Introduction
With the power of moving hundreds and thousands of people out of their homes, development-induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR) is an immensely multifaceted phenomenon. The ethical, political, economic, social and psychological dimensions of DIDR are put forward by many studies in the literature. Its long-term and complex nature is well documented, impacts and risks are analysed, solutions are suggested and policies are established (de Wet, this volume; World Bank, 1994; Cernea, 1998, 2003, 2004, 2008b; Asian Development Bank (ADB), 2000, 2006; Scudder, 2005; Mathur, 2006). Yet nothing seems to have been enough to reverse its adverse impacts and bad reputation of DIDR (Cernea, 2008a; Scudder, 2005, Mathur, 2006). With a large portfolio of failures, only a handful of successful cases have been reported to date. And even those are not unchallengeable.
What is success in DIDR? What makes it so inaccessible? When accessed, what makes it so disputable? Is it a matter of different stakes and interests? Is this a matter of perspectives? Or is it a question of methodological approaches and research limitations? With such questions in mind, I aimed to find and explore a successful case in DIDR.
In the following sections I will first outline the literature on âsuccessâ in DIDR and reasons identified for its frequent failures. After explaining my research methodology, I will narrate the history of the Tahtali Water Supply Dam which was deemed a successful case in Turkey. Notwithstanding its outward appearance, the research reveals that the misapplications of hitherto inadequate laws had sorted the displacees as state-resettled, cash-compensated and uncompensated households in Tahtali. Looking at the experiences of these groups throughout the 14 years following displacement, I will make a comparison of the quantitative and qualitative findings of the study, which were complementary in many ways but were contradicting with regards to the change in income levels. I will conclude the chapter by emphasizing the limitations and complications in research, the need to conceptualize âsuccessâ and the importance of facilitating accountable and comprehensive studies in order to minimize the potential political and methodological biases in DIDR.
Success and failure in DIDR
There have been a few attempts to define success in DIDR (see Scudder, 1984, p. 14; Horowitz et al., 1993, p. 234) but the most commonly accepted definition belongs to Cernea (2008a, p. 23) who defined it as âwhen the resettled people end up better-off, in terms of income and livelihood, or at least restore to the same level as beforeâ. This definition has also found its way to international standards and guidelines. Yet the vagueness in real-life assessments persists as the definition does not clarify what percentage of the society that needs to be equal or better-off for a project to be considered successful or when and how the assessment should be held.
There are not many âsuccessâ cases in the DIDR literature. The few cases that are claimed as successful such as the Arenal Hydroelectric Power Plant (Costa Rica), Shuikou Hydroelectric Power Plant (China) or Dalian Water Supply (China) are referenced and reproduced again and again. In these cases judgements are mainly based on increased income levels, whereas the timing, methodology and sample sizes of the assessments differ (Partridge, 1993; ADB, 2000; Zhu et al., 2000; Tamandong, 2008).1 Yet, if one is interested in challenging these evaluations, it is not impossible. Those who think resettlement can only be concluded in the second generation (Scudder, 1991; Horowitz et al., 1993, p. 234; Mathur, 2006, p. 78) can ask whether the increased income levels had continued in the long term for example. Or their common focus on âresettlersâ can also be questioned: were there no other affected groups, such as host communities or those who partially lost their lands and were cash-compensated, or were they not included in the assessments?
On the other hand, there are projects that are defined as âsuccessâ by some and âfailureâ by others. The Sardar Sarovar Dam Project was praised by the Indian government for its successful policies (Joseph, 1995) whereas it was criticized by many activists, civil organizations and researchers for its implementations (Alvares and Billorey, 1988; Morse and Berger, 1992; Tata Institute of Social Sciences, 1997; Roy, 1999). In fact an official impact assessment had not been conducted and even the number of affected people was not known for the project, let alone mitigating the entire impacts (Morse and Berger, 1992).
While the Sardar Sarovar case shows how success claims can be biased with political interests, Karimi et al. (2005) argued that âfailureâ claims may also be political, when, for instance, doing so would bring advantage for lawsuits against the government as in the case of Kotapanjang Dam in Indonesia. Pak Mun Dam was another case that remained controversial for which the World Bank report (1998) suggested that the compensation schemes were revised and improved many times upon request from the displaced people, and the livelihoods had improved after the project, whereas the civil organizations and researchers were not totally satisfied (Amornsakchai et al., 2000).
Apart from few cases, the studies in literature generally conclude that DIDR has resulted in impoverishment (Mburugu, 1994; World Bank, 1994; Cernea, 1996; Syagga and Olima, 1996; Cernea, 1997; ADB, 2000, 2006; Nayak, 2000; Scudder, 2005). In cases of displacement, âcashâ remains as the most commonly used method of compensation (Cernea, 2008a, p. 49). However, experience suggests that cash compensations frequently failed as the assets were undervalued, payments were syphoned-off by corrupt practices, poor people could not manage money well, the prices of surrounding lands tended to inflate and money was spent on other causes than restoring livelihoods (Mburugu, 1994; Syagga and Olima, 1996; Mathur, 2006, p. 55; Cernea, 2008a, pp. 53â54).
Land compensation performed arguably better (World Bank, 1994, p. x), but neither did it come without problems. The difficulties in finding enough and adequate lands, insufficient planning, under-estimation of number of displacees, houses and lands not being ready at the time of displacement, lack of consultation with displaced people, wrong site selections, lack of compensation for loss of common resources and potential conflicts with host communities were documented from various studies (Lassailly-Jacob, 1996; World Bank, 1994, 1998; Eriksen, 1999; Mejia, 1999; Koenig, 2006; Mathur, 2006).
As we were about to believe nothing works in DIDR and the displacees were almost always bound to impoverishment, a systematic bibliographic research by Wescoat (1999) suggested that actually few comprehensive post-project evaluations ha...
