivities and relationships need to be understood in order to make them operational for the aid process. While they all recognise the personal dimension as an important component of good aid delivery, the second kind of approach draws on analytical insights in order to improve practice. This places emphasis on the agency of individual development actors, but through taking it into account, rather than relying on personal change. Long suggests that, since the mindsets of practitioners and researchers are shaped by their own interpretations, âthe trick of good development practice and ethnography alike is to learn how to turn such subjectivities to analytical advantageâ. He notes that an actor-oriented approach is useful as it âhelps us to determine the degree to which specific actorsâ lifeworlds, organizing practices and cultural perceptions are relatively autonomous of or ââcolonizedââ by wider ideological, institutional and power framesâ.18
In a similar vein the approaches adopted by the contributions in this special issue are analytical rather than normative. The aim of this collection is to respond to the call for the âprimacy of the personalâ, but rather than taking its relevance for granted, the articles explore if and how this might matter for development processes. Before returning to this issue in more depth, it is useful to consider why these approaches do not seem to have yet gained much traction or, more generally, why interest in the personal dimension within formal development discourse and policy has been relatively muted. Chambers suggests that âpart of the neglect stems from academic culture with its anathema of evangelism, its value of objectivity, and its search for general rather than individual explanationsâ.19 In addition, he considers other possible reasons such as hypocrisy (as one might be held to the personal changes one is postulating); the lack of a psychological perspective on development, and a lack of capacity among trainers as potential facilitators of personal change. Ultimately, however, he remains unclear why the personal appears as the âCinderella of developmentâ.20 Chambers may be right in pinpointing academiaâs aversion to âevangelismââin the sense of making value-based judgments and aiming to influence othersâbut this does not explain the relative scarcity of analytically oriented accounts.
As indicated above, one reason for the reluctance to focus on the personal is a belief that development is, or should be, essentially a selfless enterprise. It may thus be seen as unduly self-centred, perhaps even distasteful, to dwell on the trials and tribulations of aid practitioners, especially international (rather than local) ones. This position is expressed most emphatically in Vauxâs account, The Selfish Altruist. He argues that a precondition for good aid is the self-effacement of the aid worker, because âin order to understand the person in need ⌠we need to obliterate our own selfâ. An altruistic attitude thus involves a âminimizing of the selfâ and increasing awareness of the âotherâ.21 Such abandonment or obliteration of self in aid work is necessary so âaid workers can do their job without interference of personal distortionsâ.22
While this might be an implicit and pervasive view, it is problematic insofar as it is apparently based on an understanding of aid which has altruistic, well-meaning individuals at its heart. As has been argued, however, good intentions are never enough (and can indeed be harmful). In this sense a fundamentally altruistic view of aid, which arguably underpins popular imaginations and the self-definitions of aid agencies and workers alike, with its moral imperative not to give undue attention to aid workers appears not just simplistic, but ultimately unprofessional. This is demonstrated by the fact that other professions whose members may at least be partly motivated by a âhelpingâ imperative, such as nursing, counselling or social work, have established academic debates as well as systems of practice which focus on the âhelperâ in order to improve recruitment, reduce turnover, and generally enable sustainability of their profession. These include nurse mentoring, supervision of social workers, as well as therapy and supervision for counsellors and therapists. This is not considered inappropriately self-centred, but a rational measure which is integral to ensuring good work practice. A comparable response to the question of the personal in aid work would not be calls to obliterate or ignore the aid worker self, but attempts to understand its efficacy in the process, and account for it accordingly.23
Recent debates on the professionalisation of relief and development work have not led to a greater acknowledgement of the role of the personal; in fact, they may have contributed to relegating ...