Contemporary Sociological Thinkers and Theories

Sandro Segre

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9780754671817
• eBook ISBN: 9781317160502
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

This book offers a comprehensive overview of the major theoretical perspectives in contemporary sociology, covering schools of thought or intellectual movements within the discipline, as well as the work of individual scholars. The author provides not only a rigorous exposition of each theory, but also an examination of the scholarly reception of the approach in question, considering both critical responses and defences in order to reach a balanced evaluation. Chapters cover the following theorists and perspectives: ¢ Alexander ¢ Bourdieu ¢ Ethnomethodology ¢ Exchange Theory ¢ Foucault ¢ Giddens ¢ Goffman ¢ Habermas ¢ Luhmann ¢ Merton ¢ Network and Social Capital Theory ¢ Parsons ¢ Rational Choice Theory ¢ Schutz and Phenomenalism ¢ Structuralism ¢ Symbolic Interactionism An accessible and informative treatment of the central approaches in sociology over the course of the last century, this volume marks a significant contribution to sociological theory and constitutes an essential addition to library collections in the areas of the history of sociology and contemporary social theory.

1 The Neofunctionalism of Jeffrey Alexander

DOI: 10.4324/9781315573946-1

Preliminary Remarks

Jeffrey Alexander’s (1947–) reputation as a sociology theoretician is considerable both in the United States and in Europe. Alexander received his university education in the United States, first at Harvard, where, during the 1960s, he had the opportunity to study Marx, Weber, Durkheim, and Parsons in depth. Then he continued his studies at the University of California, Berkeley, where he graduated with a thesis on Parsons. After a first teaching period spent in Los Angeles at the University of California, he is currently teaching at Yale University (Alexander 1998a: 8–10). Alexander is an outstanding representative of the neofunctionalist perspective he personally contributed to formulate, and is well known among sociology theoreticians for his epistemological orientation, which he calls “strong program.”¹

¹ Alexander has also authored, with Kenneth Thompson, A Contemporary Introduction to Sociology (see Alexander and Thompson 2008).

The Neofunctionalist Perspective and the “Strong Program”

The neofunctionalist perspective ensues from the discredit of the functionalist approach, especially in Parsons’ formulation, which the neofunctionalist perspective intends to reformulate. This perspective draws on several elements of Parsons’ theory: the distinction among personality, culture and society; a systematic analysis of the relations existing between culture and society; and differentiation as an essential characteristic of social change (see Joas and Knöbl 2008: 336). Alexander and other representatives of this perspective have charged functionalism with several criticisms, as follows: it contains conservatively oriented and unverifiable ideological assumptions; it presents the social actors as culturally determined, and consequently, not introducing the element of contingency in their theory of social order; it underestimates the relevance of social conflict and change; and it does not sufficiently distinguish between an abstract notion of equilibrium, which may prove useful as an analytical concept, and equilibrium as a condition of really existing societies.

The neofunctionalist program, in the formulation given by Alexander (who mentions in this regard also some other authors, especially Luhmann), has tried to make up for these deficiencies in different ways. The voluntaristic, symbolic and contingent aspects of action, as enunciated by Parsons but not sufficiently considered in his theory, have been taken into greater account. Greater importance has been attached to elements of strain and conflict, considered inherent in society, rather than to equilibrium and social integration factors. Different interpretations of Weber and Durkheim from those formulated by Parsons have been proposed. Greater attention has been paid to Marx’s epistemological teachings and to the micro-sociological theoretical schools of thought. The neofunctionalist program of studies and research includes, in Alexander’s opinion, a new definition and conceptualization of the relations between culture and society, in which no integration is assumed (as Parsons does). Instead, the elements of tension existing both among subcultures, and between the social and the cultural system, are carefully considered.

Furthermore, the neofunctionalist program involves a critical reinterpretation of Parsons’ contributions which does not intend to reiterate Parsons’ fundamental error. According to Parsons (in Alexander’s opinion), the normative elements of social reality have ultimately greater importance than instrumental elements (Alexander 1983b: 272). This critical reinterpretation is focused on social change (the contingent aspects and the possible dysfunctional consequences of which are particularly stressed), political sociology (Parsons’ arguments about the stability of the democratic system are questioned) and profession sociology (the conflicting relations existing within single professions and among different professions, and the importance of particular interests in professionals’ behaviors are highlighted) (Alexander 1984: 21–3; 1985a, 1998a: 216–28; Alexander and Colomy 1990: 44–55; 1998: 65–76; 2004: 207–208). This neofunctionalist program of studies is “multidimensional,” in the sense that it intends to provide non-reductionist descriptions, explanations and interpretations of social life in relation to the problems of action and social order.

Conversely a reductionist program explains these problems, whether referring to conditions that are external to the actors and cannot be changed by them, or only to internal conditions, such as interiorized social norms, but not to both kinds of conditions at the same time. The “strong program” claims the autonomy of culture from any social determination, and involves consequently a new way to carry out sociological investigations. It conceives action as the product of actors’ voluntary commitment to achieve goals or put moral norms into effect; but at the same time, action is constrained or affected by an external environment. This epistemological program concerns social sciences as a whole, without making distinctions among different disciplines, and demands to be systematically referred to the subjective meanings, which the actors, whether individually or collectively, give to reality, and to pay attention to the constraints the actors meet with in their social life.

Cultural products, which originate from the scientific community a scholar belongs to, are included in this program of studies. Investigations conforming to the “strong program” move from the epistemological assumption that knowledge produced within the sphere of social sciences – in the sense of understanding and explaining social reality – requires a particular interpretation of cultural phenomena. This interpretation should highlight that cultural phenomena are socially produced; they are, however, not determined by the social structure and, in general, by the contents and the meanings of social life. Cultural phenomena have therefore their own autonomy toward such meanings and contents. It is assumed that culture itself shapes social life, and forms an environment that is internal to the actor, and analytically distinguished from it.

The “strong program” attaches great relevance to meanings, symbols, narratives, beliefs and ideologies, collective representations, and in general, to the cultural aspects of social life. The “strong program” seeks to interpret and reconstruct the details of the constitutive elements of culture by identifying its individual and collective actors, and taking into account the hierarchies and the social institutions that mediate the relation between actors and culture. A methodology conforming to the “strong” program involves a set of procedural practices. There is, in the first place, an identification of the relevant social actors. A careful and thick description, a reconstruction and interpretation of the meanings to be attributed to a particular set of relations, and an investigation of the social consequences that directly come from those meanings, are also necessary.

In other words, a causal investigation seeks to highlight the immediate cultural causes of events that occur in the social world, based on a careful and detailed reconstruction of the culturally mediated meanings the actors give to their actions and experiences in those particular circumstances. Social causes, or causes relating to the social structure, which are emphasized by weak programs, have only an indirect relevance for the “strong program,” in the sense of subjecting the symbolic-cultural structures to continuous pressures and changes with particular and historically contingent results (Alexander 1982a: 65–7; 1987: 11–15; 1988b: 36; 1990: 25–6; 1998a: 214–18; 2005; Alexander and Smith 2003: 12–14; Cordero et al. 2008). We shall focus in this chapter on this multidimensional orientation, and on the theoretical and empirical research which Alexander has conducted in keeping with this approach. The theme of collective representations, on which the author has dwelt in his latest works, will be also considered (Alexander 2004, 2009). Finally, we shall provide some information on the reception of his work.²

² Introductions to Alexander’s sociological thought can be found in Camarda 1992; Cisneros and Pérez Fernández del Castello 2000; Colomy 2005; Colomy and Turner 1998; Donati 1990.

“Strong Program,” Cultural Sociology, and Post-Positivism

If by culture is meant a system of significant symbols, its sociological study, called “Cultural Sociology” has been pursued by Alexander keeping to the “strong” program. An effort is made to keep explicit the distinction between analyses placed at different levels of generality or abstraction. Alexander makes a distinction between these different levels. Presuppositions are placed at the highest generality level. They are assumptions concerning the nature and the meanings of social reality as regards the nature of action and social order, and consequently the opportunities and the constraints actors (whether individuals or communities) meet with by relating with others. Presuppositions are of a metaphysical nature, and therefore cannot be empirically validated, but they contribute to produce theories by inspiring and guiding the notions drawn from the empirical world. They are useful in sociology and in social sciences in general, because they establish their epistemological foundations, in the sense that they point out the general standards of validity for these sciences, and provide them with general principles able to subsume principles deriving from lower analytical levels.

In addition, presuppositions produce in the sphere of social sciences the traditions and the research programs that connote each discipline. To this end, they avail themselves of discourses, or arguments, which establish the standards of truth and validity for each discipline, suggest specific research programs, and aim at persuasion. Presuppositions are relevant for dealing with matters of sociological interest placed at all the different analytical levels. The debate on metaphysical presuppositions is recurring in the social sciences, and distinguishes them from natural sciences. The usefulness of debate consists in pointing out these presuppositions, and in showing the opportunity of changing them, if necessary. Progress in social sciences consists in this, according to Alexander. Social changes involve a theoretical change only if they contribute to produce a reformulation of the metaphysical presuppositions. If shared, metaphysical presuppositions also imply sharing the positions that are situated at a lower analytical level, and therefore close to the empirical world. In contrast to the positivist or empiricist conception, according to which theories are based on objectively verifiable facts (and scientific progress is of a cumulative nature, as it involves the elimination of theories not conforming to empirical results), Alexander recalls the results of the post-positivist reflection on the foundations of knowledge.

Theories are generalized discourses which establish the typical validity standards of a social science. Sociological traditions, ideologies, arguments, explanations and debates, which refer back to disciplinary presuppositions, converge in theories. Therefore, theories have unavoidably a non-empirical origin and nature, though they refer to the empirical world, and claim an objective validity for their propositions. “Facts” – or empirical results – are interpreted according to existing theoretical orientations; theories are often preserved, though there are empirical results incompatible with them, through ancillary hypotheses and the formulation of additional analytical categories. Finally, theoretical changes take place not because of new empirical evidences, but because of the scientists’ new epistemological and theoretical orientations.

Differently from positivist epistemology, the post-positivist epistemological approach states the impossibility of any knowledge of the natural or social reality that is not oriented by non-empirical presuppositions. Therefore, it is not sufficient to observe the empirical reality, but it is also necessary to interpret it making use of theoretical knowledge, and to reformulate it taking not only these remarks, but also alternative theories and traditions of thought into account. In the social sciences, the members of the same scientific community must make a “hermeneutic” interpretation, and an effort in mutual understanding, in order to conduct a theoretical investigation. Indeed, only in this way is it possible to make a comparison and establish a dialogue between different research programs and alternative presuppositions. Furthermore, only so does it become possible to explain structures of meaning which escape the control of particular actors (individuals and communities), though they are at the core of power structures. According to Alexander, who adopts a post-positivist epistemological approach, the empirical material highlighted by investigations carried out within the sphere of social sciences not only requires to be understood – it also requires to be interpreted for the public of the members of the same scientific community.

What is empirical takes therefore a symbolic nature, which is essential for its creation, presentation and persuasive capacity before a public of fellow scholars. In general, a symbolic communication made by any actor (whether an individual or a community) in front of any kind of public demands an effective performance and a representation capable of seeming convincing for the public that from time to time is relevant, considering that in modern societies there are a variety of publics for each actor. The success of a collective presentation/performance depends on actors’ (i.e. journalists, leaders of social movements, experts) ability to “merge” – so to say – with the texts they perform and with the public with which they communicate. The successful outcome of a presentation/performance, which is proved by the way this public receives and evaluates it, has political consequences because it strengthens or changes actors’ power and legitimacy (Alexander 1982a: 30–33; 1987a: 1–21, 291–301; 1995: 110–23; 2004b; Reed and Alexander 2009: 38, note 8; Cordero et al. 2008: 532–3).

Ideological orientations are situated at a lower and more specific analytical level than presuppositions. Ideological orientations are, in turn, more generalized (in a decreasing order of abstraction and distance from the empirical world) than models, concepts, definitions, classifications, laws, complex and simple theoretical propositions, methodological assumptions, and finally empirical observational statements, which are therefore influenced in their contents by research programs and scientific traditions. The intention is manifold: firstly, to avoid both their conflation, from which overlapping and confusion would result; secondly, to avoid the reductionism, which would derive from using only a single analytical level; and finally to formulate theories, the presuppositions of which are different and incompatible. This incompatibility is illustrated by the theories that adopt individualistic presuppositions, according to which social order is the result of interactions among individuals.

Collectivistic presuppositions, which state that social order pre-exists to individuals, provide a further illustration. In the first case, it is assumed that action involves a double element of interpretation, through which we aim at understanding the world, and strategization, through which we seek to transform it. Meanwhile, we neglect the constraints the actor encounters in the social and cultural system, which build the environments external to action. In the second case, a material or normative coercive character is imputed to this external environment. Individual action would therefore have no autonomy. In either case, theoretical analysis would not be able to include a different analytical level, and consequently, to formulate a general theory of society. Briefly stated, the result is a reduced explanatory capacity. The deficiencies resulting from the influence of the positivist and empiricist epistemology are recurring in natural and social sciences, and have been a hindrance to their progress.

To this epistemological orientation which he considers wrong and misleading, Alexander counters with his approach called “theoretical logic.” “Theoretical logic” is connoted not only by an explicit reference to the key presuppositions for carrying out an empirical research but also by the persuasion that scientific progress develops in virtue of changes occurring in the empirical and the non-empirical world. The latter is connoted by metaphysical and dogmatic presuppositions – which therefore are not subject to assessment – characterizing any scientific thought. “Theoretical logic” deals with the key sociological themes of action and social order considering all the aforementioned levels of abstraction, and keeping to the “multi-dimensional” approach and to the “strong program” of Alexander’s neofunctionalist perspective. The distinction between sociological theories placed at micro and macro analytical levels becomes therefore irrelevant.

Action is conceived at the same time as a micro-action, in the sense of resulting from the contingent meanings the actors attribute to their experiences, and as a macro-action, in the sense that there are structures w...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Foreword
• 1 The Neofunctionalism of Jeffrey Alexander
• 2 Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002)
• 3 Ethnomethodology
• 4 Exchange Theory
• 5 Michel Foucault (1926–1984)
• 6 Anthony Giddens
• 7 Erving Goffman (1922–1982)
• 8 Jürgen Habermas
• 9 Niklas Luhmann (1927–1998)
• 10 Robert K. Merton (1910–2003)
• 11 Network and Social Capital Theory
• 12 Talcott Parsons (1902–1979)
• 13 Rational Choice Theory
• 14 The Phenomenological Perspective of Alfred Schutz (1899–1959)
• 15 Structuralism in Sociology and Other Social Sciences
• 16 Symbolic Interactionism
• Index of Names
• General Index