The Teacher

Theory and Practice in Teacher Education

Allen T. Pearson

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781138692985
• eBook ISBN: 9781315531359
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Education
• Subtopic: Education General

It is widely agreed that teacher education must consist of two general components. There is a knowledge component which contains specialized subject matter knowledge, and a practical component in which intending teachers develop skills and abilities. In this original and compelling work, first published in 1989, Pearson attempts to examine the connection between the two. This title will be of interest to students of education.

CHAPTER 1
Introduction

Questions and problems of education soon become questions and problems of teacher education. It is not uncommon, and it is certainly understandable, that we turn our attention to the preparation of teachers when we are concerned with the education of the young and with the quality of the schools. When we begin to look at teacher education the issue of "theory and practice" begins to loom large. That this should have become a catch phrase in education stems no doubt from the way we have conceived teacher education. It is almost a universal feature of teacher education programs that they contain four components: general education, specialized knowledge, professional knowledge and practice.¹ Given that these components mean to provide the intending teacher with the knowledge and capabilities to become a professional teacher, teacher education expects the intending teacher to take the knowledge presented, which is often theoretical, and to apply it in classroom practice. It is this expectation, which is suggested by the label "the relation of theory and practice," that is my topic in this work.

My intention is to treat this topic as a philosophical one. My concern is to provide a conceptual understanding of theory and practice and their alleged relation. This endeavor is made difficult by the range of meanings that have been given to theory and practice in the literature. Sometimes one finds theory and practice identified, or seemingly identified, with what goes on in universities and what goes on in schools: "The three commonplaces of teacher education—the dichotomy of theory (university instruction) and practice (schooling)."² At the other extreme we find difficult and sophisticated discussions of how theory and practice can be integrated and even be made identical.³ Neither of these positions seems plausible. Surely, in the first case, theoretical matters can be found in schools and practical matters in universities. In the second case, one wants to say an integration or amalgamation of what is theoretical and what is practical is to remove an important basis for distinguishing ideas and activities. Admittedly it is often difficult to distinguish between the theoretical and practical and what counts as theoretical in one context may well count as practical in another. In spite of the difficulties inherent in these notions, they do seem to be ones that we do not want to lose. The question, then, that I want to consider here from a philosophical point of view, is what is the most plausible and fruitful way of conceptualizing the relation between theory and practice.

I will attempt to answer this question in two ways. First, I will consider and criticize some of the answers that have been given. Second, I will develop an alternative position that is not subject to the criticisms I will lay against the other accounts of theory and practice. The positions I will consider fall in two groups. The first set of positions see theory as being essentially scientific and practice as applied science. In the philosophy of education literature, a basic starting point for discussions of theory and practice is the debate between D. J. O'Connor and P. H. Hirst⁴ on the nature of educational theory. In Chapter 2 I will consider O'Connor's position in this debate. He defends the view that theory in education should be considered in the same way that it is considered in the natural and social sciences. This view will receive, in terms of space I devote to the topic, my greatest attention. It seems to me that this view is the one reflected most clearly in contemporary educational research. Because of its widespread acceptance I will need to spend some extra time with it. More controversially, I shall, in Chapter 3, consider the work of Donald Schön as an example of an account of theory and practice that is essentially scientific. His work is extremely insightful and provocative but, I will want to claim, not entirely acceptable. Although Schön claims to be developing an alternative epistemology to "technical rationality," I will try to show that his position falls within the general class of scientific approaches to an understanding of theory and practice; that is, his work is not as different as he claims, even though it adds much to our understanding of this issue.

After this consideration of scientific views of theory and practice, I will consider two approaches that put the basis for understanding educational theory and practice in philosophy. The history of educational theory is, to a large degree, a story of a variety of accounts of the purposes, policies and practices of education that are essentially philosophical. From Plato through Comenius, Locke and many others to present day thinkers, educational theory has been taken by many to be an essentially philosophical enterprise. That it might be a scientific activity is only a recent development.

The first of these positions to be examined, in Chapter 4, is Hirst's side of his debate with O'Connor. This position, which I call a "normative" theory of education, conceives of educational theory as a multidisciplinary theory drawing on the social sciences, philosophy, ethics and experience. The second position is Donna Kerr's conception of a "theory of practice." This view, discussed in Chapter 5, elucidates the concepts of theory and practice in the context of action theory, a philosophical account of how human action is to be understood.

In my discussion of these four positions, I will raise a number of questions and criticisms, but they all, I feel, have something to contribute to the final position that I will develop. This is done principally in Chapters 6 and 7. Chapter 6 may appear to be a detour; in that chapter I will discuss teaching and what, from a philosophical point of view, it entails. I do this because the account of theory and practice that I want to present is based on the practice of teaching. Part of my position is that our understanding of theory and practice in teaching should grow out of our understanding of teaching, not from some prior commitments as to the nature of theory and practice. In discussing teaching I can make clear the nature of its practice, so that in Chapter 7 I can discuss how theory and practice can plausibly be understood in education.

In that chapter I will refocus the question of theory and practice. I will try to show that the concern we have for relating theory and practice is the concern for how teachers utilize the knowledge and beliefs they have. The fundamental issue behind the question of theory and practice, I will claim, is the relation between belief and action. I will present an account of how belief and action are related through the reasoning that teachers engage in. How teachers use what they know and believe in deciding what to do is, I want to claim, the essential issue behind the catch phrase, "relating theory to practice." My view, instead of locating this discussion in a predetermined scientific or philosophical account of theory, claims that it is based in the reasoning that teachers do as part of their daily life and work. The thesis that I will be presenting and defending in this work, then, is that the concern for relating theory and practice in education is met when teachers use their knowledge and beliefs to make reasonable and reasoned decisions about what to do in their classrooms.

By this point I hope to have established that my thesis is plausible. In Chapter 8 I try to show that my thesis is fruitful. In this chapter I try to draw the implications of the thesis for teacher education. If translating theory into practice involves making reasoned decisions about what to do given one's knowledge and beliefs then teacher education will need to prepare intending teachers for making these decisions. I try to suggest what a teacher education program that takes this position seriously would need to contain. Finally, I will use the thesis to show how it helps us to understand and evaluate some of the proposals for teacher education that are currently in vogue.

The upshot of this discussion is, I hope, to show that our thinking about teacher education needs to and can benefit from careful philosophical study. Those who are entrusted with the education of the young of any society are given a task of the greatest importance and consequence. Those who are involved in the preparation and education of those teachers are engaged in a task of no less importance. Such a task deserves our most careful study and attention, whether we approach the task from philosophical or scientific standpoints; the education of teachers demands no less. Whether or not my thesis is judged to be correct, I hope that what I have to say will be provocative enough to encourage further philosophical investigations into the grounds of teacher education.

CHAPTER 2
Practice as applied science

In investigating the relation of theory and practice in teacher education, a first approximation of how the two notions are to be understood is to liken the relation to that found in the practice of medicine. There, clearly, the theory is that found in the biological sciences, and practice is found in the interaction between the physician and the patient. It seems obvious that the practice of medicine is guided by the theoretical knowledge of the physician. Physicians take the theoretical knowledge that they possess as a result of their education and apply it to a particular case at hand. The education of the physician is, then, an effort to provide the student with general knowledge of the field that can be applied in the everyday practice of medicine. While I would not want to push this analogy too far, and indeed I will return to it to discuss its limitations, it is a forceful analogy that one commonly finds in discussions about the relation of theory and practice in education. The force of the analogy is in no small part due to the success of medicine. The biological sciences have provided the practice of medicine with much knowledge and many treatments that can be used in the care of individual people. One author who has used the view behind this analogy as a basis for conceptualizing educational theory, while recognizing its limitations, is D. J. O'Connor.¹ I will turn first to his view of educational theory.

Educational theory is scientific

Given the vagueness of the word "theory" and the many different contexts in which it can be used, O'Connor's approach is to offer a stipulative definition which tries to capture the basic idea behind the notion of a scientific theory and to defend it against objections. It is: a theory is "a logically interrelated set of hypotheses confirmed by observation and which has the further properties of being both refutable and explanatory."² He spends some time discussing the notions of being refutable and explanatory, but does not discuss the notion of being confirmed by observation. The latter notion, though, is important. It makes clear that a theory, and consequently an educational theory, is a set of inductive, empirical statements. Only those statements that are confirmable by observation are candidates for inclusion in an educational theory. This, it almost goes without saying, rules out many of the kinds of claims we find in education from being part of a theory of education. Normative claims and many of the policy claims that govern the operation of educational institutions are not confirmable by observation, at least not in any obvious sense. To claim that handicapped children should receive the same educational opportunities as the non-handicapped or that every child should learn how to operate a computer are not the kinds of claims that one can confirm by observation. Although what one observes has a bearing upon whether these claims should be adopted, this would seem to be insufficient for their adoption. One also has to make judgments about the principles on which these claims rest or on the consequences of so acting. So, while it is a commonplace of conceptualizations about scientific theory that they include only those claims that are based on observation, it is a view that has important ramifications for the conceptualization of educational theory.

The other two criteria in the definition, what he calls his "minimal criteria," need some clarification. He adopts the "deductive" model of explanation. His view, again a commonplace in accounts of scientific explanation, is that an event is explained when a statement of that event can be deduced from other true statements, at least one of which is a statement of a general law of science. For us to know that the statement explains an event we need to know, under this model of explanation, that certain general laws and statements of initial conditions are true, and that the statement in question can be derived from the other statements in the explanation in accordance with the rules of logic.

The second criterion, refutability, rules out of scientific theories those claims and sets of claims that are impervious to test or experiment. Some sorts of claims are such that although they have confirming instances there is no possibility that they can be disconfirmed. Such claims are not suitable candidates for inclusion in a scientific theory. Astrology is a common example of a non-refutable set of claims. Apparent counterevidence is never, in astrology, treated as threatening the truth of the claims themselves; the disconfirming instances can always be explained away. Here the vagueness of the claims and their ability to be interpreted in a variety of ways are what make them non-refutable. Other more debatable examples of non-refutable sets of claims that masquerade as science, but examples which O'Connor accepts as clear cases of nonrefutable sets of claims, are psychoanalysis and Marxism.

So, the view of theory under consideration is the standard, even doctrinal, view of science. A theory is a set of statements that explain particular events by reference to general laws. These laws are based, ultimately, on observation, and the theory is itself always open to modification or refutation. This view of science has become so common that it may almost seem a caricature. But if educational theory can be construed in this way we have a very powerful position. All the credibility that accrues to science will accrue to education, and practitioners of education will have a strong and secure base on which to base their actions.

Limitations of the position

In adopting this position, O'Connor recognizes that it has what might be called limitations. The first has already been mentioned in that a theory of education conceptualized in this manner will not include value or normative claims. The field of education is one, however, in which normative claims are prominent; the very first questions that must be asked in education—why should we educate children, what should we teach them, and who should be taught—all raise difficult normative issues. Until they are answered, the factual questions concerning the organization and procedures of education cannot be considered. So, it would seem, that a conceptualization of educational theory that ignores such issues must be defective.

This conclusion is too hasty. Normative claims can guide the practice of education without being part of educational theory. The analogy of medicine can be appealed to again. Values concerning health, the absence of disease and access to medical care can guide the practice of the physician even though these issues do not appear in the scientific underpinnings of medicine. Similarly, in education the normative questions can be considered and answered independently of theoretical questions. Once positions have been developed about why we should educate, what should be taught, and the like, the results can be used to guide practice. The fact that normative issues are not part of an educational theory does not mean that they are considered irrelevant to the practice of education. They can guide practice from outside the theory.

This leads to a conclusion that O'Connor does not recognize. Given this conception of theory, it is now clear that a theory of education is at best necessary, but not sufficient, for the direction of practice. Since the normative claims of education are outside the theory of education and since normative claims are needed for guiding the practice of education, an educational theory is not alone sufficient for guiding practice. No matter how well developed our theory of education is, it will not by itself be able to direct the practice of education. We will always need, at least, a normative position that will help to direct the actions that one pursues.

Further, and what O'Connor does see, an educational theory is not necessary for the practice of education.³ The practice of education was not only established, but was quite effective, before there was any scientific theory of education. So given that the practice can be quite sophisticated without a theory of education, such a theory is not necessary for practice. What has made theory increasingly relevant to the practice of education, according to O'Connor, is the development of mass education. When education was restricted to a few, academically talented children, the practice of education did not need the resources of a theory of education to become more successful. The resources and experience of the teacher were sufficient. However, now that "the benefits of literacy and numeracy are such that no one must be spared them,"⁴ the practice of education has become much more difficult. In having to teach everyone, regardless of talent, interest or ambition, the challenges to the teacher have become much greater. In order to meet these challenges, ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Original Title
• Original Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Practice as Applied Science
• 3 An Epistemology of Practice
• 4 Normative Theory of Education
• 5 Theory of Practice
• 6 The Nature of Teaching
• 7 The Practice of Teaching
• 8 Teacher Education
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index