Representation and Democracy in the EU

Does one come at the expense of the other?

Richard Bellamy, Sandra Kröger

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9780367739522
• eBook ISBN: 9781317580751
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book explores the various ways in which citizens are represented in EU policy-making. Most accounts naturally focus on the European Parliament as the prime source of democratic representation. This collection focuses instead on four other channels that are as and often more important: namely, representation via governments, national parliaments, civil society organisations and directly, via referenda. Based on original research, the book combines democratic theory with detailed empirical analysis to provide an innovative, timely and up-to-date evaluation of the nature of representation in the EU.

Policy advisors, practitioners and those scholars interested in democracy and the European Union will find this volume to be a valuable resource.

This book was published as a special issue of the Journal of European Integration.

Representation Deficits and Surpluses in EU Policy-making

RICHARD BELLAMY* & SANDRA KRÖGER**

*Department of Political Science, University College London (UCL), UK;

**Politics Department, University of Exeter, UK

ABSTRACT Representation and democracy are not always complementary. Sometimes the one undermines the other. Too much democracy can create a representation deficit, as occurs when majorities oppress or neglect minorities. However, the opposite can also arise. The over representation of different groups can undermine the processes whereby representatives are authorised by and accountable to those they are supposed to serve. The EU offers multiple channels of representation. In some respects, this multiplicity reflects the diversity of the peoples, individuals and interests represented within the EU. Yet in overcoming a potential representation deficit in EU policy-making, this arrangement leads to a representation surplus and creates a democratic deficit.

The European Union (EU) has been diagnosed as suffering from a democratic deficit ever since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. Opinions abound as to the origins and severity of this malaise. Some commentators have ascribed this deficit to a failure to institutionalise representative democracy fully at the EU level by rendering the competences of the European Parliament (EP) analogous to those of national parliaments (NPs) (Lodge 1994); others have identified the deficit in the lack of a European demos, which depending on their perspective either could or could not be overcome (Weiler 1995); while still others have located the deficit at the domestic level and bemoaned the incursions of the integration process on the powers of national representative institutions (Neunreither 1994). This introduction adds to this debate by arguing that much of this discussion reflects and interacts with a more specific concern with what we shall call the EU’s representation deficits, of which the democratic deficit is both a cause and a symptom. As we shall see, democracy and representation do not easily coexist and indeed can work to the detriment of each other.

Although most contemporary democracies describe themselves as representative democracies, as does the EU in the Lisbon Treaty, the conceptual and empirical compatibility of these two terms is far from self-evident (Bobbio 1987). Historically, thinkers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau considered representation as intrinsically elitist because it displaces the direct involvement of citizens in collective decision-making (Rousseau 1968, 141). From this perspective, representation creates a democratic deficit by its very nature. The eventual linkage of representation with democracy was a product of contingent developments, most notably the gradual emergence of territorially confined nation states and competitive party systems (Hobson 2008; Rokkan 1974). The French and American Revolutions offered the intellectual and political context in which democratic government came to be envisioned and institutionalised as representative government (Urbinati 2004). What we today call the standard model of representative democracy materialised from these circumstances. According to this model, the democratic credentials of representatives could be assured by having credible electoral mechanisms for their authorisation and accountability. So conceived, representative democracy was viewed not simply as a second best adaption of direct democracy to the size and complexity of modern polities, but also a superior form of democracy whereby popular sovereignty was linked to the benefits of expertise associated with a division of labour between rulers and ruled that allowed for the professionalisation of politicians.

Nevertheless, doubts have arisen about the effectiveness of this linkage from the beginning. On the one hand, the electoral mechanism has been criticised for offering inadequate control over representatives. They have been regarded as forming a class apart, concerned solely with the pursuit of power or the perquisites of office (Mair 2006), and susceptible to capture by special interests with disproportionate influence or lobbying power, such as the financial sector, with whom they often have close personal links (Parry 1969). This first kind of representation deficit we term the elitist deficit. It arises when popular views are under-represented because elites either only represent their own interests or those of small but influential groups, such as bankers. On the other hand, the electoral mechanism has been attacked for exercising too much control over representatives. They become encouraged to strike populist attitudes that pander to popular prejudices and become reluctant to sacrifice short term gains for long term advantages (Brittan 1975). This second kind of representation deficit we term the populist deficit. It arises when unpopular views – of minorities or of expertise – are under-represented.

In different ways, which we explore below, both shortcomings can be regarded as involving a failure of representatives to represent the interests of the political community as a whole, thereby producing a representation deficit. Yet, in the first case it derives from a democratic deficit, in which majority opinion fails to get adequately represented, in the second from what could be called a democratic surplus, in which majority opinion is overly represented. The traditional solutions have been to supplement or constrain the electoral process respectively in ways that depart from the standard model for the democratic authorisation and accountability of representatives. However, as we shall see, each of these solutions threatens the balance between representation and democracy found in the standard model, and in addressing their respective problems risks introducing those associated with the other representation deficit.

Views differ as to how far the EU itself manifests these problems (e.g. Lord 2008; Moravcsik 2008), and the degree to which the integration process is their source (Scharpf 2009) or their solution (Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik 2009) within the member states (MS). Criticisms of the operation of the standard model of representative democracy have been even harsher with regard to the EU than they are in the case of the MS (Follesdal and Hix 2006). The predominance of domestic issues and parties in European elections, the EU’s multilevel nature, the fact that legislative proposals come from the Commission and are subject to co-decision by the Council of Ministers and the EP, among other features, have all resulted in voters often finding it difficult to know what European policies an individual politician or party stands for, let alone to identify which decisions, if any, they can be held responsible for. As a result, a potential representation deficit of the first elitist kind has seemed especially compelling given the wide authority enjoyed by national executives and the remote, complex and hard to follow decision-making processes of the EU. One solution would be to move the EU towards the standard model by electing a European government via direct elections to the EP, thereby abolishing the European Council and the Commission in its current form. However, though long advocated by dedicated European Federalists, only a few regard it as likely in the short term (Duff 2012; Habermas 2012), and many doubt its likelihood, workability or desirability in the long term (Mair and Thomassen 2010b).

Therefore, while the standard model within the EU has been strengthened as the EP has progressively gained more powers, attention among academics and EU policy-makers has turned increasingly to alternative channels and forms of representation that might overcome the distinctive representation deficits of the Council, the Commission and the EP (Kröger and Friedrich 2013a; Mair and Thomassen 2010a). Three have proved particularly important, addressing each of these bodies respectively. First, NPs have been formally recognised in the Lisbon Treaty as having a role within the representative structure of EU decision-making and have been given new powers to police the integration process. In this channel, the aim has been to strengthen the standard model of representative democracy with regard to one of its historical weaknesses – the discretion of executives with regard to foreign, and specifically EU, affairs. As a result, parliaments have become more proactive in ensuring their governments accurately represent the views of parliaments and citizens when negotiating in Brussels. Second, the Commission has increasingly defended its legitimacy on the grounds that it is precisely the comparative isolation of the EU’s decision-making from democratic pressures that helps it overcome a representation deficit of the second, populist, kind by offering a model of expert, efficient, and equitable good governance. Yet, to demonstrate its continued representativeness of the public as a whole it has increasingly consulted with civil society organisations (CSOs) which have a particular interest in the policies that fall within the EU’s competence. Though rarely authorised or accountable in the standard sense, CSOs have been seen as offering a more participatory way of gauging the views of citizens on a given issue and even for mobilising a transnational or pan-European constituency around it. Finally, the EU has begun to experiment with more direct forms of citizen involvement, such as the citizens’ initiatives and referenda, that address a representation deficit of the first, elitist, kind through bypassing the use of representatives altogether and allowing citizens to represent themselves.

This special issue explores examples of all three of these innovations. While some regard them as a second best to the development of the standard model of representative democracy at the EU level, and even as further intensifying the democratic deficit by muddying the lines of authorisation and accountability (Bellamy 2010; Kröger and Friedrich 2013b), others view them as part of a further transformation of democracy (Dahl 1989, ch. 6; Bohman 2007). They mirror the use of similar stratagems within the MS to overcome the two representation deficits produced by the standard model by various forms of direct democracy, on the one hand, and non-majoritarian regulators, courts and independent central banks, on the other. They claim these developments may have weakened the influence of the electoral process upon the choice of EU representatives, as per the standard model, but they have done so in ways that have enhanced the representativeness of the system as a whole (Moravcsik 2008). Indeed, they regard the EU’s multiple and complex channels of representation as improving the representativeness of not only the EU but also the MS. They help overcome the capture of national governments by powerful domestic groups, enhance the avenues for representation and the resources of expertise available to excluded minorities, and give a voice to the citizens of other countries affected by the domestic decisions of a MS other than their own who would otherwise have no way of influencing them at all (Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik 2009). In other words, the apparent democratic deficit of the EU is simply a function of its tackling the representation deficits within both the EU and the MS.

As a preliminary to examining the different views sketched above, we shall describe further the two representation deficits below, along with their relationship to persisting tensions between representation and democracy. We shall then apply this perspective to the analysis of the EU’s system of representation. As we shall see, the EU provides numerous and potentially conflicting channels of representation, some of which seek to address a democratic deficit and others a democratic surplus – potential or actual – while attempting to enhance the representative nature of the system as a whole. This evaluation – like that of the articles in this special issue – is necessarily normative as well as empirical, since the various standards of democracy and representation employed reflect normative criteria. Our claim will be that there is often a trade-off between the representativeness of a political system and its democratic responsiveness, and that to some degree the EU is moving towards a representation surplus that needs rebalancing in the direction of democracy.

The Two Representation Deficits of Representative Democracy

As we noted, the tension between representation and democracy has been overcome in standard models of representative democracy via an electoral process for authorising representatives and holding them to account. This process has rested in its turn on certain assumptions about political equality and the nature of the demos. To respect democratic norms, a system of representation needs to offer a form of government that citizens can perceive to be both ‘of’ and ‘for’ the people. The process whereby representatives are chosen must be such that citizens can see their interests and views are treated with equal concern and respect, and the decisions their representatives make must promote policies that taken overall can be defended as promoting the equal advancement of those views and interests (Dahl 1989, ch. 3; Christiano 2008). Therefore, as Article 9 of the Lisbon Treaty recognises, political equality provides the meta-norm of representative democracy (Lord and Pollak 2010, 126).

Both ontological and epistemological conditions concerning the nature of the demos ground this emphasis on political equality. Ontologically, the basis for giving everyone an equal say in the collective decision-making process stems from the assumption that all have a roughly equal stake in those decisions, at least as a package if not in each and every one (Christiano 2008, 78–88). Epistemologically, this criterion assumes that each citizen is the best judge of his or her own interests, if not necessarily of how they might be best met then of those potential representatives most likely to find ways to meet them and of their success or failure in doing so (Christiano 2008, 88–100). If both conditions regarding the demos hold, the decision-makers and decisions preferred by the majority of the people on the basis of an equal vote will be those most likely to promote their collective interest (Dahl 1989, chs. 8 and 10; Christiano 2008, ch. 6).

A representation deficit arises when either the process fails to offer voters a choice of representatives that reflects equal concern and respect for their various views and interests, or their representatives fail to promote policies that advance them on an equal basis. That may occur due to a lack of responsiveness in the system for selecting representatives, or because either the ontological or the epistemological conditions do not apply. Lack of responsiveness usually involves the tyranny of the minority resulting from the capture of the system by a particularly influential group – either directly, through their presence within the political class, or indirectly, through their power over it. It corresponds to the first, elitist, kind of representative deficit noted above. This deficit is invoked when critics complain - rightly or wrongly – that democratic politicians of all parties form an elite that serves its own interests and those of other members of the elite rather than the people more generally (Parry 1969). By contrast, the absence of the ontological and epistemological conditions is most associated with the tyranny of the majority and populism, and the consequent neglect of either intense or discrete minorities, or the pursuit of short-term benefits that prove costly in the long-term. Thus, the second, populist, kind of representation deficit has two forms. Representation deficit of type 2A results from the absence of the ontological condition. It occurs when citizens have unequal stakes or apply quite different criteria to assessing policies that reflect cultural differences. In such circumstances, the risk that populist majorities may exert majority tyranny over consistent minorities is greatly increased. This concern is often voiced by minority national groups in multinational systems, such as the French Canadians in Quebec or the Scots in the UK. Representation deficit of type 2B results from the absence of the epistemological condition. It occurs when myopia or misinformation or some other cognitive failing means that citizens may press representatives to act against the general long term interest, or be susceptible to their doing so for electoral advantage. A standard example is the temptation for governments to ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Citation Information
• 1. Representation Deficits and Surpluses in EU Policy-making
• 2. ‘An Ever Closer Union Among the Peoples of Europe’: Republican Intergovernmentalism and Demoicratic Representation within the EU
• 3. The Pitfalls of Representation as Claims-Making in the European Union
• 4. Bicameral or Tricameral? National Parliaments and Representative Democracy in the European Union
• 5. A New Type of Representative Democracy? Reconsidering the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union
• 6. Representation in the European State of Emergency: Parliaments against Governments?
• 7. Creating a European Demos? The Representativeness of European Umbrella Organisations
• 8. Making the Environment Present: Political Representation, Democracy and Civil Society Organisations in EU Climate Change Politics
• 9. What Determines Demand for European Union Referendums?
• Index