Introduction
Marx’s theory of ideology charts a hitherto unexplored epistemological terrain. In the course of his study of such thinkers as Hegel, the young Hegelians and the classical economists, and the past and present societies, Marx discovered a distinct form of reasoning about man and society. It was ahistorical and universalistic in form, systematically biased in its orientation, justificatory in its implications, and involved distinct logical fallacies. Marx was struck by the fact that this pervasive and mistaken form of reasoning had never before been noticed and exposed. Following the contemporary usage he called it ideology, and characteristically invested the term with a new range of meanings. He analysed its logical structure, identified its characteristic fallacies and proposed an alternative form of reasoning about man and society. For him ideology was not an abusive slogan to be used to discredit the opponents, nor a general term describing any organised body of beliefs, but a theoretical concept, an epistemological category designed to conceptualise a specific form of thought.
Like all intellectual explorers Marx had great difficulty articulating his discovery in unambiguous terms. He formulated it in different idioms and gave conflicting accounts of it in different writings. He made exaggerated claims for it, and overlooked many a difficult problem raised by it. Above all he confused the phenomenon he had discovered with the others that looked like it, but were, in fact, very different. 1 As we shall see, throughout his life Marx used the term ideology to mean both idealism and apologia. He evidently thought that the two were logically connected, that idealism led to apologia and the latter required idealism as its necessary epistemological basis, but never clarified the nature of the connection. Similarly he thought that ideology and what has since come to be called the social determination of knowledge were closely connected, but remained unclear about the connection.
Since Marx did not offer an unambiguous statement of his theory of ideology, it has been interpreted in many different ways, some extremely dubious and implausible. For example, some commentators have maintained that for him, ideology refers to such things as illusory ideas, false ideas determined by class interests, class-conditioned thought, unfounded ideas manufactured at the prompting of an unconscious wish or interest, and a body of justificatory beliefs. Apart from the fact that there is little textual evidence to support these crude views, which generally rely on some careless remarks in the German Ideology, they reduce a highly complex theory to a slogan, and destroy its historical integrity. Since most criticisms of Marx’s theory of ideology are based on such interpretations, they miss the target and are grossly unfair to him. Again, several commentators have argued that Marx was a relativist, rejected the concept of objective truth in favour of class truth, and inconsistently claimed to have offered an objective knowledge about the human history in general and capitalism in particular. Although the criticism is one of the commonest, there is little textual evidence to support it. What is more, Marx cannot be a relativist. Relativism is a form of absolutism. It singles out a specific factor and turns it into an absolute. Since Marx’s theory of ideology was primarily designed to undermine all forms of absolutism, it can have nothing to do with relativism either.
My purpose in the book is to articulate the logical structure and epistemological basis of Marx’s theory of ideology. Since Marx’s theory of ideology is somewhat ambiguous and confused, an exposition of it is necessarily an interpretation, and any interpretation is necessarily a form of collaboration. In order to highlight its logical structure, I have felt it necessary to develop arguments he left inchoate, draw distinctions he only hinted at, and articulate his targets and presuppositions more fully than he did. This may sound arrogant, but it is not. Marx developed many fascinating ideas which he did not have the energy, will or time sufficiently to distinguish and defend. If his Capital were to be excluded, he has left behind little more than clusters of brilliant insights. Like Rousseau and Nietzsche, he never systematically worked them out, and tended to express them in striking epigrams and arresting casual remarks requiring sustained reflection in order to squeeze out their full philosophical significance. This may partly explain why the brief first part of the German Ideology and a couple of pages of Theses on Feuerbach have inspired a greater body of literature than the three bulky tomes of Capital put together. Like all creative writers Marx requires sympathy and help; sympathy in order to enter into his world of thought in its own terms, and help to enable him fully to articulate, refine and bring out the full theoretical power of his insights. Without either, a commentator is in danger of getting distracted by his ambiguities, confusions, inadequate arguments and exaggerated claims, and unfairly dismissing his whole system of thought as a ‘philosophical farrago’. 2 A systematic critique and transcendence of Marx’s thought is long overdue, but it cannot be undertaken without a full appreciation of both his greatness and limitations.
The structure of the book is dictated by the structure of its subject matter. The first chapter outlines and explains the two basic senses in which Marx uses the term ideology. Of the two the second, namely an apologetic body of thought, is of central interest to us, and the continuing concern of the rest of the book. Accordingly the second chapter examines the concept of apologia, elucidates its basic characteristics and assumptions, and specifies what Marx does and does not mean by ideology. The next three chapters outline Marx’s analyses of the different ways in which the theorists of society became the apologists of the established social order; in the sixth, I collect together some of the important conclusions of Marx’s analyses. In the next chapter I explore how, in Marx’s view, he could avoid becoming an apologist, and assess the widespread view that he was able to do so by analysing the capitalist society from the proletarian point of view. In the eighth chapter I discuss some of the important ways in which he modified the traditional theories of truth, and outline the basic features of his own. In the final chapter I briefly and somewhat tentatively sketch some of the fundamental insights and limitations of Marx’s theory of ideology.
To avoid misunderstanding I might make three points. First, I am primarily interested in exploring the ways in which, in Marx’s view, the social theorists become ideologists, and only incidentally in his account of the way an ideology gains dominance in society. That the ordinary men should entertain ideological beliefs is explained with relative ease. The difficult and puzzling question is why, in Marx’s view, the ideas of such highly sophisticated thinkers as Hegel and the classical economists retained an ideological dimension. Second, I am not concerned to attack or defend, but simply to understand Marx’s theory of ideology. The theory has created considerable upheaval, especially in the disciplines relating to man and society. It is therefore worth exploring what it meant to its creator, and how he himself proposed to deal with its disturbing implications. Accordingly I have concentrated on laying bare its logical structure and basic assumptions as sympathetically as possible, and avoided commenting on them. Third, since I am only interested in Marx, I have generally avoided Engels’s writings except when necessary to illuminate the obscure points in his friend’s thought. This is not because I share the view that he misunderstood or vulgarised Marx, but solely because I am interested in what Marx himself thought and wrote.
In the composition of the book, I have incurred many debts. The first draft of it, with a slightly different focus, was prepared some years ago. I am most grateful to Professor David McLellan and Dr R.N. Berki for commenting on it and making most valuable suggestions. I have greatly benefited from my years of discussions with them. I am grateful also to Sir Isaiah Berlin, Professor Joseph O’Malley, Dr John Gray and the late and much missed John Rees for discussing with me several parts of it and offering most helpful comments. Finally, I am grateful to Mr David Croom for bearing with the slow progress of the book with considerable understanding and patience.
Bhikhu Parekh