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BAKHTIN AND WOMEN
A Nontopic with Immense Implications
Caryl Emerson
I should begin by explaining the irreverent and sassy title. Why a nontopic? Because Bakhtin himself, in his voluminous writings stretching over half a century, had almost nothing to say about the currently fashionable liberationist triad: race, class, gender. This fact has greatly reassured Bakhtinâs demarxified disciples in the former Soviet Union, who are bitterly aware that âthinking in group categoriesâ has brought their country to the brink of moral and economic disaster. To that issue I shall return, for in general one of the most peculiar aspects of recent years has been the spectacle of literary scholars in the formerly communist East emulating what is conservative in the West, while Western academic critics lap up what has been thoroughly discredited in the East. It is sufficient to note that âgender consciousnessâ is not part of Bakhtinâs legacy.
How might this absence be explained? The matter has puzzled many feminists. One critic admits: âIt is a paradox indeed that the great thinker of alterity, whose whole philosophical project argues for respect for the Other, seems to have removed from sight (and mind) the Other par excellence: woman and the feminineâ (Hajdukowski-Ahmed 153). Is it possible that Mikhail Bakhtin, apostle of difference, passed over in silence what many people today consider to be the most fundamental difference of all between one person and another? There are, it seems, several ways one might account for this perceived lack in Bakhtin, and let me run through them quickly.
First, there is always the Freudian possibility of repressionâthe argument that not seeing something is in fact the clearest evidence that it really exists, deeply matters, and for that reason has been stowed away out of sight, where it does its dangerous work out of the reach of consciousness. But somehow Bakhtin does not lend himself to psychoanalytic manipulation. He is too genial, too sloppy and generous in his thought; he carries too much around on his sleeve, and he gives no indication, in his life or in his works, of any special investment in guilt.
Second, there is the argument of tact and good taste. With the exception of a few passages dealing with the body in the early writings1 and many matter-of-fact discussions of body processes in the Rabelais book (in both places the tone is stultifyingly academic), Bakhtin fully partakes of the Russian critical tradition of bashfulness and reticence in print toward intimate matters, such as sexuality and private life. As anyone who has translated Bakhtin knows, much inspiration is to be had in those pagesâbut âthe pleasure of the textâ is not. This well-developed sense of propriety and privacy in written discourse is borne out by the scant evidence we have of Bakhtinâs behavior with others: he was formal, correct, somewhat aloof even with devoted students of long standing, such as the Mirkina sister; he avoided the telephone and wrote almost no letters, and those letters that do survive are largely businesslike appeals for work or reports on his health. And he never turnedâone cannot imagine him turningâhis own close and indispensable half-century of marriage into a memoir.2
Then there is the argument of indifference. The gender issue might not have been visible to Bakhtin because he took it so totally for granted: equal rights for women had been, after all, a major rallying cry of the Russian intelligentsia ever since the 1850s, and subsequently became an important platform in the Bolshevik program. To be sure, Russian women enjoy the double burden of women the world overâthat is, childbearing frequently combined with work outside the home, domestic indispensability combined with political invisibility, psychological and biological needs often not satisfied in institutions created with men in power. Nevertheless, the case could be made that whatever her inferior status, Russian woman culturally has a superiority complex: a self-image rooted in shapeless, immortal Mother Earth, a sense of herself as a person who presumes strength and autonomy even under the most adverse conditions, who does not expect help, who is willing to endure; in short, an image of Russian woman as savior, survivor, and arbiter of the mess left by generations of âsuperfluous men.â Something like this argument was made by Tat'iana Tolstaia in her defense of the recent controversial bestseller on Russian women by Francine du Plessix Gray (Tolstaya 3â7).
There is a fourth possible reason for the absence of gender consciousness in Bakhtinâs work. In Bakhtinâs world, things are either dan, âgivenâ to us ready-made, or zadan, âpositedâ by us as a project requiring time and work. Writing a novel, learning a language, and getting through the day are examples of projects. Codes, dialectics, Aristotelian poetics, and oneâs class origins are givens. Gender identity, I am afraid, is also a given. And for Bakhtin, it was the differences that you worked at, not the differences you were born with or born into, that mattered most. It follows that you can best work at difference, at becoming what only you can become, not by stressing solidarity with others with the same givens as you but by doing quite the opposite, by continually differentiating your own ever-changing and radically individual potential. These convictions, so central to Bakhtinâs passionately centrifugal thought, would seem to argue against any a priori assumptions of superiority by a group on the grounds of its subjection (or, for that matter, on any other grounds) and against âliberation movementsâ on behalf of women as women.3
There are two more possible approaches to the question. The first would dismiss the above options of repression, tact, indifference, and the given/posited distinction, claiming that there is gender bias in Bakhtinâs writings, and it is directed against women. Often this argument is mounted on little but the thin ground of translation convention.4 The translators of the volume titled The Dialogic Imagination, for instance, chose to use the male referent throughout, although Russian (like French and German) has a more or less unmarked third-person pronoun that implies no gendered image at allâas indeed English did not before the new sensitivities conquered the field. But more substantial complaints of sexist content have been raised as well. Most have to do with Bakhtinâs treatment of carnival laughter, his broad tolerance of its promiscuous imagery, and his seeming indifference to sexually offensive behavior in print. The most famous objection along these lines is by Wayne Booth, who back in 1982 took Rabelais to task for sexism and Bakhtin to task for his âantifeministâ position toward it.5 But for all the troubled sincerity of Boothâs confession, and for all the manifest unattractiveness of Rabelaisâs bad taste and old-boy tone, a close look at Bakhtinâs book suggests that the charge is unfair. According to Bakhtin, the popular tradition that inspired Rabelais was not at all hostile toward women. Quite the contrary: woman was seen as the source of all flow and change, the bodily grave of the unbendingly severe medieval Gallic man. Only when that image was impoverished and trivialized in later eras did it become sensual and base; it was, as Bakhtin argued (rightly or wrongly), âthe new, narrow conceptionâ of sexuality, described with the âmoralizing and scholastic humanist philosophyâ of the sixteenth century, that reduced women to a negative image (Rabelais 240â41).
Best, then, that we agree with the feminist critic Nancy Glazener, who opens her essay on Bakhtin and Gertrude Stein with the admission that âBakhtinâs work is not markedly feminist: he wrote mainly about canonical male authors, flirted with auteur theories of literary creation, and was conspicuously silent about feminism and the social effects of gender differenceâ (109). Except for the downputting aside about Bakhtinâs âflirting with auteur theories of literary creationââtheories of the creative process being perhaps the single greatest contribution of Bakhtinâs lifeworkâGlazener is absolutely correct. Although Bakhtin spoke quite eloquently against other -isms (Marxism, Freudianism, Formalism, structuralism), he was indeed conspicuously silent about feminism.
But then Glazener goes on to say that Bakhtinâs work âappears to be hospitable to the inclusion of gender as an additional significant social and discursive categoryâ (109). Here is our sixth and final approach to the problem, and one that seems to open the door. Bakhtin overtly opposed most of the âgroup thinkingâ that characterized his desperately overly politicized age, but he is not, at least, on record as an opponent of gendered thinking (that isnât much of an endorsement, but itâs a start). And many people would argue that in any case strong and original thinkers do not and should not control the use that others make of their thoughts. If Bakhtinâs categories now appeal to new generations in different ways, this can only be cause for rejoicing.
To a certain point I agree with that reasoning. A bold and imaginative extension of someone elseâs thought is fully appropriate if it is acknowledged as such. But transforming a theoreticianâs ideas in the process of applying them does not release critics from the obligation to read texts carefully, nor does it empower them to draw any inferences whatsoever from any imaginable source. Nor should the new reading go violently against the grain of the original in whose spirit it claims to be cast. And it is my feeling that some feminist readings inspired by Bakhtin do overstep these boundaries, even as others have opened up responsible dialogue.
In the remainder of this essay, then, I will address some of the strengths, weaknesses, and pitfallsâas I see themâof applying Bakhtin to gender criticism, using recent work known to me. (I hasten to add that I am not widely or well versed in feminist theory or practice; my interest is that of an amateur, and my expertise comes entirely on the Bakhtin end of things.) I shall then offer a few comments on why it is so difficult and dangerous to politicize and radicalize Bakhtinâas is widely done in the West, and is rapidly being undone in Bakhtinâs homeland.
The sample essays upon which I draw come from three collections published between 1989 and 1990: one is an anthology edited by American and British leftists, Bakhtin and Cultural Theory; the other two are special Bakhtin issues of the Amsterdam journal Critical Studies. As one of the contributors points out in a helpful survey of the literature, feminist readings take almost all of their Bakhtin from a few works of the middle period: the long essay âDiscourse in the Novel,â the much shorter âEpic and the Novel,â and the reworked dissertation, Rabelais and His World (Thomson 143â44). The most âdecenteredâ texts in the Bakhtin canon, these works do indeed lend themselves to theories of subversion, leakage, antitradition, collectivity, body talk, cycles of reproductivity, and the fertile life at the margins. Feminist readings also make occasional mention of the book on Dostoevskii, and of the Marxist and anti-Freudian works written by Bakhtinâs associates. The early and late Bakhtin is almost never touched. This pattern of usage yields a somewhat skewed and pinched picture of Bakhtinâbut the image is nevertheless there, and worth discussing.
Feminists who use Bakhtinâs ideas tend to begin by celebrating his work. For much appeals intuitively: Bakhtinâs obsession with open and receptive orifices, with the novel as an inherently subversive force, and his passion for undermining stable structures through the antics of such marginal figures as rogues, clowns, fools. The best among the feminists, however, celebrate these ideas with an increasingly uneasy conscience. For when they mobilize this subversive energy directly on behalf of a nominally oppressed group or âvoiceââsay, womanâs voiceâtheir readings end up with many more problems than celebrations. The stumbling blocks are two: first, the peculiarly apolitical, playful and impersonal utopianism of Bakhtinâs carnival phase, and second, his inexhaustible good humor and benevolence. Bakhtin simply refuses to take offense. (It is for this reason, I note in passing, that Bakhtin, despite all his rhetoric about the lower bodily stratum, folk culture, and popular laughter, remains an aristocratically distanced stoic: he cannot be insulted.) The carnival he advocates really does go both ways, mocking all presumptions to privilege, holding no grudge. And we probably all agree that without some mechanism for gathering and retaining power, without some minimal investment in the individualâs willingness to register an insult, it is difficult to get an effective politics out of all of Bakhtinâs inversions, guffaws, decrownings, decenterings, and heteroglossia.
A good example of the problems this can cause is Dale Bauerâs book Feminist Dialogics: A Theory of Failed Community (1988). âMy first reaction to Bakhtin was to become seduced by his theory of dialogism,â Bauer writes (5). But she soon realized that âBakhtinâs blind spot is the battle.â To be used at all for liberationist goals, he had to be radically revised. The revision is a hairâs-breadth away from rejection. In her Preface, Bauer correctly notes that âBakhtinâs model [of an active dialogic community] relies on a positive space, a community he celebrates because of its activity, its engagement of others. By adding a feminist turn to it, the dialogic community becomes a much more ambivalent territory⌠often the site of repression, subversion, marginalization, and suicideâ (xiv).
Here the âfeminist turnâ must come face to face with the maddeningly imprecise politics of Bakhtinâs carnival worldâa world governed not by politics at all, but rather by a Utopian antipolitics, a world where ârepression, subversion, marginalization, and suicideâ are simply laughed away. This disappearing act can happen, of course, because carnival doesnât contain any real bodies that hurt. Seeking some accommodation for the hurting female body, Bauer tries to âintersect [Bakhtinâs] celebration of carnivalized language with the language of sexual difference.â But she is honest enough to admit that in doing so, one sacrifices most of the spirit of carnival. She searches for ways to turn Bakhtinâs heteroglossia and double-voicedness into responsible political dissent, but is left with such ultimately unsatisfactory, nonproductive categories as womenâs âinarticulationâ and âsilence.â Bakhtin himself, we might note, rarely worried about peopleâs not being able to talkâalthough he occasionally did worry that people would not be able to hear.
A more recent account of Bakhtinâs contributions to feminism, by Myriam Diaz-Diocaretz, takes a more philosophical approach to the subject. But it too founders, albeit on the shoals of a different problem. The problem here comes not with the absen...