John Stuart Mill (Routledge Revivals)

The Politics of Progress

Oskar Kurer

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2016
• eBook ISBN: 9781317204336
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Empiricism in Philosophy

First published in 1991, this book attempts to deal with Mill's thought as a coherent system and tie some elements of his thoughts together. It seeks to show that he developed a set of ethical principles to underlie government intervention and provide a theory as to how it should intervene — which he then applied to practical politics. The first chapters deal with Mill's doctrine of improvement and what impact the improvement of man has on the social organisation of society. The third chapter deals with Mill's theory of economic development. The second part of the book deals with policy issues such as the question of the optimal constitution and Mill's policy proposals for England.

1 The Doctrine of the Improvement of Man

DOI: 10.4324/9781315562438-1

1.1 Introduction

Mill’s views on the progress of history have been very insufficiently analysed. This is rather surprising, since Mill clearly believed in progress as a historical phenomenon and his writings are pregnant with comments on historical trends. Usually, Mill’s lack of “prophetic gifts” is deplored (Berlin, 1959,11), or it is pondered why he failed to write “a system encompassing the evolution of humanity” (Feuer, 1976,86). If we look at Mill as a synthesiser his views on the progress of history become centrally important for understanding his system of thought. It is there that a synthesis of several strands of thought occurs. Mill has to square Bentham’s utilitarianism with two ideas coming from Coleridge: the philosophy of history (Coleridge, 1840,139) and the philosophy of human culture (140). The philosophy of history brings in the idea of evolution; the philosophy of human culture centers around such Romantic concepts as the importance of feelings and morals, individuality, self-expression, self-development and beauty. Out of these three strands of thought Mill forged his own synthesis: happiness becomes identified with intellectual and moral improvement, self-development, self-expression or “individuality.” Similarly, the exaltation of feelings becomes a way to improve moral standards, poetry in this sense being the handmaid of morality. Progress then is simultaneously an increase in happiness, intellectual and moral development, individuality, and the cultivation of feelings, and it manifests itself in history.

That the concept of improvement is a central unifying element in Mill’s system of thought has long been recognised. It was perceived by Morely (1873) who anticipated much of the later debate. It was resurrected by Harris (1956) and Robson (1968). Our description of Mill’s theory of improvement goes, therefore, over ground which is well trodden, since most of the particular concepts and relationships are treated somewhere in the vast Mill literature. What has been attempted here is to create our own synthesis of his doctrine of improvement.

The second point of this chapter is to elucidate the role of the government in the process of improvement. It will be argued that the government, its constitution and its policies, are the motor force of progress. That the government plays such a role is, as far as I can see, nowhere recognised in the analyses of Mill’s thought.

The third point is to argue that Mill saw the process of improvement as a historical phenomenon, and that his views on improvement would be validated by history.

Lastly, we will be interested in the question to what extent this progress in history is predetermined, and to what extent Mill was engaged in producing large scale predictions. There is Popper’s famous claim that Mill epitomised historicism, the belief that “society will necessarily change but along a predetermined path that cannot change, through stages predetermined by inexorable necessity” (Popper,1961,51). Popper argued that the reason why Mill believed in predetermined laws was a confusion between laws and trends (1961,115–119). These arguments were demolished by Ryan (1978,183–185). However, even if Popper’s reasons were wrong, it is still possible that Mill did in fact believe in a preordained process of history. If this were true, large scale predictions about the future become possible. Ryan (1978,183) has pointed out that Mill was notably averse to committing himself to distant prophesies. We will see that this is only partly true.

1.2 The improvement of man

Progress, at its most simple, is an increase in happiness. This, of course, is in the classical tradition. He diverges from this tradition, however, by not being indifferent to what constitutes happiness. In the modern context, Mill stands in the ideal-regarding tradition of utilitarianism. Mill’s aim was to alter wants, not simply to satisfy given wants. Hence Mill would loath the idea that progress can be measured by the increase in the national product. He had no sympathy with the concept of an ever increasing level of consumption of luxury goods chiefly serving ostentation. His ideal was a “comfortable subsistence” for everybody (Examiner, 1831,68; Principles, 1848,754).

Progress includes first and foremost the concept of the improvement of man. Improvement in turn is defined as the advance of man’s intellectual and moral faculties, or what he calls the “national character” (Repr. Government, 1861,243). This, he believed, would add to happiness. Progress, therefore, is associated with improvements in intellectual and moral standards. The advance of civilisation is in the main the continued evolution of the national character towards more intellectual power and a higher standard of ethics.

Whereas we might be able to define intellectual standards by measuring knowledge or reasoning power, what is moral improvement? Essentially it is a shift towards more altruism. Hence a virtuous person will not only promote his own welfare, but will be concerned with the common weal:

As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. … To do as one would be done by, and to love one’s own neighbour as oneself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality.

(Utilitarianism,1863,218)

Such a rule would undoubtedly increase the general well-being, “and if it may possibly be doubted whether a noble character is always happier for its nobleness, there can be no doubt that it makes other people happier, and the world in general is immensely a gainer by it” (Utilitarianism, 1863,213). On average, then, everybody is better off if people follow the utilitarian standard of ethics. This is even more true as the individual not only benefits from the altruism of others, but also from his own: nobleness apparently conveys happiness (Repr. Government, 1861,444; Utilitarianism, 1863,214).

Morality, as Mill saw it, is largely caused by intelligence. He fully agreed with Comte who “deems intellectual progress in no other way so beneficial as by creating a standard to judge the moral sentiments, and a mode of bringing those sentiments effectively to bear on conduct” (On Comte, 1865,322–323).

[H]aving a more developed intelligence, … gives a wider range to the whole of their sentiments, whether self-regarding or sympathetic. By virtue of his superior intelligence, even apart from his superior range of sympathy, a human being is capable of apprehending a community of interest between himself and the human society of which he forms a part.

(Utilitarianism, 1863,248)

The improvement of man is associated with a change of wants, towards what Mill calls the “higher pleasures”. They are opposed to the lower pleasures which appeal to mere sensations or the “animal appetites” (210). Naturally, the higher pleasures, those pursued by improved man, are pleasures of the “intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments” (211). Mill simply looks an the improved man from the standpoint of the activities implied by improvement: cultivating his intellect and “a fellow-feeling with the collective interest of mankind”.

A cultivated mind – I do not mean that of a philosopher, but any mind to which the fountains of knowledge have been opened, and which has been taught, in any tolerable degree, to exercise its faculties – finds sources of inexhaustible interest in all that surrounds it; in the objects of nature, the achievements the arts, the imaginations of poetry, the incidents of history, the ways of mankind, past and present, and their prospects in the future.

(Utilitarianism, 1863,216)

Improved men are happier men, their activities convey more happiness than the pursuit of lower pleasures. The higher pleasures must therefore be better for the individual who experiences them. Pushpin is not as good as poetry: “It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others” (Utilitarianism, 1863,211). There is something in the “intrinsic nature” of poetry which makes it superior to pushpin. However, this superiority in kind, this preponderance of the “intrinsic nature” can only mean that the utility derived from higher pleasures is always greater than that from lower pleasures. This left Mill with the problem of explaining why people indulge in activities like gambling at all, if they are better off reading poetry.

Why do people prefer pleasures which appeal to the animal desires? Mill argued that this is essentially due to negative influences by the environment on the formation of wants.

I believe that before they devote themselves exclusively to one, they have become incapable of the other. Capacity for the nobler feelings is in most natures a very tender plant, easily killed, not only by hostile influences, but by mere want of sustenance; and in the majority of young persons it speedily dies away if the occupations to which their position in life has devoted them … are not favourable to keeping that higher capacity in exercise.

(Utilitarianism, 1863,213)

This argument of course implies that in a certain environment, people will develop a near universal preference for the higher pleasure (212–213).

The important point is that Mill wanted to create an environment which shapes people’s character and therefore their wants in a way that favours the pursuit of an “ideal” set of activities: the higher pleasures. Mill’s proposals are not mainly directed at satisfying given wants, but at changing wants.

Improvement, then, coincides with a shift of preferences from the lower to the higher pleasures. But it is not only the type of activity which is important for the improvement of man, but also the level of activities. Mill decidedly preferred the active character “which struggles against evils, or that which endures them” to “that which bends to circumstances, or that which endeavours to make circumstances bend to itself” (Repr. Government, 1861,407). The active character is conducive to intellectual development.

All intellectual superiority is the fruit of active effort. Enterprise, the desire to keep moving, to be trying and accomplishing new things for our own benefit or that of others, is the parent even of speculative, and much more of practical, talent.

(Repr. Government, 1861,407)

It also leads to moral superiority. The passive one is marked by not desiring what he does not already possess. But

the great mass of seeming contentment is real discontent, combined with indolence or self-indulgence, which, while taking no legitimate means of raising itself, delights in bringing others down to its own level.

(Representative Government, 1861,409)

Mill thought that “as success in life is seen or believed to be the fruit of fatality or accident and not of exertion, in that same ratio does envy develop” (408). An active character is much less liable to be ridden with envy, but more likely to use his own energy to improve himself in “moral excellence” (409). Activity, therefore, is a reason also for moral superiority.

Activities may, of course, be directed exclusively towards satisfying “animal pleasures”, with no gains for the intellect or for morality. But even if

the desires are low placed, if they extend to little beyond physical comfort, and the show of riches, the immediate results … will not be much more than the continual extension of man’s power over material objects; but even this makes room, and prepares the mechanical appliances, for the greatest intellectual and social achievements; and while the energy is there, some persons will apply it and it will be applied more and more, to the perfecting not of outward circumstances alone, but of man’s inward nature.

(Repr. Government, 1861,410)

The active character has found unqualified approval.

Improvement, then, is defined by the intellectual and moral advances of man. The process coincides with a shift in preferences from the lower to the higher ones, and towards a greater level of activity. We are here not concerned whether Mill’s claim that the higher pleasures convey more happiness is tenable or not, but concentrate on the implication of his assertion.¹

1.3 The social conditions of improvement

The main social conditions for improvement are the eradication of poverty, variety and competition.

A necessary condition for the improvement of man is the eradication of poverty: a person develops a taste for the higher pleasures only if he escapes “the positive evils of life, the great sources of physical and mental suffering – such as indigence, disease, and the unkindness, worthlessness, or premature loss of affection” (Utilitarianism, 1863,216). The eradication of poverty is therefore a central element in the programme of improvement, which in general requires increase of national wealth or economic development. The rationale for economic development, therefore, is ultimately to be found in the doctrine of improvement.

The other main conditions for the improvement of man are variety and competition, which constitute the dynamic force of improvement. These arguments are tied in to Mill’s view of psychology.

Man is driven, Mill believed, by a “universal desire of increased material comforts” (Logic,1843,6.9.3). This, however, is clearly not a sufficient condition of progress, as it does not explain existing differences in the level of development.

At its most abstract, Mill tells us that man and environment are continuously shaping each other: “The circumstances in which mankind are placed … form the character of the human beings; but the human beings, in their turn, mould and shape the circumstances for themselves and for those who come after them” (Logic, 1843,913.6.10.3). It is to this interaction between men and environment that we have to look for an explanation of change.

According to Mill’s view of psychology, the environment determines the character of man. If social conditions are completely homogeneous, and have been so for a long time, we would expect a populace with very homogenous characters which in turn shape the environment in a homogenous way. A variety of social conditions, on the other hand, will produce different types of people who in turn will attempt to shape their environment in various different ways according to their different inclinations. This will lead to a perpetuation of varieties in ideas and institutions. If there is variety in society, both with regard to ideas and institutions, there will be competition. Ideas clash and compete with each other. Similarly, different institutions can be viewed as social experim...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Title Page
• Acknowledgements
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Introduction
• 1 The Doctrine of the Improvement of Man
• 2 The Future of Society: Socialism
• 3 The Theory of Economic Progess
• 4 The Policy of Progress in England: The Constitution
• 5 Good Government
• Conclusion
• Appendices
• Bibliography