Beyond Behaviorism

Vicki L. Lee

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781138641280
• eBook ISBN: 9781317247524
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psicologia
• Subtopic: Storia e teoria della psicologia

Originally published in 1988, this title explores and contrasts means and ends psychology with conventional psychology – that of stimuli and response. The author develops this comparison by exploring the general nature of psychological phenomena and clarifying many persistent doubts about psychology. She contrasts conventional psychology (stimuli and responses) involving reductionistic, organocentric, and mechanistic metatheory with alternative psychology (means and ends) that is autonomous, contextual, and evolutionary.

CHAPTER 1 Psychology as Protoscience

DOI: 10.4324/9781315630601-1

Literature of Criticism

Academic psychology has a literature of criticism that is diverse and far-reaching. This literature contains criticisms of specific problems, such as the lack of cumulative progress in psychology (e.g., Koch, 1975; Leary, 1980), the flight from naturalism (e.g., Schoenfeld, 1972), the abundance of jargonized commonsense masquerading as scientific knowledge (e.g., Bode, 1922; Joynson, 1974, pp. 6–13; Shwayder, 1965, pp. 4–5), and the lack of relevance to practical concerns and to daily life (e.g., Ades, 1981; Gaylord-Ross, 1979). The literature contains criticisms of specific fields, such as developmental psychology (e.g., Cairns & Valsiner, 1984), cognitive psychology (e.g., Allport, 1975; Sampson, 1981), social psychology (e.g., Cartwright, 1979; Elms, 1975), and educational psychology (e.g., Ausubel, 1968; Shulman, 1970). The literature also contains criticisms of particular approaches to psychological inquiry, including behaviorism (e.g., MacKenzie, 1977), cognitivism (e.g., Coulter, 1982; Hamlyn, 1981; Skinner, 1977), and humanistic psychology (e.g., Koch, 1971), as well as criticisms of psychology as a whole (e.g., Howard, 1986; Hudson, 1975; Giorgi, 1976, 1984; Joynson, 1974; Koch, 1959, 1971, 1973, 1981; MacLeod, 1965; Sarason, 1981).

The literature of criticism does not concern particular techniques and theories. Rather, it concerns the goals, methods, and achievements of psychology. More fully stated, it concerns what psychology is about, what it is trying to do, how it proposes to do it, and how much progress it has made so far. The literature of criticism expresses uncertainty and despair among psychologists concerning these matters. Indeed, the literature suggests a discipline that is replete with confusion, malaise, doubt, disillusionment, and mutual antagonism, and which lacks enthusiasm, commitment, and shared direction.

The literature of criticism does not enjoy favor in academic psychology. On the contrary, psychologists most often ignore it. Moreover, introduc tory textbooks present psychology as a science making indubitable progress. There is no space dedicated to the doubt and despair evident in parts of the psychological literature. Perhaps such doubt and despair have no place at an introductory level. Yet, the neglect is more widespread. This is evident if only because academic psychology seems to continue as before, unaffected by the criticism. Indeed, the conservative majority often seem to dismiss the critics as a disaffected minority.

For whatever reason, the critical literature has had little effect on the academic mainstream. Some writers (e.g., Carver, 1978; Gergen, 1978; Mishler, 1979; Sherif, 1979) have noted that, despite massive criticism, traditional practices have persisted in psychology. Examples include the persistence of group-statistical research designs, the persistence of a decontextualized approach to human behavior, and the persistence of a commitment to physiological reductionism. The persistence of traditional practices does not reflect the recency of the criticisms. The relevant literature dates back to the early years of this century and gives psychology a long tradition of self-criticism. Of course, the unimpressive effect of this literature is open to interpretation. It might reflect the vacuity of the criticisms. Perhaps the critics do constitute only a disaffected minority that the mainstream can ignore with impunity. At the other extreme, perhaps psychology has become impervious to criticism, persisting in traditional practices despite much criticism. Either way, the criticisms need to be addressed in order to clear the way for a more constructive psychology. Ignoring the criticisms and continuing regardless can only permit doubts to linger about the nature, purpose, and achievements of our discipline.

Disunity

This book does not merely add to the literature of criticism. Psychology does not need another critique that offers no alternative to traditional practices. The present purpose is more constructive. It is to suggest a framework that offers psychology the core of unity it currently lacks. This lack of unity warrants discussion because it is at the heart of psychology’s difficulties. The following discussion should establish the reasons why psychology urgently needs a unifying framework.

Many critics (e.g., Balz, 1940; Giorgi, 1976, 1985; Leary, 1980; Lee, 1985; Lichtenstein, 1980) have noted a lack of unity in psychology. This lack of unity does not amount to incompatible interpretations of particular experiments. More fundamental than that, it has to do with what counts as the subject matter of psychology, with what questions we should ask about this subject matter, with how we should go about finding answers to these questions, with the status of existing psychologi cal knowledge, and with whether psychology can be a science. Psychologists do not agree upon these basic matters. They do not share a common understanding about the subject matter, task, method, and achievements of psychological inquiry. Critics refer to this lack of shared understanding when they speak of psychology’s disunity.

Disunity in psychology does not amount to a lack of the theoretical integration that follows the subsumption of two or more laws under a single theory. Koch (1978) denied psychology the possibility of unity on the grounds that no discipline had achieved unity in this sense. But the theoretical integration of laws under a theory is an advanced stage of inquiry far beyond the current scope of psychology. Some writers (e.g., DeLucca, 1979; Skinner, 1972, pp. 295–313; Spence, 1956, pp. 18–19) have explained that in this sense, theory follows the identification of critical variables and the subsequent formulation of two or more laws. An example is Newton’s integration of the laws of planetary motion and mechanics. Writers who deplore disunity in psychology mean something more preliminary than theoretical integration in this advanced sense. Giorgi (1985) gave the term concinnity to unity in the preliminary sense of having a shared perspective that allows us to integrate otherwise disparate findings. This shared perspective would permit us to relate the results of diverse projects to each other in a meaningful way. Psychology lacks unity in this preliminary sense. It has no unifying theme or organizing principle that will permit integration of diverse findings and guide further inquiry. Without this unifying theme, the work of individual psychologists cannot contribute to a cumulative body of knowledge of a common domain. Without that convergence of the contributions of individuals, psychology will not reach the level of conceptual development at which theoretical integration of two or more laws becomes an issue.

Some psychologists will deny that psychology has fundamental disunity. In defending this view, they might point to the apparent unity evinced over recent years in a leading journal of academic psychology—The Psychological Review. But the unity they point to in that journal is the unity of the mainstream. It is the unity of the orthodoxy of academic psychology. To equate that particular perspective with the whole of psychology is either to define that perspective as psychology or to ignore alternative perspectives or both. Furthermore, it ignores the scholarship of many critics who believe that, as a whole, psychology lacks unity.

This lack of a shared understanding about basic issues exists not only in psychology as a whole but also in the special areas of psychology. For example, Elms (1975) commented that although research in social psychology has increased in volume and complexity, our understanding of social behavior has not improved because social psychologists do not share a common outlook on their common domain. Elms referred to the work of Shulman and Silverman (1972), who studied citation indices to determine whether social psychologists share any unifying orientations. They concluded that only a small fraction of research in social psychology suggests the coordination that a common conceptual framework would provide. Cartwright (1979) also acknowledged the lack of theoretical integration in social psychology, as did Bethlehem (1984) and Farr (1978). Critics (e.g., Cairns & Valsiner, 1984; Masters, 1981) have offered similar criticisms of developmental psychology. In short, lack of unity has been noted in some specialized areas of psychology as well as in psychology as a whole.

As some writers (e.g., Giorgi, 1976; Mulkay, 1978) have pointed out, the issue of disunity in psychology is important because genuine sciences, such as physics and genetics, have a core of unity. In this sense, unity consists of agreements about many laws, about the results of many kinds of experiments, about what counts as a scientific explanation, and about how, in principle, to solve remaining problems and uncertainties. Agreements on these basic matters exist alongside disagreements about specific hypotheses because basic unity does not preclude diversity in other respects. The advanced sciences are not bland homogeneities without theoretical controversies and interesting problems. But, agreement on basic matters lets the work of many independent investigators converge in a single, advancing stream. Individual investigators can use the procedures, formulations, and findings of other investigators in their own work, and as a result they can relate their own procedures, formulations, and findings to a common framework. In consequence, the patchwork contributions of many independent investigators can converge into a single advancing stream. Psychology lacks unity of this kind. There are few if any definitions, principles, and explanations that all psychologists agree upon. Moreover, there is no common body of data that all psychologists agree they must deal with. As we shall see, psychologists do not agree on what counts as the proper subject matter of psychology.

Science or Protoscience?

Because it lacks unity, psychology is unlike the other sciences. Accordingly, the scientific status of psychology is open to doubt. Of course, introductory textbooks routinely describe psychology as a science. However, behind the impression given by that description there is much to discuss (e.g., Howard, 1986; Koch, 1974; Leary, 1980; Lipsey, 1974; Sloane, 1945; Snoeyenbos & Putney, 1980).

Those who defend academic psychology easily dismiss the debate about the scientific status of psychology as a matter for philosophers. Yet we should not dismiss the question of whether or not psychology is a science so quickly. Ziman (1978, p. 158) explained that scientific knowledge is our most reliable guide to action, such that in matters of science, scientists rightly claim authority unquestioned by nonscientists. Therefore, the issue of whether psychology is a science is important, not only for theoreticians but also for policymakers and practitioners. Do psychologists have access to special knowledge not available to nonpsychologists? Is that knowledge sufficiently reliable and extraordinary so that it counts unequivocally as scientific? Is it sufficiently reliable and extraordinary so that we can look to psychologists for information held with some confidence and that is not already available through ordinary (i.e., nonscientific) means? These are some of the questions we must address when we consider the scientific status of psychology. The questions of interest do not concern the sophistication of our statistics or the inaccessibility of our formulations to a nontechnical audience. Rather, the questions of interest are concerned with whether we have constructed formulations that both probe beyond what is already available to ordinary observers and survive the test of replication by a critical audience. In other words, the questions of interest center on the issue of whether psychology can offer a body of extraordinary and reliable knowledge. These are questions we cannot dismiss as beyond the concerns of psychologists.

Many critics have argued that psychology does not count as a science. William James (1892/1961, p. 335) insisted that the psychology of his time only amounted to the hope of a science. It was no more advanced than physics before Galileo or chemistry before Lavoisier. Sloane (1945) offered a similar conclusion. He said that modern psychology has produced a psychology no more advanced than the Aristotelian-Thomistic psychology of scholastic times. The...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Title Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• Chapter 1 Psychology as Protoscience
• Chapter 2 Subject Matter
• Chapter 3 Origins
• Chapter 4 Consensible Reality
• Chapter 5 Acts as Raw Materials
• Chapter 6 Means and Ends
• Chapter 7 Contingencies
• Chapter 8 Radical Behaviorism
• Chapter 9 Organism and Person
• Chapter 10 More on Persons
• Chapter 11 Structure and Content
• Chapter 12 Means-End Interpretation
• Chapter 13 Stimulus-Response Psychology
• Chapter 14 Final Comments
• References
• Author Index
• Subject Index