One of Akira Kurosawaâs late films, Kagemusha (1980) tells the story of a double who is recruited as a standby for Lord Shingen and who must, in effect, become Shingen when the lord dies and leaves his clan vulnerable. The movieâs interest in the sovereignâs double is on one hand mechanical. How will the double pass as the sovereign? When Shingenâs grandson is presented with the double, the young boy detects the impostor. âYou canât fool a child,â Shingenâs brother admits, and it was ârecklessâ for them to try. Shingenâs horse rejects the double, too, suggesting that neither can animal instinct be deceived. The movieâs interest, on the other hand, is conceptual. In what does sovereignty consist? When Shingenâs disinherited son, Katsuyori, seeks to assert the legitimacy of his own sovereign claim by a display of military daring, he doubts his success owes solely to himself. He took the castle, his aide assures him. âItâs true that I took the castle,â Katsuyori says, âbut the credit does not go to me, it goes to the phantom of my late father.â The very fact of Shingen, deceased in person but not in spirit, âfrightened the enemy away.â It becomes clear in the course of Kagemusha not only that the mechanics of sovereignty are simply the means by which the movie narrativizes its interest in the concept of sovereignty, but also that Kurosawa means to draw a connection between sovereignty as a concept and the operations of film as a medium. In a late scene, Shingenâs brother seems to regret his recruitment of the double. âWhat will happen to the double,â he wonders. âA shadow cannot exist without the person. When itâs finally known that the person is gone, what will happen to the shadow?â Itâs a curious involution of metaphor: the shadow, in this case, is the flesh-and-blood double, masquerading as the dead Shingen. That Shingenâs brother continues to think the dead brother more substantial a person than the living person of the double would seem to attest to something in sovereignty of corporeal transcendence. It might be that, conceptually speaking, sovereignty requires a material body as the shadow cast by what we call the body politic. In a certain respect, this is why neither the child nor the horse is fooled by the double, because sovereignty is a concept, not a thing. Children and horses can get by without concepts. What makes the metaphor of the body and its shadow more interesting, for our purposes, is that itâs easy to hear in it Kurosawaâs theoretical fascination with film. Film will outlive the bodies that have been impressed on it. Which will be more real, ultimately, the bodies or the medium preserving their shadows?
When just over a decade later Dave (Reitman, 1993) appeared as more or less a rewriting of Kagemusha, even if it didnât raise matters to the philosophical order that Kagemusha had, it suggested that a fascination with sovereignty and filmâas operations in doublingâwas in the warp and woof of American cinema. It suggested this notion, at any rate, to critics who kept Hollywood movies in historical perspective. The story of citizen Dave Kovic (Kevin Klein) recruited to stand in for President Bill Mitchell (also Kevin Klein), Dave, Stanley Kauffmann would note, recalled any number of movies: Kagemusha, The Prisoner of Zenda (Cromwell, 1937) and (Thorpe, 1952), The Prince and the Pauper (Keighley, 1937), Moon over Parador (Mazursky, 1988), andâthe key comparison, for KauffmannâThe Phantom President (Taurog, 1932). 1 Dave was written by Gary Ross, also a speechwriter for Bill Clinton, so the consanguinity of this Hollywood fantasy and Clintonian political style is easy to trace. Clintonâs deputy director for personnel, Jon Emerson, credited Ross with âa good sense of the pulse of the people. Itâs why his sound bites work and why his movies work.â 2 Critics found meaning, indeed, in the movieâs release within months of Clintonâs inauguration. The hopeful everyman, Dave figured the âClintonian burst of energy and good intentions in the White House,â in Kauffmannâs words. 3 In one register, thenâa quite practical oneâa movie like Dave lets us consider how the technical infrastructure of Hollywood and the US presidency are related. Theyâre related, simply, because personnel pass between them; one can learn techniques in Hollywood and apply them in politics. We can call this an instrumental relation. The famous case of this is Ronald Reagan. But there are many less obvious versions. Bill Clinton, for instance, claimed to have studied High Noon (Zinnemann, 1952) in order to learn from âthe look in Gary Cooperâs eyes as he stares into the face of almost certain defeat, and how he keeps walking through his fears toward his duty.â 4 In his study The Leading Man, Burton Peretti gives the most forceful articulation (in what is now a considerable literature) of the instrumental relation between Hollywood and the US presidency. 5 Because the president âhad the potential to enact a powerful and charismatic role,â Peretti argues, his part in government was analogous to the lead actorâs in motion pictures. Harnessing such charismaâa patent operation of Hollywood industryâwas a means for âincorporating vastly different subgroups and individuals,â Peretti says, into a unitary national audience, whether for the sake of the box office or ballot box. 6 As Hollywood perfected its charismatic appeals in the 1920s and on, the White House increasingly turned to it for instruction. 7
But in another register, what a movie like Dave suggests is that these high institutions of culture and politicsâHollywood and the US presidencyâhave understood their powers in view of each other. We can call this understanding a conceptual relation. In learning its medium, Hollywood seems to have been taken with its power for producing doubles. From The Playhouse (Keaton, 1921) to The Parent Trap (Swift, 1961) to Multiplicity (Ramis, 1996), bringing together two or more exposures of an actor in a composite frame has been a way to declare the peculiarities of the medium. Film multiplies a person. A movie that double exposes Hayley Mills as identical twins, though, is only a showy rendition of what the medium does in the first place. Among classical film theorists, Jean Epstein took a certain kind of splitting to be definitive of the film image. âOn the screen we are seeing what the cinema has already seen once,â he wrote, âa double transformation, or rather raised to the power of two, since it is multiplied in this way.â 8 Watching the screen image, that is, we are given views of the object as seen by the cameraâby its âmetal brain,â as Epstein puts itâwhich is to say we see it âenhanced by filmic reproduction.â 9 Itâs no longer the same thing; itâs now a new thing: âa second generation beauty, the daughterâthough prematurely delivered and slightly monstrousâof a mother whom we loved with our naked eyes.â 10 Epstein described this process in the somewhat mystical French Impressionist term photogĂ©nie, a term that âone runs into a brick wall trying to define.â 11 Whatever the film image added to its object, in short, was impossible to specify. But it added something, this much was clear. Epstein was led by this ineffability to say that âcinema is essentially supernatural.â In it, âEverything is transformed.â 12 While Epsteinâs modernist enthusiasms did not carry the discourse in Hollywood, it was nonetheless the case that those within the industry granted film this transformative effect. Take the example of Humphrey Bogart. âBogie was a medium-sized man,â according to John Huston, ânot particularly impressive offscreen, but something happened when he was playing the right part. Those lights and shadows composed themselves into another, nobler personality.â 13
It was this aspect that Ronald Reagan knew how to exploit. âThe actor,â Reagan said, âlearns to see himself from the outside in as others see him, not from the inside out.â This perception, it should be qualified, is more practically true of the film actor, who has a derealized version of himself to aid this act of seeing. With it, Reagan âgives up the âmental pictureâ of the character he plays as separate from himself and becomes at once the viewer of the object and the object seen.â 14 It is something other than W.E.B. Du Boisâs âdouble consciousness.â That term, after all, though it ever suggested oneâs âtwo-ness,â as Du Bois put it, did so in marking oneâs disempowerment in the gaze of another. From Reaganâs âtwo-ness,â by contrast, he derived the power of sovereignty. In his screen self, Reagan imagined that people âsee themselves and that Iâm one of them.â He was, he liked to say, âMr. Norm.â 15 Calling himself the norm let him hide the fact that his exceptional status as an image helped focalize for the audience their normative representation, a disavowal of sovereignty that typifies popular sovereignty. If Reagan was the norm yet held the juridical power to say what the norm was, to set it in place or declare its suspension, then he was not norm but sovereign. In the famous formulation of legal theorist Carl Schmitt, âSovereign is he who decides on the exception.â The exception, which entails suspending the constitutional framework, no matter how briefly, has abetted the redoubling of executive power in the US government, in emergency after emergency, from the Civil War to the Great Depression to the 9/11 attacks. The âliberal constitutional stateâ tries to ârepressâ such a concentration of power, Schmitt notes, âby a division and mutual control of competences.â But the high incidence of crises undoes the effort. In The Executive Unbound, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule claim that âliberal legalismâ has âproven unable to generate meaningful constraints on the executive.â 16 The mechanisms of the presidentâs redoubled power, they explain, have been delegations (âlegislatures enact statutes that grant the executive authority to regulate or otherwise determine policyâ) and emergencies (âexternal shocks require new policies to be adopted and executed with great speedâ). 17
What has emerged in response to the weak constraints on the executive, argue Posner and Vermeule, are constraints in the form of âpolitics and public opinion.â 18 Itâs not ex ante law that constrains presidential power, that is, but ex post popular response. Such an outlook quickly makes it plain why the cinema can understand itself as a political institution. Television, too. To the extent that the mass media shapes public opinion, it generally assumes political power. âThe greater the presidentâs powers become,â Posner and Vermeule argue, âthe more essential popularity and credibility become.â 19 But we are concerned with the cinema in particular, and how it has produced such popularity and credibility in dimensions unavailable in other media. Television has played a more ad hoc part in shaping public opinionâissue by issue, as it wereâsuch that a consensus might be enacted in plebiscitary terms (we will not tolerate Watergate, for instance, we will tolerate Monica Lewinsky, and so on). Cinema, by contrast, acts on different scales to set the parameters of what we might call a presidential imaginary. It lets us see power from the inside, the dynamics and byways of the political process in operation. It lets us imagine the qualities that make one presidential, the training and background that prepare one to act under world-historical distress. Because this cinema is usually Hollywood cinemaâas taken up in the essays in this anthology, anywayâthese representations are worked out in rather short-form storytelling. Some of the famous president films, such as Wilson (King, 1944, 154 min.), Sunrise at Campobello (Donehue, 1960, 144 min.), and Lincoln (Spielberg, 2012, 150 min.), have run long relative to the average feature-length movie, perhaps in a kind of formal recognition of their epic subjects. But even such a length requires a narrative compression unnecessary in, say, a novel or television series. Hence itâs hard to say that these movies are narrativizing the political process in the ways we might find in other modes of realism. It might be more correct to say that they catch the spectacle of executive presence and deed.
Tabbing the spectacular nature of president filmsâthis, we note, being the nature of film itself (its duration, its doubling)âwe can then take inventory of the narratives that emerge from it. Weâll accentuate, here, two of the more persistent narrative strains. One, to borrow from Dana Nelson, is the president-as-superhero. 20 The spectacle in these narratives is the presidentâs salvific act. In the exaggerated form, the president fulfills his role as commander-in-chief in the mode of a âkick-butt action hero,â as Varietyâs Todd McCarthy would say of Harrison Fordâs president in Air Force One (Petersen, 1997). 21 This role involves fisticuffs, skulking around with weapons, and ultimately the triumph and redemption of the nation. In the understated form, the president is simply a graceful, remarkably effective statesman, pure of heart in contrast to politicians that we find everywhere else in his story. He can oversee and execute legislation in so efficient a manner that the political system, by his grace, suddenly seems designed to work. In the case of Gabriel Over the White House (La Cava, 1933), the presidentâs grace is explained in supernatural terms. An angel, Gabriel, has entered the body of President Hammond while he is near death. In other cases, the president is merely a simpler man, which is to say he isnât self-interested. A movie like Dave is the outcome of this tradition that includes, too, more kid-friendly movies like Streets of New York (Night, 1939). In the latter movie, young Jimmy aspires to be a public defender, which is just a way for him to formalize his good citizenship, and his hero in this effort is Abe Lincoln. Hence the movieâs alternate title, Abe Lincoln of Ninth Avenue. Lincolnâs pure model of citizenship, in fact, presides over much of American cinema, whether in earnest in something like Cheyenne Autumn (Ford, 1964) or in parody in something like Putney Swope (Downey, Sr., 1969). John Ford, we might say, was the first to understand that working within the tradition of the pr...