Introduction
Godfrey Baldacchinoa and Eve Hepburnb
aIsland Studies Programme, University of Prince Edward Island, 550 University Avenue, Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, C1A 4P3, Canada; bSchool of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh, 21 George Square, Edinburgh EH8 9LD, UK
What are the strategies, modalities and aspirations of island-based, stateless nationalist and regionalist parties in the twenty-first century? Political independence is now easier to achieve, even by the smallest of territories; yet, it is not so likely to be pursued with any vigour by the worldâs various persisting sub-national (and mainly island) jurisdictions. Theirs is a pursuit of different expressions of sub-national autonomy, stopping short of independence. And yet, a number of independence referenda are scheduled, including one looming in Scotland in autumn 2014.
Divisible sovereignty?
With the independence of South Sudan in 2011, the United Nations (UN) now has 193 members; but the International Olympic Committee (IOC) has 204 âNational Olympic Committeesâ (NOCs) within its membership. South Sudan is, in fact, so far the only recognised sovereign state and UN member not to have an NOC: Guor Marial, a marathon runner from South Sudan, had to compete under the Olympic Flag in the 2012 London Olympics (BBC Sport, 2012).
Meanwhile, 12 other ânationsâ have their own NOCs, even though they may not be widely recognised, or not recognised at all, as sovereign states. These are: Taiwan (replaced in the UN by the Peopleâs Republic of China in 1971 and recognised as a state by 22 UN members); Palestine (which has full diplomatic relations with 106 UN states); the US Territories of American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico and US Virgin Islands; the UK Overseas Territories of Bermuda, (British) Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands; Aruba (a âcountryâ within the Kingdom of the Netherlands); Hong Kong (a special administrative region of the Peopleâs Republic of China) and the Cook Islands (in âfree associationâ with New Zealand). Following rule changes in 1996, the IOC has henceforth only accepted members that are also recognised as sovereign states by the UN, but the rule is not applied retroactively. There are at least 14 other âcountriesâ and/or regions that have âOlympic Committeesâ but are not recognised by the IOC: Abkhazia, Anguilla, Catalonia, French Polynesia, Gibraltar, Kosovo, Kurdistan, Montserrat, Native Americans, Niue, Northern Cyprus, Northern Marianas, Somaliland and the Turks and Caicos Islands. Other âstateless nationsâ such as Scotland have also been agitating for their own Olympic Team.
What may initially come across as slippage and inconsistency however highlights the real difficulties in looking at sovereignty as something indivisible, much like binary computer code. It is either 0 or 1: one is either sovereign or is not, with no room for dithering in between. Yet, timely improvements have been advised in how âsovereigntyâ is measured, and the glib and reductionist use of dichotomous (sovereign/non-sovereign) variables has been cautioned against (Armstrong et al., 1998: 639, 641; Armstrong & Read, 2005, passim). The European Union has developed into a more flexible, yet more complex, âmulti-speedâ institution with various countries enjoying various levels of opt-out (e.g. Warleigh, 2002), and more of this may yet unfold in the current euro crisis. Decades ago, Willoughby and Fenwick (1974) identified various candidates for ârestricted sovereigntyâ or âcolonial autonomyâ. In reviewing such cases as Taiwan, Palestine but also Bosnia, Tibet and Hong Kong, Krasner (2001) speaks of âproblematic sovereigntyâ. Lake (2003: 310) suggests a gradation, or âa continuum of increasing hierarchy in international relationsâ. He also warns (ibid.: 314) that âanomalies may be more commonplace than we often realizeâ. Dommen (1985) had proposed a stratified continuum of jurisdictions, including a rather vacuous category of âmore or less independentâ jurisdictions. Kerr (2005: 504) undertakes a similar exercise, using actual cases to illustrate different points on his continuum.
Indeed, unusual authority relations are quite typical in todayâs international domain; and the rationale for their existence and operation may be steadily increasing. Ong (2004) has identified a tendency on the part of governments to condone a progressively more variegated zonal capitalism or âgraduated sovereigntyâ; this has been described geographically as a âcomplex and uneven experience of selective boundary crossings, subjectivities and exclusionsâ (Sidaway, 2007: 352).
In the complex game of politics, what impacts on the disposition of governments to condone constituent parts of their territory to assume autonomy, up to the point that they may be sovereign in all but name? After all, initiatives for devolution do not usually happen in an unsolicited fashion. They may be triggered by strong demands for self-determination, strong and historically traced grounds for cultural and linguistic specificity amongst national groupings within the state, a withdrawal from former colonial relationships and/or a pragmatic response to the difficulties of operating a unitary state mechanism in such contexts.
In such matters, independence-leaning movements and political parties can make a difference. They may reflect existing nationalistic sentiments on the ground, as well as agitate for their ascendency in national or regional political contests. In exceptional circumstances, they may secure political power and manoeuvre their nation towards independence. However, sometimes gaining government incumbency is more of a hindrance than an advantage for independence-seeking parties: in order to win the next election, they must prove that they have done a good job â without being independent â which may inadvertently âcontainâ their aspirations if the electorate is content with their performance (Hepburn, 2010a).
The Scottish National Party (SNP) now finds itself in this position: having secured a majority of seats in the May 2011 elections to the Scottish Parliament, it has committed itself to an âindependence referendumâ in autumn 2014 (e.g. Scottish Parliament, 2012). In this situation, it joins territories like Bougainville (with an independence referendum envisioned by the Peace Agreement with Papua New Guinea, scheduled between 2015 and 2020) and New Caledonia (with its independence referendum expected between 2014 and 2019). However, the SNP faces a considerable challenge in persuading the electorate to choose âfreedomâ from the UK; public opinion polls consistently show that independence is a minority preference; most Scottish voters instead prefer the option of further strengthening the Scottish Parliament through a form of âmaximum devolutionâ, including more substantial fiscal powers. Indeed, polls suggest that the London Olympics 2012 may have had a negative impact on support for independence. Former UK Prime Minister and Scot, Gordon Brown, even went so far as to claim that the âpooling and sharingâ of national resources and expertise â exemplified by âTeam GBâ â is a reason to oppose Scottish independence (Higgens & Carrell, 2012). But even he would not argue against augmenting Scotlandâs autonomy within the Union.
Particular cases such as Scotland aside, one cannot help noting that many such candidates for increased autonomy are relatively small islands or archipelagos. Their distinct and discrete physicality, at times fairly remote from the administrative centre of their associated metropolitan country, makes them likely to secure separate administrative status as well as facilitate the generation of considerable local identity: the stage is therefore set for autonomy claims, and for a clearly identified territory over which such claims are meant to operate.
This special collection of papers was inspired by a deep seated curiosity to find out more about the function of independence movements in the twenty-first century. This follows the editorsâ own complementary research interests in sub-national island jurisdictions (or SNIJs) and stateless nationalist and regional parties (or SNRPs), respectively (Baldacchino & Milne, 2009; Baldacchino, 2010; Hepburn, 2010a, 2010b). And, with the eventuality of a Scottish independence referendum a distinct political reality, an international workshop was convened â most Ă propos â at the University of Edinburgh, Scotland, in September 2011, to discuss the dynamics of independence movements in SNIJs. The workshop brought together political activists and academics to discuss the strategies, modalities and aspirations of island SNRPs in the twenty-first century. They considered the opportunities and challenges to independence in an area of supranational integration and globalisation, and compared and contrasted these with different expressions of sub-national autonomy. The papers first presented at this workshop, and now revised and edited for this collection, investigated the role and impact of (nascent) nationalism in the context of domestic politics, as well as broader international influences, such as European integration. They also critically examined a number of âbest practicesâ in island sub-national autonomy and capacity in relation to significant policy areas. All in all, this was a uniquely stimulating forum for an exchange of ideas between academics and practitioners.
Acknowledgements
We are very grateful to the following organisations that have supported the workshop âIsland independence movements and parties in an age of European integration and globalisationâ, held on 8â10 September 2011 at the University of Edinburgh, Scotland: Dr David Howarthâs Jean Monnet Chair, the Jean Monnet Centre for Excellence at the Europa Institute, and the College of Humanities and Social Sciences, all at the University of Edinburgh; the Madison Trust. We thank Mike MacKenzie (MSP, Highlands and Islands) and Franciscu Sedda (political activist with IndipendĂ©ntzia RepĂșbrica de Sardigna, IRS) for sharing their political insights on the subject matter at the workshop. We are also grateful to Michael Keating and David Milne for their insightful comments during and after the workshop. Finally, we thank Harvey W. Armstrong, John Connell, Anwen Elias, Sieglinde Gstöhl, Pertti Joenniemi, Nicola McEwen, Bernard Poirine and Paul K. Sutton for helping review all manuscripts prior to publication. The usual disclaimers apply.
We also especially thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) for supporting the research with a Standard Research Grant titled âOffshoring strategies from/for sub-national island jurisdictionsâ awarded to Godfrey Baldacchino in 2007.
Finally, we thank James Chiriyankandath and Roger Charlton, co-editors of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics (CCP), as well as Stephen Thompson at Taylor and Francis, for the opportunity to publish our work in a special issue of CCP as well as a stand-alone Routledge volume.
Content review
This collection kicks off with a comparative examination by Jerome L. McElroy and Courtney E. Parry of the socioeconomic profiles for 25 dependent island jurisdictions and 30 sovereign island states, all with populations of less than one million. The evidence presented is clear: the non-sovereign cluster now manifests âconsistently superior performanceâ; whereas the same performance indicators were decidedly reversed in favour of the larger, soon-to-be sovereign islands back in the period 1945â85. What exactly has happened to bring about this reversal of fortune merits further research; meanwhile, the âmaterial advantageâ is not conducive to entertaining intimations of sovereignty in the current period.
In this scenario, then, we should not be surprised that independence movements and parties in non-sovereign island territories are âwithering on the vineâ. This is the argument proposed by Peter Clegg in his contribution, focussing on the Caribbean, where sub-national units belonging to France, the Netherlands, the UK and the USA continue to persist, and thrive. Popular calls and overriding motivations for reform have not been directed towards the securing of independence but, are rather fuelled by an âinter-island antipathy and rivalry, and insular particularismâ. There is hardly any desire to break away from the respective metropole.
A similar story unfolds in the broad insular Pacific: as Stephen Levine argues in his contribution, there are various âsemi-sovereignâ island territories (some of which are SNIJs, but some of which are fully fledged sovereign states) in the region and they can be realistically expected to continue their economically oriented diplomacy into the foreseeable future. The presence of âexternal powersâ â Britain, Chile, France, Indonesia and the USA â restricts full sovereignty, which providing an impetus to the semi-sovereign territories to seek some inroads into self-determination that however do not threaten their political status.
The situation is, however, somewhat different in the French Pacific. As discussed by Nathalie Mrgudovic in this collection, there has never been any pro-independence group or political party in Wallis and Futuna; but proindependence movements have, since the 1980s, âevolved from illegal movements to democratically elected political forces wielding political power at every level of governanceâ in both New Caledonia and French Polynesia. With the Cook IslandsâNew Zealand relationship in mind, nationalist forces in both islands are probably heading towards some kind of status of sovereignty association with France.
The situation is extremely different in the Mediterranean, where independence movements in the Balearics, Corsica and Sardinia must contend not just with their respective metropoles â Barcelona, Madrid, Paris and Rome â but with the European Union of which they form part and where pooled sovereignty limits room for manoeuvre. As AndrĂ© Fazi makes clear in his contribution, however, one cannot judge these movements simply on the basis of their ideological underpinnings and (not so strong) electoral support; they do have an impact on the policies of other, more mainstream parties, as well as the political system as a whole; and this, perhaps, is the best that they can hope for.
Still in Europe, Maria AckrĂ©n and Bjarne Lindström take us with their contribution to Scandinavia in order to critically review the tensions in the islandâmainland relations of three different island jurisdictions: Ă
land, Faroes and Greenland. While the latter two territories are on a gradualist but steady path towards looser ties with Denmark, their metropolitan state, Ă
land may be obliged towards âa gradual adaptation to the linguistic and political realitiesâ of metropolitan Finland despite the recent growth in support of an Ă
landic independence party.
Next is a âwhat ifâ contribution: Britt Cartrite examines the likely implications of a successful 2014 independence referendum in Scotland on the rest of the British Isles: and especially so on the outlying archipelagos of Orkney and Shetland that have maintained strong Norse identities and cultures that are distinct from the Gaelic identity of northern and western Scotland, and which have demonstrated antipathy towards the Scottish nationalist project. âAn extension of the same logic used to justify an independent Scotlandâ may very well manifest itself there, triggering a âdomino effectâ.
Do the travails of island states and territories have any bearing on the political evolutions and trajectories of other, non-island jurisdictions? In his contribution, Barry Bartmann describes the sovereignty march of another cluster of small jurisdictions: the European microstates. The case is convincingly made: differences in country size are no longer significant in dealing with claims for sovereignty. But there are âhuge economic differencesâ between the European microstates and the worldâs small island developing states, and this also impacts on the latterâs ability to pursue their diplomatic relations. Being sovereign is, therefore, not enough: sovereignty needs to be well managed, and âthe resourcefulness of jurisdictionâ needs to be properly exploited.
Bringing up the rear, Godfrey Baldacchino and Eve Hepburn look back but also forward. Not many small territories are likely to deliberately cut off their lucrative connections to their current metropolitan patrons; but many will continue to agitate for enhanced and improved opportunities for self-determination, even as the metropolitan powers seek to use their financing â apart from their sheer political clout â as leverage towards the pursuit of social reform, fiscal responsibility and the upholding of good governance practices.
With a sovereigntist party just retu...