“Belgrade is the world” was one of the most famous slogans and probably the key landmark of the student demonstrations against the regime of Slobodan Milošević in Serbia in 1996/1997. Yet, another important picture has also become a landmark of these demonstrations. It is the picture of the late Patriarch Pavle (1914–2009) of the Serbian Orthodox Church leading the protesters in January 1997 and breaking down the police cordon in downtown Belgrade. Almost two decades after this event, as a PhD student I have become very interested in the latter picture. It simply did not fit into the general framework of the Serbian Orthodox Church as a supporter of Milošević’s regime and his authoritarian politics. Moreover, it did not fit into the general framework of the Orthodox Christian Churches as an authoritarian religious institution per se. That is how I became interested in the political role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the democratization process in Serbia in the first place, and particularly in its relationship with the regime of Slobodan Milošević (1991–2000). However, for a broader theory on the political roles of the Orthodox Christian Churches in the democratization processes across Eastern Europe, the Serbian case was simply not sufficient. Thus, I have decided to include two additional cases in my research: Greece and the Russian Federation (simply referred to as Russia throughout the book). These two probably represent the most important predominant Orthodox Christian countries in the world, particularly in terms of their historical and political influence on the development of the Orthodox Christianity. Yet, the Orthodox Christian Churches of Greece, Serbia and Russia responded quite differently to the democratization processes in their respective countries. This is a research problem which this book tackles. Therefore, this book is a small-n comparative analysis of the significantly different responses and political roles of the Orthodox Christian Churches in the democratization processes in Greece, Serbia and Russia. It belongs to the field of religion and politics, or politology of religion,1 which represents one of the fastest growing areas of research in the field of political sciences. The main research question of this book is: Why did different Orthodox Christian Churches, although sharing the same ideas about politics (political theology), act significantly differently in the democratization processes in Greece, Russia and Serbia?
However, even though today it is clear that religion matters in politics, and that we are living in an era characterized by the revenge of God,2 labeled “God’s century”,3 and an era in which it “is common to say that religion influences politics, political behavior, and political outcomes”4 around the globe, it seems that political scientists are still having problems accepting religion and religious actors as political actors. Contrary to this, the vast majority of political scientists ignored and neglected religion for a long time.5 In my opinion, it seems that political scientists were caught unprepared for the process of religious resurgence and the rising role of religion in politics worldwide, particularly after the Iranian revolution 1979. That is why it is probably true that religion represents one of the major contemporary challenges for social sciences, and in particular for political sciences.6 Neglecting religion in the political science literature has many causes. However, the literature often points to the secularization thesis as the main paradigm. The secularization thesis was a dominant paradigm for dealing with religion in the social sciences since the end of World War II. According to the secularization thesis, due to the increasing level of modernization across the globe it was likely to expect that the level of religiosity would significantly decrease. Thus, the political importance of religious actors around the globe will become irrelevant. One of the front runners of the secularization thesis was the late Peter L. Berger (1929–2017), a respected sociologist of religion who said in 1968 that “By [the] 21st century, religious believers are likely to be found in small sects, huddled together to resist a worldwide secular culture.”7 In 1969, Berger wrote an extensive and influential study on the sociology of religion, arguing that secularization is “the process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols”.8 However, 30 years after he edited an important book entitled The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent of Religion and World Politics (1999), he acknowledges the following:
My point is that the assumption that we live in a secularized world is false. The world today … is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so than ever. This means that the whole body of literature by historians and social scientists loosely labelled as “secularization theory” is essentially mistaken.9
This fact is particularly important for Eastern Europe, and those countries with a predominantly Orthodox Christian population. Among other things, these countries are characterized by the dominant religious actor, usually represented in an autocephalous and autonomous Orthodox Christian Church, whose role in society goes far beyond the religious realm. It is a fact that Orthodox Christian Churches nowadays represent one of the most important historical, cultural and above all political actors in their respective countries. Moreover, studies show that these institutions traditionally have the highest level of trust among citizens, and that belonging to a specific Orthodox Christian Church is probably one of the key identification factors across Eastern Europe.10 Thus, their political role and political authority should not be ignored or neglected but should rather be carefully studied and analyzed.
This book has three main goals. First of all to offer a fresh and innovative insight into the study of Orthodox Christianity and politics in general, and particularly the relationship between Orthodoxy and democratization. The book argues that there is a need for a reassessment of the current state-of-the-art literature on Orthodox Christianity and democratization. This particular reassessment entails shifting the focus from the existing and almost dominant linear approach of understanding the Orthodox Christianity as an authoritarian religious tradition, and suggests the use of the religious political ambivalence approach, or multi-vocality. Second, it aims to identify the specific political roles of the Orthodox Christian Churches in the democratization processes in Greece, Serbia and Russia. The political roles of the religious actors in the democratization processes have been identified by Toft, Philpott and Shah. Their approach suggests four different political roles of the religious actors in the democratization processes according to their specific activities, and these are: leading actor, supportive actor, free-rider and reactionary resister.11 In this book, I focus on the political role of the Church of Greece during the rule of the military junta in Greece (1967–1974), and following the imposition of democracy in the post-1974 period. My research has shown that the role of the Church of Greece in the democratization process in Greece can be labeled a “free-rider”. On the other side, I focus on the political roles of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and the Russian Orthodox Church, in the post-communist societies of Serbia and Russia. This is where things become far more complex. According to my research, the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the democratization process in post-communist Serbia should be labeled a “leading actor”, while the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in the democratization process in post-communist Russian is labelled a “reactionary resister”. Due to the fact that my research, mostly focused on the primary sources, identified the significantly different political roles of the Orthodox Christian Churches in the democratization processes in Greece, Serbia and Russia, the third goal of this book is to offer a comparative perspective on this issue and try to explain why this was the case.
That being said, I would like to add that this book deeply relies on my understanding of how a political scientist should deal with religion, and particularly with the political activities of religious actors. It is my firm opinion that one of the main goals of the social sciences, and thus the political sciences, is to explain (political) behavior.12 Therefore, a political scientist should aim towards understanding and explaining political behavior. When it comes to the field of religion and politics, one should either try to explain individual political behavior, or the political behavior of religious institutions.13 For example, one can either try to explain how individual religious affiliations affect voting preferences, or to explain the motives of the foreign fighters to fight for another country in the name of religion. On the other hand, it is equally important for a political scientist to try to understand and explain the political behavior of different religious institutions. Religious institutions, even if they belong to the same religious tradition, tend to behave differently in various social and political environments. That is why this book tends to explain the different political behavior of the Orthodox Christian Churches in the democratization processes in Greece, Serbia, and Russia, and to explore the factors which led to their specific political behavior.
In comparison to the existing body of literature in the field, I believe that this book is genuinely different, due mostly to its comparative perspective of three relevant cases and its explanatory potential. Contrary to this, the existing literature in the field of Orthodox Christianity and democratization is relatively descriptive, tends to oversimplify this relationship, and – most importantly – lacks the comparative perspective. Although my three cases have their own specifics, I believe they are comparable due to several reasons. First, all three cases have a dominant religious actor: the Church of Greece, the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Russian Orthodox Church. However, even though they share the same religious doctrine, and therefore political theology, their roles in the democratization processes were significantly different. That is why the sole focus on the political theology of Orthodox Christianity will not be of great help in the aims of this book. Second, the very processes of democratization in these three cases occurred in different time periods, and in historical and political contexts. Greece underwent democratic transition in the 1970s, whereas Serbia and Russia had to wait for the fall of communism to initiate the democratization process. Third, Greece is currently a stable democracy, Serbia is in the process of democratic consolidation, while Russia is still having its ups and downs in dealing with authoritarian tendencies. Since 2000, it seems that this country is in the down phase. Finally, a comparative study of the roles of Orthodox Christian Churches in politics in general will simply have to cover the two most important cases: Greece and Russia. These two states are arguably the most important dominant Orthodox Christian countries in the world in different aspects. Therefore, they had to be a part of this study. And with Serbia in the middle, I strongly believe that the relevant comparative moment achieved is reasonable and scientifically approved.
Yet, recent literature on religion and democratization is predominately focused on Western Christianity and Islam.14 Irina Papkova is right to argue that prior to Huntington’s work on the clash of civilization there was almost no research into how Orthodoxy can influence politics.15 Rising interest in Orthodoxy is a product of the fall of communism, which was followed by the resurgence of religion, and particularly Orthodox Christianity, across Eastern Europe.16 Even though the majority of the existing body of literature followed Huntington’s ideas about Orthodoxy as an anti-modern, and thus anti-democratic religious tradition,17 this is actually not the case. Most of the dominant Orthodox Christian countries today are stable democratic regimes, or on the way to becoming so, with a minority of authoritarian regimes. Therefore, most of the dominant Orthodox Christian countries experienced democratization. As all of them have a dominant religious actor, namely autocephalous Orthodox Christian Churches, it is logical to presume that they had a role to play in this process.
This book shows that Orthodox Christianity has much to offer to the literature in this field. The Orthodox Christian Churches have been widely affected by the democratization processes across Eastern Europe, and contrary to the general framework of the authoritarian, conservative, and intolerant religious actors, they responded quite positively to democratization. However, even though dominant Orthodox Christian countries are similar in some regards, they all have their own peculiarities which makes them special. That is why their responses to democratization vary from country to country. And this is exactly the problem which this book tackles and tries to explain.
This book consists of...