Rising Powers and the Future of Global Governance

Kevin Gray, Craig N. Murphy

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9780415714051
• eBook ISBN: 9781317525158
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This volume contributes to the growing debate surrounding the impact that the rising powers may or may not be having on contemporary global political and economic governance. Through studies of Brazil, India, China, and other important developing countries within their respective regions such as Turkey and South Africa, we raise the question of the extent to which the challenge posed by the rising powers to global governance is likely to lead to an increase in democracy and social justice for the majority of the world's peoples. By addressing such questions, the volume explicitly seeks to raise the broader normative question of the implications of this emergent redistribution of economic and political power for the sustainability and legitimacy of the emerging 21st century system of global political and economic governance. Questions of democracy, legitimacy, and social justice are largely ignored or under-emphasised in many existing studies, and the aim of this collection of papers is to show that serious consideration of such questions provides important insights into the sustainability of the emerging global political economy and new forms of global governance.

This book was published as a special issue of Third World Quarterly.

Introduction: rising powers and the future of global governance

KEVIN GRAY & CRAIG N MURPHY

Kevin Gray is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex. Craig N Murphy is Research Professor at the Department of Conflict Resolution, Human Security, and Global Governance, McCormack Graduate School, University of Massachusetts Boston.

ABSTRACT There has been much debate over the extent to which the rising powers of the global South are challenging contemporary global political and economic governance. While some observers see an emancipatory potential in the redistribution of power among states, others see the rising powers as firmly located within the Western-centred neoliberal world order. This collection of papers seeks to go beyond the state-centrism of existing approaches by examining how challenges to global governance by rising powers are rooted in specific state–society configurations. Through studies of Brazil, India, China and other important developing countries within their respective regions, such as Turkey and South Africa, the papers examine the way domestic structures, arrangements, actors and dynamics influence the nature of the international interventions and behaviour of rising powers. They ask how their increased political and economic enmeshment in the international system impacts upon their own internal societal cohesion and development. By examining these issues, the papers raise the question of whether the challenge posed by the rising powers to global governance is likely to lead to an increase in democracy and social justice for the majority of the world’s peoples.

Summary of the papers

Little more than a decade ago the economic and financial crisis that swept across the non-Western world (the so-called ‘Asian financial crisis’ of 1997–98) was ostensibly a harbinger of the ‘end of late development’ and a reassertion of the West’s political and economic dominance over the global South. The current global financial crisis, however, having originated in the West itself, has arguably turned that narrative on its head. In sharp contrast to the triumphalism exhibited on the part of the West towards the alleged ‘crony capitalism’ of the East and its tendency to spread contagion, it is the West whose lax financial regulation has allowed contagion to spread from the centres of global finance in the West towards the global South.¹ The fact that this time the South has in relative terms experienced a ‘good crisis’² has meant that the West has lost the moral authority to lecture the non-Western countries on the ‘proper’ way to organise and regulate their economies.

As a result, the crisis has now opened up space for rising powers of the global South to play an increasingly active role in the reform of global economic and political governance, to the extent that a ‘regime change’ in global governance is now at least a distinct possibility.³ Crisis management has not only involved a reliance on the financial reserves of the rising powers, but has also conferred a participatory role for rising power governments themselves through the forum of the G20. Even before the crisis countries such as India and Brazil had become increasingly vocal in the Doha Round in promoting a rising powers position on the reform of the rules of global trade. And, perhaps most importantly, in 2009 the ‘BRIC’ acronym ceased to be simply a convenient category indicating countries with the greatest investment potential,⁴ and became a political reality as Brazil, Russia, India and China (and from 2010 South Africa) sought to forge close political ties through annual meetings of rising power leaders. High on the agenda of this grouping has been the desire to move away from the dollar as the world’s foremost reserve currency, thus offering the potential to bring about an end to the ‘exorbitant privilege’ of the USA and the situation in which the surplus countries of the global South repress consumption in order to subsidise consumption in the West. Further proposals include establishment of a BRICS development bank that, if realised, could potentially pose a significant challenge to the World Bank.

Yet the rhetoric of ‘South–South cooperation’ mobilised by groupings such as the BRICS notwithstanding, it is quite clear that the challenge that the rising powers pose to global governance is of a qualitatively different nature to that of previous Third World political movements, such as the Non-aligned Movement, the G-77, and their efforts in the 1970s to set an agenda for a ‘New International Economic Order’. Although substantive differences within BRICS, for example, have led some to doubt whether it constitutes a useful analytical category at all,⁵ the countries it comprises share in common the fact that their recent growth owes much to their extensive and increasing international engagement, rather than to any partial withdrawal or ‘de-linkage’ from the global economy. At the same time, however, as the reform agendas noted above suggest, they are nonetheless openly critical of the perceived bias towards the global North in the institutions of global economic and political governance structures and seek to alter the global status quo and enhance the influence of the global South.

It is not surprising therefore that opinion as to the longer-term implications of the rising powers is divided. It may now be that the global South is emerging to form a real economic and political force that may move beyond dependence on the West to form a new centre of power in the global political economy.⁶ In this view the global financial crisis can be seen as having accelerated trends of a significant challenge to the geopolitical and geo-economic predominance of the West and to the global hegemony of the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism. This has been characterised as a transition from a unipolar US hegemony to one of ‘emancipatory multipolarity’,⁷ in which the countries that represent the majority of the world’s peoples now have a position at the head table, or even as a broader underlying ‘global centre shift’ or ‘hegemonic transition’.⁸

However, there is much ground for a more ‘pessimistic’ view that that the rise of these new powers has been overstated or that their rise is firmly located within the Western global hegemony. Indeed, when we examine the participation of the rising powers in the G20, there is evidence to suggest that this has much to do with crisis management through shifting the burden on to the rising powers themselves, a form of rebalancing of the sort pursued during the 1985 Plaza Accord that eventually led to the economic decline of Japan. Questions of representation surrounding the G20 remain,⁹ and this is even more the case with BRICS. Despite the latter’s proposal of a development bank as an alternative to the World Bank, the BRICS initiative can be viewed more as a case of seeking a place at the table of global neoliberal economic governance. As Bond argues in this issue, like Berlin in 1884–85, the BRICS summit scheduled to take place in March 2013 in Durban, South Africa looks set to carve up Africa, unburdened by ‘Western’ concerns about democracy and human rights.

With these questions in mind, the aim of this collection of papers is to contribute to this debate on the impact of the rising powers on global governance. Through studies of Brazil, India, China and other important developing countries within their respective regions, such as Turkey and South Africa, we raise the question of the extent to which the challenge posed by the rising powers to the contemporary system of global governance is likely to lead to an increase in democracy and social justice for the majority of the world’s peoples. This approach is based on the recognition that, within the mainstream literature on the rising powers, there has been something of an unacknowledged transition from the globalisation debate of the 1990s, in which transnational economic processes were alleged to have made the state a less relevant actor, to a more state-centric framework in which the rising powers and the West are locked in a zero-sum struggle for influence over global governance institutions. A corollary of this approach has been that, within the mainstream discourse on rising powers, there has been an assumption that an increased voice at the global level necessarily translates into greater social justice for domestic societies within the rising powers themselves and in the global South more broadly.

Thus, the papers seek to go beyond mainstream state-centric analyses of rising powers to consider how the potential challenge these countries pose to the politico-economic predominance of the West are rooted in specific state–society configurations. It seeks to critically interrogate such approaches by exploring how domestic structures, arrangements, actors and dynamics are influencing the nature of the international interventions and behaviour of rising powers. What are the main constituencies and interest groups, such as domestic or foreign capital, domestic lobbies and civil society organisations, which most significantly influence the interventions of the rising powers in the reform of global governance? What material and political interests do these interventions represent? Also, to what extent is increased political and economic enmeshment in the international system by the rising powers having an impact on their own internal societal cohesion and development? Moreover, how are these interventions at the global level located within, and instigated and/or constrained by, the increasingly transnationalised neoliberal nature of global political economy? One of the key developments since the Third Worldism of the 1960 and 1970s has been the relative pluralisation of domestic societies. While the rising powers clearly differ in terms of their degree of institutionalisation of formal democracy,¹⁰ even authoritarian states, such as China, are becoming more open to forms of influence from domestic constituencies.¹¹ The special issue thus seeks to examine the extent to which greater pluralism at the domestic level influences the position that rising powers adopt on the international stage, and the degree to which nongovernmental and governmental realms interact in terms of policy formation.

By addressing such questions, it is possible to raise the broader normative question of the implications of this emergent redistribution of economic and political power for the sustainability and legitimacy of the emerging 21st century system of global political and economic governance. To what extent is the integration of these rising powers into contemporary global governance creating new and serious domestic and international tensions and vulnerabilities that may also undermine or challenge future global economic stability and prosperity? This special issue examines how the domestic legitimacy of the international positions adopted by emerging power has an impact on the negotiated new global order itself. Questions of democracy, legitimacy and social justice are largely ignored or under-emphasised in many existing studies, and the aim of this collection of papers is to show that serious consideration of such questions provides important insights into the sustainability of the emerging global political economy and new forms of global governance.

Achin Vanaik, in his contribution to the issue, poses the question of how to conceptualise the emerging constellation of rising Southern powers and to what extent this constellation may be displacing the USA as the world’s pre-eminent hegemon. He begins by engaging with ongoing debates surrounding the relationship between the state and global capitalism, arguing that the fact of competition among individual capitals contributes to competition between states, in turn constituting a world order consisting of both geopolitical and geo-economic dynamics. The question thus becomes one of examining whether any of the rising powers has the potential to displace the USA as a global hegemonic power. The most obvious candidate, China, is in fact beset by profound problems associated with its rapid late industrialisation: structural imbalances, financial instability, deep social inequalities and endemic unrest. The fact that these problems are not easily resolvable raises a question mark over China’s ability to exercise global hegemony. Despite the recent rapid growth of a service industry and the emergence of a sizable middle class, India’s rapid economic growth occurs in a context of endemic poverty. In terms of foreign policy the country has since the end of the Cold War been fully incorporated into the broader geopolitical aims of the USA. In fact, neither China nor India shows any inclination to overtly challenge the global position of the USA. The strong discourse of ‘South–South cooperation’ deployed by many of the rising powers might more accurately be seen as rhetoric with which to negotiate a stronger bargaining position within the US-centred world order. Similarly, the BRICS initiative can be seen in much the same light. Indeed, the real vulnerabilities to US hegemony exist not within the rising powers but in the Middle Eastern, North African and Central Asian regions. As an alternative, therefore, Vanaik proposes a ‘quintet’ of the USA and rising powers as the most apt conceptualisation of the emerging and existent dominant powers: a hub and spokes arrangement that includes the rising powers but relies on the indispensable role of the USA and its military power and capacity as lender of last resort. Such a geopolitical configuration is not invulnerable, however, and remains subject to the kind of people power that has been seen in the recent Arab Spring. Indeed, Vanaik concludes by considering the possibility of surpassing the current geopolitical conjuncture—a possibility predicated on the decline of US power but which will, given the lack of social prerequisites, not involve a return to global Keynesianism but rather will necessitate a genuinely anti-capitalist alternative.

In his contribution Andreas Antoniades examines the new global debt relations following the recent global financial crisis. Specifically he raises the question of whether the crisis and the fact that rising powers are the primary holders of US debt confer a degree of structural power on the rising powers. More broadly, how does debt operate as an instrument of power in the context of hegemonic rivalry between the established West and the rising powers? Central here is the issue of global imbalances. To some extent it is correct to say that the Western economies are faced with heightened levels of public and private debt that extend down to the level of individuals and households, and that governments have little room for policy manoeuvre; thus the process of deleveraging is likely to be a long drawn out one. The position of the USA as debtor and the rising economies as creditors has thus been maintained and deepened. This does not mean that a shift of hegemony to the rising powers has taken place, however, since the USA continues to enjoy considerable structural power. The ‘exorbitant privilege’ that the USA enjoys as a result of the international use of the dollar has even been strengthened as a result of the crisis. The USA has been able to devalue away a significant portion of its debt. This has occurred through exchange rate valuation, in which a depreciation of the dollar has served to increase the value of foreign assets belonging to the USA while not being affected by US liabilities. The USA has been able to control this process through domestic monetary policy. The role of the stock market also functions in a way that benefits the particular composition of US investments.

Following this overview of the global structure, the next four papers consist of country case studies of rising powers, their potential, and/or their policies. Beeson raises the question of the extent to which China may be able to translate its growing material preponderance into regional and global leadership. He argues that, despite a strong potential for increased Chinese leadership, constraints that are both specific to China and related to the broader geopolitical conjuncture serve to place stringent limitations on China’s ability to exercise the kind of leadership deployed by past hegemons. The analysis thus casts doubt on the question of whether there can be such a thing as ‘hegemony with Chinese characteristics’. While China exercised a form of hegemony in Sino-centric East Asia before the 19th century clash with the Western powers, there are formidable barriers to regaining such a position in the 21st century. Recent events, such as China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) suggests that, rather than proposing an alternative to the US-centred Washington Consensus, China may conversely be in the process of internalising the rules of the West.

While China’s distinctive model of ‘state capitalism’ ostensibly provides an alternative model for other developing countries, debates surrounding the Beijing Consensus notwithstanding, what appears to be lacking is any attempt by China to formulate its own model as a set of universal principles. China’s grand strategy, as expressed in the notion of ‘comprehensive security’, suggests an emerging regional leadership role, and indeed there is evidence to suggest that China has launched a charm offensive to bolster its soft power in the region. Yet here countervailing forces exist too in the form of the Obama administration, which has sought to reverse the relative neglect of East Asia under George W Bush. While China’s participation in various regional multilateral institutions again suggests a willingness to play by the rules of cooperation, regionalism itself is a contested project. The reluctance to see the kind of potential Chinese dominance exercised through groupings such as ASEAN+3 has led to a range of alternative institutions favoured by the other countries in East Asia. Increased maritime disputes in recent years also threaten to undermine any goodwill that China may have earned previously. In conclusion, Beeson argues that, rather than seeing the emergence of China’s leadership role, we may perhaps be entering into a situation in which global leadership is carried out by a wider group of powers, including a post-hegemonic USA. While this has parallels to Vanaik’s quintet, Beeson sees this arrangement in a more favourable light.

Bond’s contribution argues that South Africa’s regional and global rise, despite the rhetoric, should be described as a case of ‘sub-imperialism’ rather than ‘anti-imperialism’. Sub-imperialism, according to Bond, involves the promotion of neoliberal Washington C...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Citation Information
• 1. Introduction: rising powers and the future of global governance
• 2. Capitalist Globalisation and the Problem of Stability: enter the new quintet and other emerging powers
• 3. Recasting the Power Politics of Debt: structural power, hegemonic stabilisers and change
• 4. Can China Lead?
• 5. Sub-imperialism as Lubricant of Neoliberalism: South African ‘deputy sheriff’ duty within BRICS
• 6. Brazil’s Foreign Policy Priorities
• 7. The ‘Ankara Moment’: the politics of Turkey’s regional power in the Middle East, 2007–11
• 8. Realising Justice
• 9. Rising Donors and the New Narrative of ‘South–South’ Cooperation: what prospects for changing the landscape of development assistance programmes?
• 10. Rising Powers and the Future of Democracy Promotion: the case of Brazil and India
• Index